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Journal of Balkan and Black Sea Studies is an interdisciplinary refereed journal focusing on the humanities and social sciences of the Balkan countries and the former Soviet republics. The journal welcomes contributions in the fields of history, economics, politics, international relations, culture, art, geography, literature, theology, ethnography and environmental sciences. The idea behind this initiative is to extend a cross-cultural and cross-disciplinary approach over issues of regional importance. Under this light, the journal aspires to act as an academic forum for scholars in historical as well as contemporary context on a wide range of cross-regional issues and to provide the epistemological framework for a comparative investigation, which would enhance our understanding of the Balkan, and Black Sea societies, politics and communities. Furthermore, manuscripts connecting the region with wider scopes, such as technological applications, will be also considered.

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İstanbul University

Editorial

Journal of Balkan and Black Sea Studies is an Istanbul-based journal aiming at strengthening academic exchange among social scientists from Turkey, the Balkans, the Caucasus and Eastern European countries. We published the first number of the journal in December 2018 (with six research articles and two book reviews), the second number in June 2019 (with six research articles, one review article and two book reviews), and the third number in December 2019 with six articles and two book reviews. This issue is the 4th issue of the journal and includes six research articles (five in English and one in Turkish) and one book review.

The first article “Soviet-Turkish Relations in 1921-1923: A Few Nuances from the Bulgarian Archives” by *Tsvetelina Tsvetkova* (Sofia) deals with the diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and the Ankara government during the Turkish war of liberation. She utilizes Bulgarian archival sources which give valuable information about this critical period and help us also to understand the Bulgarian attitude towards both countries.

The second article “The Immigrants of 1989 from Bulgaria and Their Adaptation to City as Identity Construction: Sakarya Case” (in Turkish) by *Begüm Hergüven* (Istanbul) deals with the process of integration of Turks from Bulgaria who came to Turkey through deportation or forced migration in 1989. She analyses her interviews with emigres in the city of Sakarya and finds out important results regarding the difficulties of integration of Turkish migrants into the city and community consisting of emigres from different parts of Eastern Anatolia.

The third article “Historiographic controversy about the Crusades against Bosnian “heretics” by *Dženan Dautović* (Travnik/Bihać) deals with the history of the Bosnian church and tendencies and interpretations in the existing historiography.

The fourth article “Peace Treaty Tensions: The Relationship between Content and Implementation of Negotiated Agreements in Former Yugoslavia” by *Michael Schulz* and *Jens Stillhoff Sörensen* (Gothenburg)

analyses the peace treaties or agreements in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia. The authors discuss the conditions and obstacles in the implementation of these agreements and treaties and their limited role to solve the ethnic tensions in the region.

The fifth article “Ethnicity Based Democratic Constitutional Structures: the Cases of Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia and Kosovo” by *Avdi Smajljaj* (Kuala Lumpur) discusses the constitutions of three former Yugoslav republics with multi-ethnic populations and ethnic tensions. The author shows that despite the ethnic principles in the constitution, the expected positive effect on the inter-ethnic relations has not been achieved and that on the contrary the gap among the ethnic groups have become bigger.

The sixth and last article of this issue “Turkish Local Communities and City Diplomacy with Bosnia and Herzegovina” by *Jahja Muhasilović* (Sarajevo) deals with Turkish NGOs and local community associations which were established mainly by Muslim emigrees from the Balkans. He analyses their role and impact on Turkish foreign policy and relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The issue also includes one book review of the Turkish translation of “Giorgi Kazbegi, Diary of a Russian General, ‘Three Months in Turkish Georgia’ (İstanbul: Doruk Yayıncılık, 2019)” by *Taner Gökdemir* (İstanbul).

I would like to thank all the authors for their valuable contributions and all referees for their precious efforts during the evaluation process of the articles.

Mehmet Hacısalihoğlu, Prof. Dr.

Editor in Chief

Soviet-Turkish Relations in 1921-1923: A Few Nuances from the Bulgarian Archives*

Dr. Tsvetelina Tsvetkova*

Abstract:

The article aims at presenting information from unpublished and unexplored until now Bulgarian archival documents about the Soviet-Turkish relations. It follows their development in the period 1921-1923, based on the reports of the Bulgarian diplomats residing in Istanbul - Todor K. Pavlov, Todor Markov and Ivan Altanov. Among the topics concerned were the status of the Soviet-Turkish relations; the Soviet military and financial support for the Ankara Government; the Soviet-Turkish rivalry for the influence over Muslim peoples in the Middle East and Asia; international conferences; internal politics and developments within the Grand National Assembly; important Turkish personages that influenced directly or indirectly the Soviet-Turkish relations, etc. The presented documents reveal not only some important nuances of already known facts and events, but open new unexplored topics in the historiography, related to the Soviet-Turkish relations during the period under consideration.

Key words: *Bulgarian archives, Bulgarian diplomats' reports, Soviet-Turkish relations, Soviet support, Ankara government, Turkish politicians and leaders*

* This article is based on a research, implemented under Turkey Scholarship Program for foreign researchers.

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The eventful post-war period of the First World War intensified the relations between the Soviet Government and the newly-established Turkish government in Ankara*, transforming a century-long confrontation into a politically profitable cooperation, paving the way for overcoming the international isolation and revision of the Entente's plans for the new European order. The communists in Moscow and the nationalists in Ankara, being threatened by the same enemy, managed to find common grounds for establishing relations and providing mutual support. Still, "under the surface" the rivalry continued, especially regarding the Caucasus and Central Asia. These processes as well as many others, related in general with the developments in the period of the Turkish War for Independence, were followed closely by the Bulgarian diplomats in Istanbul as one of the main focuses of the Bulgarian foreign policy was the protection of Bulgarian interests in Thrace. Another issue was the relations with Soviet Russia and the representatives of the White army in Istanbul.

At the end of 1918 the diplomatic relations between the two former allies of the Central Powers – Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire, were officially suspended due to the requirements of the Armistice of Salonica, signed by Bulgaria¹ and the Allied Powers and the Mudros Armistice, signed by the latter and the Ottoman Empire². As a result, since December 1918, the protection of the Bulgarian interests in the Ottoman Empire was transferred to the competences of the Swedish legation in Istanbul, and those of the Ottoman government – to the Spanish legation in Sofia³. Still, in August 1921, the government of Aleksandar Stamboliyski managed to send an unofficial representative to the Swedish legation in Istanbul – Todor K. Pavlov, who was providing consular services. On 1 March 1923, he was replaced by Gen. of the Reserve Todor Markov⁴. Their reports, as

* In the Bulgarian documents, presented in this article, the term "Turkey" referred either to the Ottoman Empire or the Government of the Grand National Assembly in Ankara. Still, there is clear differentiation in the reports as Bulgarian diplomats referred either to Angora (Ankara) government or the Sultan's one in Istanbul. It should be also considered that "Russian" was often used as synonymous to "Bolshevik" or "Soviet". For the purposes to keep the correct citation of the documents the term "Russian" was used in this respective way. Differentiation was made when there was reference to the "White Russians" and the former Russian Empire.

¹ "Bulgaria Armistice Convention, September 29, 1918.", *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 13, No. 4 (1919): 402–404, www.jstor.org/stable/2212836 (accessed October 29, 2019)

² "Mudros Agreement: Armistice with Turkey (October 30, 1918)", *German History in Documents and Images*, Vol. 6. Weimar Germany, 1918/19–1933, http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/pdf/eng/armistice_turk_eng.pdf (accessed October 29, 2019)

³ Mariya Mateeva, Hristo Tepavicharov, *Diplomaticeskite otnosheniya na Balgariya (1878–1988)* (Sofia: BAN, 1989), 283.

⁴ Lyudmil Spasov, Balgaroro-turski diplomaticheski otnosheniya 1925–1934 g., *Voenoistoricheski sbornik*, Issue 2 (2014), https://logos.uni-plovdiv.net/documents/35514/508268/Bulgaro-turski_otnoshenia.pdf/62024a35-6364-48d9-bb99-0b26cb4fd0f6 (accessed October 15, 2019)

well as those of the secretary of the Bulgarian legation Ivan Altanov⁵, contribute with additional nuances to the Soviet-Turkish relations in the period 1921-1923. The information Bulgarian diplomats managed to provide the Bulgarian government with was based on their active engagement on the spot by establishing contacts with journalists, politicians, public figures, people close to both governments in Istanbul and Ankara, foreign representatives of the Allied powers, etc.



1. Gen. Todor Markov - head of the Bulgarian Legation in Istanbul from 1923 to 1925.

The documents to be presented are nowadays stored in the Bulgarian Central State Archive. They, tracking the developments mainly in political aspect, outlined two periods in the Soviet-Turkish relations:

- **First period (1921-end of 1922)**, when the Soviet-Turkish relations were stable and the mutual cooperation prevailed conflict situations. The cohesion was strengthened due to the international isolation of both governments and the military conflicts they were engaged in. The focus was on

establishing strong partnership and finding ways to oppose the common enemy - the Entente. During this period there were also moments of conflict but they didn't bring a change in the policy towards the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR).

- **Second period (end of 1922-1923)**, when the Soviet and Ankara governments finalised the military conflicts and started to receive international recognition. There was comprehension that it was time to negotiate with the Entente for finalisation of the peace process and stabilization of the internal socio-political and economic life. The major threat for close cooperation was exhausted and more orientation to self-interests could be observed. This led to conflicts and "cooling-off" of the relations.

The topics concerned in these two periods included not only the general status of the relations but also the Soviet military and financial support for the Ankara Government; the Soviet-Turkish rivalry for influence over the Muslim peoples in the Middle East and Asia; conferences, such as those in Moscow (1921) and Lausanne (1922-1923);

⁵ Lalyu Metev, *Vidni balgarski pravniitsi 1879 - 1944* (Sofia: Atlas-L, 2013), 7, <https://en.calameo.com/read/0004463717c0432b3e042> (accessed October 15, 2019)

internal politics, developments in the Grand National Assembly (GNA) in Ankara; Mustafa Kemal's prestige and role; important Turkish personages that influenced directly or indirectly the Soviet-Turkish relations.

1. First period (1921-end of 1922)

On 1 April 1921, Todor Pavlov prepared a report on the political situation in Turkey in which a separate chapter was devoted to the relations with Soviet Russia⁶. Writing that the Turkish nationalists didn't cease to sustain close friendship with Moscow and to receive different support from it, Pavlov confirmed that there was not the slightest tendency among the Kemalists to introduce communism in Anatolia. He cited the official newspaper "Hâkimiyet-i Milliye", according to which the communist movement could have caused serious damage had it been spread in Anatolia, namely disintegrating the country and making it vulnerable to the enemies. In such situation, the latter would even reach Caucasus. Thus, the Turkish nationalist army was protecting the most important front of the Russian revolution⁷.

The report continues with an overview of the establishment of a communist party in November 1920 and a collectivist party* later. As both were short-lived, it was supposed that the only aim was to prevent Moscow from intervening in the internal affairs and creating a real communist party.

The Russian-Turkish relations were disturbed by the rivalry for influence over the Muslim peoples according to the Bulgarian diplomat. Nevertheless, the Ankara government did everything possible to preserve the close relations with Soviet Russia, which, on its part, was making efforts to prevent a rift with the Turkish nationalists. According to Todor K. Pavlov: "The latter understand very well that without Russia's friendship and support, they can neither preserve their acquisitions in Caucasus, nor fight successfully against the Greek army, for the combat with which they need all their forces"⁸.

⁶ TsDA, f. 321K, op. 1, a.e. 2772, 41-44.

⁷ TsDA, f. 321K, op. 1, a.e. 2772, 41.

* The information has to be referred to the Turkish Communist Party (Türk Komünist Fırkası) founded in October 1920 by decision of Mustafa Kemal as "official" and disbanded soon after; and the People's Communist Party of Turkey (Türkiye Halk İştirakiyyun Fırkası), founded in November 1920 and in relations with the Bolsheviks. On 7 December 1920, the Ministry of Interior granted to the latter an official permission to operate, but later in October 1922 it was suppressed. See: Feridun Kandemir, *Atatürk'ün Kurduğu Türkiye Komünist Partisi ve Sonrası*. (İstanbul: Yakın Tarihimiz Yayınları, 1966); Erden Akbulut, Mete Tunçay, *Türkiye Halk İştirakiyyun Fırkası (1920-1923)* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayımevi, 2016); George S. Harris, *The Origins of Communism in Turkey* (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Publications, 1967).

⁸ TsDA, f. 321K, op. 1, a.e. 2772, 43.

Information about a conference in Moscow starting on 1 March 1921 was given as it was said to have been aimed at arranging all disputable issues between Russia and Turkey, and which had as a consequence the Treaty of Moscow (16 March 1921)⁹. But as a strong motive for the conference, T. K. Pavlov pointed out Moscow's concern about London's negotiations with Ankara, regardless of the fact that the Soviets at that time were also negotiating with the British government. The Bolshevik propaganda was trying desperately to convince the Turks that the Entente remained their "intransigent enemy" as it was in Russia's interest the war in Anatolia to continue. Without citing a name, Pavlov gave a short excerpt from an interview with a Kemalist leader. Answering the question on how an eventual peace treaty (with the Entente - a.n.) would be met in Moscow, he stated that if it left Turkey economically and politically dependent, most probably this would not trouble the Soviets. On the other hand, if it confirmed the national demands, Turkey would have the freedom to deal with the Caucasian issues in Azerbaijan, Dagestan, Batumi. Officially, the Ankara government had no interest in these issues in order not to be blamed in pan-Turanism*, but the Muslim public opinion called for Turkey to help the Muslims who were disturbed by the Reds and the Ankara government could not resist this appeal. This was what Moscow was afraid of¹⁰.

Another important point was the pan-Islamist movement, which, according to Todor K. Pavlov, represented another support for the Kemalists. He said that even though Mustafa Kemal was not sharing the pan-Islamism dreams of Enver Pasha and Cemal Pasha, he continued to use it and to keep close relations with other Muslim countries. Pavlov mentions the relations with Azerbaijan and revolutionaries in India but with regard to the Soviet-Turkish relations. It is interesting that in Moscow, in March 1921, an agreement was signed between the Afghanistan representative and the Angora government¹¹. Additionally, it was even foreseen a pan-Islamic council (congress) to be opened in Ankara, being in future a common Islamic parliament and dealing with the issues of interest of all these countries. T. K. Pavlov mentioned Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, from which there was confirmation; Khiva, Bukhara, to which representatives of the Angora government were sent. At the same time, Turkish nationalists were trying to support the

⁹ Todor K. Pavlov managed to acquire the full text of the Treaty in French "privately and confidentially from a source close to the Kemalist government", TsDA, f. 321K, op. 1, a.e. 2797, 145-151.

* As the respective document retold an interview, the term was used without any additional clarification about what it implied.

¹⁰ TsDA, f. 321K, op. 1, a.e. 2772, 44.

¹¹ TsDA, f. 321K, op. 1, a.e. 2772, 45.

movements in Egypt, Tunisia, Syria and other Muslim countries¹². It was mentioned also in a later report from the same year that many Turkish officers had infiltrated in Azerbaijan, Turkestan, Dagestan and other countries in order to organise the Muslim population¹³. In this respect, Pavlov reported about the speech of the Afghan representative Sultan Ahmed Han during the opening of the legation in Ankara on 10 June 1921, saying that the “Turkish-Afghan-Russian union will break the hands that tried to conquer the East”, emphasizing the Western imperialists who violated the rights of the Muslims. The Afghan representative additionally said that the united Muslims would again acquire their rights¹⁴. Mustafa Kemal was said to confirm that they want independence for the Muslims and for the oppressed at the East as the union between Turkey, Soviet Russia and Afghanistan was “a happy event”¹⁵.

It could be seen as a confirmation of Moscow’s wish to use Turkish nationalists to spread its influence in the Muslim countries. In addition, uniting the Muslims in Asia and Africa would contribute to the fight with the Allied powers and especially Great Britain. This definitely would be harmful for a county, which ruled over a huge Muslim population.

When speaking about Muslim communities, we should not underestimate the one in the Caucasian region, the cooperation with whom, through the prism of Soviet-Turkish relations, was an important factor. A curious fact that appeared from the Bulgarian archives concerns the grandson of Imam Şamil – the Dagestani leader who led a war against the Russian empire for almost 30 years in the 19th century. Prince Şamil or Mehmet Kamil¹⁶, was said to be ready to send his 10 000 army to help Mustafa Kemal in the war against the Greeks. As T. K. Pavlov wrote, this was



2. Mehmed Said Şamil (1901-1981) - grandson of Imam Şamil.

possible after negotiations with the Bolsheviks. He also emphasized that Prince Şamil was very popular in Dagestan; he had graduated from the Harbiye Military School in Istanbul and was an officer from the Turkish

¹² TsDA, f. 321K, op. 1, a.e. 2772, 24.

¹³ TsDA, f. 176, op. 4, a.e. 1951, 17.

¹⁴ TsDA, f. 321K, op. 1, a.e. 2797, 108-109.

¹⁵ TsDA, f. 321K, op. 1, a.e. 2797, 109.

¹⁶ TsDA, f. 321K, op. 1, 2772, l. 16r-v.

As the name of Imam Şamil’s youngest son was Mehmet Kamil, most probably here it was meant his grandson – Mehmed Said Şamil, who was a famous figure of the Mountain Republic.

army. This confidential information was sent to the Bulgarian acting Minister of Foreign Affairs Rayko Daskalov dated 26 May 1921.

Referring to the close relations Dagestani people had established with the Ottoman Empire in the past and during the short existence of the Mountainous Republic of the Northern Caucasus, their engagement could be considered a normal continuation of the mutual cooperation. In addition, at that time Dagestan was already a Soviet republic, which in the framework of the Soviet support for the Turkish government in Ankara, could contribute to the efforts of the Bolsheviks. The fact that Said Şamil was engaged in this process is not as simple as could be suggested. He was one of the founders of the short-lived Mountainous Republic and struggled against the Bolsheviks, after they established their power in Dagestan in the beginning of 1920, and after the defeat of which he escaped in the Ottoman Empire¹⁷. This fact should be considered when speaking about the help he wanted to provide to the Ankara government, maybe expecting to receive reciprocity to liberate his fatherland. At the same time, having 10 000 trained Caucasian people in Turkey would be a serious threat for Soviet Russia in the future. Maybe due to this fact we could assume his negotiations with the Bolsheviks were not successful as there is no historical information for realisation of his plan for military participation in the Turkish War of Independence.

For the Bulgarian diplomats the above information presented in the report was important with regard to the forces the New Turkish Army included and the support it received from the Soviets, which would affect the course of the war with the Greeks. Namely, the last was a regular topic of the documents sent to the Bulgarian government. In his report from 29 June 1921 to the Bulgarian Prime Minister, Todor K. Pavlov stated that the Ankara government received money, munitions and weapons from the Soviets. In addition, there was a secret Russian-Turkish convention that obliged Moscow to provide military support in case a third power intervened in the war with Greece on the side of the latter. Not long ago, he wrote, when there was a possible English intervention, 10 Bolshevik divisions were situated at the Turkish border on Caucasus with the aim to be sent to the Izmir front in case England left neutrality. As it didn't happen, these divisions were protecting the back of the Turks from "Kurdistan" where Britain tried to incite the population against the Ankara government. Thanks to this, part of the Turkish army on Caucasus would be sent to the Western front¹⁸. A later report by Pavlov, based on

¹⁷ Some additional information about Said Şamil, see: Oleg Smyslov, *Proklyatye legiony. Izmenniki Rodiny na sluzhbe Gitlera*, (Moskva: Veche, 2017), <https://www.litmir.me/br/?b=569635&p=8> (accessed March 2, 2020)

¹⁸ TsDA, f. 321K, op. 1, a.e. 2772, 12-13.

evidence from the former Bulgarian officer Georgi Babadzhanov¹⁹, informed that the main financial support of the Russians was in gold, with which the Kemalists were buying equipment and ammunition for the army from wherever they could find, even from the English²⁰. Russian gold was a special topic of the report dated 27 April 1921, in which he informed Al. Stamboliyski about the import of a significant sum in gold by the Bolsheviks in the Ottoman Empire²¹, used not only to buy goods for Soviet Russia but also to spread the communist idea in the capital, mainly among the refugee camps and Wrangel's army. The import was done through Batumi, Trabzon, sometimes through Kyustendzha and the amount was usually between 10 and 15 000 rubles. Recently a sum of 250 000 was imported by Bolsheviks in Istanbul, exchanging it at separate smaller parts in order not to be confiscated by the foreign administration. The import was also done by Turks through Anatolia for the needs of the Ankara government. Some Turkish tradesmen were said to possess significant amount of golden rubles due to the loan Soviet Russia gave to Ankara. Most of the operations done by the Kemalists at the Istanbul market were done in gold through the facilitation of Italians.

The Soviet support was also presented in the "Report on the organisation of the Turkish Nationalistic Army"²² from 26 April 1921. Based on an "authentic Kemalist source", it provided very detailed information about the mobilisation system, the release from military service and operational zones, senior commanding staff, military equipment, etc. Quite interesting is the statement that the Anatolian Army had a small Russo-German headquarters, part of the General headquarters, where the foreign officers were helping in developing the general plans of the military actions²³. Here we definitely cannot assume that the mentioned Russians from the headquarters were "White Russians" as in addition, their generals or other military staff had never supported the Turkish nationalists even though there were such attempts²⁴.

¹⁹ The last was a captive for one year in Eastern Anatolia as after the Balkan Wars he started a service in the Armenian Army and was captured during the Turkish-Armenian military conflict, during which he commanded the artillery in Kars. After he was liberated, he met with T. Pavlov and gave him information about the East-Anatolian Army commanded by Kâzım Karabekir and in general about the Turkish Army. TsDA, f. 321K, op. 1, a.e. 2759, 1, 8, 12-13.

²⁰ TsDA, f. 321K, op. 1, a.e. 2759, 2.

²¹ TsDA, f. 321K, op. 1, a.e. 2797, 144.

²² TsDA, f. 176, op. 4, a.e. 1951, 1-20.

²³ TsDA, f. 176, op. 4, a.e. 1951, 8.

²⁴ Oya Dağlar Macar, Elçin Macar, *Beyaz Rus Ordusu Türkiye'de* (Istanbul: Libra Kitapçılık ve Yayıncılık, 2010), 219-230.

As the Bolshevik support for the Kemalists is a proven fact (Mikhail Frunze and Semen Aralov's missions, financial and military support²⁵), the mentioning of Germans sheds a new light on the period of the Turkish War of Independence as it is an unexplored topic in the historiography²⁶. Even though the information is limited, there are at least three prerequisites for it to be proven historically in the future.

First, RSFSR, Germany and the Ottoman Empire were in total isolation and the last two were "punished" as defeated countries with severe treaties. The approach and politics of the Allied powers was a motivation for establishing a ground for cooperation between the Soviet, Weimar and Ankara governments. Thus, Germans and Soviets, supporting the new Turkish army, found a way to fight against common enemies – Great Britain and France.

Second, attempts for establishment of a Soviet-German military cooperation started in 1920, as some German leaders didn't want to reconcile with the losses from the war and the threats coming from France. At the same time, the war between Soviet Russia and Poland provided them with an opportunity to solve their own territorial problems with the Polish government through cooperation with the Soviets²⁷. This cooperation was most probably transferred on "Turkish ground" as well and the connection with the GNA was implemented though the Bolsheviks. The provision of German military means for the Turkish army should also be taken into account. In the already mentioned report, Pavlov wrote that the Turkish army had been mostly armed with "Mauser" rifles, part of which provided by the Soviets, and planes manufactured by Germany – some left from the war, but some bought through the Bolsheviks²⁸.

Third, the factor "Enver Pasha" could give some clue. Enver Pasha was one of the first trying to establish relations between the Germans and the Soviets, planning after that to use them in order to provide support for his own country against the Allied powers. As he was also in contact with the GNA and Mustafa Kemal, it was possible he could contribute to the

²⁵ Semen Aralov, *Vospominaniya sovetskogo diplomata. 1922-1923* (Moskva: Izdatel'stvo IMO, 1960); Mikhail Frunze, *Sobranie sochineniy* (Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo 1929), Vol. 1 (1905-1923 gody); Ali Fuat Cebesoy, *Moskova Hatırları. Milli Mücadele ve Bolşevik Rusya* (İstanbul: Temel Yayınları., 2017).

²⁶ Until now there is only limited information for Captain Hans Tröbst, based on his own memoirs. He was a German officer, who took part in the Turkish War of Independence, serving behind the front and having the right only to give advice to a respective commanding Turkish officer in the Turkish Army. See: Gerhard Grüsshaber, *The "German Spirit" in the Ottoman and Turkish Army, 1908-1938: A history of military knowledge transfer* (Berlin; Boston: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2018), 190-193.

²⁷ Sergei Gorlov, *Sovershenno sekretno: Al'ians Moskva – Berlin, 1920–1933 gg* (*Voенно-politicheskie otnosheniya SSSR — Germaniya*) (Moskva: Olma-Press, 2001), 31-60.

²⁸ TsDA, f. 176, op. 4, a.e. 1951, 11.

establishment of contacts between the nationalists and the Germans. Judging by the available documents, he achieved some success at least with the Soviet support. As Pavlov stated in a confidential transcript from 4 August 1921 to the managing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Aleksandar Radolov, Enver Pasha managed to form a small army of 15-20 000 under the command of his uncle Nuri Pasha, situated in Trabzon. Despite the insistence of the Soviets, there still were no results in the negotiations with Mustafa Kemal this army to be sent to the front²⁹. The Soviet “patronage” of Enver Pasha was a reason for the increase of the mutual distrust between the Soviet and Ankara governments with time, as stated by Pavlov in a report to the Bulgarian Prime Minister, dated 29 November 1921 and based on information by Georgi Babadzhanov³⁰.



3. The original wagon, gifted by the Bolsheviks to Kâzım Karabekir, which can be seen in the Caucasus Front Museum of War History in Kars, Turkey.

Reports, containing data about many political and military leaders are of peculiar interest. They reveal nuances in the Soviet-Turkish relations through the prism of people who were directly engaged in their realisation. An example in this regard is Gen. Kâzım Karabekir.

Information concerning his attitude to the Bolsheviks and to Bolshevism as a whole, can be derived from a report dated 31 August 1921. He was considered to maintain good relations with the Russian Bolsheviks and the latter doing the same gifted him a first-class wagon. At the same time, he took severe measures against the spread of Bolshevism among the Turkish population and army. According to Pavlov’s information, Karabekir was arresting and executing all Turkish communists. Example was given with two young Turkish officers, who due to their contacts with the Soviet Army in Caucasus started to sympathise with communism. Karabekir ordered the officers to be sent to Erzurum where they were shot dead. In addition, he was said to have ordered the execution of Yusuf Kemal – a former secretary of the Aleksandropol revolutionary committee

²⁹ TsDA, f. 176, op. 4, a.e. 1951, 15.

³⁰ TsDA, f. 321K, op. 1, a.e. 2759, 1, 8, 12-13.

and Süleyman Nuri, who was a People's Commissar for Justice in the first Armenian Bolshevik government³¹.

Conflicts and suspicions were part of the relations. In January of the same year two Turkish divisions were asked by the Soviets to leave Nakhichevan and the situation would have escalated to a military clash if Kâzım Karabekir hadn't order the commanding Şevket Bey to retreat³². According to the information, Gen. Karabekir was considering as possible a future conflict with the Russian and Armenian Bolsheviks and due to this fact he kept a close watch on their military forces. He had representatives in Yerevan, Baku and Tiflis who were providing him with information about the status and location of the Bolshevik armies. In Sarıkamış, within his headquarters, there was also a Russian Military Mission consisting of 12 people³³. According to the report, Kâzım Karabekir and the Turks didn't trust the Russians, who continued to be accepted as the most dangerous enemies. Due to this, Gen. Karabekir wanted to establish a barrier of independent Caucasian states. He supported the two Armenian revolts as the aim was a non-Bolshevik government to come to power and to fulfil the obligations under the Treaty of Aleksandropol.



4. Mustafa Kemal and Yusuf Kemal
(Foreign Affairs Commissar 1921-1922)

Not last in importance is the information that Kâzım Karabekir often acted separately and even to some extent against the politics of the government in Ankara. Many people were said to believe that if Mustafa Kemal did not achieve success against the Greeks, Gen. Karabekir and colonel Kadri Bey

³¹ TsDA, f. 176, op. 4, a.e. 1951, 16.

Nowadays this information provided to the Bulgarian diplomat proved to be unreliable. Based on the sources available so far, we can state with a high degree of confidence that the name "Yusuf Kemal" and the administrative position, occupied by this person, were wrong and couldn't identify the person, mentioned in the document. Süleyman Nuri was member of Mustafa Suphi's Communist Party of Turkey (Türkiye Komünist Partisi), but not occupying the mentioned position. He died in 1966 in Moscow. More about him and his activities: Süleyman Nuri, *Çanakkale Siperlerinden TKP Yönetimine. Uyanan Esirler* (Istanbul: TÜSAV, 2002); Emel Akal, *Moskova-Ankara-Londra Üçgeninde: İştirakiyuncular, Komünistler ve Paşa Hazretleri* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık, 2013).

³² TsDA, f. 176, op. 4, a.e. 1951, 16.

³³ TsDA, f. 176, op. 4, a.e. 1951, 17.

would start negotiations with the English “in order to save what is possible to be saved”³⁴.

The opposition to some governmental decisions and politics was something existing in the Turkish parliament too. Reporting in May and June 1921, about the governmental crisis in Ankara and the election of a new cabinet³⁵, T. K. Pavlov presented shortly two opposing currents that were in a permanent clash, which due to their views for the direction of the external politics influenced the internal ones: one “moderate” that assumed together with the military means diplomatic ones had to be used in order soon to finish the war and not to provoke the Allied powers; the other was presented by supporters of the extreme decisions and close cooperation with the Bolsheviks and the Muslim countries. Bekir Sami’s resignation was considered a result of the confrontation between the two currents³⁶. Another result was the election of Yusuf Kemal for Foreign Affairs Commissar, which was said to be a sign for even closer relations with Soviet Russia³⁷. Pavlov stated that the moderate elements in the Kemalist government were removed by “the extreme chauvinist-nationalists” under the influence of Soviet emissaries³⁸. The extreme wing started a war against the Entente in the printed media as well as provoking the Muslims in Mesopotamia, Arabia, Egypt and Afghanistan, and continuing the project about creation of an “Islamic Federative Union” in Ankara. All these enabled the English diplomacy to try to convince France and Italy in the need of more decisive measures against the Ankara government, which according to Britain was “a hearth of pan-Islamist and Bolshevik propaganda”³⁹, posing a danger over the territorial possessions of the three countries in Asia and Africa, populated by Muslims.

As confirmation of the new direction of the foreign policy and most precisely the one towards Soviet Russia, T. K. Pavlov prepared a summary of Yusuf Kemal’s presentation in front of the GNA, taken from Anatolian Agency publication. According to the Commissar of Foreign Affairs, the relations with Russia were based on “the brotherhood”, which was expressed in the Treaty from 16 March (Treaty of Moscow – a.n.). The government was working in close cooperation with the new representative of the RSFSR (Sergey P. Natsarenus – a.n.), who had arrived in Ankara in order to strengthen the mutual friendship. Both

³⁴ TsDA, f. 176, op. 4, a.e. 1951, 17.

³⁵ TsDA, f. 321K, op. 1, a.e. 2764, 55-60.

³⁶ TsDA, f. 321K, op. 1, a.e. 2764, 60.

³⁷ TsDA, f. 321K, op. 1, a.e. 2764, 58.

³⁸ TsDA, f. 321K, op. 1, a.e. 2797, 126.

³⁹ TsDA, f. 321K, op. 1, a.e. 2797, 127.

governments would conclude other agreements to facilitate the relations between the two nations⁴⁰.

“The brotherhood” was proven also in another dimension. The violence against the civil Muslim population in the Asia Minor territories occupied by the Greek Army, provoked reactions both from the Istanbul and the Ankara governments. On 12 April 1921, Mustafa Kemal protested against the Greek atrocities to the whole civilized world⁴¹. The Soviets did not remain indifferent and Moscow donated 30 000 golden rubles to the Ankara government to help the victims, as T. K. Pavlov reported on 3 May 1921⁴². The Soviet representative at that time Polikarp Mdivani was also asked by Mustafa Kemal to spread broadly the word about the Greek inhumanity.

The Kütahya–Eskişehir battle, ending with Greek victory, reinforced the discussions in the Turkish political circles about the relations with Soviet Russia. The common opinion, shared by the Bulgarian diplomat in a report to Al. Radolov – acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, was that the Kemalists would rely on more efficient help from the Bolsheviks⁴³. The ratification of the Treaty of Moscow by the GNA was accepted as a sign of this intent. Another one was the unconfirmed presence of Gen. Brusilov* in Ankara. Still, the mentioned efficiency was not anticipated as calling Bolshevik Army in Anatolia and Pavlov stated with high level of affirmation that it would happen only if the Ankara government lost confidence in its own power. At the same time, it was presumed that Soviet Russia would not want to actively engage in military actions in Anatolia as this could be perceived as hostility towards the Allied powers, which the Russians were relying on for support to fight the famine in the country⁴⁴.

2. Second period (end of 1922-1923)

The Turkish victory at Sakarya (13 September 1921) led to further developments, which strengthened Ankara government’s internal and international positions. The conclusion of the Treaty of Kars finalized the process of solving the border question between the Soviet Transcaucasia Republic and Turkey, thus also closing a “sensitive chapter” in the Soviet-Turkish relations. Then, another important issue came to the agenda – the

⁴⁰ TsDA, f. 321K, op. 1, a.e. 2797, 102.

⁴¹ Yunan zulümlerine dair insanlık âlemine beyanname (12. IV. 1921). *Atatürk'ün Tamim, Telgraf ve Beyannameleri*, Vol IV (Istanbul: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1991), 393-394, <http://kitaplar.ankara.edu.tr/dosyalar/pdf/355.pdf> (accessed November 17, 2019)

⁴² TsDA, f. 321K, op. 1, a.e. 2740, 9.

⁴³ TsDA, f. 321K, op. 1, a.e. 2789, 183.

* Gen. A. A. Brusilov had never been in Ankara. More about him and his life: Sergey Bazanov, *Brusilov Aleksei Alekseevich* (Moskva: Tseihgus, 2006).

⁴⁴ TsDA, f. 321K, op. 1, a.e. 2789, 184.

status of the Straits, which became one of the reasons for destabilisation of the Soviet-Turkish relations at the end of 1922.

According to the National Pact (Misak-ı Millî) the right to define the status of the Straits was reserved to the Ottoman Empire and the countries concerned⁴⁵. In the Treaty of Moscow, Article 5, Ankara government agreed the future of the Straits and the status of the Black Sea to be decided on a conference with “delegates from the littoral states”⁴⁶. Thus, the Soviet diplomacy managed not only to exclude the Entente powers from the decision-making process but also to guarantee Moscow a predominant voice due to the fact that all littoral states on the Black Sea Eastern coast were sovietised and under its control. In this respect, it is not surprising that the Turkish project for the status of the Straits was discussed together with representatives of Soviet Russia and Ukraine. Such information was provided to T. K. Pavlov by a “Kemalist source” and was included in a report dated 26 January 1922 to the Prime Minister Aleksandar Stamboliyski⁴⁷. Additionally, a Bulgarian translation of the full text of the mentioned project was enclosed. The most important conclusions made by the Bulgarian diplomat were that the aim of the project was to guarantee the sovereignty of Turkey and at the same time to establish solidarity between the Black Sea countries – Russia, Bulgaria, Caucasus, etc. through a common body – a commission, where they would be engaged in the defence and management of the Straits thus decreasing the future advantage for the Entente and namely England. More interesting is that, if really agreed with Soviet representatives, the project showed a completely different view of Moscow about the Straits’ status from the one declared later at the Lausanne Conference. Article 12 of the project stated: “In normal time (here having the meaning of “peaceful” – a. n.) the military ships will be able to freely cross the Straits under the condition that they will not stay more than 24 hours.”⁴⁸ At the Lausanne conference the Soviets insisted that “the Dardanelles and the Bosphorous must be permanently closed both in peace and in war to warships, armed vessels and military aircraft of all countries except Turkey”⁴⁹. This change could be related to Moscow’s increased confidence that it could exercise a political influence on Turkey in future issues related to the Black Sea

⁴⁵ A. Suat Bilge, Ahmet Şükrü Esmer, Mehmet Gönlübol, Oral Sander, Cem Sar, Duygu Sezer, Haluk Ülman, *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919-1965)* (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Yayını, 1969), 13-14.

⁴⁶ Moskovskiy dogovor mezhdru Rossiiyey i Turtsiiyey 16 marta 1921 goda, <http://www.amsi.ge/istoria/sab/moskovi.html> (accessed November 17, 2019)

⁴⁷ TsDA, f. 321K, op. 1, a.e. 2788, 1-2.

⁴⁸ TsDA, f. 321K, op. 1, a.e. 2788, 1.

⁴⁹ Conference on Near Eastern Affairs. 1923. *Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs, 1922-1923: records of proceedings and draft terms of peace*. London: H.M.S.O., 129.

region and to the possibility to deal with only one country in case of necessity. Nevertheless, if we can trust the source, it was a quite fast transformation of the Soviet position within less than a year.

A document, regarding the international politics of the Allied powers, prepared by the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the Bulgarian Foreign Legations, had a separate paragraph dedicated to the situation in Turkey. According to it, a topic that troubled the Ankara government in the beginning of 1922 was the dissolution of the Cannes Conference and the resignation of the French Prime Minister Aristide Briand. It was reported that the Turks considered the situation as possibly having an unfavourable impact on the resolution of the Greek-Turkish conflict. They were worried also about eventual revision of the French-Turkish agreement. Additional negative factors – source of pressure for the Ankara government, were the people's tiredness of the war; the English inciting of Kurdish tribes in Eastern Anatolia against the power of Mustafa Kemal; the internal conflicts in the government – ministers' resignation, and the supposed decrease of Mustafa Kemal's prestige – a litmus for this was a proposed draft-bill to limit his powers; the intrigues of Enver Pasha; the financial difficulties⁵⁰.

As it would be further presented in the following reports of the Bulgarian legation in Istanbul, 1922 was a crucial year for the Ankara government for the finalization of the war and the international recognition of the state borders. The relations with Soviet Russia were important in regard to these developments, even though they underwent some changes at the end of the year. The visits of Mikhail Frunze at the end of 1921-beginning of 1922 and the work of the Soviet envoy to Turkey Semen Aralov in 1922, had to strengthen the trust in Russia's moral and material support in the final period of the Turkish War of Independence. In May 1922 a final balance of the given credit of 10 million rubles was done in a period when the Entente made an attempt to end the war between Greece and Turkey⁵¹. The Turkish victory at the Izmir battle in September, followed by the Armistice of Mudanya, intensified the international relations and negotiations to finally solve the Eastern question.

⁵⁰ TsDA, f. 321K, op. 1, a.e. 2789, 115a.

⁵¹ Harish Kapur, *Soviet Russia and Asia, 1917–1927: A Study of Soviet Policy towards Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan* (Geneva: V. Chevalier, 1966), 114; Aralov, *Vospominaniya*, 104.

All processes were closely followed by Bulgaria, due to its interests in Thrace and the expectation some of them to be achieved. In this regard, the internal affairs in Turkey were of importance as they directly influenced the external ones. As the secretary of the Bulgarian Legation Ivan Altanov informed in his report dated 18 July 1922, the new law accepted by the GNA for limiting the powers of Mustafa Kemal would not change his foreign policy⁵². However, an agreement between the Angora government on the one side, and Azerbaijan and Afghanistan on the



5. Ivan Altanov - a secretary of the Bulgarian legation in Istanbul (1922)

other for mutual support was signed, joined also by Persia, but without keeping RSFSR updated about it⁵³. Being in political and economic relations with Afghanistan and Persia, and having a communist government in Azerbaijan, it is quite strange that the Soviets were not informed about the new agreements by their partners, so this information needs further investigation in the future.

Meanwhile, the Soviets were to end with Cemal Pasha and Enver Pasha. The first one, as declared by Altanov⁵⁴, was killed in Tiflis on 21 July 1922. It was said that he was travelling to Moscow in order to assure the Bolsheviks he had nothing to do with the movement, organised by Enver Pasha in Turkestan. According to the Armenian newspaper in Istanbul "Dzhagadamard" the assassination was done by the Bolsheviks, who were afraid of Cemal playing the same role in Afghanistan as Enver in Turkestan. Nowadays it is accepted that his assassination was done as part of operation "Nemesis"^{*}, but the information presented has its logic, too, bearing in mind that after Enver was no longer useful to the Soviets⁵⁵, they stopped supporting him and tried to dispose of him.

⁵² Mustafa Kemal would still be commander-in-chief of the army and representative of the country, but there would be a ministry cabinet and a prime minister directly elected by the Parliament. TsDA, f. 321K, op. 1, a.e. 2799, 31-35.

⁵³ TsDA, f. 321K, op. 1, a.e. 2799, 35.

⁵⁴ TsDA, f. 321K, op. 1, a.e. 2799, 24-25.

* A covert operation carried out between 1920-1922 by the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnaksutyun) for the assassination of Ottoman political and military figures as well as leaders of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic.

⁵⁵ As Y. Masayuki wrote: "For certain, Soviet Russia kept Enver Pasha as a "trump card" in bargaining with Ankara government diplomatically. He could be used to check Kemal's rapprochement with the Entente", Yamauchi Masayuki, *The Green Crescent under the Red Star. Enver Pasha in Soviet Russia 1919-1922* (Tokyo: Institute for Study of Languages and Cultures, 1991), 43; See also: Salahi Sonyel, "Mustafa Kemal and Enver in Conflict, 1919-1922", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 25, № 4 (1989).

The preparations for the conference in Lausanne and solving the issue of the status of the Straits were topic of two reports by Ivan Altanov in September and October 1922⁵⁶. In Ankara government's response to the Allied powers, the GNA agreed on the principle of free Straits provided that the security of Istanbul and the minorities was to be ensured in a way compatible with the national sovereignty. They insisted also Russia, Ukraine and the countries from the Caucasian Federation to participate in the conference. As Altanov assumed "behind the back of Angora government stays Soviet Russia with its natural striving to the Straits, maybe now more actively interested in the question as it is connected with possible complications in the East, which are strongly wished in Moscow⁵⁷". This was something the Bulgarian diplomat noticed in his conversation with Hamid Bey – a representative of the Ankara government in Istanbul^{**}. In fact, the Turkish delegation at the Lausanne Conference would rely on the support of the Soviet representatives, but at the same time during it, the Turkish representatives tried to counterbalance the Russian strength in the Black Sea region and to decrease the dependency on it in case of future issues.

The different positions about the Straits' status at the Lausanne Conference deteriorated the Soviet-Turkish relations according to the Bulgarian diplomat Todor Markov⁵⁸. On 12 March 1923, the 5th Bolshevik Congress in Baku strongly condemned the behaviour of the Turkish delegation during the negotiations. The last hope of the Soviets was Semen Aralov who had to exercise influence on the GNA not to accept the Lausanne draft-agreement. As these attempts were unsuccessful, Moscow undertook a threatening measure towards Ankara by strengthening its army in Transcaucasia. The official motive was that the Turkish army was doing the same at its Caucasian border, which as T. Markov stated was not true. In addition, some local freedoms preserved for the Transcaucasian Republics in order to "manage the Turkish patriotic feelings"⁵⁹ were limited. At the same time, after the Soviets put a lot of efforts, a new pro-Russian government in Tehran came to power, outlining a military front against Turkey from the Black Sea to Mosul.

⁵⁶ TsDA, f. 321K, op. 1, a.e. 2799, 175, 188-191.

⁵⁷ TsDA, f. 321K, op. 1, a.e. 2799, 175, 191.

^{**} Gordon A. Craig, Felix Gilbert (ed.), *The Diplomats, 1919-1939* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994), 182.

⁵⁸ TsDA, f. 321K, op. 1, a.e. 2797, 160.

⁵⁹ TsDA, f. 321K, op. 1, a.e. 2797, 161.



6. Semen Aralov (first row, second on the right). He was Plenipotentiary Representative of the RSFSR in Turkey in 1922–1923. Here he was photographed with his wife (sitting next to him), Soviet embassy staff, and Turkish officials (Turkey, 1922).

The dissolution of the GNA and the decision for election of a new one was seen by Markov as the final capitulation for Aralov's aspirations and his recall to Moscow was one of the signs for the new relations between RSFSR and Turkey. T. Markov declared that one journalist from Lausanne informed him that during the conference Grigory Chicherin had stated in front of some journalist that they had never given up on Istanbul but at the moment were compelled to support the Turks. Even though the Bulgarian diplomat could not check whether this statement was true, he wrote

that it described very well the behaviour of the Moscow government. Last but not least, he had a conversation with the Turkish publicist-philosopher Mehmet Ali Bey, who stated that the friendship with Bulgaria was of big importance for Turkey as it provided security at the western border, which would give the Turks the possibility to concentrate eventually all their forces at the Eastern front⁶⁰.

A telegram from T. Markov dated 17 April 1923 gave important information from first hand – he met twice with Semen Aralov, who was in Istanbul on his way back to Moscow. Reportedly the Russian diplomat was not pleased with the Turks. He presumed that they would enter in an understanding with England in order to use it, too. Concerning the appointment of Bekir Sami Bey as Minister-Plenipotentiary in Bucharest, it was important for Aralov since Bekir Sami Bey was a big "Russo-hater"⁶¹.

After Semen Aralov, the position of Soviet representative was occupied by Yakov Surits. On his way to Ankara, he stopped in Istanbul where he made a press release in front of the Turkish newspapers. He stated that the relations between Russia and Turkey were still close and correct. According to him the two countries had entered into a commercial fight with the Western countries and if they remained united they would achieve success. Surits spoke about the development of the Soviet

⁶⁰ TsDA, f. 321K, op. 1, a.e. 2797, 162-164.

⁶¹ TsDA, f. 321K, op. 1, a.e. 2797, 157.

industry and that it would strengthen the economic and trade relations with Turkey, as one of his tasks was to stabilize them through consular and trade agreements. He stated that the friendship between Russia and Turkey was best seen at the Lausanne Conference where both countries had sincerely supported each other. For the aggravation of the relations he first heard in Turkey, saying that there were some attacks in the newspapers – one Russian and a response in some Turkish ones, but those were insignificant issues that could not spoil at all the correct relations between the two countries⁶².

Still, provocations on local level increased the tension between Moscow and Ankara. Some of them as presented by T. Markov in April 1923:

1. The arrival of the first Bolshevik trade ship in Istanbul. The captain and the chief mechanic of the ship visited the Greek patriarchy, which was accepted by the Turks as a provocation, ordered by Moscow.

2. According to the information of some press in Istanbul, the Turkish consuls in Soviet Russia were not treated accordingly.

3. The Turkish steamship “Gül Cemal” was not allowed to enter Batumi port by the Bolshevik port management under the pretext it hadn’t obtained the necessary visa from the Soviet representative in Istanbul. In response to this, the Turks announced that they did not recognize the Bolshevik delegation in Istanbul as an official representation because it did not have a valid exequatur from the Ankara government⁶³.

As could be seen, the diplomatic statements differed from the real situation, where signs of confrontation appeared. The cases presented by the Bulgarian diplomat could be seen as a warning to the Ankara government, marking the end of a period of consent and “business partnership”⁶⁴.

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The presented documents reveal the importance of the Bulgarian archives as a source that should be considered when researching the Soviet-Turkish relations in the period 1921-1923. The detailed reports of the Bulgarian diplomats can contribute to a more sophisticated analysis, to better comprehending the nuances of facts and events, and last but not least, can open new unexplored topics in the historiography. These topics need a further research as they can shed a light on some important moments, offering an alternative historical perspective of the processes of

⁶² TsDA, f. 321K, op. 1, a.e. 2797, 155-156.

⁶³ TsDA, f. 321K, op. 1, a.e. 2797, 162-163.

⁶⁴ Bülent Gökay, Turkish settlement and the Caucasus, 1918–20, *Middle Eastern Studies*, (1996), 32:2, 68.

establishment and development of the Soviet-Turkish relations. At the same time, the professional work requires careful cross-check of some facts for which there was not reliable information at the moment of their reporting by the Bulgarian diplomats.

Last but not least, the documents outline Bulgaria's focus on the international politics that could impact the decision making process with regard to the national interests after the end of the First World War.

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89 Bulgaristan Göçmenlerinin Kimlik Kurguları Üzerinden Şehre Uyum Pratikleri: Sakarya Örneği

Begüm Hergüvenç*

Abstract:

Title: *The Immigrants of 1989 from Bulgaria and Their Adaptation to City as Identity Construction: Sakarya Case*

This study takes form on the narratives of the immigrants who settled in Sakarya following the Forced Migration of 1989 from Bulgaria. It aims to tell the reasons for the immigrants' decisions to move into Sakarya, whether they are satisfied with their lives, their thoughts about returning to Bulgaria, and their regrets and remorse. In addition, it essentially focuses on "in what ways" the immigrants perceive the locals and how they construct their own identities in accordance with this perception. The immigrants construct their identities in contrast with the locals. This construct has made the immigrants in closer ties with their kins and friends in a common identity, and, in turn, these ties of familiarity have strengthened their ties with the city. On the other hand, the distance the immigrants put between themselves and the locals, especially when solidarity networks are absent, made their integration into the city somewhat more difficult.

Keywords: Forced Migration, Turks of Bulgaria, Immigrants from Bulgaria, Sakarya

Giriş

1989 yılı, Türkiye, Bulgaristan ve en çok da bu coğrafyalara tabi insanlar için tarihsel bir fay hattının kırılması anlamına gelmektedir. Bu

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büyük kırılmaya giden süreçte zaman zaman daha küçük, zaman zaman daha şiddetli depremler gerçekleşmiş, Balkan coğrafyasından Türkiye'ye yönelen göç dalgaları tarihsel olarak iç içe girmiş iki coğrafya arasındaki ilişkilerin muhteviyatının sonuçlarından biri olagelmıştır. Bulgaristan'ın 93 Harbi'nden sonra 1878 yılında Prenslik, 1908 yılında ise bağımsız bir devlet olarak Osmanlı Devleti'nden ayrılışıyla birlikte yoğun bir Türk nüfus Bulgaristan'a bağlı topraklarda kalmış; 93 Harbi, Balkan Savaşları sonrasında göç dalgaları olduğu gibi Türkiye Cumhuriyeti kurulduktan sonra; 1950-1951 ve 1968-1978 yılları arasında da Bulgaristan'dan Türkiye'ye yoğun göç dalgaları meydana gelmiştir. Son göç dalgası ise 1989 yılında asimilasyon politikaları neticesinde gerçekleşmiş, hem gelen göçmenlerin sayısı baz alındığında, daha da önemlisi beraberinde getirdikleri hatıralar açısından bakıldığında en yoğunu da bu dalga olmuştur.

Bakışımızı 1984-1989 asimilasyon politikaları ve zorunlu göç sürecine çevirdiğimizde, Bulgaristan'da Jivkov Hükümeti'nin Osmanlı İmparatorluğu tarafından ilhak edilen Balkanlar coğrafyasının zorla Türkleştirildiği ve Müslümanlaştırıldığı fikrinden yola çıkarak Bulgaristan'daki Türk ve Müslümanların esasen Bulgar olduğunu iddia etmesiyle başlayan bir süreçle karşılaşırız. Darina Vasileva, bu iddia ile beraber "ulusal yeniden doğuş süreci" adı verilen sürecin başlatıldığına, Bulgaristan Türklerinin totaliter Bulgaristan hükümeti tarafından "gelişen sosyalist topluma" entegre edilme arzusuyla asimilasyon politikalarının hedefi olduğuna işaret etmektedir.¹ Bu amaçla Jivkov Hükümeti 1984 yılının son aylarında zorla isim değiştirme politikalarına başlamış, Türkçe isimler Bulgarca isimlerle değiştirilmiş; asimilasyon süreci kamusal alanda Türkçe konuşmanın yasaklanması ve yasağın delinmesi neticesinde uygulanan para cezaları, inanca yönelik yasaklar, geleneksel kıyafetlerin ve Türk müziğinin yasaklanması, Bulgar gelenek ve alışkanlıklarının yerleştirilmeye çalışılması gibi kimlikle birebir ilgili alanlarda, gündelik hayatın topyekün değişimine neden olacak uygulamalarla ilerletilmeye çalışılmıştır.² Türk ve Müslüman nüfusun asimilasyon politikalarına gösterdiği tepkiler neticesinde Bulgaristan Devlet Başkanı Jivkov 2 Haziran 1989 tarihinde bir açıklama yaparak Türkiye'yi sınır kapılarını açmaya çağırmış, isteyenlerin pasaportlarıyla birlikte gitmesine müsaade edeceklerini bildirmiştir.³ Turgut Özal

¹ Darina Vasileva, "Bulgarian Turkish Emigration and Return", *International Migration Review*, c. 26, s. 2 (1992): 342-352, s. 346.

² Ömer E. Lütem, *Türk - Bulgar İlişkileri 1983 - 1989*, (Ankara: ASAM Yayınları, 2000): 439-470.

³ Ercüment Konukman, *Tarihi Belgeler Işığında Büyük Göç ve Anavatan*, haz: Kutlay Doğan, (Ankara: 1990): 60.

Hükümeti'nin, sınır kapılarını Bulgaristan'dan gelecek Bulgaristan Türklerine açmasıyla, Jivkov'un konuşmasını takiben ilk üç ay muazzam bir göç dalgası yaşanmış, üç aylık sürenin sonunda vize uygulamasına geçilmesiyle sınırı geçen göçmen sayısı düşmüştür. İlk üç aylık göç dalgası içerisinde Türkiye'ye giriş yapan kişi sayısının 350 bini aşkın olduğu, 1989 yılının sonuna kadarsa gelenlerin 154 bin civarının Bulgaristan'a geri döndüğü ifade edilmektedir.⁴ Göçmenler, Türkiye'nin sınır kapılarından girer girmez çeşitli illere geçiş yaparak kendilerine yeni bir hayat kurma amacıyla adımlar atmaya başlamışlardır.

Asimilasyon politikalarıyla beraber göçe zorlanan Bulgaristan Türklerinin Türkiye'de Marmara ve Ege Bölgesi'ndeki illerde yoğunlaştığı tespit edilmektedir. Göçmenlerin yerleştikleri iller bazında bir analiz yapacak olursak 1950-1988 döneminde vuku bulan göçlerde İstanbul, Bursa, İzmir, Tekirdağ, Eskişehir, Kırklareli, Manisa, Ankara, Kocaeli illerinin yoğunlukla göç aldığı; 1990 sonu itibariyle Eskişehir ve Kocaeli'nin yerine Edirne ve Sakarya'nın göç alan ilk 9 il listesine girdiği gözlenir. Son göç dalgasıyla birlikte Sakarya özelinde göç eden kişi sayısının 921 olduğu ifade edilmektedir.⁵ 1990 yılı genel nüfus sayımlarına baktığımızda, Bulgaristan'da doğduğunu söyleyen kişi sayısının 1106 olduğu görülmektedir.⁶ Konukman'ın belgeleri ise Sakarya'daki göçmen sayısının 3068 olduğunu aktarmaktadır.⁷ Bunun dışında göçmenler için yapılan konutların en yoğun olduğu 8. il 1030 konut sayısı ile Sakarya'dır.⁸ Özellikle kişi sayısını baz aldığımızda, veriler, yukarıda görüldüğü üzere, değişkenlik gösterse de Sakarya'ya yerleşen göçmenlerin oranının azımsanmayacak nitelikte olduğunu söylemek mümkündür.

Bulgaristan göçmenleriyle ilgili saha çalışmalarına baktığımızda İstanbul, İzmir, Bursa, Ankara, Eskişehir, Tekirdağ, Balıkesir, Mersin, Çanakkale, Kocaeli gibi çeşitli illerde zorunlu göçle gelen Bulgaristan

⁴ Magdalena Elchinova, "Alien by Default: The Identity of the Turks of Bulgaria at Home and in Immigration", *Developing Cultural Identity in the Balkans: Convergence vs. Divergence*, R. Detrez and P. Plas, (Brüksel: P.I.E.-Peter Lang, 2005): 87-110, s. 87.

⁵ (Bulgaristan'dan Türk Göçleri, Sosyal Planlama Başkanlığı, 1990, 10)'den aktaran, Nihan Cığerci Ulukan, "Göçmenler ve İşgücü Piyasası: Bursa'da Bulgaristan Göçmenleri Örneği" (Doktora Tezi, Marmara Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 2008): 70, 76.

⁶ Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu 1990 Yılı Genel Nüfus Sayımı Verileri, <https://biruni.tuik.gov.tr/nufusmenuapp/menu.zul>, [Erişim tarihi: 25.04.2020]

⁷ Konukman, "Tarihi Belgeler Işığında", 85.

⁸ Turhan Çetin, "Bulgaristan'dan Göç Eden Türk Nüfusun Dağılımını Etkileyen Coğrafi ve Kültürel Faktörler", *Ankara Üniversitesi Türkiye Coğrafyası Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi (TÜCAUM) 6. Ulusal Coğrafya Sempozyumu Bildiriler*, 3-5 Kasım 2010, (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi, 2011): 71-82, s. 74.

Türklerinin gündelik hayatta, istihdamda yaşadıkları deneyimlerin irdelendiği; göç etmeden önce Türkiye’den beklentileri ve karşılaştıkları güçlükler, ekonomik ilişkileri, uyum süreçleri, dayanışma ağları, göçmenlik algıları, siyasete katılım biçimleri gibi birçok konunun masaya yatırıldığı görülmektedir. Sakarya, yerleşen göçmen sayısı itibariyle üst sıralarda yer almasına rağmen şimdiye kadar üzerine çalışılan bir il olmamıştır.

Çalışmadaki hedefim Sakarya’da yaşayan göçmenlerin kimlik kurulumlarının şehre uyum sağlama sürecindeki etkisine odaklanmaktır. Bu doğrultuda göçmenlerin Sakarya’ya neden yerleştikleri, şehirde yaşamaktan memnun olup olmadıkları, “yerli” halkla etkileşimlerinin ve temaslarının ne düzeyde olduğu sorularına odaklandım. Yanı sıra Bulgaristan Türkleri ile Türkiye’deki Türklerin kültürünün benzeşikliğine vurgu yapan yaygın literatürden yola çıkarak göçmenlerin “yerli” halka dair algılarının ne olduğu ve kendi kimliklerini hangi nüveler üzerinden kurguladıkları, neticede kurguladıkları kimlikle birlikte kültürel adetlere ve gündelik yaşam biçimlerine angaje olup olmadıklarının ele alınmasının neticesinde şehre uyum sağlama deneyimlerini anlamaya çalıştım.

Çalışmayı nitel araştırma yönteminin veri toplama tekniklerinden biri olan derinlemesine görüşmeyi kullanarak yapılandırdım. Ekim-Aralık 2019 tarihleri arasında Sakarya Bal-Göç Derneği aracılığıyla 5 kadın 5 erkeğe ulaşarak toplam 10 kişiyle görüşmeler gerçekleştirdim. Ulaştığım kişilerin beşi, biri sınır dışı edilmiş olmak üzere vize uygulamasının olmadığı Haziran- Ağustos ayları içerisinde giriş yapmış; diğer beşi ise kapılar kapandıktan sonra vize alarak Türkiye’ye gelmişlerdir. Yaptığım görüşmelerin süresi 50 dakika ile 2,5 saat arasında değişiyor. Bazı görüşmeler hem görüşmecilerin hem de araştırmacı olarak benim konuya dair heyecanımız dolayısıyla planlanan sürenin epey aşılmasıyla sonuçlandı. Yanı sıra, birçok görüşmeciyle görüşmeleri sonlandırdıktan sonra da kişisel sohbetimizin devam etmesi, özellikle göçmen kadınlarla grup sohbeti yapma şansım, hatıraları ve hislerini nasıl aktardıklarını gözlemlemek açısından muhteşem bir fırsat verdi. Neticede görüşmelerin deşifresi ve raporlanmasının akabinde yoğunlaşan başlıklar üzerinden bir ayrıma giderek görüşmeleri dört bölüm üzerinden ele almaya; göçmenlerin yoğunlukla işaret ettiği alanları, ilgili konuyla bağlantılı olan bölümlerde alt başlıklar halinde sunmaya çalıştım. Sakarya’nın küçük bir şehir olmasından hareketle, görüşmecilerimin en ufak incinme ihtimallerini ortadan kaldırmak için, isimleri ve ses kayıtları bende kalmak kaydıyla; gerçek isimlerini çalışmanın içerisinde kullanmamayı tercih ettim. Buna karşın

göçmenlerin yaşlarını, cinsiyetlerini ve Bulgaristan'dan geldikleri şehirleri dipnotlarda belirttim.

Göç Kararı

Bulgaristan'dan gelen göçmenlerin Sakarya'ya yerleşme nedenlerinin, her göçmenin hikayesi eşsiz olsa da bazı ortaklıklara işaret ettiği görülür. Bu ortaklıkları ana başlıklar halinde toplamak istediğimizde; Sakarya'ya yerleşmedeki en önemli itkinin aile, akrabalık, arkadaşlık bağları olduğu, ikinci olarak Sakarya'nın doğası ve konumunun yerleşme kararında rol oynadığı, son olarak iş ve mesleğe dayalı tercih etkili olduğu anlaşılır. Bu nedenleri kategorize ederken değinmemiz gereken, göçün ilk üç ayında hızlı bir şekilde göç edip yerleşenlerle 1990 yılı içerisinde vize alarak yerleşenler arasında Sakarya'yı tercih etmeye dair herhangi bir fark olup olmadığı sorusudur. Vizeyle gelen beş göçmenin tamamı özellikle göçün ilk aylarında Bulgaristan'dan gelen aile ve akrabaları Sakarya'da yaşadıkları için Sakarya'yı tercih ettiklerini belirtirler. Hatta aralarından bir tanesi (şu anda asla ayrılmak istemediğini vurgulayarak) ilk başta Türkiye'ye gelmek istememesine rağmen ailesi Türkiye'de olduğu için Türkiye'ye göç ettiğini ifade etmektedir. Kan bağının göçün rotasını değiştirebilecek güce sahip olduğu açıktır:

“Amacım benim, Avrupa'ya açılmaktı. Açılacaktım, problemler oluştu. Çünkü babam burada, annem burada, biraderim burada, Adapazarı'na yerleşmişlerdi. Devamlı çağırıyorlardı beni, gel. Onlar seksen dokuzda gelmişti ama ben İsviçre'yi düşünüyordum. Oralar daha güzeldi ama kıyamadım anneme, babama ve iki bavulla; hanımı, oğlumu yanıma...”⁹

Göçün rotasını değiştirebilecek güce sahip aile, akrabalık ve arkadaşlık bağları aynı zamanda bir mekânı “vatan” yapabilme gücüne de sahiptir: *“Sakarya'da tanıdık arkadaşlarımız ve ablam var. “Bir yandan arkadaşlar bir yandan kardeş burayı vatan olarak tercih etmemize etken oldu”¹⁰* ifadesinden de anlaşılacağı üzere, dayanışma bağlarının hayati bir rol oynadığı görülmektedir.

Göçmenlerin Sakarya'ya yerleşmesinde etkili olan ikinci faktör ise, Sakarya'nın ikliminin ve doğasının Bulgaristan'da yaşadıkları yerlere benzemesi üzerinden tanımlanmaktadır. Bulgaristan'dayken Türkiye'yi gerçek evleri, yurtları, vatanları olarak gördüklerine dair anlatılar sık sık tekrarlınsa da Bulgaristan Türklerinin, Bulgaristan'dan söz ederken

⁹ 2. Katılımcı, (65, erkek, vizeli, Osmanpazarı) ile mülakat, 23.10.2019, Sakarya.

¹⁰ 5. Katılımcı, (65, erkek, vizesiz, Kırcaali) ile mülakat, 06.11.2019, Sakarya.

“memleket” demeleri dikkate değerdir. Bununla bağlantılı olarak, Sakarya ile kurulan ilk bağın kendi “memleketlerine” olan benzerlik üzerinden tanımlandığı, Sakarya’nın doğası ve ikliminin bu benzerlik üzerinden güzelleştiği görülür. Bulgaristan Türklerinin, Türkiye’yi vatan olarak görüyor olmaları; fakat diğer yandan da bir yerin vatan olması için gerekli koşulları Bulgaristan’daki "vatanları" ile olan benzerliklerin belirliyor olması anlamlıdır.

Son olarak, görüşülen göçmenlerin küçük bir kısmının ise iş dolayısıyla Sakarya’ya geldiği anlaşılmaktadır. Devlet memuru olarak atama isteyenlerin Sakarya’ya atanmasının yerleşim nedenlerinden bir tanesi olduğu görülür. Bu şekilde beyan veren iki görüşmeci Sakarya’ya yerleşmedeki temel sebeplerini aile ve akrabalar olarak değil, iş durumu olarak nitelemişlerdir.

Beklentiler, Pişmanlıklar, Özlemler

Görüşülen Bulgaristan göçmenlerinin Türkiye’ye yerleştikten sonra beklentilerinin, özlemlerinin, pişmanlıklarının çeşitlendiği anlaşılırken göç etmeden önce Türkiye ile ilgili, Sakarya ile ilgili herhangi bir beklenti içerisinde olmadıklarına dair beyanda buldukları görülür. Özellikle ilk 3 aylık süre zarfında yerleşen göçmenler bir an önce Bulgaristan’dan çıkmak ve Türkiye’ye yerleşmekten başka beklentileri olmadığını altını daha fazla çizmektedir:

“Baskı dönemi olduğu için çocukları kurtarmaya geldik. İş kurarım, öğretmen olurum böyle şeyler hiç düşünmedik biz. Bizim verdiğimiz mücadele kimlik mücadelesiydi. (...) Hiçbir beklenti olmadan geldik. Ne bulursak çalışacağız diye geldik. Eşim de öğretmen, biz, yani ikimiz de öğretmenlikten önce, eşim konfeksiyonda kendim de ışıklı reklam atölyesinde çalıştık.”¹¹

Sakarya’ya yerleşmeden önce Sakarya ile ilgili bilgiye sahip olan göçmenler olduğu gibi, hiçbir bilgisi olmayan göçmenler de vardır. Sakarya ile ilgili bilgisi olan göçmenler özellikle yakınlarından Sakarya’nın doğası ve konumuyla ilgili olumlu ifadeler duyduklarını dile getirirler. Bu noktada bir görüşmecinin farklı beyanı dikkat çekmektedir: “(Göç sırasında Kırklareli’nde kamptayken görüşmecinin eşi tanıdıklarıyla karşılaşmış) *Adam demiş ki eşime sakın boğazdan öte geçme.*

¹¹ 5. Katılımcı, (65, erkek, vizesiz, Kırcalı) ile mülakat, 06.11.2019, Sakarya

*Nereye gidiyorsun, Adapazarı'na, sakın demiş Adapazarı'na gitme. Hala da neden öyle dedi, nedenini bilmiyoruz."*¹²

Sakarya'ya gelmeden önce şehre dair bir umut beslemiş olsalar da olmasalar da görüşülen göçmenlerin tamamı maddi olarak hayat standartlarından memnun olduklarını dile getirirler. Bunda görüşmecilerin bizzat kendilerinin ve/ya eşlerinin aktif iş yaşamının devam ediyor olması, İstanbul, İzmir gibi büyükşehirlerle oranla Sakarya'da yaşamının görece daha kolay olması gibi faktörler elbette etkilidir.

Yaşam standartlarından memnun olmanın dışında, Sakarya'ya geldiğinizde pişman oldunuz mu sorusunu yönelttiğim göçmenlerin biri hariç, diğerleri Sakarya'ya yerleşmiş olmaktan pişman olmadıklarını dile getirmişlerdir. Zaman zaman bu soruya verilen yanıtların kafa karıştırıcı olduğu görülür; zira yerleşmiş olmanın işaret ettiği anlam Sakarya'ya yerleşmekten çıkarak Türkiye'ye yerleşmiş olmakla eş değer bir düzlemde ifade edilir. Ayrıntılandığımızda, Sakarya'ya yerleşmiş olmaktan pişmanlık duymadığını, Sakarya'yı sevdiğini, burada yaşamaktan dolayı mutlu olduğunu dile getiren göçmenler; Sakarya'dan başka yerde yaşama imkânı olsaydı -artık çok geç olduğunu ima eden bir anlatım eşlik etmek suretiyle- bu imkânı kullanacaklarını dile getiren göçmenlere oranla çoğunluktadır. Sakarya'yı sevdiğini ifade eden göçmenlerin gösterdikleri en büyük kanıt, 1999 depreminden sonra Sakarya'da yaşamaya devam etmiş olmalarıdır. Zira 1999 depreminin, tüm Sakarya halkı gibi, Bulgaristan göçmenleri için de oldukça travmatik olduğu anlaşılmaktadır. Bu noktada 1999 depreminin Bulgaristan göçmenleri için travmatik olmasının özgün bir yanına değinmek gerekir. Bu bağlamda görüşmecilerden bir tanesinin şu sözleri dikkat çekicidir: *"Bizim eşlerimize, bayanlarımıza çok şeyler oldu. Açık geziyorsunuz, sizden ötürü Allah bizi cezalandırdı manasında sözler oldu."*¹³ Bu haliyle 1999 depreminin göçmenlerde hem bir kırılma yarattığı hem de Sakarya'da kalmaya devam etmekle adeta şehirle bağlantı açısından bir tutkal vazifesi gördüğü söylenebilir.

Sakarya'da -isteyerek yahut istemeyerek- yaşamaya devam etseler de bazı göçmenlerin, "Balkanlar'dan gelen göçmenler olarak" Sakarya'nın yaşam tarzının kendilerine uymadığını söylediklerine şahit olunmaktadır. Bu göçmenler Avrupa'yı, Trakya'yı, İzmir'i, İstanbul'u, Eskişehir'i kendi yaşam tarzlarına daha yakın olarak nitelerler.

¹² 7. Katılımcı, (61, kadın, vizesiz, Razgrad) ile mülakat, 13.11.2019, Sakarya.

¹³ 3. Katılımcı, (65, erkek, vizesiz, Kırcalı) ile mülakat, 30.10.2019, Sakarya.

Sakarya'ya yerleşmiş olduğu için pişmanlık duyan yahut başka bir şehirde yaşamayı tercih edecek göçmenlerin anlatılarına da kulak vermek gerekir:

“Eşim pişman değil ama ben pişmanım. Adapazarı'nda kimsem yok. Eskişehir'e gitmeyi tercih ederdim, orada akrabalarım çok... Arkadaşlarım ve akrabalarım... Dedim, ya İstanbul olsun ya Eskişehir olsun. (...) Biz Adapazarı'na geldik görmemişiz ki... İnsanlar kapalı, pardesülü yaz ortasında. Ben eşime dedim ki, ben gideceğim dedim. Hep gideceğim, hep gideceğim.”¹⁴

Yukarıda işaret ettiğim üzere, merceğimiz Türkiye'ye çevrildiğinde görüşülen göçmenlerin tamamı Türkiye'de bulunmaktan hiç pişman olmadıklarının altını çizmişlerdir. Birçoğu asimilasyon politikalarına kadar Bulgaristan'daki hayatlarından memnun olduklarını dile getirmiş, buna rağmen geri dönmeyi asla tercih etmediklerini belirtmişlerdir: *“Ya ne döneceğim. Ben süper bir hayat yaşamıştım orada, yaşamışım... (...) ben burasını seçtim, annem babam burada, dedim kesinlikle dönmek yok, burada...”¹⁵* Dikkat çekici nokta, göçmenlerin Türkiye'ye gelmiş olmalarından dolayı asla pişman olmadıklarına yaptıkları vurgunun yanında asimilasyon politikalarına gelene kadar Bulgaristan'daki hayatlarından memnun olduklarını söylemeleridir. Bu söylem elbette farklı şekillerde yorumlanabilir; ilk olarak, bu yorum öncelikle Bulgaristan Türklerinin hafızasında asimilasyon politikalarıyla yaşadıkları deneyimlerin kendileri için ne kadar can yakıcı olduğuna işaret eder, bir başka yorum ise Bulgaristan'daki yaşamlarından duydukları memnuniyeti vurgulayarak burada çektikleri sıkıntıların vatanda bulunmak koşuluyla dindiği anlamı üzerinden yapılabilir.

İkinci anlam üzerinden okuduğumuzda Türkiye'de kalmaya devam etmenin, dönmek istemiyor/istememiş olmaya yapılan vurgunun Bulgaristan göçmenleri için işlevsel bir yanı olduğu, anlatılar dikkate alındığında defalarca göze çarpar. Bu çıkarım göçmenlerden bazılarının dönmeyerek yahut Bulgaristan'dan ayrılarak neleri kaçırdığını vurgulamalarının altında, bazılarının ise dönenlere yönelik bakış açılarının sergilenişinde yatar. Parçalanmış aileler, Bulgaristan'daki hayatlarıyla karşılaştırınca Türkiye'deki hayat şartlarının zorluğu yahut hayata sıfırdan başlamanın güçlüğü gibi sebepler geri dönenlerin dönüşlerinin meşruiyetini sağlar. Diğer yandan, geri dönenlerin “büyük” beklentilerle gelmiş olabileceği, bu yüzden beklentileri karşılanmadığı için geri dönmüş olabileceklerine dair tahmin yürütülür. Geri dönenlerle

¹⁴ 7. Katılımcı, (61, kadın, vizesiz, Razgrad) ile mülakat, 13.11.2019, Sakarya.

¹⁵ 2. Katılımcı, (65, erkek, vizeli, Osmanpazarı) ile mülakat, 23.10.2019, Sakarya.

ilgili daha kötümser ifadeler de vardır. Örneğin, Bulgaristan'a geri dönenlerin Bulgaristan hükümetinin tabir-i caizse komplosu olduğu iddiası görüşmecilerden biri tarafından şu sözlerle dile getirilir:

“Geri dönmek kanaatimce, demin de belirttiğim gibi önceden planlanmıştı. Bazı insanlar biz sınura geldiğimizde; o rejim için çalışan, halk arasında muhbir olarak bilinen yani Türkler arasında, insanları biz sınırda gördük. Bizden önce onlar gelmişti oraya. Bu insanlar bizden önce o sınura gelmişti ve daha sonra benim tahminimce bu insanlar geri dönme propagandası yaptılar. Türkiye’yi kötüleme...”¹⁶

Bir diğer görüşmeci ise geri dönenlerin yeteri kadar mücadele etmediği konusunda görüş bildirir:

“Biz sınırdan geliyoruz, biz diyelim on kişi giriyoruz, yüz kişi çıkış yapıyor. Hepsi ağlıyor, moralleri bozuk, gençler dönüyor. Diyorum bunlar, kendi kendime böyle bir düşünüyorum, dışarı açılmamışlar, görmemişler bir şey. Türklükle alakaları yok. Belki Türk ama o sevgileri, düşünceleri yok. Diyorum bunlar hazırcular (hazırcılar). Anneleri büyütmüş, babaları çalışmadan işte öyle tembel insanlar. Benim için dönenler, hepsi de tembel insanlar. Tabi ki de, mücadele vereceksin ya. Böyle bedavaya yok bir yerde ya.”¹⁷

Anlaşılan göçmenler arasında daha fazla “Türk” olmak, daha fazla “Türk” hissetmek bir zaruriyet taşımaktadır. Türkiye’ye gelmiş olmaktan pişman olmamak, geri dönmemiş olmaya yönelik söylemler, Türkiye’de kalmanın Türk kimliği ve tarihini sahiplenmenin duygusal arka planı dışında göçmen topluluğunda yer edinmek adına bir anlamı olduğu fikrini de akla getirir. Geri dönenlere yönelik algı, kalanların “onlardan olmadığını” kanıtlamasının bir yolu olarak Türklüğe sıkı sıkıya sarılan bir söylemi daha da güçlendirmiş olabilir. Bu iddia geri dönenlerle ilgili ifadeleri niçin işlevsel olarak gördüğümü açıklamaktadır.

İkinci olarak, Bulgaristan’da kalmanın “getireceği” düşünülen avantajlarının da vurgulanması, fakat bu avantajların geri plana itilmiş olduğuna yapılan vurgu hem yukarıdaki iddiamı destekleyecek bir alt metin sunar hem de kalmak için edilen mücadelelerin soyut çıktısının - vatanda olmak, özlem çekmemek gibi- her şeyden üstün olduğunu vurgulama işlevi görür:

“Lise mezunu ve üniversite mezunu arkadaşlarımız Bulgaristan’dan, Türklere, milletekili oldular. Hatta benim bir okul arkadaşım Bakan oldu,

¹⁶ 4. Katılımcı, (60-65, kadın, sınır dışı edilmiş, Kırcalı) ile mülakat, 30.10.2019, Sakarya.

¹⁷ 2. Katılımcı, (65, erkek, vizeli, Osmanpaazarı) ile mülakat, 23.10.2019, Sakarya.

Tarım Bakanı oldu. Yani ben onlarla olsaydım, çünkü çok insan göç etti, Türk Partisi falan kuruldu, o dönem de bir yerlere geldik. Yani böyle bir şey de vardı ama biz dedik, mücadelemizi vereceğiz. Hatta eşim de o yönü ile... Çocuklarımızla bu Türkiye özlemi ile senelerden beri yaşıyoruz. Biz burada uğraşacağız. Mücadelemizi vereceğiz. Yani bir daha onları görmek istemiyoruz gibi o niyetle mücadele ettik hep beraber.”¹⁸

Çocuklarını Türkiye özlemiyle büyütüyor olmak, Bulgaristan’da kalan Türklerin “kıymetli” hale gelmesinin yanında göz önüne alınmayacak kadar değersizdir. Yine de Bulgaristan Türklerinin bir tanesinin bile hafızasında başka türlüünün mümkün olup olmayacağına dair bir düşünce bulutunun geçmediği iddia edilemez:

“Geldiğim için hiç pişman olmadım. Biz anne-baba olarak çocuklarımızı kurtardık diye hiç pişman olmadık ancak şimdi çocuklarımız Bulgaristan Avrupa Birliği’ne girince, ekonomik sıkıntılar da burada baş göstermeye başlayınca, 30 yıl sonra çocuklarımız bize dedi ki; direnemediniz orada, neden geldiniz? Çocuklarımız bize bakın bu suçlamayı yaptı. Siz orada mücadele verecektiniz, direnecektiniz dediler. Ama olayların böyle gelişeceğini nereden bilecektik ki? Avrupa Birliği’ni geçtim Jivkov rejiminin yıkılacağını, isimlerin iade edileceğini, seçmeli de olsa Türkçe okunacağını nereden bilebilirdik?”¹⁹

Yerel Halkla Etkileşim

Sakarya, yerleşik Manavlar (Türkmen kökenli), Abhazlar, Gürcüler, Yörükler, Lazlar, Çerkesler, Arnavutlar, Kürtler, Muhacirler gibi çok sayıda topluluğun ve göçmenin ikamet yeri olan, tarih boyunca sürekli göç alan bir sosyo-kültürel yapıya sahiptir. Berry’nin kültürleşme kavramı üzerinden okuduğumuzda böylesi kozmopolit bir yapının, göç edilen yerdeki “yerli” halk ile göçmenlerin karşılıklı bir iletişim içine girdikleri ve bu iletişimin neticesinde birbirlerini de değiştirip dönüştürerek göç alınan toplumu etkiledikleri bir perspektif üzerinden şekillendiği söylenebilir.²⁰ Dolayısıyla yekpare, bütünleşik bir Sakarya “yerlisi” olmadığı gibi, Sakarya “yerlisi” olarak anılan kesimin birçok etnik ve kültürel tabandan geldiğine işaret etmek gereklidir. Fakat anlatılara odaklanıldığında, Bulgaristan Türklerinin algısında bütüncül bir gelenek-görenekler ağı ve Sakaryalı imgesi bulunduğu görülür.

¹⁸ 1. Katılımcı, (59, erkek, vizesiz, Zagoriçe) ile mülakat, 23.10.2019, Sakarya.

¹⁹ 5. Katılımcı, (65, erkek vizesiz, Kırcaali) ile mülakat, 06.11.2019, Sakarya.

²⁰ John W. Berry, "Acculturation: Living Successfully In Two Cultures." *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, c. 29, s. 6 (2005): 697-712, s. 699,700.

Kültürel çatışmaların yahut kesişmelerin bu genel-geçer Sakarya “yerlisi” imgesi başlangıç noktası alınarak anlatılara sirayet ettiği anlaşılır. “Yerli halk” ile ilk karşılaşmanın getirdiği uyumsuzluklar yahut garipsenen gelenekler gibi farklı dinamikler aracılığıyla inşa edilen algı, aynı zamanda göçmenlerin “yerli” halkın karşısında kendi kimliklerini kurmasına yarayacak doneleri de bünyesinde barındırır.

Bu bağlamda, Stuart Hall’un, bir iktidar ve dışlanma oyunu içerisinde sürekli inşa edilen ve asla tamamlanmayan bir süreç olarak gördüğü kimliklere işaret ederken neyden bahsettiği bir nebze anlam kazanır. Hall, kimliklerin özdeşlikten çok farklılık ve dışlanmanın birer ürünü olduğunu söylerken kimliklerin doğal yahut kaçınılmaz bütünlüğüne değil, sınırları belirlenmiş bir “kapanım” sürecine dikkat çeker. Hall’a göre kimlikler farklılıklar yoluyla inşa edilir.²¹ Stets ve Burke de benzer bir noktaya dikkat çekerek bir kimliğe ait olmanın o kimliği paylaşan grup üyeleriyle olan benzerliklerin, buna mukabil grup dışındaki bireylerle aradaki farklılıkların vurgulanması sonucunu doğurduğunu söyler.²² Farklılıkların öne sürülmesini, Schnapper, “gruplar arasındaki düşmanlığın doğuşu” olarak görür. Bu doğrultuda kolektif “biz” kimliği dışarıdaki tehdit algısını kendi grup bağlılığını vurgulamak için kullanır; aynı zamanda özsaygının inşası da bu grupların niteliklerinin genelleştirilmesini, dışarıda bırakılmasını yahut değersizleştirilmesini sağlar.²³ Kimliğin ait olduğu toplumsal grubun anlamı ise Bilgin’in altını çizdiği üzere referansını toplumsal hafızadan almaktadır. Tarih, coğrafya, kültürel semboller, kurumlar ise bu toplumsal hafızanın birer parçasıdır.²⁴ Bauman’ın tespitiyle, bir grup içerisinde yer alan bireysel kimlik, tam da var olduğu grubun içerisinde yer almakla kendisine güvenilir, korunaklı bir alan yaratmış olur. Dışarıda kalan dünya ise içeridekinin güvenliğine zıt olacak şekilde tehlikelerle dolu olarak mimlenir.²⁵ Bu bakış açısı çalışmamda “yerli” halk ile etkileşim içinde bulunan ve kimliklerini korumaya, savunmaya

21 Stuart Hall, “Who Needs Identity”, *Questions of Cultural Identity*, ed: Stuart Hall, Paul Du Gay, (Sage, 2003): 1-17.

22 Jan E. Stets, Peter J. Burke, “Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory”, *Social Psychology Quarterly*, c.63, s. 3, (2000): 224-237, s. 225.

23 Dominique Schnapper, *Sosyoloji Düşüncesinin Özünde Öteki ile İlişki*, çev: Ayşegül Sönmezay, (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2005): 150-153.

24 Nuri Bilgin, “Kültür Değişimleri ve Kimlik Sorunları”, *Aramızdan Ayrılışın 40. Yılında Prof. Dr. Mümtaz Turhan Sempozyumu*, 2-3 Kasım 2009, (Ankara: Gazi Üniversitesi Rektörlüğü yayınları, 2009), 161-188, s. 173.

25 Zygmunt Bauman, *Akışkan Modernite*, çev: Sinan Okan Çavuş, 3. bs, (İstanbul: Can Yayınları, 2018): 246-250.

çalışan Bulgaristan göçmenlerinin “yerli” halkı tanımlayış biçimlerinde gözlenebilir.

Bulgaristan’da yaşadıkları evlerden, köylerden, kentlerden ayrılarak Türkiye’ye göç etmek, bir görüşmecinin altını çizdiği gibi, “*hem ülke hem şehir hem rejim değiştirmek*”²⁶ göçmenleri daha önce hiç alışık olmadıkları gündelik hayat pratikleriyle karşı karşıya bırakır. Dolayısıyla bunca değişikliğin arasında “yerli” halkın yaşam biçimine alışmanın göçmenler için oldukça zor olduğu anlaşılmaktadır: “*Tabii hiç sıkıntısız olmadı kızım. Her şey başka, kültür başka, insanlar başka, şehir yabancı.*”²⁷

İki grubun ilk temasının muhteviyatından başlayacak olursak görüşmecilerin tamamına yakını “yerli” halkın kendilerine karşı ilk tutumlarının oldukça olumlu olduğunu dile getirerek kendilerine sıcakkanlı, saygılı, kucaklayıcı ve paylaşımcı yaklaştığını ifade ederler. Buna rağmen aynı göçmenler “yerli” halkın tutumunu yaratan alt metnin göçmen camiasının davranışlarında saklı olduğu imasında bulunur; iyi kalpli, temiz, saygılı, çalışkan, yardımsever olmakla “yerli” halkın kendilerini tanıdığına ve bu davranışları üzerinden olumlu yaklaştıklarına işaret ederler. “Yerli” halkın göçmenlere yönelik tutumlarının “yerli” halka içkin olmaması, bilakis göçmenlerin kendilerini tanımladıkları kimlik üzerinden şekilleniyor olması ilgi çekicidir. Zira “yerli” halka yönelik olumlu algı esasen göçmenlerin kendi kimliklerini güzellemesiyle ilintilidir. “Yerli” halka dair olumlu ne varsa göçmenlerin kendi kimliklerinin yansımadır, buna mukabil “yerli” halka içkin olumsuz addedilen tüm özellikler de göçmen kimliğinin “olmadığı” nitelikler üzerinden tanımlanır.

Öteki’nin sahip olmadığı bir kimlik üzerinden kendi kimliğini tanımlamak öncelikle “olmayanları” tespit etmekten geçer. Göçmenlerin “yerli” halkla ilgili tanımladıkları ilk olumsuzlama “yerli” halkın kendileri gibi Türk tarihini “iyi bilmiyor” oluşuyla simgelenir. Tarihin iyi bilinmiyor olduğuna dair ilk çıkarım, göçmenlerin Türkiye’ye geldikleri yıllarda kendilerine yönelik Bulgar göçmeni, Bulgar, Hristiyan gibi ifadeler kullanılması üzerinden örneklenir. Kendi kimliklerine yönelen böyle bir yanlışlık “tarihin bilinmiyor” oluşuna yönelik bir algıyı genelleştirir:

“Biz zaten şunu diyoruz; biz Bulgar olsaydık buraya gelmezdik. Ne işimiz vardı burada? Biz Türk ve Müslüman olduğumuz için geldik bu topraklara. Beni üzen bir başka bir şey var. Buradaki insanlar tarihlerini çok

²⁶ 6. Katılımcı, (60-65, erkek, vizesiz, Kırcalı) ile mülakat, 7.11.2019, Sakarya.

²⁷ 10. Katılımcı, (65-70, kadın, vizesiz, Kırcalı) ile mülakat, 13.11.2019, Sakarya.

iyi bilmiyor. Yani, Bulgaristan'da Osmanlı döneminden, buradan insanlar göç ettiğini ve orada uzun seneler yaşadığını ve en son Osmanlı savaşıdan sonra da göçlerin tekrar geriye dönük başladığını....”²⁸

Göçmenlerin “yerli” halkla ilgili yaşadığı çatışmaların en şiddetlilerinin kadınların giyim kuşamı ve çalışması üzerinden şekillendiğini söylemek mümkündür. Görüşülen göçmen kadınların hepsi özellikle ilk yıllarda Sakarya'daki “kapalılığa” işaret etmiş, kendi giyim tarzlarının Sakarya halkı tarafından oldukça yadırgandığını, bu yadırgamanın içinin çeşitli imalarla doldurulduğunu belirtmişlerdir: “Sakarya'da geldiğimde, biz hepimiz açığız tabii. Geçerken böyle dışarıdan ‘pü pü’ yaptılar suratımıza böyle erkekler. Neden, biz açığız. O zaman açık insan mı vardı Adapazarı'nda, yoktu. Bizim gibi çalışan hanım mı vardı, yoktu.”²⁹

Göçmen kadınların kıyafetlerinin Sakarya'da yadırgandığı, Bulgaristan'daki hayatlarına sirayet etmiş giyim-kuşam özgürlüğünün, Sakarya'daki hayatlarına teğet geçmediği aşıkardır. Anlatılardan anlaşıldığı üzere, göçmen kadınların yaşadıkları baskıların, erkeklerle ölçülemeyecek şekillerde cereyan ettiğinin altını çizmek gerekir. Yine de erkek göçmenlerin de tıpkı kadın göçmenler gibi eşlerinin giyim tarzlarının yadırganmasıyla ilgili hatıraları vardır:

“Benim yadırgadığım olay, eşimin başı açıktı. Neredeyse başı açık olan, çalışan bir de benim eşimdi başka kimse yoktu. Ablam bundan rahatsız oldu mesela. Öğretmen olduğundan dolayı bir şey diyemediler ama kendi oğlunu everirken gelinine nasıl diyecek başını ört diye? Bu yüzden oğlan evlenirken onun evinden taşındık yani.”³⁰

Göçmenlerin farklı yaşadığı bir başka deneyim ise kadınların çalışması mevzusudur. Bulgaristan'da kadın-erkek çalışmaya alışkın olduklarını vurgulayan göçmenler, Sakarya'da kadınların çalışmasının tuhaf karşılanmasını anlamlandırmakta zorluk çekmişlerdir. Kadın göçmenlerin çalışması onları çeşitli kınamalar, iğnelemelerle karşı karşıya bırakmış, bu deneyimler otuz yıl sonra bile kadınların anlatırken en çok üzerinde durdukları hatıralardan olmuştur:

“Sabah erken iş başı yapıyorum bankada. Yaşlı amcalar da çıkmışlar camiden sabah namazında böyle bakıyorlar. Bir sabah amca dedi ki, kızım dedi ben seni kaç sabah beri görüyorum, bu saatte bizim Adapazarı'nda bayanlar çıkmaz ki bu saatte dedi. Evinde dedi, kocana kahvaltıyı hazırlarsın o da kahvaltısını yapıp işine gider. Sen nereye gidiyorsun? Veya bir yerden mi

²⁸ 1. Katılımcı, (59, erkek, vizesiz, Zagoriçe) ile mülakat, 23.10.2019, Sakarya.

²⁹ 9. Katılımcı, (74, kadın, vizeli, Kırcaali) ile mülakat, 13.11.2019, Sakarya.

³⁰ 5. Katılımcı, (65, erkek, vizesiz, Kırcaali) ile mülakat, 06.11.2019, Sakarya.

dönüyorsun, dedi. Yaşlı başlı bir amca. Ve benim böyle kaynar su döküldü gitti başımdan aşığıya.”³¹

Anlatıyı paylaşan görüşmeci, çalıştığı iş yeri içerisinde de çeşitli baskılara maruz kaldığını belirterek bu baskılara dayanamayıp işinden ayrılmak zorunda kaldığını ifade etmiştir. Yukarıdaki anlatının hemen hemen aynısı farklı şekillerde diğer kadın görüşmeciler tarafından da dile getirilir. Özellikle birkaç işte birden çalışıp para biriktirme gayesinde olan göçmen kadınlar, evlerinden erken saatlerde çıkıp evlerine geç saatlerde döndükleri için mahalleli tarafından “nereden” geldikleri ile ilgili çeşitli imalara maruz kaldıklarını, mahalleliyi çalıştıklarına inandıramadıklarını ifade ederler. Kadın göçmenler “sizin erkeğiniz yok mu” sorusuyla uğraşmak zorunda kalırken, erkek göçmenler “bakamıyorsan neden evlendin” serzenişleriyle karşı karşıya kalırlar. Bu örneklerden görüldüğü üzere, göçün ilk yıllarında günlük hayatta kadınların varlığının bile olağanüstü bir durum olduğu anlaşılır; zira kadın göçmenler örneğin yerleşmek için kiralık ev aramaya çıktıklarında, alışverişe gittiklerinde, işe gidip gelirken yahut sırf yolda yürürken bile çeşitli baskılarla yüz yüze geldiklerini aktarırlar.

Bulgaristan’daki karma sosyal hayatın ardından, tam da hayatlarını yeniden kurmak için kadın-erkek çalışıp para kazanmalarının gerekliliğine işaret ettikleri bir dönemde göçmenlerin karşı karşıya kaldığı mahalle baskısının, şehre uyum sağlamaya gayret edilen süreçte bir başka kırılma yarattığı anlaşılır. Bu kırılma, Sakarya’daki yaşam tarzının kendi yaşam tarzlarıyla uyuşmadığını ifade eden anlatılarla çoğu zaman eşlenme eğilimi gösterir. Bulgaristan göçmenleri Sakarya’daki halkın bazı alışkanlıklarının kendi yaşam tarzlarına, inandıkları değerlere uymayışını farklı anlatılarla örneklendirirler. Bebeklerinin sırtını batıl inançları dolayısıyla jiletleyenler, ortaokulda okulu bırakıp “biraz da öteki dünya için çalışacağını” söyleyen genç kızlar, 99 depreminin müziğe, güneş tutulmasına, dini yaşam tarzına uymayan davranışlar yüzünden gerçekleştiğine inananlar, akraba evlilikleri, her mahallede “konuşlandığı” ifade edilen tarikatlar gibi anlatılarla göçmenler, Sakarya’nın yaşam tarzına yönelik gariptedikleri olayları örneklendirirler. Özellikle akraba evliliklerinin Bulgaristan göçmenleri arasında kabul edilemez karşılandığı üzerine çok sık yorum yapılır. Tarikat ve cemaatlerden ötürü duyulan rahatsızlık ise yine aynı sıklıkta dile getirilir.

³¹ 7. Katılımcı, (61, kadın, vizesiz, Razgrad) ile mülakat, 13.11.2019, Sakarya.

Göçmenlerin Sakarya'da yaşadıkları sıkıntılardan bir tanesi de yukarıdaki ifadelerin arka planından anlaşılacağı gibi Sakarya'yı "kapalı" bulmalarıyla paralellik gösterir. Görüşmecilerden birinin Sakarya'da içerisinde kaldığı durum şu sözlerle dile getirilir:

"Ben burada başörtüsünü tartışacak değilim. Oruç meselesi mesela, tutmadığım zaman da tuttum derim. Sorsanız içki kullanmaz A... hoca diyecekler. Kullandığım da olmuştur. Bana da sorulunca ben de diyorum ki ben içmiyorum. (...) Ben oturduğum mahallede tedirginim. Eşime kızıma laf atmaları... Yanacaksın yanacaksın diye...Şimdi kızıma işte sen artık büyüksün nasıl böyle giyinirsin gibi..."³²

Bulgaristan'da inançlarını icra etmeye dair yasaklarla karşılaşmış göçmenlerin Sakarya'da bu sefer norm kabul edilen uygulamaları icra etmemeleri üzerinden baskı altına alınmaları düşündürücüdür.

Yerel adetlere dair benzerlikler yahut farklılıklar noktasına gelindiğinde, yerel adetlerden bahsederken görüşmecilerin bir kısmı kendi adetleri arasında hiçbir fark olmadığını ifade ederken, bir kısmı ise düğün, sünnet, mevlüt, cenaze gibi adetlerde birtakım farklılıklar bulunduğunu söyler. Örneğin; düğünlerin Bulgaristan'da daha kalabalık ve daha neşeli, daha canlı olduğunu ifade eden göçmenler; cenazelerin ve mevlütlerin ise daha duygulu, daha yoğun, daha içten geçtiğini belirtirler.

Sakaryalı olmak / Göçmen olmak

Çalışmanın sorularından biri de göçmenlerin kendi kimliklerini nasıl tanımladıkları ve "Sakaryalılık" kimliğinin işaret ettiği noktaların bu kimliğin örtüşüp örtüşmediği ile ilgiliydi. Göçmenlerin kendi kimliklerini "ne" olarak tanımladıkları sorusunun cevabı bu bağlamda neredeyse her göçmen için farklılık göstermektedir. Soruya verilen cevapların dışında, tüm görüşmeler dikkate alındığında, göçmenlerin farklı farklı kimlikleri üstlendikleri görülmektedir.

Göçmenler kendilerini en çok; Türk, Türkiye yerlisi, Avrupalı, Avrupa kültürüyle yetişmiş Türk, Türkiyeli, ülkesini çok seven Türk vatandaşı, göçmen, Bulgaristan göçmeni, Bulgaristan Türkü, Müslüman, Osmanlı Müslümanı, Osmanlı torunu, muhacir kimlikleri üzerinden tanımlarlar. Kendilerini tanımladıkları kimliklerin çeşitliliğine karşın Türk kimliğinin ortak olarak sahiplenilen en baskın kimlik olduğu

³² 5. Katılımcı, (65, erkek, vizesiz, Kırcalı) ile mülakat, 06.11.2019, Sakarya.

anlaşılır, zira bütün bu kimlikler Türk kimliği vurgulanmadan ele alınmaz.

Türklük dışında sahiplenilen en önemli kimlik göçmenliktir. Bu bağlamda göçmen kimliği mutlaka sahiplenilmesi gereken bir parça olarak karşımıza çıkar: *“Göçmeniz aslını inkâr etmeyeceksin. Biz göçmeniz, benim çoluğum çocuğum da göçmen, torunlarım da göçmen kalacak.”*³³ Göçmenliği inkâr etmek/göçmenliği inkâr etmemenin gerekliliği görüşmecilerin sıklıkla tekrarladığı bir söyleme işaret eder. Bu işaret, kendisini göçmen kimliğinden çok “yerli” olarak tanımlayan yahut göçmenliğini gizleyen kişiler olduğu izlenimini uyandırır. Bu izlenim, Sakarya’daki nüfus verilerine baktığımızda daha da güçlenir. Zira göç dalgasından önce, 1985 yılındaki nüfus verileri Bulgaristan’da doğduğunu söyleyen 53 kişinin varlığına işaret ederken göçün hemen ertesinde, 1990 nüfus sayımındaki verilerde bu sayı 1106’ya çıkar. 2000 yılına gelindiğinde ise sayının 112’ye düştüğü görülür.³⁴ Elbette verilerin toplanma biçimi gibi farklı sonuçlar doğuracak faktörler dikkate alınmadan kesin bir yorum yapılamaz; fakat göçmenlerin söylemleriyle birleştğinde elimizdeki veriler tahmin yürütmemize olanak sağlayabilecek niteliktedir.

Matruşka gibi açılan kimliklerin içinde göçmenlerin kendilerini “göçmenlik” kimliğine içkin olarak tanımlamaktan en memnun kaldıkları nitelik ise çalışkanlık üzerine kuruludur. Çalışkan olduklarına dair vurgu göçmenlerin en çok altını çizdiği özellikleridir: *“Ev yok, arsa yok, iş yok, para yok ama bizler çalışkanız. Bize bu çok söyleniyor, demek ki hak ediyoruz.”*³⁵ Göçmenler çalışkan olmalarının sebebini çoğunlukla Bulgaristan’da aldıkları eğitimle bağdaştırırlar. Bulgaristan’da aldıkları eğitimin niteliğine dair olumlu algıları, Türkiye’nin eğitim sistemine yaptıkları olumsuz vurgunun yanında oldukça dikkat çekicidir. Ezbere dayalı olmayan, öğrencinin okuduğunu yorumlama becerilerini destekleyen, lise sona kadar zorunlu olan, sadece teorik bilgiye dayalı değil pratiğin de önemsendiği, kaliteli bir eğitim sisteminin portresini çizen göçmenlerin Türkiye’deki eğitim sistemini en çok eleştirdiği noktalar eğitimin içeriğinin boş olması, temel kaygının öğrenmekten ziyade diploma almak olması, öğretmenliğin değersiz görülmesi ve düşük puanlı olması, sınıfların kalabalık olması, mesleki yönlendirme olmaması gibi konular üzerinde yoğunlaşır. Bu bağlamda Bulgaristan

³³ 6. Katılımcı, (60-65, kadın, vizesiz, Kırcalı) ile mülakat, 7.11.2019, Sakarya.

³⁴ Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu 1990 Yılı Genel Nüfus Sayımı Verileri, <https://biruni.tuik.gov.tr/nufusmenuapp/menu.zul>, [Erişim tarihi: 25.04.2020]

³⁵ 8. Katılımcı, (62, kadın, vizesiz, Kırcalı) ile mülakat, 13.11.2019, Sakarya.

eğitim sistemiyle ilgili göçmenlerin duygusunun bir parça minnet içerdiği görülmektedir:

“(komünist rejim çalışkanlığı perçinleyen bir şey mi sorusu üzerine) *O da var, ama başka bir şey daha var, eğitim meselesi. Yani hakikaten bize doğruluğu, dürüstlüğü, çalışkanlığı aşıladılar yani. Yani şöyle söyleyeyim; mesela ben, Yetmiş Beş yılında hatırlıyorum. Bir Bulgar öğretmen geldi. İlden gelip gidiyordu köyde. Ben beşinci sınıftayım o zaman, ilkokulda. Derslerimizi takip ediyor, çok böyle, sıkı. Ondan sonra dedi ki: ‘Bir gün hazırlığınızı yapın, çalışma odanızı göreceğim’ dedi. Şimdi ben de eve geldim. Çok heyecanlıyım. Öğretmenimiz bize gelecek. İşte çalışma odamızı görecek ama çalışma odam diye bir şey yok. Ondan sonra, bir oda vardı. Boş bir oda... Bir hasır atıldı, bir masa konuldu, bir perde koydu annem falan böyle, hazır etti. O da benim sonraki zamanlar için çalışma odam oldu. Şimdi siz burada duyduğunuz mu öyle bir şey mesela?’”³⁶*

Eğitilmiş olmaya ilişkin görülen kültürlülük, saygılılık, temizlik, dürüstlük yine göçmenlerin kendilerini nitelerken en sık kullandıkları ifadelerdir. Eğitim ve kültürün mütemmim cüzü olarak işaretlenen hoşgörü de göçmenler tarafından farklı veçhelerde görünür kılınır. Sakarya’nın kozmopolit yapısına işaret edecek şekilde diğer etnik gruplarla aralarında herhangi bir sürtüşme olmadığını; evlilik, komşuluk, arkadaşlık gibi farklı ilişki biçimlerini kurarken ve sürdürürken göçmenler olarak herhangi bir ayırım yapmadıklarının altını çizerler. Kendi ifadeleriyle demokratik olmak, kapsayıcı olmak, farklı etnik gruplar arasında ayırım gözetmemek göçmenlerin kendilerini takdir ettiği özelliklerin başında gelir: *“Biz belki Sakarya’nın, göçmenler, Sakarya’nın en demokratik düşünen etnik grubuyuz. (...) İnsanlar Laz mı, Arnavut mu, Boşnak mı onu asla sorgulamıyoruz.”*³⁷ Bu bağlamda Sakarya’da yaygın olarak, etnik kökeni öğrenmek için sorulan “sen ne milletsin” sorusunun göçmenler açısından yadırganması bir anlama oturur. Zira görüşmecilerin bir kısmı zaman zaman karşılaştıkları bu soruyu oldukça yadırgadıklarını belirtirler: *“Adetler aşağı yukarı aynı, o anlamda garip gelmedi, sadece bize yasak olduğu için garip geldi yoksa yasak olmasaydı biz de böyle yapacaktık belki diye düşünmüşümdür. En çok garibime giden şey ise sen ne milletsin sorusu oldu...”*³⁸

Görüşmelerde, göçmenlerin kendilerine dair algılarının yanında “yerli” halka dair algılarını da anlayabileceğimiz söylemler yoğunlukla görülür. Görüşmeciler genellikle “yerli” halka dair doğrudan olumsuz

³⁶ 1. Katılımcı, (59, erkek, vizesiz, Zagoriçe) ile mülakat, 23.11.2019, Sakarya.

³⁷ 4. Katılımcı, (60-65, kadın, sınır dışı edilmiş, Kırcaali) ile mülakat, 30.10.2019, Sakarya.

³⁸ 6. Katılımcı, (60-65, kadın, vizesiz, Kırcaali) ile mülakat, 7.11.2019, Sakarya.

yorum yapmaktan kaçınırlar, buna rağmen nadiren direkt olarak, bazen de dolaylı olarak söylemlerinin arasından Sakarya halkına dair hayal kırıklıkları açıkça belirir:

“Kültürlü değil bizim milletimiz, çok çok çok kötü. Saygı yok aramızda. (...)Sakarya milleti de çok çok cahil, çok kötü. Vallahi, ben açık açık söylüyorum. (...)Sakarya’ya inemiyorum, dedim ya; insanların yanlışlıklarından. (...) Çok tersliyorlar, anlayışlı değil. Böyle bir problem var. Adapazarı’nda Sakarya işte, tam istediğim gibi değil. Çünkü biz Avrupalıyız, başka görüşlüyüz.”³⁹

Göçmenlerin tüm söylemleri birleştirildiğinde karşımıza çıkan tablo, Sakarya “yerlilerini” cahil, kültürsüz, saygısız, kaba, anlayışsız, neşesiz, kapalı, maddiyatçı buldukları üzerinden şekillenir. Bu algı, göçmenlerin kendilerini / birbirlerini kültürlü, eğitilmiş, dürüst, ahlaklı, çalışkan kimseler olarak görmelerinde ve bu tanımlamalar üzerinden bir Bulgaristan göçmeni üst kimliği yaratmalarında etkili olur: *“Biz burada Bulgaristan’ın farklı yerlerinde olsak da kader arkadaşınız, ben ona güvenirim çünkü o Bulgaristan eğitimi almış. Dürüştür, sözüne sadıktır, hırsızlığı yoktur, kültür seviyesi yüksektir, bitti!”⁴⁰*

Peki göçmenler kendilerini Sakaryalı gibi hissediyorlar mıdır? Sakarya “yerlilerine” attettikleri değerler kendi kimliklerini kurgularken karşılıklarına nasıl çıkmaktadır? Bu alt soruları anlamlandırabilmek için sorulan “kendinizi Sakaryalı olarak görüyor musunuz/hissediyor musunuz” sorusuna görüşülen göçmenlerin bir kısmı kendisini Sakaryalı gibi hissettiği cevabını verirken bir kısmı ise kendisine Sakaryalı diyemediğini ifade etmektedir. Sakaryalı gibi hissetmediğini söyleyen göçmenlerin temel sebeplerinin Sakarya halkıyla farklı görüş ve yaşam tarzlarını paylaşmaları ve/veya Sakarya’ya bağlanacak akrabalık ve yakınlık ilişkilerini kuramamaları olduğu gözlenir. Sakaryalı gibi hisseden göçmenlerin temel motivasyon kaynaklarının ise evlerinin, ailelerinin ve akrabalarının Sakarya’da olması, Sakarya’nın ikliminin, yeşilliğinin kendilerine iyi gelmesi olduğu anlaşılır. Göçmenlerin Sakaryalı hissetmeye dair sundukları argüman dikkat çekicidir, zira bu söylem evlerinin ve ailelerinin olduğu herhangi bir yerin göçmenler için çekici olabileceği anlamına gelebilir. Diğer taraftan iklimin ve doğanın daha önce de işaret ettiğim üzere geldikleri memlekete benzemesi Sakarya’ya atfedilen önemin bir miktar altını oymaktadır. İklim ve çevrenin güzelliği Sakarya’ya has yahut Sakarya’da tanıdıkları ve beğendikleri özellikler olmaktan ziyade memleketlerine benzerlik

³⁹ 2. Katılımcı, (65, erkek, vizeli, Osmanpazarı) ile mülakat, 23.10.2019, Sakarya.

⁴⁰ 8. Katılımcı, (62, kadın, vizesiz, Kircaali) ile mülakat, 13.11.2019, Sakarya.

üzerinden tanımlanmıştır. Dolayısıyla Sakarya'ya kendi "memleketlerine" olan benzerliği dolayısıyla önem atfedilmiştir.

Bu durumda Sakarya'nın göçmenlerin gözündeki anlamı muğlaklaşmış görünür. Sakarya'nın kültürel yapısı ve yerleşik adetleri göçmenlerin alışkın olmadığı, bilakis 30 yıl sonra bile çoğunlukla eleştirdikleri bir konumda durur. Bu kültürel yapıya angaje olamadan yahut bu kültürel yapıyı eleştirerek; aynı zamanda kendi göçmen kimlikleri üzerinden kurdukları arkadaşlık ilişkilerinin şehirde yaşamaya dair en hayati bağlar olduğuna işaret eden göçmenlerin şehre uyum sağladıklarını söylemek, şehirle kurulan bağların bir anlamda gereklilik/zorunluluk yönünün ihmal edilmesi anlamına gelmemekte midir?

Sonuç ve Değerlendirme

Göçmenlerin yerel halkla etkileşimlerinin sürecin önemli bir parçası olduğu fikrinden yola çıkarak hem kendilerine dair kimlik kurgularının hem de yerel halka dair imajlarının şehre uyum sağlamadaki etkisinin incelenmesinin hedeflendiği çalışmam, özellikle aşağıda ifade ettiğim bazı konulara dair sorulara cevap vermek kadar yeni soruları öne çıkarmayı da önemsemektedir. Verilmeye çalışılan cevaplar ve çalışmanın sorduğu yeni soruları bu bölümde aktarmaya çalışacağım.

Sakarya'ya yerleşme nedenini sorduğum göçmenler aile ve akrabalarının Sakarya'da olması, Sakarya'nın iklim ve bitki örtüsünün göç ettikleri coğrafyaya benzemesi ve Sakarya'ya memur olarak atanmaları olmak üzere 3 başlık altında yerleşme nedenlerini sıralamışlardır. Bunların arasından, daha önce farklı bölgelerde yapılan birçok saha araştırmasıyla da uyum sağlayacak şekilde aile, akraba ve arkadaşlarının şehirde olmasının ana etken olduğu görülmektedir. İkinci olarak, iklim ve bitki örtüsünün göç ettikleri "memleketleriyle" benzerlik göstermesi Sakarya tercihlerini açıklayan bir başka faktör olmaktadır. Bu durum sadece Sakarya özelinde vuku bulmamış; örneğin bir başka çalışmada Bursa'ya yerleşen göçmenlerin de şehri memleketlerine benzerlik üzerinden değerlendirdiği ortaya konulmuştur.⁴¹ Bu bağlamda derinlikli bir çalışmada göçmenlerin Türkiye'yi vatan olarak görüyor olmaları; fakat diğer yandan da bir yerin vatan olması için gerekli

⁴¹ Nihan Çiğerci Ulukan, "Göçmenler ve İşgücü Piyasası: Bursa'da Bulgaristan Göçmenleri Örneği" (Doktora Tezi, Marmara Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 2008): 167.

koşulları Bulgaristan'daki "vatanları" ile olan benzerliklerinin belirliyor olması tespiti ayrıntılı incelenebilir.

Vasileva, makalesinde 1989 göçünün sadece asimilasyon politikalarından kaçmak için değil, serbest ekonomi sahasında bulunan Türkiye'nin vatandaşlarına sağladığı imkanlardan yararlanmak yahut daha iyi bir yaşam, daha fazla para ve göçmen işçi olarak Batı Avrupa'ya açılma ihtimalini elde etmek için de gerçekleşmiş olduğunu ifade etmektedir.⁴² Benim saha çalışmamda, özellikle ilk aylarda, Jivkov rejimi henüz yıkılmadan gelen göçmenlerin asimilasyon politikalarından önce hayatlarından memnun olmalarına rağmen Bulgaristan'da yaşadıkları sancılı süreç sonunda Türkiye'ye hiçbir beklentiyi kurgulayacak zamanları kalmadan göç etmek zorunda kaldıkları sonucu çıkmaktadır. Sakarya'ya yerleşmiş olmaktan ötürü memnun olan göçmenler olduğu gibi pişman olan yahut kendi kültürel özelliklerine yakın olduğunu düşündükleri şehirlere yerleşmiş olmayı tercih eden göçmenler de bulunmaktadır. Sakarya'ya yerleşmiş olmaktan pişman olmadığını dile getiren göçmenlerin en önemli kanıtı 1999 depreminde şehri terk etmemeleridir. Pişman olmuş yahut başka yerlerde yaşamayı tercih etmiş olmayı isteyenlerin en önemli argümanı ise Sakarya'daki kültürel değerlerin kendi kültürlerine uymayışı üzerinden şekillenmektedir. Göçmenler pratik olarak bilmedikleri bir şehre, ülkeye, rejime yerleşmekten ötürü hem gündelik hayatta hem de "yerli" halkla olan ilişkilerinde çeşitli zorluklarla karşı karşıya kalmışlardır. Yine de hiçbir görüşmeci Türkiye'ye yerleşmiş olmaktan ötürü pişman olduğunu beyan etmemiş, "Türk" kimliklerini ön plana çıkararak bu kimliklerin eşlendiği coğrafyanın Türkiye olması üzerinden yaşadıkları sıkıntıları adeta "sineye çekmişlerdir". Bu söylemle uygun olacak şekilde, Bulgaristan'da kalsalardı yahut geri dönselerdi daha iyi bir konumda olabileceklerine, fakat Türkiye'nin kendi "vatan"ları olduğuna dikkat çeken görüşmeciler bulunmaktadır.

Yanı sıra, özellikle geri dönenlerle ilgili pejoratif yorumlar dikkate alındığında bu iki unsurun Türk kimliklerini besleyen işlevsel bir noktaya tekabül ettiği sonucuna ulaşılabilir. Türkiye'de yaşıyor olmaktan "asla" pişman olmamak, geri dönmeyi bir gün bile istememek/düşünmemek Türk kimliğini pekiştiren ve vurgulayan söylemlerdir. Ayşe Parla, Türk milliyetçiliğinin ön plana çıktığı literatürde Bulgaristan Türkleri ile Türkiye Türklerinin "ayrılmaz bir bütün" şeklinde ele alınışının, Bulgaristan Türklerinin etnik ve kültürel özlerinin korunduğuna işaret eden "akrabalık ruhuna" yapılan

⁴² Vasileva, *Bulgarian Turkish Emigration*, 348.

vurgunun “ne pahasına olursa olsun” sürdürüldüğünün altını çizmektedir.⁴³ Belki de incelenmesi gereken Türkiye’de “ödedikleri bedellere” vurgu yapan -keza çektikleri sıkıntılar vurgu yapılmaya da berrak bir şekilde görülebilir- göçmenlerin de Türk milliyetçiliğine atfedilen diskurun tam içinden söylem üretme dinamikleri olmalıdır.

Göçmenlerin “yerli” halkla etkileşimleri Elchinova’nın İzmir’de yürüttüğü saha çalışmasında işaret ettiği çıktılarla da benzerlik gösterecek şekilde uyum sorunlarıyla örülüdür. Bulgaristan’daki kapalı rejim yapısı sebebiyle Türk toplumu hakkında ya hiç bilgiye sahip olmayan ya da çok az bilgisi olan Bulgaristan göçmenlerinin Türkiye’de nasıl giyineceklerinden nasıl konuşacaklarına yahut nasıl davranacaklarına kadar gündelik hayatın yaşanış biçimlerinden hiçbirine tam anlamıyla haiz olamadıklarına, hakim kültüre aşinalığın eksikliğinin göçmenleri toplumda “marjinal” bir konuma yerleştirmiş olduğuna işaret eden Elchinova, göçmenlerin akrabalarının yanında yaşamasının bu durumla birebir bağlantılı olduğu sonucuna ulaşmıştır.⁴⁴ Ayşe Parla da Bulgaristan Türklerinin Bulgaristan’da “Türk” oldukları için eziyet gördüğünü, Türkiye’de ise “Bulgar” görüldükleri için marjinalize edildiğine dikkat çekmektedir.⁴⁵ Neticede her iki saha çalışmasının çıkardığı sonuç benim çalışmamla uyumlu olacak şekilde sosyal adaptasyonun göçmenler için kolay olmadığı yönündedir.

Göçmenlerin Türkiye’ye adaptasyonu, yukarıda işaret ettiğim üzere, yaşam biçimlerinin ve kültürel arka planlarının farklılığı nedeniyle kırılmalarla doludur. En önemli kırılmalardan biri, kadınların giyim-kuşama ve çalışması üzerinden gerçekleşmiştir. Göçmen kadınların giyim kuşama ve çalışma hayatına katılmasının “yerli” halkla göçmenlerin arasındaki ilişkiyi germesi ve özellikle göçmen kadınların maruz kaldığı baskılar Bursa, Ankara, İzmir, Eskişehir, Çanakkale gibi farklı özelliklere sahip illerde çalışan araştırmacıların da dikkat çektiği önemli bir konudur.⁴⁶ Gizem Kılıçlı ise Bulgaristan’a geri dönen kadınların

⁴³ Ayşe Parla, “Longing, Belonging and Locations of Homeland among Turkish Immigrants from Bulgaria”, *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, c.6, s.4 (2006): 563-557, s. 545.

⁴⁴ Elchinova, “Alien by Default”, 103.

⁴⁵ Parla, “Longing, Belonging and Locations”, 546.

⁴⁶ Elchinova, “Alien by Default”, Çiğerci Ulukan, **age**; Asya Durmaz, “Bitmeyen Muhacirlik: Balıkesir’de Göçmen Konutlarında Yaşayan 1989 Bulgaristan Göçmenleri”, (Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Mimar Sinan Güzel Sanatlar Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 2019); Coşkun Borlat, “1989 Zorunlu Göçü Göçmenlerin Sosyal Entegrasyonu: Çanakkale Şirinköy Bulgaristan Göçmenleri Üzerine Bir Araştırma”, (Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Çanakkale 18 Mart Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 2019); Cemile Bayraklı, “Dış Göçün Sosyo-Ekonomik Etkileri: Görece Göçmen Konutları’nda (İzmir) Yaşayan Bulgaristan Göçmenleri Örneği”, (Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Adnan Menderes Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü,

deneyimlerini ele aldığı çalışmasında Bulgaristan Türkü kadınların geri dönüşünde “yabancı” görüldüklerine dair söylemlerin ve Türkiye’de karşı karşıya kaldıkları baskı ve ayrımcılığın tuttuğu yeri anlatılar aracılığıyla deşifre etmektedir.⁴⁷

Göçmenler şehre uyum sağlamayı, dayanışma ağlarının ipliklerini sınımsız örmeye çalışmak suretiyle gerçekleştirmişler, bu doğrultuda kendi kimliklerini kurguladığı noktalar, aralarındaki dayanışma bağlarının ilmeklerini atma işlevi görmüştür. Göçmenlerin “yerli” halk karşısında kendi kimlik kurguları iyi kalpli, temiz, saygılı, çalışkan, yardımsever, eğitilmiş, kültürlü, hoşgörülü, dürüst, açık fikirli gibi değerler üzerinden tanımlanır. Suat Kolukırık da ‘çalışkan’, ‘dürüst’, ‘temiz’ ve ‘Avrupalı’ gibi tanımlamalarda bulunan göçmenlerin “yerlileri” kendilerinin ötekisi olarak kurguladıklarından bahsetmektedir.⁴⁸ Hasan Şen, 435 kişiyle anket, 15 kişiyle ise derinlemesine görüşmeler yaparak biçimlendirdiği çalışmasında göçmenlerin “yerli” halkı cahil, cimri, tembel, ikiyüzlü gibi tanımlamalar aracılığıyla nitelendirdiği sonucuna ulaşmıştır.⁴⁹ Benim çalışmamda da benzer şekilde, göçmenlerin “yerli” halkı algılayış biçimi ve “yerli” halka attikleri kimliğin nüvelerinin, kendi kimliklerine attikleri tanımlamalarla taban tabana zıt olduğu görülür. Göçmenlerin kendi kimliklerinin karşısına oturttukları “yerli” halk; cahil, saygısız, kaba, anlayışsız, neşesiz, kültürsüz, kapalı, bilgisiz gibi tanımlamalar aracılığıyla kurgulanmıştır.

Dikkat çekici nokta, Mehmet Hacısalihoğlu’nun da Magdalena Elchinova’nın da tıpkı göçmenlerin Sakarya “yerlilerine” attettiği

2007); Gizem Kılıçlı, “Bulgaristan Türkü Göçmen Kadınlarının Öz-Kimlik İnşası”, *Hacettepe Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Dergisi*, c.36 s.1 (2019): 150-162; Gülbahar Kurtuluş, *Bulgaristan Türklerinin Göç Hikayeleri: Bir Sözlü Tarih Denemesi*, 2.bs (Ankara: Karakum, 2019); Hasan Şen, “Çoklu Sadakat Ekseninde Türk Göçmenleri”, *Sosyoloji Dergisi*, c.1, s.12-13 (2004): 37-60; İlhan Zeynep Karakılıç, “The Work Strategies and Experience of the Wave of 1989 Immigrants from Bulgaria Settled in Ankara”, (Yüksek Lisans Tezi, ODTÜ Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 2007); Jale Balaban, Fatme Fevzi Mehmed, “1989 Bulgaristan Göçmenlerinin Kültürlerarası İletişim Pratikleri: Eskişehir Örneği”, *Selçuk Üniversitesi İletişim Fakültesi Akademik Dergisi*, c. 8, s. 3 (2014): 5-34; Özge Kaytan, “Gendered Citizenship: Experiences and Perceptions of the Bulgarian Turkish Immigrant Women”, (Yüksek Lisans Tezi, ODTÜ Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 2014); Sercan Eklemezler, “Toplumsal Hafıza ve Mekan: Bulgaristan Göçmeni Kadınların Deneyimleri ve Bursa Göç Tarihi Müzesi”, (Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Anadolu Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 2018); Suat Kolukırık, *Bulgaristan’dan Göç Eden Türk Göçmenlerin Dayanışma ve Örgütlenme Biçimleri: İzmir Örneği*, *C.Ü. Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, c.30, s.1 (2006): 1-13.

⁴⁷ Gizem Kılıçlı, “Bulgaristan Türkü Göçmen Kadınlarının”, 150-162.

⁴⁸ Suat Kolukırık, “Bulgaristan’dan Göç Eden Türk Göçmenlerin”, 1-13, s. 5.

⁴⁹ Hasan Şen, “Çoklu Sadakat Ekseninde”, 37-60.

tanımlamalarda görüldüğü gibi; Bulgaristan’da, Bulgaristan Türklerine yönelik benzer ifadelerin olduğuna işaret etmesidir. Hacısalihioğlu, Türklere Bulgaristan’da “en uzak ötekiler” ve “yeterince modern ve laik olmayanlar” dendiğini aktarır.⁵⁰ Elchinova da benzer şekilde Bulgaristan Türklerinin ulusal çoğunluktan “farklı olarak” eğitimsiz, geleneksel (kapalı), vasıfsız (kültürsüz), az-gelişmiş, muhafazakâr gibi sıfatlarla tasvir edildiklerini ifade eder. Elchinova, bu pejoratif algının beslenme noktalarının kırsal nüfusta yoğunlaşmış olan Türk azınlığın Bulgar çoğunluğa göre daha vasıfsız işlerde çalışması, eğitim oranlarının düşük olması, erken evlilikler ve çok çocukla bezenmiş geniş ailelerin yaygınlığı, kadın-erkek eşitliğine dair muhafazakâr düşünceler nedeniyle bu şekilde çizildiğini söyler.⁵¹ Bunun dışında Bulgaristan’da çoğunluktan azınlığa, göçmenler örneğinde ise azınlıktan çoğunluğa yönelmesi açısından bile baktığımızda, iki imajın kurulum nedenleri birbirinden farklıdır. İşaret etmek istediğim nokta kimliğin ötekisinin benzer imajlarla tasvir edilebileceği, keza göçmenlerin de kendi kimliklerini Sakaryalılığa yekpare bir vücut atfederek Sakaryalı heyulası üzerinden kurgulamaları üzerinedir. Böylece göçmenler, Elchinova’nın da işaret ettiği üzere, ev sahibi topluluğun yaşam tarzından daha iyi, daha medeni ve “Avrupalı” olarak tanımladıkları ve kendi gruplarının özsaygısının kaynağını buldukları belirli bir yaşam tarzına bağlılıklarını ifade etmişlerdir.⁵² Benzer bir bakış açısı Suat Kolukırık’ın ve Hasan Şen’in bahsedilen çalışmasında, Asya Durmaz’ın 2019 yılında Balıkesir’i örneklem seçtiği yüksek lisans tezi kapsamında, Jale Balaban Sarı ve Fevziye Mehmed’in Eskişehir örneklemlerinde çalışmasında da ele alınır.⁵³

Farklı çalışmalarda ise Türkiyeli Türkler ile Bulgaristan Türklerinin “ortaklığına” vurgu yapılarak uyum sürecinin “kolaylaşmış” olduğu varsayılmıştır.⁵⁴ Bu noktada, etnik kimlik ve “Türk” kültürü hususunda

⁵⁰ Mehmet Hacısalihioğlu, “Göç Kavramı, Tarih Yazımı ve Kamuoyu”, 89 *Göçü: Bulgaristan’da 1984-1989 Azınlık Politikaları ve Türkiye’ye Zorunlu Göç*, ed: Neriman Ersoy – Hacısalihioğlu, Mehmet Hacısalihioğlu, (İstanbul: Balkar & Balmed, 2012): 31-74, s. 38.

⁵¹ Elchinova, “Alien by Default”, 90-93.

⁵² Elchinova, “Alien by Default”, 87-110.

⁵³ Jale Balaban, Fatme Fevzi Mehmed, “1989 Bulgaristan Göçmenlerinin Kültürlerarası İletişim Pratikleri: Eskişehir Örneği”, *Selçuk Üniversitesi İletişim Fakültesi Akademik Dergisi*, c. 8 s. 3 (2014): 5-34, 31.

⁵⁴ Nuri Korkmaz, Ayhan Öztürk, “Bulgaristan Türklerinin Göç Süreci ve Göçmenlerin Türkiye’deki İskan ve İş Gücüne Dayalı Entegrasyonu”, *ANKASAM*, c.1, s.3 (2017): 268-289, s. 284; Yıldırım Şafak Üstün, “Bulgaristan’dan Yalova’ya Göç Eden Türklerin Sosyo-Kültürel Yaşamı ve Sürec İçindeki Değişimi”, (Yüksek Lisans Tezi, İTÜ Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 2018): 67; Yücel Yiğit, “Balıkesir’de 89 Göçü”, *Balıkesir Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi*, c. 15, s. 28-1 (2012): 158-173, s. 157; Turhan Çetin, “Bulgaristan’daki Soydaşlarımızın Türkiye’ye Göç Etme Süreçlerini Etkileyen Bazı Değişkenlerin

“yerli” halk ile ortak bir politik geçmiş, Bulgaristan’a ait gündelik yaşam kültürü ve eğitim sistemi aracılığıyla Bulgar halkı ile ortaklaşan göçmenlerin, neden Türkiyeli Türklerle daha çok ortak noktası olduğu düşünülmüştür yahut hangi saiklerle her iki gruptan da ayrılmıştır noktası yine ele alınması gereken sorulardan bir tanesi olabilir.

Göçmenler kendi kimliklerine içkin gördükleri parçaların çoğunu Bulgaristan eğitimi sayesinde kazandıklarını ifade etmişlerdir. Bulgaristan’da verilen eğitimin göçmenlerin kimliklerine dair sahiplendikleri değerlerin orijini olması da ele alınması gereken bir konudur. Kendi kimliklerini Bulgaristan eğitimi almak üzerinden kuran göçmenlerin eğitimin getirdiği sıfatları kullanarak “yerli” halkla aralarına mesafe koyduğu sonucu çalışmamın çıktılarında biridir. Bu çıktıdan yola çıkarak soru işaretim, çocuklarının Bulgaristan eğitimine ya hiç maruz kalmadığı ya da çok sınırlı süre maruz kaldığı düşünüldüğünde göçmen çocuklarının “yerli” halkın pejoratif tanımından ayrıştıkları yerlerin neresi olduğu noktasıdır. Zira göçmenler kendi çocuklarından bahsederken sıklıkla kendi kimliklerinin yansımalarının çocuklarında da belirdiği tespitinde bulunmuşlardır. Yanı sıra, çocuklarının da göçmen ruhunu taşıdığına işaret eden anlatılar mevcuttur: “Yani bir Amerikalıya da sorsanız, benim dedem İrlandalı diyecek, değil mi? yani o çünkü aile içinde, nesilden nesile derler ya, toplum hafızasıdır. Bizim toplumumuzun hafızasından o silinmeyecek.”⁵⁵

Bu doğrultuda, evdeki eğitim kamusal eğitimin önüne geçiyorsa göçmen çocuklarının aynı değerleri taşıması anlamlıdır; aksi durumda, yani kamusal eğitimin evdeki eğitimin önüne geçtiği varsayılıyorsa, -ki göçmenlerin Bulgaristan eğitimine yaptıkları vurgu bu anlayışa tekabül etmektedir- ikinci neslin kendi kimliklerini nereden kurguladıkları sorusu anlam taşır. Bu bağlamda eğer ikinci nesil kendisini göçmen olarak niteliyorsa, göçmenlik bağlarını hangi saikler üzerinden kurguluyor sorusu bir başka derinlikli araştırmanın konusu olabilir.

Dayanışma ağlarının bütünleşme hususunda yarattığı hayati bağa atıfta bulunarak kimlik kuruluşu ile şehirle uyum sağlama pratiklerini

İncelenmesi”, *Ege Üniversitesi Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Enstitüsü Türk Dünyası İncelemeleri Dergisi*, c. 8. s.1 (2008): 55-77, s. 56; Coşkun Borlat, 1989 Zorunlu Göçü Göçmenlerin Sosyal Entegrasyonu: Çanakkale Şirinköy Bulgaristan Göçmenleri Üzerine Bir Araştırma, (Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Çanakkale 18 Mart Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 2019):161; Cemile Bayraklı, Dış Göçün Sosyo-Ekonomik Etkileri: Görece Göçmen Konutları’nda (İzmir) Yaşayan Bulgaristan Göçmenleri Örneği, (Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Adnan Menderes Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 2007): 139,140; Gülbahar Kurtuluş, *Bulgaristan Türklerinin Göç Hikayeleri: Bir Sözlü Tarih Denemesi*, 2.bs (Ankara: Karakum, 2019): 180.

⁵⁵ 4. Katılımcı, (60-65, kadın, sınır dışı edilmiş, Kırcalı) ile mülakat, 30.10.2019, Sakarya.

birlikte düşündüğümüzde özellikle göçmenlerin “biz” kimliği üzerinden aile, akraba ve arkadaşlarını tanımlaması bu bağların kuvvetli kurulumunu sağlayarak şehirle bütünleşme pratiklerini güçlendirmiş olabilir; zira şehirle kurulan ilişki, yakınlık bağları üzerinden tanımlanmış ve Sakaryalılık algısı bu yakınlık bağlarına atıfta bulunmuştur. Öte yandan, “biz” ile “onlar” arasındaki ayrımın belli bir mesafede konumlanması, özellikle dayanışma ağlarının sürekliliğinin varlığıyla bütünleşmeyi desteklerken, dayanışma ağlarının olmayışı yahut mesafenin makasının dayanışma ağlarının gücünü kırarak ölçüde açık olması şehirle bütünleşmeyi güçleştirmektedir. Bu durumda yaşam memnuniyetinin ekonomik olanaklarla sınırlı kaldığı, Sakaryalılık kimliğinin üstlenilemediği, salt mekânsal bir var olma üzerinden şehirle bağlantı kurulabildiği gözlenir.

Bu durumda üzerinden 30 yıl da geçse kendilerini yerleştikleri şehrin bir parçası hissedememiş, “şehirle bütünleşememiş” anlatıları es geçmeden yahut Türk kimliğinin birleştirici tutkal olduğu ve göçmenlerin yaşadıkları sıkıntıların bu tutkal içerisinde görünmez kılındığı bir anlatıdan ziyade uyumsuzluğa veya zoraki bir uyuma işaret eden anlatılara da kulak vermek kıymeti iade etmenin bir yolu olabilir: “(Sakarya’ya uyum sağlamaya) *Mecbur kaldık kızım, mecbur kaldık, çocuklarımız için mecbur kaldık.*”⁵⁶

⁵⁶ 7. Katılımcı, (61, kadın, vizesiz, Razgrad) ile mülakat, 13.11.2019, Sakarya.

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Historiographic controversy about the Crusades against Bosnian "heretics"

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Abstract:

The teachings of the Bosnian Church constitute one of the greatest mysteries of the medieval period of Bosnian history. The issue whether it acted in the realms of heresy or orthodoxy has been disputed in a scientific battleground in historiographical circles many times. Just a touch less controversy is linked with the nature of military missions proclaimed and executed against Bosnian "heretics". Some authors characterize these conflicts as religious, so typical for crusades, while others, however, emphasize the political and territorial pretensions of Hungary regarding Bosnia, as the main motif, describing the Holy war idea as a cover story for the sake of the Papal curia. The triangle between Hungary, Rome and Bosnia was the focal point of discourse in which numerous accusations on one side and explanations from the other occurred, along with war propaganda, anti-heretic warnings and attempts to prove innocence and that right path were followed. Interestingly, the Bosnian medieval state, so many times threatened with crusades against it, became the leading advocate for crusade missions against the Ottoman danger in the 15th century. This transformation did not occur because crusader ideas prevailed, but rather because of an evolution within the social and administrative structures. This work will explore all the differences between the opposing historiographic streams, their approaches regarding sources and literature.

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The main goal is to determine how research performed with more or less identical source material, can produce such opposing results.¹

Keywords: Medieval Bosnia, Crusade against heretics, 13th - 15th Century, Church of Bosnia, propaganda, historiography, different interpretations.

Studying of the Crusades against the medieval Bosnian state implies the analysis of whole sets of propaganda activities aimed at the exploitation of accusations about the existence of heretics in Bosnia. Unlike most other Crusades, when main propaganda activities came from ecclesiastical circles,² from the beginning of correlation of Bosnia with heresy, main accusers were its neighbours, who almost always had either territorial or economic motives. Thus, the first mention of heresy in Bosnia originates from a letter created in 1199 by Vukan, the ruler of Duklja, in which he informed Pope Innocent III that the ruler of Bosnia, Ban Kulin (1180-1204), shelters and protects heretics in his realm.³ It would be naïve to conclude that Vukan had purity and wellbeing of the Catholic faith on his mind when he sent this denuntiation against the bosnian ruler to the papal curia, as some authors advocate.⁴ Concrete political motives which arose from the existence of the two conflicting political alliances were prevailing reason for labeling Bosnia as heretical haven.⁵

¹ This paper initially was presented on the Conference "The Fairest Meadows in the Worlds: Crusades and Crusaders in the Balkans", which was organized by St. Cyril and St. Methodius University in Veliko Tarnovo, Bulgaria, on November 7th - 9th 2013. Unfortunately, the volume with the essays from this Conference never was published.

² Christoph T. Maier, *Crusade Propaganda and Ideology. Model Sermons for the Preaching of the Cross*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) 280.

³ Since that in this occasion Innocent III did not mention the possibility of launching a Crusade against Bosnia, this topic is not included in paper. More information about a series of events that Vukan's letter triggered, and eventually end with the so-called *Abjuration of Bolino Polje*, one of the most famous documents from medieval Bosnian history, can be found in vast literature. We emphasize: Dragutin Kniewald, "Vjerodostojnost latinskih izvora o bosanskim krstjanima." *Rad JAZU* 270 (1949): 115-283; Pejo Čošković, "Interpretacija Kniewaldovog kritičkog izdanja Bilinopoljske izjave." *Prilozi* 32 (2003): 75-115; Lujo Margetić, "Neka pitanja abjuracije iz 1203. godine," in *Fenomen "krstjani" u srednjovjekovnoj Bosni i Humu*, ed. Franjo Šanjek (Sarajevo and Zagreb, 2005) 27-103.

⁴ Ivana Komatina, *Crkva i država u srpskim zemljama od XI do XIII veka*, (Beograd: Istorijski institut, 2016), 231.

⁵ Dženan Dautović, "Prilog tumačenju značaja pisma Inocenta III od 9. novembra 1202. godine (Reg.Vat. 5, ff: 53v-54r, e: 103) za proučavanje političkih odnosa u Jugoistočnoj Europi početkom 13. stoljeća", in *Bosanski ban Tvrtko "pod Prozorom u Rami"*, ed. Tomislav Brković (Prozor, Sarajevo and Zagreb: Synopsis, 2016), 195-212.

In historiographical writings we can find that there were eight different occasions when Crusades were launched to medieval Bosnia. The main goal of this paper is to gather in one place all sources about these events, and to present very different historiographical opinions and interpretations of these sources, and finally to show how many of them we can actually label as Crusades. Regarding the preconditions which have to be present so one military campaign could receive a crusader prefix, one can still rely on the arguments by famous German medievalist Hans Eberhard Mayer, who stated that such a campaign have to be authorized by the Pope, participants had to pledge a crusader oath, and a pope had to issue general indulgences for every participant.⁶

Acontius' Crusade (1221-1222)

The first half of 13th century was without a doubt the period of most intense relations between Bosnia and the Papacy, so it is not surprising that the majority of alleged Crusade campaigns happened at that time. It started with a mission of the papal legate Acontius on the eastern Adriatic coast. The main task of this papal chaplain was to deal with pirates from Omiš who attacked Crusade armies and pilgrimages on their way to the Holy Land.⁷ While he was in Dalmatia, Acontius was warned that heretics were warmly welcomed in Bosnia. This information reached Pope Honorius III. who, in his letter *Inter alias Sollicitudines*, from the 3rd December 1221, for the first time in history called for a Crusade on Bosnia.⁸ The leader of this Crusade was supposed to be the King of Hungary Andrew II., but he was preoccupied with some problems in his kingdom, so Archbishop of Kalocsa Ugrin was appointed to this honour instead.⁹ Acontius on the other hand, organized a synod in Dubrovnik,

⁶ Hans Eberhard Mayer, *The Crusades*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 30-37. Cf. Rebecca Rist, *The Papacy and Crusading in Europe, 1198-1245*, (London: Continuum, 2009), 1.

⁷ The most detailed description of this mission can be found in: Ivan Majnarić, „Papinski poslanik Akoncije u Dalmaciji i Hrvatskoj 1219. - 1223. godine,“ in *Humanitas et Litterae, ad honorem Franjo Šanjek*, eds. Lovorka Čoralić and Slavko Slišković (Zagreb: Dominikanska nakladna istina and Kršćanska sadašnjost, 2009), 79-98.

⁸ Augustino Theiner, *Vetera Monumenta Historica Hungariam Sacram Illustrantia*, Vol. I (Romae: Typis Vaticanis, 1859), 31.

⁹ King Andrew II promised to Ugrin that he would give him Bosnia and Usora, if he managed to expel heresy from there: „Honorius episcopus servus servorum dei venerabili fratri Ugrino archiepiscopo Colocensi salutem et apostolicam benedictionem. Cum a nobis supplicasti, siquidem nobis, ut cum karissimus in Christo filius noster Andreas Ungarie rex illustris terras quasdam, videlicet Bosnam, Soy et Wosora, infectas heretica pravitate tibi purgandas committens, eas ecclesie tue in perpetuum pia liberalitate donavit, prout eiusdem presentate nobis littere plenius continebant, donationem huiusmodi apostolico dignaremur munimine roborare, presertim cum idem rex nobis super hoc porrexit preces suas. Nos itaque tam ipsius regis quam tuis supplicationibus annuentes, terras ipsas sicut

with all the bishops from “Pannonia, Trachia and Illyria”, with one theme only – the fight against the heretics in Bosnia.¹⁰

Most authors agree that this campaign was not realized, and Hungarian and Croatian noblemen were pointed out as main culprits.¹¹ Some of the studies that deal with crusades in the 13th century do not even mention this mission,¹² which cannot be accepted as proper methodology since with this campaign the Crusade wars had been established as a specific sort of diplomatic relations between papacy and Hungary with Bosnian state. Outside all these interpretations, stands the opinion of Dominik Mandić (which is supported only by Miroslav Brandt) who claims that “this crusade, had actually happened, and that Acontius and Ugrin assembled a large army and attacked Bosnia, whose defences, unprepared for war, were overrun and suffered heavy losses. The Crusaders managed to conquer most of the country, and thousands of infidels were deported to southern Hungary”.¹³ However, these arguments were discarded as unfounded constructions.¹⁴ Regarding the

pie ac provide sunt donate, tibi et ecclesie tue per te salvo iure regio in redditibus et rationibus consuetis auctoritate apostolica confirmamus et presentis scripti patrocinio communimus. Nulli ergo etc. nostre confirmationis etc. Si quis etc. Datum Tibure idibus maii, (pontificatus nostri) ano nono“. Tadija Smičiklas, *Codex Diplomaticus Regni Croatiae, Dalmatiae et Slavoniae*, Vol. III (Zagreb: Ex officina societatis typographicae, 1905), 243; Theiner, *Vetera Monumenta Historica Hungariam I*, 55-56.

¹⁰ Whether this synod actually took place or not still is not finally decided in historiography. More information in: Giacomo Lucari, *Copioso ristretto de gli annali di Rausa*, (Venetia: Ad instantia di Antonio Leonardi, 1605) 35; Majnarić, „Papinski poslanik Akoncije u Dalmaciji i Hrvatskoj“, 92-93.

¹¹ Franjo Rački, „Bogomili i patareni“, *Rad JAZU* 10 (1870), 146-147; Vjekoslav Klaić, *Poviest Bosne do propasti kraljevstva*, (Zagreb: Tiskom dioničke tiskare, 1882), 66; Marko Perojević, „Ban Stjepan“, in *Poviest hrvatskih zemalja Bosne i Hercegovine, od najstarijih vremena do godine 1463*, (Sarajevo: HKD Napredak, 1942) 217; Sima Ćirković, *Istorija srednjovekovne bosanske države* (Beograd: Srpska književna zadruga, 1964), 58-59; Anto Babić, *Iz istorije srednjovekovne Bosne*, (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1972), 246-247; Milan Loos, *Dualist Heresy in the Middle Ages* (Prague: Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, 1973), 212; Jaroslav Šidak, *Studije o "Crkvi bosanskoj" i bogumilstvu* (Zagreb: Sveučilišna naklada Liber, 1975), 182; John V. A. Fine Jr., *The Bosnian church: A New Interpretation* (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1975), 135; Dragoljub Dragojević, *Krstjani i jeretička Crkva bosanska* (Beograd: Balkanološki institut SANU, 1987), 60; Salih Jalimam, *Historija bosanskih bogumila* (Tuzla: IP Hamidović, 1999), 104; Majnarić, „Papinski poslanik Akoncije u Dalmaciji i Hrvatskoj“, 91.

¹² Mladen Ančić, „Križarske vojne" XIII stoljeća“, *Radovi Hrvatskog društva za znanost i umjetnost* 4 (1996): 12-35.

¹³ Domagoj Mandić, *Bogomilska crkva bosanskih krstjana* (Chicago: The Croatian Historical Institute, 1962), 57; Miroslav Brandt, „Dubrovnik i heretička Bosna u prvoj polovini XIII stoljeća“ *Anali* 12 (1970): 29-30.

¹⁴ Šidak, *Studije o Crkvi bosanskoj*, 182, footnote 27: „This conceptualization, for which he (Mandić) couldn't find any contemporary source, should corroborate his main hypothesis

aftermath of this campaign, there are a lot of disagreements about whether, after the collapse of the idea of a crusade, Acontius went to Bosnia and died there, or not.¹⁵

Ugrin's Crusade (1225-1227)

As we could see, the origins of this campaign were established during the mission of legate Acontius, when King of Hungary Andrew III. appointed Ugrin, the Archbishop of Kalocsa, as the leader of the crusade army. Ugrin needed an experienced military leader for his crusade units, so he promised a wage of 200 marks of silver to Ivan Angelos, son of the Byzantine Empress Margareta, and nephew of King Andrew III.¹⁶ This campaign was began on the 15th May 1225 with the issuing of the papal confirmation of King Andrews grant of *Bosnia, Soy et Wasora* to Ugrin. No crusade rhetoric was repeated until a year later when Ugrin bought castrum Požega from the King of Hungary. He pleaded to the Pope for confirmation of this purchase referring to the need that "heretics in those lands should be destroyed".¹⁷ Obviously, not even this papal confirmation was sufficient entice warriors to a Crusade on Bosnia, because only a couple of days later, Pope Honorius III. reminded prince Angelos of his commitments.¹⁸

Sources are silent on whether the Hungarian-Byzantine prince and the Archbishop of Kalocsa fulfilled their promise, but historiography is almost unanimous that none of these crusading armies entered Bosnia at this time.¹⁹ Vjekoslav Klaić even claims that the failure of the crusade idea led to the change on the Bosnian throne, when the previous ruler Ban Stephan, was replaced by Ban Mathew Ninoslav.²⁰ However, this is almost impossible to prove, and we must treat that assumption with a great deal of suspicion. As the only result of this campaign Marko

about fled of pretended djed Bartul-Tomaš from Bosnia to France. To these arguments of Mandić, with same arguments, accepted M. Brandt".

¹⁵ More about that in: Majnarić, „Papinski poslanik Akoncije u Dalmaciji i Hrvatskoj“, 91-93 (although we cannot agree with authors baseless statement that in that time there wasn't any secular power in Bosnia).

¹⁶ Ančić, „Križarske vojne" XIII stoljeća“, 18.

¹⁷ Smičiklas, *Codex Diplomaticus Regni Croatiae, Dalmatiae et Slavoniae*, Vol. III, 264; Šidak, *Studije o Crkvi bosanskoj*, 183.

¹⁸ Smičiklas, *Codex Diplomaticus Regni Croatiae, Dalmatiae et Slavoniae*, Vol. III, 264-265. Šidak, *Studije o Crkvi bosanskoj*, 183; Rački, „Bogomili i patareni“, 149.

¹⁹ Rački, „Bogomili i patareni“, 149; Šidak, *Studije o Crkvi bosanskoj*, 183-184; Babić, *Iz istorije srednjovjekovne Bosne*, 246-247; Loos, *Dualist Heresy in the Middle Ages*, 212, 222; Fine Jr., *The Bosnian church*, 136-137; Dragojović, *Krstjani i jeretička Crkva bosanska*, 60-61.

²⁰ Klaić, *Poviest Bosne*, 67.

Perojević mentions the building of some fortress on the Hungarian-Bosnian border,²¹ while Mladen Ančić just states that the results of this campaigns remain “a subject of vivid discussions between historians, but without any real results”.²² Of course, there were some authors who claimed that Ugrin’s Crusade was real and very bitter. This time round Dominik Mandić did not even mention the events from 1225 to 1227 because they did not suit his theories about the successful war from 1222, whereas his faithful follower Miroslav Brandt, in the attempt to make Mandić’s arguments stronger, wrote about the three Crusades of Archbishop Ugrin in 1221, 1225 and 1227.²³ Salih Jalimam approached this historiographical stream with his analyses, but without any real progress,²⁴ and even Sima Ćirković “assumed” that these early crusades were successful, even though in the same text he claimed that the course of events remains unknown.²⁵

Koloman’s Crusade (1234-1239)

During the following 10 years there were not any military actions, but some very important events happened. First of all, in that period, the friars of the Dominican order arrived in Bosnia. These fierce fighters against heresy, proved their eagerness for the preservation of the purity of church in southern France.²⁶ Then, in late 1233 some complaints about Bosnia reached the Roman curia again. The energetic leader of the catholic world Gregory IX sent his representative, the legate Iacopo Pecorarius, to investigate allegations against a domestic Bosnian bishop who was accused of being illiterate in Latin and of living in a village, together with his brother who was “heresiarch” – the leader of the Bosnian heretics.²⁷ The main results of this investigation were the replacement of the accused bishop and exemption of the Bosnian diocese from the jurisdiction of the Ragusan archdiocese. The new Bosnian ruler Ban Mathew Ninoslav, who was “born in heresy”, together with his relative Prijezda, accepted Christianity, and as insurance, Prijezda’s son

²¹ Perojević, „Ban Stjepan“, 218.

²² Ančić, „Križarske vojne“ XIII stoljeća“, 18.

²³ Brandt, „Dubrovnik i heretička Bosna“, 31-33.

²⁴ Jalimam, *Historija bosanskih bogumila*, 104-105.

²⁵ Ćirković, *Istorija srednjovekovne bosanske države*, 60.

²⁶ More in: Salih Jalimam, *Djelatnost dominikanaca u srednjovjekovnoj Bosni* (Tuzla: IP Hamidović, 1999), 196. In one dominican chronicle from 1259. it was written that they established two monasteries in Bosnia where they burned heretics (Sima Ćirković, in: *Leksikon srpskog srednjeg vijeka*, s.v. „Dominikanci“), but that source was never subject of serious scientific exploration.

²⁷ More information about these events can be found in: Šidak, *Studije o Crkvi bosanskoj*, 184-186.

was handed over as hostage to Dominicans. With these actions, the stage was prepared for the attempt of the final solution for all ecclesiastical problems in Bosnia.

King Andrew II again avoided assuming a direct role in this campaign, and appointed his son, Duke Coloman as the leader of his armies. And again, same as Archbishop Ugrin before him, Coloman was to be rewarded with lands in Bosnia for his success. Pope eagerly confirmed this donation.²⁸ The recently appointed Bosnian bishop, dominican friar Johannes von Wildeshausen (Johannes Teutonicus) was at that time very tired in carrying out his duty, and was eager to withdraw from his function, but was averted with a papal letter in which he was persuaded to "kill infidels".²⁹ Most authors agree that this was the only implemented Crusade war on the bosnian soil. Their conclusions rest on the assumption that the Bosnian ruler Ban Ninoslav, had actually, at first, taken the side of the crusaders. He appealed to Pope Gregory IX. that he fought against heretics in his land, and confiscated their property, but also that he encountered big opposition among nobles. That same day the Pope wrote three letters, one to the Ban, to Prince Koloman, and to the Dominicans with further instructions.³⁰ But soon the Bosnian ruler realized that religious motives were secondary in Koloman's goals, and that sovereignty of his realm was in danger, so he distanced himself from the invaders. This role of the Ban Ninoslav was probably wrongly interpreted, though sources did say that Koloman had much success in this campaign, enough to boast about his victories to the Pope,³¹ and the position of the defenders in Bosnia was obviously very difficult. The salvation came from a direction nobody expected. The fiercest warriors of their time, the Mongols, attacked Hungary in 1241. inflicting heavy defeat to the Hungarian army in the Battle of Mohi (11th April 1241) where Prince Koloman was murdered, and King Bela IV. was forced to flee all the way to the city of Trogir. Bosnia, because of its mountainous terrain did not suffer in these incursions, so ban Ninoslav used these events to re-establish his power over the Bosnian banate.

This Crusade campaign lasted very long, and had many consequences, so it was natural that it left significant marks in

²⁸ Smičiklas, *Codex Diplomaticus Regni Croatiae, Dalmatiae et Slavoniae*, Vol. III, 443.

²⁹ "... si cruce officii pontificalis assumpta hostes crucifixi indutus armaturam dei hacentus viriliter expugnaris, si te belli labores opprimunt, si ad regressum e contra insurgentia pro fide certamina te inducunt"; Theiner, *Vetera Monumenta Historica Hungariam I*, 137; Rački, „Bogomili i patareni“, 156.

³⁰ Theiner, *Vetera Monumenta Historica Hungariam I*, 120-121.

³¹ Theiner, *Vetera Monumenta Historica Hungariam I*, 169.

historiography. We will start with the most radical of all the theories, that of Nada Klaić. The renowned Croatian medievalist stated that even this campaign never happened, that Hungarian armies never crossed Bosnian borders, and that Koloman's bragging to the Pope was in fact lies fabricated to cover the fact that he failed to fulfil his promise.³² This brave theory of a historian known for her very rigorous relations to the sources did not find many supporters. Events presented in previous lines were drawn first from the sources by Franjo Rački, who was then followed by most historians who stressed political over religious motives of the Hungarian forces.³³ One of the few historians, who highlighted Koloman's religious components as well as the other 13th century campaigns on Bosnia, was Mladen Ančić, but he also stands alone regarding this interpretation.³⁴ There were also some disputes over the exact meaning of the term "hereticos de Sclavonie partibus" in one of the previously mentioned papal letters, but that is not the subject of this paper.³⁵

Later Thirteenth century Crusade

Mathew Ninoslav felt confident enough that, only a couple of years after the Hungarian catastrophe on Mohi, he participated in some activities within the domestic policy of the Hungarian kingdom. He got involved in the quarrel between towns of Split and Trogir, and took the side of the commune of Split, against King Bela IV. who favoured Trogir. However, the restored military power of the Hungarian kingdom once again proved to be too strong for Bosnian forces. In 1244. the Ban was forced to sign a peace agreement in which Bela imposed some requirements considering the organization of the church in Bosnia.³⁶ These arrangements did not probably work, because two years later the Archbishop of Kalocsa again called for a Crusade, and in 1248, Pope Innocent IV. declared that "the Bosnian diocese is so deep in heresy, that it no longer can be considered even a part of the Catholic church".³⁷ This campaign did not result with a military expedition, but with an action with far-reaching consequences. The Bosnian diocese was removed from

³² Nada Klaić, *Srednjovjekovna Bosna. Politički položaj bosanskih vladara do Tvrtkove krunidbe (1377. g.)* (Zagreb: Eminex, 1994), 100-101.

³³ Rački, „Bogomili i patareni“, 155-158; Vladimir Ćorović, *Historija Bosne* (Beograd: Srpska kraljevska akademija, 1940), 196; Ćirković, *Istorija srednjovjekovne bosanske države*, 62-64. Mandić, *Bogomilska crkva*, 427.

³⁴ Ančić, „Križarske vojne" XIII stoljeća“, 18-20.

³⁵ More in: Šidak, *Studije o Crkvi bosanskoj*, 279-280, 363-365.

³⁶ Ćirković, *Istorija srednjovjekovne bosanske države*, 67.

³⁷ Theiner, *Vetera Monumenta Historica Hungarum I*, 204-205.

Bosnia and relocated to the city of Požega in the Hungarian kingdom.³⁸ After this time, Bosnia became the only medieval state that broke its connections with the Papacy, and from the vacancy within the Bosnian diocese arose the Church of Bosnia, as a fine example of a state-church. This situation remained long after the disappearance of the Bosnian medieval state.

Fourteenth and Fifteenth century Crusades

After the turbulent events in the 13th century, there were four other occasions when Bosnia was marked as a target of crusade campaigns. We must emphasize that none of these incidents were implemented with actual military expeditions, but all of them were filled with crusader terminology, papal indulgencies and other similar folklore that accompanied proper Crusade wars. The first attempt was from 1337. when Croatian and Hungarian nobles managed to acquire a papal permission for a crusade against the Bosnian ruler Stephen II. Kotromanić.³⁹ It failed because King of Hungary Charles I. Robert did not allow this attack on his loyal ally. There are a lot of different explanations with a political context behind this campaign. The main theory is that it was a product of a struggle between the Croatian nobility and the King for power and more autonomy within the realm of the Hungarian crown.⁴⁰ The Bosnian ruler was caught in the middle of this struggle. Traditionally, Rački the main role in the proclamation of war address to the Pope;⁴¹ Marko Perojević regarded the aspirations of Duke Nelipčić as the main motive,⁴² whereas John Fine had doubts in choosing between these two options.⁴³

³⁸ More information about these events in: Dubravko Lovrenović, „Translatio sedis i uspostava novog konfesionalnog identiteta u srednjovjekovnoj Bosni - I“, in *Franjevački samostan u Gučoj Gori*, ed. Velimir Valjan, (Guča Gora and Sarajevo: Franjevački samostan Guča Gora and Kulturno-povijesni institut Bosne Srebrene, 2010), 113-125.

³⁹ Theiner, *Vetera Monumenta Historica Hungarum* I, 616-617.

⁴⁰ Ćirković, *Istorija srednjovjekovne bosanske države*, 110. To some degree, this thesis was supported by Ćorović, *Historija Bosne*, 257, and Loos, *Dualist Heresy in the Middle Ages*, 296.

⁴¹ Rački, „Bogomili i patareni“, 179. Also, V. Klaić and S. Jalimam accept this thesis, Klaić, *Poviest Bosne*, 121; Salih Jalimam, „Spor dominikanaca i franjevaca u srednjovjekovnoj Bosni“, *Croatia Christiana Periodica* 13 (1989): 18.

⁴² Marko Perojević, „Stjepan II Kotromanić,“ in *Povijest hrvatskih zemalja Bosne i Hercegovine od najstarijih vremena do godine 1463* (Sarajevo: HK Napredak, 1942), 262; also in: Dubravko Lovrenović, „Utjecaj Ugarske na odnos crkve i države u srednjovjekovnoj Bosni“, in *Znanstveni skup "11. stoljeća bosanskih franjevaca 1291 - 1991.*, ed. Marko Karamatić (Samobor: Franjevačka teologija Sarajevo, 1994), 60.

⁴³ Fine Jr., *The Bosnian church*, 179.

In 1357, Bosnia was again linked with a Crusade. The powerful King of Hungary Louis I. the Great, wanted to obtain crusade status for his campaign against Serbia. This action woke up the old idea of a crusade against the Bosnian heretics inside the Hungarian ecclesiastical circles. Especially active in the implementation of these ideas was the new Bosnian bishop Peter Siklosi, who three years later received a letter from Pope Innocent VI. encouraging him for the fight against heretics.⁴⁴ It is certain that in that period no campaigns were led against Bosnia, but there are still some issues about the war between Bosnia and Hungary from 1363. Due to the fact that King Louis justified his attack with words "... ubi in regno nostro Bozne innumerabilis multitudo hereticorum et patarenorum pululasset in errore fidei orthodoxe",⁴⁵ some historians also characterized this campaign as a Crusade,⁴⁶ while others pointed out the writings of the King's secretary John archdeacon, who described the war as "an attempt to destroy the arrogance of some rebels".⁴⁷ As we could not find any papal reactions on these events, we are willing to say that this war either was not a crusade campaign, or that it was a continuation of propaganda activities initiated in 1357, when the crusade idea, more than any time before that, was used as a camouflage of political aspirations of the Hungarian King.

At the end, there are two conquest attempts by King Sigismund of Luxemburg. This medieval ruler was a master of all kinds of diplomatic pressure, so he also used crusade vocabulary in his numerous attempts to obtain the Bosnian crown. In late 1391. Sigismund sent his plea to the Pope Boniface IX. to assure that his campaign against "Turks, Manicheans and heretics" in neighbouring lands got a form of a Crusade war. Of course, this request was approved, and the Pope in a letter from 18th December 1391. promised the same indulgences as for the fighters in Holy Land.⁴⁸ Eventually, nothing happened, because Sigismund had a lot of problems in his other projects. These events did not attract much

⁴⁴ Tadija Smičiklas, *Codex Diplomaticus Regni Croatiae, Dalmatiae et Slavoniae*, Vol. XIII (Zagreb: Tisak dioničke tiskare, 1915), 18-19.

⁴⁵ Smičiklas, *Codex Diplomaticus XIII*, 358; Šidak, *Studije o Crkvi bosanskoj*, 235.

⁴⁶ In fact, Nada Klaić even named one of chapter in her book: „Failed Crusade of Louis on Bosnia from 1363.“, Klaić, *Srednjovjekovna Bosna*, 238-247.

⁴⁷ Marko Perojević, „Ban Stjepan Tvrtko,“ in *Povijest Bosne i Hercegovine od najstarijih vremena do godine 1463* (Sarajevo: HK Napredak, 1942), 300; Ćorović, *Historija Bosne*, 285; Mandić, *Bogomilska crkva*, 400; Lovrenović, „Utjecaj Ugarske“, 68.

⁴⁸ Tadija Smičiklas, *Codex Diplomaticus Regni Croatiae, Dalmatiae et Slavoniae*, Vol. XVII (Zagreb: Jugoslovenska akademija znanosti i umjetnosti, 1981), 409-410; Dubravko Lovrenović, *Na klizištu povijesti. Sveta kruna ugarska i Sveta kruna bosanska 1387-1463*, (Zagreb and Sarajevo: Synopsis, 2006), 69.

attention in historiography. Fine said that these events "must be taken in the context of the war Sigismund waged against Ladislaus, Bosnian King Tvrtko (recently deceased) and various Croatian nobles including Hrvoje",⁴⁹ but the most logical assumption is that the main motive for this campaign was the great victory that the new Bosnian King Dabiša achieved earlier of the same year over a strong contingent of the Ottoman army.⁵⁰ Sigismund had to wait for a new chance for more than fifteen years. These events belong to a very turbulent period of Bosnian-Hungarian relations from the first decade of 15th century.⁵¹ Armies of King Sigismund had a lot of success in Bosnia, and then a letter arrived from Pope Gregory XII. who summoned "the whole Christian world" to gather help for the King of Hungary in the fight against "Turks, Arians, Manicheans and other infidels".⁵² Whether this appeal worked or not, is unknown, but in the next year the Hungarian King launched another overwhelming attack on Bosnia. What is certain is that this war had nothing to do with religious motives. It was a usual conquest war for territory and power. Obviously, "wars of Sigismund against Bosnia, guided under the pretence of the Christian zeal, were very far from the religious ideals which once powered the crusade idea. Just an ideological

⁴⁹ Fine Jr., *The Bosnian church*, 198.

⁵⁰ Lovrenović, *Na klizištu povijesti*, 69.

⁵¹ More about that in chapter: „Years when only weapon spoke (1404-1408.)“ in: Lovrenović, *Na klizištu povijesti*, 121-142.

⁵² „Gregorius etc. Universis et singulis Christi Fidelibus presentes litteras inspecturis salutem etc. In vinea Domini Sabaoth Sancta videlicet et universali Ecclesia Cultores atque Custodes, quanquam immeritos, inscrutabilis dispositione consilii deputatos attentius vigilare nos convenit, ne gens impiissima de Sylva tanquam essera progrediens videlicet Teucrorum quos Turcos vocant, Arianorum, Manichaeorum ac aliorum perfidorum infidelium vineam ipsam inhumaniter depascatur, et quantum nobis ex alto conceditur, ut eadem vinea praeservetur illaesa, impetum bestiarum illam demoliri satagentium sub omnipotentis virtute dexteræ reprimamus. Verum Sacrosancta Romana Ecclesia mater omnium fidelium et magistra suspiria producit ab intimis, eculi ejus solvuntur in lachrymas, vehementibusque genitibus ipsius pectora quatiuntur, eo quod praeter hostilitates, quae a blasphemis crucis adversus fidei professores exercentur extrinsecus, undique bella fremunt intrinsecus, seditioes intestinae dilaniant et inquietant domesticae similitates, gladiisque fidelium, qui ad Christianorum salutem et exterminium malorum foret contra hostium fidei cuneos exercendus, conversus, conversus in proximos, proh dolor! Inebriatur sanguine christiano et (quod acrius excoquit mentem nostram) scelerati filii et a devotione semoti caeco furore immaniter debachati armantur in matrem, ac illum ex quo prodierunt uterum, nituntur summis viribus lacerare; quo sit, ut nos una cum memorata Ecclesia sponsa nostra circa exhibitionem opportuni subsidii in hac parte juxta desiderium nostrum et apostolicae debitum servitutis manus adjutrices extendere nequeamus“ Joseph Koller, *Historia Episcopatus Quinqueecclesiarum*, Vol. III (Posonii: sumptibus Joannis Michaelis Landerer, 1784), 283-288; Lovrenović, *Na klizištu povijesti*, 134.

shell remained from former ideals which served as a cover for political goals".⁵³

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The crusade wars against Bosnia and its "heretics" are very complicated questions that delve into some of the most dubious aspects of Bosnian medieval history, such as the teachings of the Church of Bosnia, Bosnian-Hungarian-papal relations etc. Lack of contemporary sources leaves room for very diverse historiographic interpretations and theories, which arose during the previous century and a half. These interpretations proved to be very rigid, and one's opinion was hardly ever altered with strength of argument from the other side.

Obviously, campaigns from the 13th century, mainly the Koloman Crusade (others were only threats and not real campaigns), were more serious and had more long-term consequences. They eventually resulted in the dislocation of the Bosnian diocese outside Bosnian borders, which was the direct cause for the appearance of the Bosnian church. With that, Bosnia became the only medieval European state that ended all formal connections with papacy. In the later period, crusades against Bosnia were declared several times, always as purely political wars, without a genuine religious background. Additionally, these events are a great example of how religion, its postulates and its importance in the society, were used in the Middle Ages as a weapon for completing political ambitions. One can easily say that the whole story of heresy in medieval Bosnia was a well-used political theatre by the Hungarian Kingdom, warmly welcomed at the Papal curia.

We can see that one of the most widespread romantic perceptions (beside the alleged link between Bosnian *krstjani* and Bulgarian *Bogomils*) about the medieval Bosnian history – Bosnian state as a victim of numerous Crusade wars, doesn't have almost any confirmations in contemporary sources, and it had to be abandoned as one of the main narratives in popular culture. However, that one occasion when the crusade war against Bosnia most probably was realized, is sufficient argument that medieval Bosnia should be included as one, although particular episode of crusade warfare on the European soil during the Middle Ages.

⁵³ Lovrenović, *Na klizištu povijesti*, 155-156.

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Peace Treaty Tensions: The Relationship between Content and Implementation of Negotiated Agreements in Former Yugoslavia

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Abstract:

This article presents a framework, applied on the case of former Yugoslavia, which should be considered in the design and analysis of negotiated agreements dealing with 'ethnic conflict' and civil wars. Such agreements implemented from above must include an analysis of how they affect: i) the local rationality structure (both intra- and inter-ethnic relations); ii) structural conditions; iii) institutional conditions and relations; and iv) the space for contestation of implementation. Based on document analysis, this study demonstrates that if left unattended these dimensions may recreate tensions for years to come, block implementation and generate risk of relapse into violent conflict.

Keywords: Former Yugoslavia, peace treaties, Dayton, Rambouillet, Ohrid

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Peace Agreements as Roadmaps for Building Peace

Several agreements that have been signed and implemented in the process of dissolution of former Yugoslavia have brought silence to the arms. Most would agree that these agreements thereby served their purpose to end the wars. Bieber who analysed the Dayton agreement in Bosnia claims that '[t]here is little controversy over the fact that the peace agreement has kept the peace... there has been a notable decline of ethnically motivated violence since the end of the conflict'¹. At the same time, '... the type of peace the Dayton Accord set out to establish has not yet been researched in depth'², and as Rice underlines, 'although the Dayton Peace Accords aimed at creating a unified state, they also served to reinforce the ethnic segregation that resulted from practices of ethnic cleansing during the civil war'³. We agree with the negative peace claims of Bieber, however, yet simultaneously give credence to Keil and Kudlenko⁴ who state that 'the Dayton Accord contains requirements for both types of peace with a focus on the positive one. Yet gives much clearer instructions for achieving the negative one'. Of course, it is hard to foresee all the factors that may impact a long-term peace process, but we argue that the inclusion of specific dimensions in negotiated agreements especially in the context of ethno-national civic wars are crucial, for the direction, dynamics and quality of the subsequent long-term peacebuilding process. Applying new analytical tools to the case of former Yugoslavia, we present four specific dimensions which are crucial to be considered in the design and analysis of such peace agreements in ethno-national conflicts, namely how they affect: i) the rationality structure of the local agents; ii) structural conditions (especially social and economic relations); iii) institutional conditions and relations; and, iv) the space for contestation in implementation enabled by the agreement (or the 'level of vagueness').

Previous research on civil wars has indeed downplayed these specific dimensions. Although substantial literature exists and academic research has been conducted, focusing on, and examining the substantial content of negotiated agreements and effects of implementation, these

¹ Florian Bieber, 'After Dayton, Dayton? The Evolution of an Unpopular Peace,' *Ethnopolitics*, 5(1) (2006a):15-31, 16.

² Soeren Keil and Anastasiia Kudlenko, "Bosnia and Herzegovina Twenty Years after Dayton -Complexity Born of Paradoxes." *International Peacekeeping*, 22 (5):1-19, 2.

³ Florian Bieber, *Post War Bosnia: Ethnic Structure, Inequality and Governance of the Public Sector* (London: Palgrave, 2006b), 6.

⁴ Keil and Kudlenko, op. cit. 3.

four dimensions and the way they influence the durability of peace in the implementation have not been addressed and received the attention they require. In previous research, the implementation phase has often been viewed as having its own dynamics with exogenous factors fostering challenges and pitfalls. While the dynamics of the implementation phase are certainly important⁵, we argue that these four dimensions remain fundamental to the issue and are key dimensions that need to be addressed in negotiated agreements of identity wars, for the implementation to have a chance of long-term impact, and avoid continuous tensions between ethnic groups, which could, at worst, escalate into renewed conflict. We rest our argument on researchers claiming that the specific endogenous agreement factors, the contents of the agreement, often include inherent problems which build a permanent structure and block the space for manoeuvre for the involved actors, thereby eventually causing new conflict escalations between the signatories to the agreement⁶. In the following sections, we present and apply this framework in four negotiations addressing armed conflicts in the context of erstwhile Yugoslavia, all of which have an ethno-national conflict dimension.

Peace and Negotiated Agreements

We present below, previous research that has dealt with the content of negotiated agreements, which include both ceasefire agreements and full-fledged peace accords. This research establishes the relationship between the content and the implementation phase, in the short as well as long-term perspective.

When a mediator has used a soft and facilitating approach to bridge the gap and also to find the (few) bridging denominators between the parties, there lies a risk of leaving out the essential dimensions that need

⁵ Roger Mac Ginty, "Introduction: The Transcripts for Peace: Public, Hidden or Non-obvious?" *Journal of Intervention and State Building*, 7(4)(2013):423- 430
Dzemaal Sokolović and Florian Bieber (Eds.), *Reconstructing Multi-ethnic Societies: The Case of Bosnia-Herzegovina* (Ashgate Publishers, 2001).

⁶ Deiniol Jones, *Cosmopolitan Mediation? Conflict Resolution and the Oslo Accords* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999); George Downs and Stephen John Stedman, "Evaluation Issues in Peace Implementation," in *Ending Civil Wars. The Implementation of Peace Agreements*. eds. Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild and Elizabeth M. Cousens (Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 43-70; Ramzi Badran, "Intrastate Peace Agreements and the Durability of Peace," *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 31(3) (2014):193-217; Virginia Page Fortna, *Peace Time: Cease-Fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).

to be included in the content of the agreement. Several scholars have emphasised the risks with weak agreements that do not include the key issue(s) of the conflict, merely agree to a ceasefire without a negotiated agreement⁷. When these key issues are not included, and no detailed roadmap for implementation is part of the agreement, peace processes are at risk of stalling.

Those arguing that the content of the agreement matters more, analysed inter-state armed conflicts and further argued that ‘...belligerents can draft ceasefire agreements that foster peace by altering the incentives to attack, by reducing uncertainty about intentions, and by preventing and controlling accidents’⁸. Several mechanisms can be included in such ceasefire agreements, for instance, installing third-party security guarantees and separating the parties from each other, confidence-building measures, and measures to control rogue groups and thereby reducing the risk of renewed wars⁹.

Also, Badran¹⁰ analysed intra-state conflicts from 1946 to 2010 and through his research demonstrated that the design and quality of the peace agreement have a significant effect on the durability of the peace. Agreements that are carefully designed to deal with all obstacles to cooperation have the strongest pacifying effect.

Druckman and Albin¹¹ explored the relationship between the principles of distributive justice and the durability of negotiated agreements. The data from these studies were used to evaluate three sets of hypotheses regarding the relationship between distributive justice and durability, the role of the conflict environment, and the types of distributive justice principles. They coded four justice components (equality, equity, compensation, or need) in the agreement and tested them in relation to the durability of the agreements¹². The results obtained from both statistical and focused-comparison analyses indicate that distributive justice moderates the relationship between conflict environments and the outcomes. When principles of justice are central to

⁷ Stedman et al, op. cit., 56; Jones, op. cit.

⁸ Fortna, op. cit., 3.

⁹ Madhav, Joshi, Sung Yong Lee and Roger Mac Ginty. “Built-in Safeguards and the Implementation of Civil War Peace Accords’, *Empirical and Theoretical Research in International Relations*, (2016) 1-25; Fortna, op. cit.

¹⁰ Badran, op. cit.

¹¹ Daniel Druckman and Cecilia Albin, “Distributive Justice and the Durability of Peace Agreements’, *Review of International Studies* 37 (2011):1137-1168.

¹² Ibid.

an agreement, the negative effects of difficult conflict environment are reduced. When principles are not central, the negative effects of difficulty are heightened. These relationships are accounted for primarily by one of the four distributive justice principles: equality.

Wagner and Druckman¹³ examined beyond the mere absence of violence (negative peace) aspects of durable peace and questioned whether the effects on the durable peace are similar or different from those found for the durability of agreements. They have demonstrated that stable agreements focus on and mediate the relationship between equality provisions in peace agreements and durable peace and also the relationship between procedural justice and the reconciliation component of durable peace. When it came to the economic component, it seemed to not play a role in durability.

Contribution of this Study

Leaning on the above-mentioned endogenous factors, we argue that in ethnic or ethno-national armed conflicts, one of the reasons for a stalled or collapsed peace process is precisely linked to the substance of the content of a peace agreement, specifically aspects that frame and set the structural conditions for the peace process and the implementation phase. We argue that these elements (analysed in detail below) are linked to how peace agreements comprising ethnic identity conflicts as part of a civil war, are affected by the aspects discussed below.

The study is based on a qualitative case study approach. This work presents a methodological description of how the analysis is conducted, followed by the findings of the study. We finalise the article with a discussion of the results and with a conclusion regarding the extent to which we can generalise this study's findings from the case of former Yugoslavia. Moreover, we give inputs for the implications of future research on the role of peace agreements in ending ethnic identity conflicts in civil wars.

Framework for the Analysis

We have used four sub-processes within the former Yugoslavia as our foundation for analysing the suggested aspects to be decisive about

¹³ Lynn Wagner and Daniel Druckman, "Drivers of Durable Peace: The Role of Justice in Negotiating Civil War Termination," *Group Decis Negot* 26 (2017):45- 67.

the outcome of the peace process. By considering these, we hypothesised that one has a good chance of arriving at a relatively rich assessment of problems that may arise with the agreement in the long-term implementation phase of identity conflicts. The four inquired agreements have been in place for more than 15 years and have in many ways contributed to establishing negative peace, but the long-term tensions that have developed during these time periods risk breaking down the negative peace (absence of violence) and chances for a future durable peace.

The mere absence of direct violence (negative peace) does not preclude the complex political conflicts that have been linked to the implementation phase, and there has been a constant risk of escalation into renewed armed conflicts. This is not to say that a peace agreement should make peace for all time but that, when the above-mentioned four dimensions are not properly addressed, it will influence the implementation phase, maybe even for decades. We argue that new-old political tensions have followed every step of the implementation period. These issues have become obstacles in the implementation process, even after decades of negative peace, due to the absence or subordination of the four key aspects in the agreements.

Rationality Structure of Local Agents

This aspect is crucial when it comes to the future dynamics of the relationship between the conflicting parties and also when taking into consideration the spectrum of 'moderates' versus 'radicals' within each respective party. With a minimum of two conflict parties in cases of 'ethnic conflicts', we have emphasised that one should consider at least four parties. Usually, we can also identify that the views of the ethnic group's grassroots differ from the views of top leaders about the conflict, and the views should therefore not only be seen from above, but also from below, and we could speak of official vs popular, formal vs informal, or civic vs ethnic¹⁴ dimensions of an ethnic conflict party. It is therefore important to analyse how these actors are affected by the agreement

¹⁴ Thomas Hylland Eriksen, *Us and Them in Modern Society* (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1992).

Structural Conditions

We need to carefully assess how the agreements deal with the effects on structural conditions, for example, economic and social relations. We know how important this is from the lesson of the Versailles Treaty after the First World War. The terms and conditions of the treaty imposed on Germany were humiliating. Germany was never invited to discuss peace and a finalised treaty was forced upon Germany, and fostered economic and social chaos, subsequently leading to the Second World War, a fact which is still debated¹⁵. Today we have the liberal peace and liberal economic orders, which foster challenges in former war zones¹⁶. The Versailles Treaty's structural conditions are also crucial lessons for contemporary liberal economics that must be considered when analysing how peace agreements affect structural conditions, such as economic and social ones.

Institutional Conditions and Relations

We also need to address institutional conditions and how new institutional relations may recreate tensions. An example of this can be seen when the agreement stipulates an excessively dysfunctional form of local self-rule in which cantons, regions, or municipality structures with high local self-governance contribute to a less efficient central authority, undermining the governance structures or vice versa.

Space for Contestation in Implementation

Finally, we need to analyse the extent to which the agreement creates a space for contestation in implementation (or the level of 'vagueness'). Certain details naturally need to be hammered out in a post-agreement phase. However, while the use of vagueness can often be a useful technique to pilot an agreement towards completion and avoid technical disputes among other benefits, all negotiators know that the 'devil is in the details'. Leaving too much space for contestation in implementation can create gridlocks that remain for decades.

¹⁵ Cf. Manfred F. Boemeke, Gerald D. Feldman, and Elisabeth Glaser (Eds.), *Versailles: A Reassessment after 75 Years* (Publications of the German Historical Institute. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); John Maynard Keynes, *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* (London/New York: Macmillan/Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971).

¹⁶ Jens Stilhoff Sørensen, "The Shadow Economy, War and State building," *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* 14(3) (2006):317-351.

In the following sections, we explore and illustrate this framework with its application to four selected negotiation processes, all linked to the Balkan wars and the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. The first two are the agreements for Bosnia and Herzegovina. First, the 1994 Washington Agreement, which was a ceasefire agreement between the warring parties: the Croatian Republic of Herzegovina-Bosnia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The second was the Dayton Peace Agreement of 1995 for Bosnia-Herzegovina, which incorporated the former. The third is the text from the Rambouillet negotiations of 1999 between the Albanians in Kosovo and Serbia, which was never signed and ratified but became the basis for the NATO bombings and influenced the agreement that came after the bombings, and also affected the Macedonian situation. The fourth and final agreement is the Ohrid Framework Agreement from 2001 between the Macedonian government and the Albanians in Macedonia.

Table 1. Dimensions Analysed in Each Negotiated Process

<i>Negotiations</i>	<i>Rationality Structure of Local Agents</i>	<i>Structural Conditions</i>	<i>Institutional Conditions</i>	<i>Extent of Space for Contestation</i>
Bosnia- Herzegovina, Washington 1994 & Dayton 1995		X	X	
Kosovo, Rambouillet 1999 (not signed)	X			
Macedonia, Ohrid Framework Agreement 2001	X	X	X	X

It should be noted that the analysis is by no means exhaustive regarding the agreements; all aspects of the agreements have not been considered. Both space limit and the complexity of the conflicts and agreements preclude any detailed analysis of all agreements. Some of them, like the Dayton Agreement, have complex conditions and ramifications in a range of fields from police and security to education.

Instead, our aim is to utilise the four negotiations to provide empirical examples and highlight the relevance of some of the four aspects taken from the proposed analytical model.

Findings

Agreements for Bosnia and Herzegovina: Washington and Dayton Agreements

The Washington Agreement of 1994 was drafted by the USA to broker a ceasefire between the Bosniaks and Bosnian Croat parties and to end the tripartite dimension of conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, thereby creating a unified party vis-à-vis the Bosnian Serbs. The Dayton Peace Agreement signed in 1995 is another peace agreement that also included the Serbian side. The analysis of the two agreements below will focus on two of the dimensions of the model: structural conditions and institutional conditions and relations.

Structural conditions

The Dayton Agreement was drafted on the lines of the Washington Agreement with the principle of ethnic separation. It was decided that the central government in Sarajevo has a tripartite presidency in charge of foreign affairs, defence, and the central state budget. The three candidates represent the ethnic groups and are self-defined in the sense that they must claim one ethnic identity. It was not possible to agree to a candidate transgressing the ethnic category or identifying outside the pre-constituted groups. While this ensures ethnic representation, it also freezes the division. Tax collection takes place within the two entities, having separate budgets and allocating funds to the central government and cantons or municipalities respectively.

Institutional Conditions and Relations

In many respects, the Washington Agreement was a peculiar construct from the start, aiming at a ceasefire but with no desire from any of the local parties to create a common state. The constitution illustrated this since it created a central government as a nearly empty category but instead invested ten cantons with considerable power¹⁷. The division of power essentially established the federation as an economic community

¹⁷ Robert M. Hayden, *Blueprints for a House Divided: The Constitutional Logic of the Yugoslav Wars* (University of Michigan Press, 1999).

with defence forces, and originally a foreign office, which was dropped in the final version. Citizenship, defence, foreign relations (dropped), economic policy, commerce, finance and financial institutions, combatting crime (international and inter-cantonal), allocation of electronic frequencies and energy, and finances for these functions were to be exclusive federal responsibilities. In contrast, the jurisdiction of human rights, environment, health, communications and transport, social welfare, implementation of citizenship laws, immigration, tourism, and natural resources were shared responsibilities with the cantons¹⁸. All other responsibilities were granted to the cantons¹⁹. Each canton has its own government, presidency, cabinet, and ministers and various ministries, agencies, and services. The structure of the federation became the foundation for one of the entities in the Dayton Agreement.

The Dayton Agreement laid the foundations for a federal constitution based on three constituent peoples, Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks or Bosnian Muslims, and two self-governing federal entities, the Serbian 'Republika Srpska' and the Bosniak-Croat 'Federation Bosnia and Herzegovina'. In addition, there is the self-governing entity, the district of Brčko. To provide for as much ethnic self-rule as possible, the constitution devolves as much power as possible to the entities and levels below. Centralisation would simply not have been acceptable to the ethnic groups. This condition has provided for a very weak central administration with recurrent themes of how to organise a functioning state. The multi-level administration between cantons, municipalities, and the central government in the federation (Bosniak-Croat) constitutes a complicated and unruly structure²⁰. In multi-ethnic areas, ethnic interests must be balanced in canton and municipal councils with duplicate mayors, deputy mayors, ministers, and senior officials. The Serbian entity, Republika Srpska, is more homogenous and therefore has a simpler and more easily governed structure.

¹⁸ Washington 1994, Art. III.1 and III.2:

<http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/peace/BoH%201994%200301.pdf> (2018-03-01); Robert M. Hayden, *Blueprints for a House Divided: The Constitutional Logic of the Yugoslav Wars* (University of Michigan Press, 1999) 114-15.

¹⁹ Washington 1994, Art. III.4:

<http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/peace/BoH%201994%200301.pdf> (2018-03-01); (Art. III.4)

²⁰ E.g. Bieber, op. cit; Roland Kostić, "Ambivalent Peace: External Peacebuilding Threatened Identity and Reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina" (PhD diss., Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, 2007).

For prolonged periods, the internal borders have seemed stronger than the external borders, with Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats effectively pretending that they live in neighbouring states (Serbia and Croatia)²¹. With politicians unwilling to cooperate or unwilling to be seen cooperating, this heavy constitutional structure has created a dysfunctional state. In the words of the Bosnian philosopher Zdravko Grebo, it is a monstrous state created by the international community, but in which the local people must live.²²

A real dilemma has been that the structure has laid clear foundations for decentralisation to secure ethnic self-determination and thereby has also locked them in and prevented the core functions of a state. Any attempt to bridge or amend this initial design at a later stage comes with the risk of escalating tensions rather than ameliorating them. It has become obvious to local and international agents and observers that the Dayton structure is dysfunctional and requires amendment or renegotiation.

However, this has never been initiated for the fear of being unable to control the process of re-opening the Dayton Agreement. Instead, the international administration has simply tried to overrule various aspects of the constitution or initiated reforms it has considered necessary to create a functioning state. The continuous story has been the Bosniak politicians in Sarajevo arguing for increased central powers, in which they have typically been backed by the international administration. The Bosnian Serbs have vetoed such attempts and claimed them unconstitutional, with reference to the Dayton Agreement. The Bosnian Croats, locked into a federation they never wanted, have often sided with the Bosniaks, while desiring to create an entity of their own.

Education and Reproduction of Divisions

While the inbuilt tensions of the Dayton and Washington Agreements have materialised in many dimensions, the education system provides an illustration of how these divisions continually reproduce. The education system, which lacks a coordinating central Ministry of Education, is segmented along entity and canton lines into 12 education ministries (one for each entity and canton) and an education department in the District of Brčko. This resulted in an 'ethnified'

²¹ See also Kostić, op. cit.

²² Personal communication.

structure, or a structure coloured by ethnicity, where Bosnian Serbs have decision-making power in Republika Srpska, and the Bosniak and Croat majorities respectively have such power in each of the ten cantons in the federation, while the two mixed cantons are particularly fragmented at a sub-cantonal level²³.

The political and administrative division has meant a continuous politicisation of education, which maintains ethnically coloured curricula that affects a range of subjects, especially history, geography, civics, language, and music culture with ethnic symbols in the schools²⁴. This has proved a real obstacle to the return and reintegration process. Placing children in schools where the school has been hostile to their ethnic group creates a very real obstacle. Further, transfers between schools and programmes have remained difficult since the curricula are not coordinated. Therefore, the divided and ethnically tainted education system has been a continuous obstacle to returning to a common education system and for reconciliation attempts.

Many institutional reforms have been attempted, for example, with a conference of ministers of education and a central Education Agency, but it has lacked any real power. In this frozen framework, the international community has played an increasingly passive role and, as noted by Valery Perry²⁵, the domestic ruling parties feed on nationalist sentiment and employment of patronage systems, and have little to gain from engaging in policies that produce compromise or inclusive civic orientation

Police Reform and Escalating Tensions

Another instructive example highlighting how the tension inbuilt in the Dayton Agreement generates problems for implementation is the structure of the police and the attempts at reform to create a coordinated

²³ Marina Bowder and Valery Perry, "Returnees and the Challenges for Education Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina," in *Education and Internally Displaced Persons* eds. Christine Smith Ellison and Alan Smith (Bloomsbury, 2013, 142-164); Valery Perry, "Classroom Battlegrounds for Hearts and Minds: Efforts to Reform and Transform Education in Post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina," in *Bosnia-Herzegovina Since Dayton: Civic and Uncivic Values* eds. Ola Listhaug and Sabrina P. Ramet (Ravenna: Longo Editore, 2013, 225-246).

²⁴ Bowder and Perry, op. cit.

²⁵ Valery Perry, "Classroom Battlegrounds for Hearts and Minds: Efforts to Reform and Transform Education in Post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina," in *Bosnia-Herzegovina Since Dayton: Civic and Uncivic Values*. eds. Ola Listhaug and Sabrina P. Ramet (Ravenna: Longo Editore, 2013, 225-246).

law enforcement agency. In the decentralised Dayton structure, almost all competencies of the police were allocated at the level of the entities and cantons, which meant that there were as many as 15 autonomous police agencies.

In 2000 and 2002, two state level functions were created with the 'State Border Service' and 'State Investigation and Protection Agency', but overall, the fragmented and uncoordinated police structure remained, which created a dysfunctional state of law enforcement. Meanwhile, there was a growing international awareness of the problem with organised crime and corruption, which was paramount in the whole region and affected Europe.²⁶ With crime and corruption being a major obstacle to development and with the informal local control of the police, the international administration, through its representative Office of the High Representative (OHR), initiated negotiations on police reform with the aim of forming a unified police force with competencies at the central state level and with districts crossing the inter-entity boundary line and hence centralisation.

This would set in motion a centrifugal and conflict-escalating dynamic with increasing tension among local politicians²⁷. It started with an OHR-imposed decision in 2004 to establish a restructuring commission and continued over a three-year period of protracted negotiations and tensions and was finally aborted in December 2007. The seemingly technical and practical issue of the police was in fact a crucial state-building issue, and local politicians and observers immediately perceived this as such and hence as a constitutional rearrangement in violation of the Dayton Agreement. Therefore, it generated a dispute on the organisation of the state, rather than on the practical coordination of law enforcement.

Resistance and suspicion regarding the reform initiative came from all ethnic groups, but the Bosnian Serbs saw it as an attempt to fully or partially abolish the Serbian entity. In an unfortunate move, the reforms were pinned to Bosnia and Herzegovina's relations with the EU, by making them conditional to the 'Stabilization and Association Agreement' (SAA), which was under negotiation. Eager to move the

²⁶ The central Balkans became one of the largest smuggling zones in the world, and, for example, between 70% and 80% of all heroin trade in Western Europe (depending on the country) travelled through the Balkans. See Sørensen, op. cit. 2006.

²⁷ Daniel Lindvall, *The Limits of the European Vision in Bosnia and Herzegovina* (Acta Universitatis Stockholmiensis: Stockholm Studies in Sociology, New Series 40, 2009).

state-building and peace-building process forward, the OHR referred to the police reform in terms of the conditionality to fulfil European standards, which the EU, internally divided, allowed it to formulate. Because of the failure to reach an agreement, the reform effectively came to block the entire EU policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Since local tensions and mutual suspicion were escalated rather than ameliorated, the initiative was eventually abandoned, and the conditionality bar lowered.

However, this again directly affected the negotiation dynamics. The Bosniak politicians who had built up expectations of an increased centralisation saw a lowering of the bar as a move by the international community to reward the Bosnian Serbs for obstructions related to the reforms²⁸. Now, anything that was weaker than the initial proposal was perceived by the Bosniaks as rewarding the Serbs, and vice versa. Specific proposals and counter proposals were offered and blocked.

One of the Bosnian Serb leaders, Milorad Dodik offered a compromise proposal in which the police were brought under supervision at the central level, while keeping the organisation at the entity level. The Bosniak representative Haris Silajdžić expressed that his main goal was to abolish the Bosnian Serb entity, Republika Srpska, proclaiming that its existence was a legalisation of a structure resulting from genocide²⁹. The positions became increasingly blocked, and in the end, the international community suggested a watered-down proposal, which was rejected by both the Serbs and the Bosniaks. The final demise of the police reform came from an OHR attempt to impose several decisions to force local politicians back to negotiations. With the Bosnian Serbs simply refusing and instead threatening with a complete withdrawal from the central government and parliament, the OHR had to abandon its decision. The net result of the process was that the legitimacy of the OHR as the international community's representative, was considerably undermined.

Kosovo: Rambouillet Negotiations and Shock Waves from Dayton

The Rambouillet negotiations aimed at bringing an agreement between Kosovo leaders and Serbian leaders to a joint agreement over Kosovo's future. However, the text of the Rambouillet talks were never

²⁸ Lindvall, op. cit.

²⁹ Lindvall, op. cit..

signed and ratified. Notwithstanding, the text became slightly revised after the NATO bombings of Serbia in 1999. The subsequent NATO bombing campaign spurred an immediate Serbian counterstrike and assault inside Kosovo, both to prepare the ground for an expected NATO invasion and as a revenge act upon the Albanians.

In face of the subsequent humanitarian disaster, it became evident that new negotiations were necessary to break the deadlock. A renegotiation after the bombings was possible with the involvement of Russia, and now the crucial problem points from the first (February) version of Rambouillet were dropped or altered, after which Serbia agreed to what in effect became a UN protectorate in Kosovo³⁰. The UN Security Council Resolution 1244 formalised the mandate, officially guaranteeing Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo, but placing it under UN administration. The focus of the analysis below is on the rationality structure of local agents in the Kosovo context.

Rationality structure of local agents

The Rambouillet negotiation is as close to a textbook case as one may find on how an agreement profoundly affects the rationality structure of local agents and thereby the political dynamic in a direction towards radicalisation of the conflict. One of the claimed causes of the breakdown was the content of the appendix B. The Serbs representing the Former Yugoslavian side had been close to agreeing until this appendix was shown. It implied that 'NATO personnel shall enjoy, together with their vehicles, vessels, aircraft and equipment, free and unrestricted passage throughout the FRY, including associated airspace and territorial waters. This shall include but not be limited to, the right of bivouac, manoeuvre, billet, and utilisation of any areas or facilities as required for support, training, and operations.'³¹

It was also one of the clearest examples of how an agreement immediately affects intra-ethnic relations. Moreover, in the case of

³⁰ Kjell Magnusson, *Rambouilletavtalet: Texten, förhandlingarna, bakgrunden*. Centrum för Multietnisk forskning, Uppsala, 1999; E. A Dauphinee, "Rambouillet: A Critical (Re)Assessment," in *Understanding the War in Kosovo* eds. F. Bieber & Z. Daskalovski (Frank Cass, 2003), 101-121; Jens Stihoff Sörensen, *State Collapse and Reconstruction in the Periphery: Political Economy, Ethnicity and Development in Yugoslavia, Serbia, and Kosovo* (Oxford & New York: Berghahn Books, 2009).

³¹ From Appendix B quoted in Alex Bellamy, "Reconsidering Rambouillet", *Contemporary Security Policy*, 2001, 22:1, 31-56, 36.

Kosovo, the 'neighbouring' Dayton Agreement had a profound effect, although (or precisely because) it did not mention Kosovo.

In Kosovo, we also find a particularly clear example of the importance of the intra-ethnic dimension in an ethnically delineated conflict. Here, the most crucial issue aside from the dynamic in Serbian-Albanian relations was the intra-Albanian competition between the moderate and initially hegemonic political party Democratic Alliance of Kosovo (LDK) and the radical faction Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), with the latter's continuous consolidation throughout the second half of the 1990s. Of importance is how the latter obtained international support intentionally and unintentionally and how the peace agreements contributed to this. This development throughout the 1990s profoundly influenced the conditions and direction of peace- and state-building after 2000.

In response to the *de facto* abolishment of Kosovo's autonomy within Serbia, the Albanian majority organised their own parallel institutions and boycotted all the state ones, which were dominated by Serbs. Since the Albanians opted for a non-violent strategy, there was little direct confrontation, but the result was a deeply divided society. The system was financed through a 3% tax for all Albanians, including those working abroad, diaspora remittances and, to some extent, international aid with donors supporting what they perceived as an emerging 'civil society'. It also relied on voluntary work, solidarity, reduced salaries, bartering, and subsistence farming.

Politically and institutionally the scene was completely dominated by the LDK, which essentially managed to temporarily unify the Albanians against the Serbs. The LDK's strategy was not undisputed, and there was opposition and divisions within the party and with other smaller parties, especially from autumn 1994 onwards. There was a split with a breakaway moderate faction of those willing to settle for autonomy within the new Yugoslavia. The split also developed across the diaspora in Germany, Switzerland, and the US, and there was an accompanying growing opposition towards LDK's dominance in the local government³².

³² Sørensen, op. cit 2009; Jens Stilhoff Sørensen, "Reconstituting Crisis: Revisiting the Dayton and Rambouillet Agreement" in *Mediation and Liberal Peacebuilding*. eds. M. Eriksson, & R. Kostić (Routledge Studies in Intervention and State building, London: Routledge, 2013).

Within the diaspora, there were also more radical groups. While most joined the LDK in 1990, some militant factions remained³³. From these grew the KLA, formed during 1992-93, with the objective of an independent Kosovo and unification of all Albanians in a Greater Albania³⁴. The KLA drew its members mainly from a few clans in the Drenica area and from the diaspora. The group remained very small and marginal until autumn 1995.

Internal divisions grew and a real change in strategy in the Albanian movement came in the second half of the 1990s. This partly resulted from the perception shock wave that the Dayton Agreement sent among the Albanians in Kosovo. The Albanian interpretation of the Dayton Agreement was that building ethnic polity had been legitimised (the entities were created through ethnic cleansing). More importantly, since Kosovo had been ignored at Dayton, they interpreted that the only way to receive serious international attention was through violence³⁵.

The strategy of non-violence was now openly challenged, and the political spectrum widened with divisions into three positions, pacifist, activist, and militant. In the following years, the KLA gained more initiative. From November 1997, masked KLA guerrillas started displaying themselves at funerals to read statements, a tactic creating fear among many Albanians³⁶. They targeted not only Serbs, but also LDK supporters, and many Albanians began to fear the KLA.

The KLA had limited resources, but their strategy was to provoke violence, as in Bosnia and Herzegovina, to gain international attention for their cause³⁷. The strategy proved successful, and an incident in early 1998, the Drenica massacre, placed Kosovo at the centre of international attention, which would strengthen the KLA considerably (see Sørensen 2009, 2013). In two operations in February and March, Serbian forces attacked a few extended families connected to the KLA in the Drenica area and killed 26 and 58 people respectively, in the compound of the

³³ Tim Judah, 'The Kosovo Liberation Army', in *Perceptions*, 2000, pp. 61-77; Sørensen, op. cit., 2009; Sørensen, op. cit., 2013.

³⁴ D. Janjić, *Kosovo under the Reign of Slobodan Milosevic*, Belgrade: *Forum for Ethnic Relations*, Institute of Social Sciences, 2009.

³⁵ Janjić, op. cit; Skelzhen Maliqi, *Kosova: Separate Worlds*. Prishtina, Dukagjini Publishing House, 1998.

³⁶ A. Salihu, M. Hajrullahu and J. Xharra, 'Radicals Test the Ground in Drenica' *Balkan Crisis Report No 498, 20 May 2004* (London: Institute for War & Peace Reporting, 2004)

³⁷ H. Thaqi, 'The KLA Brought NATO to Kosova' in *Kosovo: Contending Voices on Balkan Interventions*. ed. J. W Buckley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 282-290

guerrilla leader Adem Jashari³⁸. This provoked outrage among Albanians throughout Kosovo and in the diaspora, and the clan elders in various regions now began supporting the military uprising. Moreover, the Albanian-American community, which had been supporting the LDK, now shifted its political and financial support to the KLA³⁹.

At this time, the KLA was internationally labelled as a terrorist organisation, but within a few months, the US changed its position radically regarding the KLA⁴⁰. During the second half of 1998, the US dropped its support of LDK and began supporting the KLA, a foreign policy shift that was finally completed by spring 1999. Although the KLA had no elected representatives nor any wide popular support, it was given a key role at the Rambouillet talks in February 1999, whereas the LDK was marginalised⁴¹.

From the start, the UN mission was entrenched in the explosive issue of Kosovo's status and a highly radicalised local political dynamic. From now on, the KLA would come to have a strong position in Kosovo, and once a protectorate was established, they embarked on a revenge wave of ethnic cleansing upon the Serbs. Serbs were attacked and murdered or forced to leave, and property, monasteries, and cemeteries were demolished. Moreover, NATO became a bystander, either unable or unmotivated to stop it.

The KLA's leader, Hashim Thaqi, proclaimed himself prime minister and began forming a government, which the UN could not prevent, although it was considered illegitimate. It took almost a year before some security and control were established, and this initial period marked the coming years by generating deep distrust and resentment from the Serbs vis-à-vis the international administration. Violence and destabilisation also spread to Macedonia and southern Serbia, where branches of the KLA embarked on guerrilla campaigns.

³⁸ Magnusson, op. cit.; Tim Judah, 'The Kosovo Liberation Army', in *Perceptions*, 2000, 61–77.

³⁹ F. Nazi, 'Balkan Diaspora 1: The American-Albanian Community' in *Kosovo: Contending Voices on Balkan Interventions*. ed. W.J. Buckley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 152.

⁴⁰ Magnusson, op. cit.; Sørensen, op. cit, 2009; Sørensen, op. cit., 2013.

⁴¹ Magnusson, op. cit.; Dauphinee, 'op. cit., 2003; Sørensen, op. cit., 2009

Preventing Further Shock Waves: Ohrid Framework Agreement for Macedonia

The Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) was signed on 8 August 2001 between the Albanian and Macedonian leaders of the main political parties of the Republic of Macedonia. The signatories of the OFA were Prime Minister Ljubcho Georgievski (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation – Democratic Party of National Unity), Branko Crvenkovski (Social Democratic Union of Macedonia, SDSM), Arben Xhaferi (Democratic Party of the Albanians, DPA), and Ymer Ymeri (Party of Democratic Prosperity, another Albanian party).

To avoid further escalation into a full-scale major armed conflict and to cease the fighting that had begun in early 2001, they agreed to a set of new amendments to the 1991 Constitution. These amendments implied relative far-reaching legislative changes that were supposed to meet the Albanians' long-standing demands. The international community, the EU, and the US, freshly experienced from other regional 'powder kegs', primarily the Bosnian and Kosovo armed conflicts, rushed to curb the outbreak of the armed conflict. In May 2001, after EU and US mediation, a unity government was formed and 'a package of wide-ranging amendments to the constitution and far reaching legislative changes that should meet the Albanians' long-standing demands'⁴² was reached, to be ratified in August 2001. However, several spoiling attempts followed, and armed clashes continued, which forced the external actors to continue pressurising for a peace agreement that should be signed by the involved parties.

The OFA agreement is considered to have addressed some of the important conflict issues that hampered the relations between Albanians and ethnic Macedonians in the otherwise civic-defined Republic of Macedonia. The power-sharing arrangements that were drafted in the agreement were expected to avoid a continued and escalated violent civil war. In many ways, the idea was to build the political system similar to a model of a consociational democracy. However, it also included some aspects that would create long-term consequences for the implementation process. Hence, the primary focus was placed on the

⁴² Ulf Brunnbauer, "The Implementation of the Ohrid Agreement: Ethnic Macedonian Resentment," *Journal of Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe*, Issue 1/2002. European Centre for Minority Issues, 2002, 3.

rationality structure of local agents, structural conditions, and institutional conditions and relations.

Rationality Structure of Local Agents

In Macedonia, the events in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo had a direct effect on the political tensions between the largest ethnic group, the Macedonians, and the largest minority group in the country, the Albanians. It also had an effect on how the OFA came into being as the political reality. The international community's determination to prevent further escalation was based on the experiences in Kosovo. In a similar way as in Kosovo, the Albanian militant organisation, the National Liberation Army (NLA), closely linked and partly overlapped with the KLA in Kosovo, launched several attacks against Macedonian security forces in January 2001. Their official political objective was to fight against the Macedonian security forces until the Albanian basic rights were achieved and were at parity with most of the country's other citizens, the ethnic Macedonians. However, to achieve this, as was the case with the KLA in Kosovo, NLA's strategy was to first gain attention from the international community. This search for attention was aimed to give NLA a legitimate presence as key actor in the forthcoming political process.

The NLA, partly considered an insurgency movement from Kosovo since many of their commanders had been founders and commanders of the KLA in Kosovo, also created political confusion among the Macedonian parties. Soon the NLA also made a claim that they were part of the new political reality and should be considered as one party to the conflict. Until then, Macedonia had been described as '...an "oasis of peace"', mostly because everyone needed at least one peaceful actor and alleged success in the regional nightmare⁴³ of former Yugoslavia.

Some challenging and sporadic violence broke out after the attack by the Albanian National Army (ANA), who opposed the OFA and wanted a unification of what they considered all Albanian areas in the Western Balkans⁴⁴. Despite this, there was a 'surprisingly low level of

⁴³ Biljana Vankovska, "The Role of the Ohrid Framework Agreement and the Peace Process in Macedonia", in *Regional Cooperation, Peace Enforcement, and the Role of the Treaties in the Balkans*, eds. S. Bianchini, J. Marko, C. Nation, and A. M. Uvalic (Ravenna: A. Longo Editore, 2007), 41–63, p. 12.

⁴⁴ Norbert Mappes-Niediek, 'Warum die Kosovo-Mission gescheitert ist', in *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik*, 2001, 46, 447–455, 446.

inter-communal violence in ethnically mixed localities...'⁴⁵. Vankovska argued that the EU and US primarily enforced the OFA on the signatory parties without any deeper understanding of the conflict situation. In fact, she underlined that the NLA leader and his party (today the Democratic Union for Integration, DUI), became a 'shadow actor' that, with its armed attacks, placed itself on the political arena despite the NLA not participating directly at the Ohrid negotiations. In September 2001, a month after the signing of the OFA, NLA was disarmed, although only formally in the view of many ethnic Macedonians.

Its commander and political leader, Ali Ahmeti, who also was one of the founding figures of the KLA in 1998, formed the political party DUI in 2002. From that point onwards, DUI became a dedicated supporter of the OFA, thereby initially downplaying the role of other Albanian parties. It soon became the largest Albanian party. However, for many ethnic Macedonians, 'for whom he remains a perpetrator of war crimes'⁴⁶, it was an improper outcome of the 2001 violence. Paradoxically, one of the previously main Albanian parties, the DPA, that had been part of the government coalition did not believe the OFA would give what the Albanians demanded. A similar pattern as in the case of Kosovo followed, in which violence was politically rewarded in the sense that the international community, primarily the EU and US, took the mediator role upon themselves to curb further violence, and *de facto* 'the weak and non-democratic leaders who contributed the most to the conflict explosion were given international support to decide upon the destiny and the future of the ordinary citizens who had never really been involved in direct inter-ethnic armed hostilities'⁴⁷. The international mediators pressured the Macedonian government to give several concessions to the Albanian minorities but also continued to support the OFA and created EU guarantees for local warlords.

Structural Conditions

Studies have shown that despite a relatively high growth rate compared to neighbouring countries, there is a high degree of social exclusion in Macedonia among ethnic Albanians and the Roma population in rural areas and the capital itself compared to places with a

⁴⁵ Vankovska, op. cit., 13.

⁴⁶ Brunnbauer, op. cit, 18.

⁴⁷ Vankovska, op. cit., 13.

population less than 30,000 that tend to have a better situation⁴⁸. The broader public appreciated the immediate peace dividend in the form of the absence of violence and the ceasefire. With time however, when the implementation did not follow the OFA, public frustrations increased, and when the expectations were thus not fulfilled, escalation of different forms of resistance followed.

In recent years, popular frustrations with lack of increased socio-economic output, particularly in terms of dividing the socio-economic improvements in a fair way, has spurred demonstrations and protests. With a critique of the government budget proposal, the now former leader of the leftist opposition party (SDSM) Branko Crvenkovski while addressing the thousands of supporters outside of the parliament on 23 December 2012 said that 'We are calling for civil disobedience... Macedonia will see a popular uprising'⁴⁹.

Critique has also been forthcoming for the lack of implementation of health reform and the high corruption rate within government structures. Several new government reforms were implemented in 2014, for example, that universities are placed under closer control of the government, and civil society has received a three-fold increase in tax payment requests on honorarium payment. These reforms increased popular questioning of the government policies but risk being addressed in ethnic terminology and in relation to the OFA. This can evolve into renewed ethnic tensions in society.

At present (June 2020), Macedonia still faces an open question on whether the political parties will risk playing the 'ethnic card', and whether the public is willing to be dragged into such a political game; especially when the country has been shaken by series of corruption scandals investigated by a Special Public Prosecution Office. Still, voices from the Albanians continue to claim that the implementation of the OFA is not yet accomplished, while voices among ethnic Macedonians have begun to say that it is time to go beyond the OFA.

Institutional conditions and relations

⁴⁸ Joseph Deutsch, Jacques Silber and Paolo Verme, 'On Measuring Social Exclusion: A New Approach with an Application to FYR Macedonia,' in *Poverty and Social Exclusion in the Western Balkans. New Directions in Measurement and Policy*. eds. Caterina Ruggeri Laderchi and Sara Savastano (New York/Heidelberg: Springer Verlag, 2013) 99-116.

⁴⁹ Al Jazeera, 12 Dec. 2012, 'Macedonia Budget Sparks Clashes.'

In contrast to the Washington, Dayton, and Rambouillet Agreements, the OFA included elucidations regarding the language issues and the relationship between the local autonomy requests (primarily Albanian party positions) and the demands to keep the centrality of the state (primarily the position of the ethnic Macedonian party position).

Further, the OFA states that the relative size of the minorities of the total population should be reflected in the number of civil police employed. A clear plan of how many new recruits are needed for recruitment was built on a forthcoming census, and 'the parties commit themselves to ensuring that the police services will by 2004 generally reflect the composition and distribution of the population of Macedonia' (Article 5.2). The new recruits should be trained by the OSCE and USA.

The objective was to let all sectors mirror the Macedonian ethnic societal composition and 'increase the representation of members of communities not in the majority in Macedonia in public administration, the military, and public enterprises, as well as to improve their access to public financing for business development' (Article 5.1). Moreover, the media sector became affected and 'the parties invite the international community, including the OSCE, to increase its assistance for projects in media to further strengthen radio, TV, and print media, including Albanian language and multi-ethnic media' (Article 6.1) thereby, creating two *de facto* media systems, one in the Macedonian and one in the Albanian language, respectively.

The OFA did not change the political system and is based on the 1991 Constitution. The election system, in which 85 representatives of the 120 seats in the parliament are elected according to the majority principle, in effect, sparks intra-ethnic rivalry, meaning that wherever Albanians are the majority, it becomes an inter-Albanian rivalry for gaining most of the votes. Further, it forms an actual model in which essentially only two ethnic groups are part of the *de facto* consociational democratic system. Due to the OFA, with a further strengthening of local autonomy for the municipalities, further segregation between Albanians and ethnic Macedonians was strengthened

Space of Contestation in Implementation

When we bring our focus on the space of contestation in the OFA, we find further issues of ambivalence. In the OFA we find that when the

signatories signed the agreement, they 'violated the Constitution'⁵⁰ since the Constitution of 1991 required that political agreements as the OFA must be signed in the Macedonian language. The OFA was written in American English and is the only authentic version of it. Furthermore, several translations of such terms as 'community', 'public body', 'public space', etc., were ambiguous and created questions, such as whether 'community' referred to the 'ethnic' or 'local' community (Škaric 2004).

Today, 19 years after the signing of the agreement, although most public grievance is mainly directed at the government, there is a latent risk of increased polarisation mainly between ethnic Albanians and ethnic Macedonians. The risk of renewed ethnic mobilisation and escalation into new violence and armed conflict overshadows the various issues of the OFA that have been achieved. Much of the development and economic policies during the last years have led to a major gross domestic product (GDP) output; however, it also created a rift, and socio-economic gaps have widened between the 'haves' and "have-nots'. Due to continuous segregation in the country, these socio-economic and political cleavages risk being addressed in ethnic terms. What has shifted in terms of expectations since 2001, and how has the resistance against the top-down peace project unfolded over time?

The OFA provides a quota system concerning how power sharing should be designed to ensure that the biggest minority, the Albanians, could gain access to power and work options in the various parts of the authority. In recent studies, we find that most of the ethnic Macedonians consider the OFA to be outdated, and to give the Albanians *de facto* better work options even in cases in which the merits are fewer. Albanians, on the other hand, emphasise that the OFA still has not been implemented, and that the segregation still prevails in practice. Incidents such as attacks and violent clashes between demonstrating Albanians and police have further fuelled the tensions.

Conclusion

Peace agreements are often designed with the immediate concern of ending violent conflict. This study has particularly looked at four aspects that are of crucial importance to be included in the negotiations of ethnic identity conflicts. If these aspects are not dealt with properly, it risks

⁵⁰ Svetomir Škaric, "Ohrid Agreement and Minority Communities in Macedonia" in *Prospects of Multiculturalism in Western Balkan States*. eds. Vojislav Stanovčić and Goran Bašić, (Belgrade, Ethnicity Research Center, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2004) 96.

freezing conditions around which conflicts can re-crystallise and re-emerge for years and even decades after the treaty was signed. They may contain inbuilt tensions with wide-ranging and long-lasting ramifications for the implementation of peace and for the subsequent political (and ethnic) dynamics in post-intervention society. Using former Yugoslavia as a case, we analysed how these four aspects have been neglected in the negotiations, namely: i) how the agreement affects the rationality structure of local agents; ii) how it affects structural conditions, such as socio-economic; iii) how it affects institutional conditions and relations, and iv) the extent of space for contestation of the content of the agreement. While these dimensions mattered to various extents for the outcome in the four agreements analysed, they provide a complementary framework to engage in to achieve the desired results. Hence, these aspects can be seen as complementary to the research that has argued that endogenous factors matter for the outcome of the long-term peace process⁵¹.

This study's findings complement previous research, and in specific when we deal with ethnic conflict contexts. We have highlighted the importance of analysing the aspects, and to what extent they constitute determining or contributing factors that bring conflict parties into a successful conflict transformation process or not. As shown in this study, we can draw some tentative conclusions regarding the dimensions analysed and how they may be of concern. Failure to consider them and incorporate all or some of them, when relevant, may partly explain why many peace processes related to ethnic and armed conflict dynamics return to armed conflicts within the first five years. Although we draw our conclusion from one single, yet highly complex, case, our findings indicate that these dimensions matter for ethnic conflict transformations. Hence, we propose that more systematic studies should be conducted on how peace processes of ethnic conflicts are linked to peace agreements, with special emphasis on the four dimensions as discussed in this study. This will further broaden the scope of our understanding on the subject.

⁵¹ Wagner and Druckman, op. cit.; Madhav et al, op. cit.; Badran, op. cit.; Daniel Druckman and Cecilia Albin, 'Distributive Justice and the Durability of Peace Agreements,' *Review of International Studies*, 37 (2011):1137-1168; Jean Poitras, and Aurélie Le Tareau, 'Quantifying the Quality of Mediation Agreements', in *Negotiation and Conflict Management Research*, 2(4), 2009, 363-380; Fortna, op. cit., 2004; Stedman et al op. cit, 2002; Jones, op. cit.

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Ethnicity Based Democratic Constitutional Structures: the Cases of Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia and Kosovo

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Abstract:

Though always ethnic in nature, the Western Balkans has never been so divided into ethnic cleavages as it is today. The three post Yugoslav countries: Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, and Kosovo have opted for a sort of consociational and centripetal constitutional systems, pertaining to provide enough say and representation to ethnicities, as primarily driven by a democratization process and post-conflict ethnic reconciliation motives. The experience so far has led to stalemate in central government capacities, no progress in inter-ethnic reconciliation, and has necessitated post-democratic practices, as short term solutions. This paper will address the issue of inter-ethnic post-conflict structural settlements and their reflections into democratic politics, governability, and inter-ethnic reconciliation. It compares the three cases by addressing the research question of what are their current constitutional and structural settings based on ethnicity, and their influence on governability, interethnic reconciliation and on *democraticness*.

Key words: Ethnic constitutional settings, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Kosovo

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Introduction

Governing multi-ethnic societies is one of the most complex and sensitive issues in constitutional settings and politics. This is further complicated in post-conflict cases, where ethnicities that fought each other along ethnic identity lines have to live side by side and share the same political system. The difficulties in finding a constitutional formula in multi-ethnic settings has been a continuous concern among scholars and policy makers as well. Among many others, Horowitz has pointed out the obscurity in managing ethnic relations in post-conflict societies, especially in a complex, small and tiny region such as Balkans, where one of the global wars started.¹ Geographic position explains to a large degree ethnic and cultural diversity of the western Balkans, ethnically structured along and within the small states mapping out the colorful region. History of inter-ethnic relations in the western Balkans is rich, marking phases when multi-ethnic relations flourished in positive sense as an asset of social capital, but there were also periods on which ethnic cleavages were deeply entrenched turned into bloodbaths, among others the last one in 90s. In this regard, from the constructivist perspective such ups and downs of inter-ethnic relations in the western Balkans along different times often reflect global geopolitical calculations. It explains the transformations from a sort of brotherhood inter-ethnic relations in one extreme to inter-ethnic bloodbaths on the other. Yet, history of inter-ethnic relations in the western Balkans is not the concern of this paper, but rather the constitutional and political settlements along ethnic divisions in the three multi-ethnic cases in the western Balkans: Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, and Kosovo. Three of the cases have much in common. Aside from being multi-ethnic societies, they share a common past, experienced inter-ethnic conflict, and settled their conflict and achieved post-conflict arrangements assisted and monitored by the international community. Their constitutional settings are considered fundamentally consociationalist and have also centripetal elements to some extent. Furthermore, what is important here is that in three of the cases such constitutional settings are considerably challenged internally, but they rely on the basis of the guarantee by the international community, to a certain extent in contrary to the political will of the internal political forces and actors.

¹ Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley - Los Angeles - London: University of California Press, 1985).

This paper aims to address the main questions related to constitutional settings and their outputs on the prospects of inter-ethnic relations in those three countries. After elaborating the constitutional arrangements of the three cases, it will look at how those consociationalist and centripetalist arrangements are affecting their governability, inter-ethnic reconciliation prospects, and democratisation process through post-democratic practices. The first part of the paper explains the constitutional settings of the three cases, followed by a deeper comparative exploration on the outcome of those constitutional structures and politics.

Consociationalism and Centripetalism

In discussing multi-ethnic political systems, consociationalism becomes a prioritised reference point, as it was created explicitly to address the issue of governing mixed societies. In a number of cases it has proven successful. The concept of consociationalism was developed by Lijphart.² Its meaning is derived from the word *consociation* which implies the coexistence of different entities within the same political setting. Consociationalism as a political and constitutional model has developed out of the experiences of various western European countries such as the Netherlands, Belgium and, Switzerland. Initially it was meant to provide a governing formula for solutions in the political contexts based on which it was developed, where it actually functioned considerably well. However, taking into account its usefulness, it was later observed that such models have been found in various similar contexts around the world, though with differing output results compared to western European countries. Such constitutional settings are also attractive to post-conflict multi-ethnic societies struggling with simultaneous demands for multi-ethnic governing principles and inter-ethnic reconciliation. This model has been implemented to various degrees in the cases of the three countries under consideration in this paper. It was considered very attractive based on the internal circumstances, but also by the international community, whose role in such decisions was decisive. Hence, an overall evaluation of the experience of those countries up to the present day demonstrates diverse results, from the very promising to the dysfunctional. It is likely that the model might be functional in multi-ethnic societies, keeping together ethnicities that did not slaughter each other, at least in the recent past. Post-conflict multi-ethnic contexts, like the western Balkans,

² Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration* (Yale University Press, 1977).

are facing difficulties in accommodating consociational settings, due to the experience of inter-ethnic conflict due to which wounds remain open. This is manifested in a number of ways, including a high number of missing persons, and the low number of war crimes and crimes against humanity cases handled by local and international courts. Nonetheless, it is clear that in three of the cases considered here, consociationalism is not delivering as expected.

In principle, consociationalism is considered an elite consensual arrangement, expected to gradually be reflected at a general level of society through the socialisation process. However, in different contexts it has continually proven to have the opposite effect as it could not deliver as a workable and sustainable tool to encourage and keep different entities together. This experience shows that in some cases it was even hardly acceptable, or it was aborted while underdeveloped, or it otherwise needed additional enforcement by the international community. In the case of the western Balkans, the role of the international community to ensure consociational settings is indispensable, though this places the international community in a very uncomfortable position. As the international community is itself the main sponsor of the democratisation process in the region, it often had to go even against various fundamental principles of democracy through internal involvement in decision-making. Here lies an inconsistency, which is going to be addressed here: a discrepancy between democratic and post-democratic principles.

In addition to consociationalism, elements of centripetalism are conceptualised as a helpful tool to facilitate and encourage reconciliation among entities, in this case, ethnicities.³ They serve as a supplementary route for post-conflict societies, and as such they are expected to be present among the political and institutional settings of the three cases considered here. According to Reilly, centripetalism has three dimensions: the existence of initiative among politicians in an electoral campaign to attract voters of other ethnic groups, which encourages candidates to maintain a more moderate rhetoric; the enabling of the negotiating arena in which political actors of different groups have incentives to achieve agreements on electoral support and certain important issues; and the development of politically central

³ Donald L. Horowitz. 2014. "Ethnic Power Sharing: Three Big Problems," *Journal of Democracy* 25(2014): 5-20.

parties, and multi-ethnic political parties and coalitions.⁴ Often these two models complement each other, with centripetalist principles manifested in inter-ethnic coalitions as frequently required by constitutional settings, or as occasionally imposed externally by the international community based on the principle of good will. Each of the three cases considered here has elements of the two models to various degrees as explained in the followings.

The multi-ethnic constitutional settings in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Bosnia presents the most tragic experience in the process of Yugoslavia's breakup. Historically it has always been a mixed and heterogeneous society. During the time of Yugoslavia and even prior to that, it had high levels of multi-ethnic and multi-cultural values.⁵ Based on this, and referring to the recent war experience, it can be assumed that the deeper the interlinkage among entities during peace, more tragic the experience among entities was likely to be during the war. This is one of the lessons drawn from the recent war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The impact on the post-conflict settings and reconciliation process remains to be seen, since it is still happening, and is in a state of fluidity. However, observations up to now suggest that it is hardly promising. Just to illustrate the high level of multi-ethnic interlinkages, it is important to mention that prior to the war, in Bosnia there were a hundred thousand intermarriages across ethnic lines in Mostar alone, one of main cities, the rate of intermarriage was around 42%. Throughout its history, Bosnia was very rich in terms of multi-ethnicity and multiculturalism, and this essential fact has not been taken into account in drawing up post-conflict constitutional settings. Therefore, one of the capital mistakes of the international community⁶, having as it does a decisive role in post-conflict settlements, has been to ignore the past realities of inter-ethnic relations and divide ethnicities into territories. Such ethnic territorial division resulted in a form of post-conflict ethnic cleansing on a territorial basis, cementing deeply-entrenched ethnic cleavages which developed primarily during the war. Meanwhile, it created an obstacle to any current or future inter-ethnic reconciliation which could have otherwise potentially resulted had

⁴ Benjamin Reilly, "Electoral Systems for Divided Societies," *Journal of Democracy* 13 (2002):156-170.

⁵ Dusko Sekulic, Garth Massey and Randy Hodson, Ethnic Intolerance and Ethnic Conflict in the Dissolution of Yugoslavia. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 5, 2006.

⁶ Ruzica Jakesevic, "Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding in the Western Balkans - The Role of International Actors". *Teorija in Praksa*, vol. 55 (2018).

structural arrangements been made in a way which necessitated inter-ethnic connection and ethnic interdependence.⁷

None of the historical empires that ruled Bosnian territory or people – the Romans, Byzantines, Ottomans, Austro-Hungarians, and Yugoslavs, created this type of territorially ethnic division, as the current international community did.⁸ This structural arrangement on ethnic territorial division is considered a major source fuelling ethnically motivated hate, inter-ethnic non-reconciliation, and non-governability in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is important to explain that constitutional structures in Bosnia reflect the attempts of the international community to bring the war to an end, and which seem not to have taken into account their suitability for post-conflict concerns. Based on that, the war was brought to an end, and inter-ethnic bloodbaths were stopped. However, the post-conflict developments seem to have different demands compared to those of wartime, and current constitutional structures do not appear to be able to address them properly.

The constitutional structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina is also known as the Dayton constitution, based on the Dayton agreement sponsored and enforced by the international community. The constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina forms part of the Dayton Agreement as one of the eleven annexes of the agreement. Based on the provisions of the Dayton agreement, Bosnia and Herzegovina is structured and divided into three constituent nations, two entities, ten cantons, and the Brčko District.

To all parties in Dayton Peace Process Brčko represented the most vital point. It is a geopolitical and geostrategic location to the Federation and *Republika Srpska* as well. Before the war Brčko was one of the wealthiest municipalities (*Opština*). It is located close to the Zagreb-Belgrade highway, the main trade route between Central Europe and Southern Balkans. Its port in Sava River linked trade and industry between the central Bosnia and Tuzla to Croatia and beyond. Furthermore, it connects strategically, military, and economically eastern and western parts of *Republika Srpska*, a 3 miles wide *Posavina* corridor linking Serbs of western Bosnia with Serbia itself.

⁷ Cermak Petr, “Reintegration of Local Communities Divided by Ethnic Conflict: Ethnically Mixed Municipalities in the Western Balkans”. *Croatian Political Science Review*, vol. 53 (2016): 191-229.

⁸ Wolfgang Ismayr, *Die Politischen Systeme Osteuropas* (Opladen: Leske+Budrich, 2004).

Therefore, issue of the Brčko District represented the hottest point in the Dayton Peace Process, as it was about to fail if parties did not agree on the proposal of the US secretary of state Warren Christopher, suggested by the president of Serbia Milosevic, to bring the issue of Brčko to the arbitral tribunal for its final status settlement⁹. The two entities agreed for an interim solution to divide Brčko district between them establishing Inter-Entity Boundary Line of Brčko area, until the arbitrary tribunal sets the final award. The interim decision of the tribunal issued on 14th of February 1997 maintained the status quo of Inter-Entity Boundary Line and provided for the establishment of the Office of High Representative-North, known as District Supervisor, run by the deputy High Representative for Brčko. The supervisor was vested with interim legislative and executive power, and authority to overrule any rules and regulations against the Dayton Peace Agreement and mandate of the supervisor¹⁰. The final award of the arbitral tribunal of date 5th of March 1999 established the Brčko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as autonomous district and a condominium between two entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska. This was adopted on the first constitutional amendment of Bosnia and Herzegovina ten years later by Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina on 26th of March 2009¹¹. Brčko district is not an entity, it has its self-government and is jointly owned by two entities. It lacks the power of the entities, its people are directly citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina¹². It uses the Bosnia and Herzegovina's flag and coat of arms¹³.

The final award represents the last phase of implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement. It empowered the Supervisor with duties of its implementation, to establish the Brčko district, and declare the demise of Inter-Entity Border Line. The Brčko Law Revision Commission, composed of the chairman and one representative of the Republika Srpska and two members from the Federation, was set to create the legal and institutional foundations of Brčko district. This structure is based on Statute of the Brčko District as the supreme law. It defines the legal and institutional structure of the district. The functions

⁹ Michael G. Karnavas, "Creating the Legal Framework of the Brčko District of the Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Model for the Region and Other Post-conflict Countries." *The American Journal of International Law* Vol. 97, No.1 (2003): 111-131.

¹⁰ Karnavas, op.cit.

¹¹ *The Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina*, Article VI, 4.

¹² Statute of the Brčko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina – 7 December 1999, *Article 12*.

¹³ *Statute op.cit.*, Article 3.

and powers of the district include: economy, finances, customs administration, public property, public services/infrastructure, culture, education, health care, environment, social welfare, judicial and legal services, police services, housing, urban development and zoning, and other functions necessary for the functioning of the district as a single administrative unit of local self-government¹⁴.

The district Assembly is the highest legislative body of the district, elected by general direct vote¹⁵. The Executive branch is composed of the Mayor and heads of departments elected by the Assembly and is accountable to the assembly¹⁶. It has an independent judiciary system¹⁷. The district is demilitarised¹⁸, but it has unified police force independent of the police structure of both entities¹⁹. The responsibility for the management of the district affairs is vested in local institutions.

The two entities constitute the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina with ten cantons, and *Republika Srpska* has a unitary character without cantons. The Federation includes two ethnicities Bosniaks and Croats, while *Republika Srpska* Serb ethnicity. The Federation has fourteen constitutions, including one state constitution, two entity constitutions, ten cantonal constitutions and one district constitution. It comprises fourteen legislative bodies and fourteen governments. As such, it presents an over-structured constitutional order implying uneasiness in its functioning, often manifested in political stalemate being routine in Bosnian politics. Bosnia and Herzegovina has a political system of multi-level government and multi-level policy and decision-making power centres, from the level of state, to entity, canton, district and municipal (around hundred forty seven municipalities – varying from time to time).²⁰ All horizontal and vertical divisions of power are driven by ethnic considerations that produce and promote values of ethnic partition, serving as inter-ethnic broken bridges. Aside from its functionality and its implications on governability, such sharp, legal and institutionalised ethnic divisions decrease the interdependence and interaction among entities which is necessary for post-conflict reconciliation.

¹⁴ *Statute, op.cit.*, – 7 December 1999, Article 9.

¹⁵ *Statute, op.cit.*, Article 23-41.

¹⁶ *Statute, op.cit.*, Article 46-57.

¹⁷ *Statute, op.cit.*, Article 62-69.

¹⁸ *Statute, op.cit.*, Article 8.

¹⁹ *Statute, op.cit.*, Article 58-61.

²⁰ Mirjana Kasapović, *Bosna i Hercegovina Podijeljeno Drustvo i Nestabilna Drzava* (Zagreb: Politicka Kultura, 2005).

According to democratic principles, and as is the case in advanced democracies, it is usual to have a single person at the top of the political hierarchy, in order to achieve clarity in exercising legitimate authority. Yet in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina the institution of Presidency, as the highest body of the political hierarchy, has three members, since each of the three ethnicities, Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs elect their respective members.²¹ The position is held by each of the three members in rotation for eight months. The Presidency has territorial responsibility for the state as a whole, although its members are not legitimised by votes from all citizens, since they are elected separately by each respective ethnicity. Moreover, what ensures political stalemate is the veto power belonging to each nation of the three recognised nations in Bosnia and Herzegovina over the laws that violate the national interest. In addition, an important and powerful institution in Bosnia and Herzegovina, acting as the final and ultimate authority in terms of interpretation and implementation of the Dayton agreement, is the Office of High Representative (OHR).²² It is nominated by the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council, confirmed by the UN Security Council. This position and power can also be framed within the context of post-democratic practices present in the case of Bosnia.

Furthermore, each entity has a type of self-government comprised of their own parliaments, governments and courts. In practical terms, Bosnia and Herzegovina has fourteen governments and fourteen parliaments. The governmental division on ethnic lines has enabled each entity to pass laws on their own, principally independently from other entities. In addition, they maintain separate administrative structures, overburdening the public sector and compromising the efficiency of the administrations. In other words, Bosnia and Herzegovina can be regarded as a governing model of internal non-coordination and contradiction.

In terms of democracy, Bosnia and Herzegovina is considered a democratic system, yet with stipulated deficiencies, among which are institutionalised deficiencies with the power of OHR categorised within the post-democratic settings. It seems a contradiction in itself, promoting and enforcing democracy through post-democratic practices, but this will be addressed later in this paper. Bosnia and Herzegovina has a separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers.

²¹ *The Constitution of Bosnia, op.cit.*, Article III.

²² *The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina* (Initialed in Dayton on 21 November 1995 and signed in Paris on 14 December 1995), Annex 10.

Fragmentation of the structure of the system has led to an over-division of power centres, compromising the very governability of the system. This ethnic governing structure is institutionalising further inter-ethnic divisions.

Having such an ethnically divided governing structure is also reflected in local politics and political participation. Political pluralism is also mainly ethnicity-based. Parties recruit based on ethnic identities, with the ethnic governing structure and ethnic party politics reinforcing each other. The judicial system is considered to be independent, having a catalogue of human rights organised mainly on an entity basis.

In relation to the horizontal division of power, Bosnia and Herzegovina is strongly decentralised within the Federation, and strongly centralised in the case of *Republika Srpska*. The division of power is further regulated by the constitution, highlighting the power of the state in the areas of foreign policy, foreign trade, customs, monetary policy, the finances of the institutions, the international obligations of Bosnia and Herzegovina, immigration, refugee and asylum policy and regulation, international and inter-entity criminal law enforcement. The latter includes relations with Interpol, the establishment and operation of common and international communications facilities, regulation of inter-entity transportation, and air traffic control.²³ Meanwhile the competencies within the remaining areas are distributed to entities, with the expectation that the necessary support is provided to conduct policies at state level, which often is not the reality. Entities have certain features of member states such as territory, population, constitution, parliament, government, judiciary, army, police, official languages, flag, and coat of arms. Furthermore, within institutional settings, the constitutional court plays a considerable role, and its decisions are normatively binding on both entities. Thus, Bosnia and Herzegovina appears to be a *sui generis* political system, set up through arrangements meant to end the war, but with no prospects to build sustainable peace and development. The over-complexity of the governing structure is compromising governability, inter-ethnic reconciliation, and to some extent democratic principles

The multi-ethnic constitutional settings in North Macedonia

Another case of multi-ethnic society in the western Balkans is North Macedonia. Unlike Bosnia and Herzegovina, it broke away from

²³ *The Constitution of Bosnia, op.cit.*, Article III.

Yugoslavia and attained independence peacefully, through a referendum conducted to secede from Yugoslavia. The process took place under the supervision of the international community, whose commitment was decisive in smoothing the process of independence. This is the main reason why Macedonia (North Macedonia) was not initially exposed to a need to be provided with deterministic system settings by the international community, in order to integrate various ethnicities comprising society in Macedonia (North Macedonia), as was the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina. On the other hand, it appears that this was the main reason for a new war to erupt a decade later, to readjust constitutional settings for better integration of other ethnic entities, aside from ethnic Macedonians. Therefore, a stronger international influence was needed to achieve such arrangements, resulting in multi-ethnic constitutional setting principles stipulated by the Ohrid Framework Agreement.

Initially, ethnic Macedonians in Macedonia (North Macedonia) had a free hand in constitutional design, including issues of inter-ethnic empowerment and relations, as they constituted the majority. At the beginning of this process, the ethnic Albanians were quite indifferent, though they comprised around 25% of the population (this is an estimate, as no census has been undertaken after 2002). The majority ethnic Macedonians, using their privileged position, relegated the status of other ethnicities compared to their own status as entities during the Yugoslavian time.²⁴ In the Yugoslavian constitution of 1974, the Republic of Macedonia was composed of the Macedonian nation, with Albanian and Turkish minorities explicitly mentioned, making them constituent entities. Yet in the new constitution after independence, Macedonia (North Macedonia) was defined as a nation state of Macedonians, with other ethnicities also identified as Macedonians.²⁵ This was not welcomed by other ethnicities. The ethnic Albanians perceived it as discriminatory, marking the beginning of new era of unhealthy inter-ethnic relations that later erupted into a civil war. Such damage to inter-ethnic relations, furthered during the civil war, are largely present even today.

Macedonia (North Macedonia)'s constitutional arrangements at the outset after independence challenged consociational values which were highly promoted and valued in Yugoslavia. Thus Macedonia (North

²⁴ State Statistical Office, *Republic of North Macedonia* (stat.gov.mk).

²⁵ Wolfgang Ismayr, *Die Politischen Systeme Osteuropas* (Opladen: Leske+Budrich, 2004), 773.

Macedonia) set its own way of managing inter-ethnic relations by legally subduing other ethnicities to Macedonian ethnicity. However, in practical terms, ethnic Albanian parties always participated in the governing coalitions with the parties of majority Macedonians. Although this was not a legal requirement by the constitution, due to the high percentage of ethnic Albanians and for practical reasons, this was always the reality.

Despite its deficiencies, this constitutional structure survived for almost a decade. It was also sustained due to regional geopolitical considerations, and the inability of ethnic Albanians to mobilise and advance their political position within the system through political means. However, some elements of the consociational system were introduced in practical terms immediately after independence, including proportionality, grand coalitions, and minority veto power. In other words, legislative activities were based on consociational logic. This enabled ethnic Albanian political parties to maintain a presence in any coalition. Yet such ethnic rights were not explicitly stated in the constitution, as is the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo. Those rights were advanced into legally-binding terms with the mobilisation of ethnic Albanians using civil war as a tool to achieve their political aims. The war came to an end with an agreement that established and institutionalised consociational settings, advancing them from being partially practiced into becoming legally codified and binding principles.

However, the level of institutional, legal and practical consociationalism is still limited, due to the inherent lack of trust in inter-ethnic relations. This has fuelled reciprocal distrust among two ethnicities which is not easily alleviated. It needs to be addressed either through full consociational settings that could better integrate other ethnicities and preserve North Macedonia as a state, or a break-up of the country along ethnic divisions that could bring into question the very existence of the state. The initial limited consociational setting was due to the lack of readiness of ethnic Macedonians to recognise Albanian and other ethnicities as constitutionally constitutive entities, considered as a fundamental requirement for a consociational system. This requirement was later advanced by the Ohrid Framework Agreement, but is still not fully implemented. Therefore North Macedonia is a case of managing ethnic relations through quasi consociational settings, initially in practical terms, but later advanced through civil war mobilisation and the Ohrid Framework Agreement principles which

partially codified them, but which did not prove feasible, especially at the implementation stage.

Furthermore, the Ohrid Framework Agreement ended the civil war and inter-ethnic armed conflict, but not inter-ethnic mistrust and rivalry, while it transformed Macedonia (North Macedonia), at least partly constitutionally, from the very definition of Macedonia as a national Macedonian state, as 1991 Constitution stated, into a mixture with elements of nation, civic and bi-national state.²⁶ Yet, the inter-ethnic mistrust still continues at various degrees and levels of intensity, with no positive prospects in the near future.²⁷ The bi-national state was ensured through guaranteeing a number of rights to communities comprising more than 20% of the population, which qualifies only ethnic Albanians as a community, since they constitute more than 20% of the population of the state.²⁸ The Ohrid Framework Agreement transformed Macedonia (North Macedonia) into a quasi consociational democracy, legally accepting the Albanian ethnicity as a constituent part, recognising their language in public and official use, allowing them to have higher education institutions organised in the Albanian language, forming new municipalities with Albanian ethnic majorities, and increasing the composition of ethnic Albanians in public service. However, those rights have not yet been fully implemented. The agreement ended the armed conflict since ethnic Macedonians accepted the Ohrid Framework Agreement, but its provisions have been compromised at the implementation stage.

The multi-ethnic constitutional settings in Kosovo

The Kosovo case is one of the tragedies following the process of the breakup of Yugoslavia. This tragic end laid complex foundations of complexity for post-conflict settlement, since the war was fought purely along ethnic lines. According to the Humanitarian Law Center, the number of victims and missing persons in Kosovo during the war stands at 13,535.²⁹ Meanwhile, the number of war crimes handled remains low. As such, the wounds of war remain open, and significantly affect inter-ethnic reconciliation and governability.

²⁶ Florian Bieber, *Power-Sharing and Implementation of Ohrid Framework Agreement* (Skopje: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2008).

²⁷ Agon Demjaha, "The State of Inter-Ethnic Relations in Macedonia After 16 Years of The Ohrid Agreement." *SEEU Review*, vol.2, Issue 2 (2016): 8-31.

²⁸ Dejan Jovic. "Bitka za Etnicki Status u Postjugoslovenskim Drzavama," *Politicke Analize*, no.5, (2011): 36-45.

²⁹ *Humanitarian Law Center* (<http://www.hlc-rdc.org/?cat=218&lang=de>).

Kosovo's constitutional structure is heavily dependent on, and shaped by, the recent conflict in Kosovo. The NATO intervention in 1999 brought conflict to an end and opened the way for new constitutional settlements on a merely ethnic basis, reflecting the ethnic dimensions during, and even prior to the conflict itself. The constitutional order was initially set by UNSC Resolution 1244 and the constitutional framework. After declaring independence in 2008, Kosovo adopted its constitution based on the Comprehensive Proposal for Kosovo Status Settlement. In terms of the role of the international community in the constitutional settings process, Kosovo closely resembles the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Yet, in terms of final output it differs from it, as Kosovo did not attain a form of federalisation or confederalisation. Even here a degree of uncertainty still exists pending the northern issue, where the central government has difficulties in exercising state authority in four northern municipalities, mostly populated by ethnic Serbs and bordered with Serbia. As the negotiation process between Kosovo and Serbia is still ongoing, the fate of this part of the territory is not yet clear.

What is peculiar in the Kosovo ethnic constitutional structure is that the decentralisation process was accompanied by a form of peaceful ethnic cleansing, creating pure ethnic municipalities. The main aim of the Comprehensive Proposal for Kosovo Status Settlement provided by Ahtisaari was to find a workable solution relating to the final status, taking into account the issue of accommodating Serb minorities within the constitutional settings, and finding a way of integrating them into the system. The document laid the foundations for a consociational model of governing reflected, inter alia, into legislative, executive and judicial branches. It provides a minimum number of reserved seats for minorities in the national assembly (10 to Serbs and 10 to other minorities),³⁰ and a number of ministries allocated to minorities at the executive level.³¹ The judicial system also requires multi-ethnic composition, as two of the nine members of the constitutional courts also require the consent of minorities.³² In order to ensure the political satisfaction of ethnic minorities and encourage them to integrate and socialise within the system, the proposal equips minorities with a veto power by which two-thirds of the votes of minorities is required for all laws related to the rights of minorities.³³ In addition to guaranteed

³⁰ *Comprehensive Proposal for Kosovo Status Settlement* (2 February 2007), Annex 1, Art. 3.

³¹ *Comprehensive Proposal for Kosovo, op.cit.*, Annex 1, Art. 5.

³² *Comprehensive Proposal for Kosovo, op.cit.*, Annex 1, Art. 6.

³³ *Comprehensive Proposal for Kosovo, op.cit.*, Annex 1, Art. 3.7.

representation and participation in governing structures at the central government level, the proposal laid the foundation for territorial administrative division along ethnicities through a decentralisation process, which has so far proven to have undermined inter-ethnic relations and compromised integration incentives set at central legislative and executive branches. Decentralisation in broad terms is specified by the proposal in Annex 1 Article 8, while specifications are explicitly stated by law on decentralisation and local government. The main principles of decentralisation have structured local government along ethnic lines, producing purely ethnic municipalities.

The municipalities in Kosovo with Serb minorities, excluding the northern part, have to some extent recognised the statehood of Kosovo, but they remain divided along ethnic lines, proving unsuitable especially in terms of inter-ethnic reconciliation. Yet, in the problematic northern part the Serbs are less integrated, and in general they do not recognise the statehood of Kosovo and they also lack loyalty, which serves as a source of frozen inter-ethnic conflict.

Compared to the two other cases considered here, the Kosovo settlement promotes positive discrimination, favouring minorities, especially privileging the Serb minority, although they comprise no more than 5% of total population, against 90% of ethnic Albanians, and 5% of other minorities. Regardless of the privileges provided to the Serb minority, they still contest Kosovo statehood consistently, and support Serbia's territorial claims in Kosovo, which complicates the issue further.³⁴ In other words, the consociational setting in Kosovo is not delivering in terms of minority integration and ethnic reconciliation. The consociational settings in Kosovo which are hardly delivering, they also compromise centripetalist tendencies, as no political recruitment across ethnic lines is encouraged. Meanwhile, on the side of the majority, this setting has created a feeling of discrimination, fuelling inter-ethnic suspicion and mistrust, and reducing the likelihood of inter-ethnic reconciliation.

Comparing Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, and Kosovo

The three cases considered here are comparable in terms of multi-ethnic constitutional settings on one hand, and their output in post-conflict developments on the other. A mismatch between the legal and

³⁴ Agon Demjaha, "Inter-Ethnic Relations in Kosovo", *SEEU Review*, vol. 12. Issue 1 (2017), 181-196.

practical settings is perceived in each case. They have shown progress in terms of formal institutional and constitutional settings, although these have largely been supported and imposed by the international community. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo have already experienced marked progress in establishing formal institutions and constitutional guarantees, providing space to ensure the empowerment of ethnicities through participation at central and local levels of the governing structure and process.³⁵ Nominally they have established formal consociational systems. However, in practical terms the end product of a consociational system remains far from being a reality. North Macedonia, meanwhile, lags behind the two other cases even in terms of formal constitutional and institutional settings. The Ohrid Framework Agreement, which was expected to further the consociationalist principles, is not yet fully constitutionalised and implemented.

The three cases share common deep divisions along ethnic lines, obstructing their democratic developments and inter-ethnic reconciliation as necessary conditions to ensure regional stability, peace and prosperity. Such deeply-entrenched ethnic divisions also reflect incompatibility between the political will of ethnicities and the constitutional structures imposed by the international community. Contrary to expectations, they result in greater inter-ethnic divisions, rather than inter-ethnic integration and mobilisation. Placing ethnicities into purely ethnic territorial and administrative units has minimised the interdependence, communication and contact among ethnicities, which are essential to initiate and develop inter-ethnic relations.

Bosnia and Herzegovina is highly fragmented with three nations and two entities into a form of loose confederation or an asymmetric confederation, with a high level of institutionalised decentralisation of the Federation unit.³⁶ Kosovo and North Macedonia remain unitary systems, the former with deep ethnic decentralisation, and the latter with a moderated but not yet fully implemented decentralisation, as had been expected.³⁷ In this regard, the Ohrid Framework Agreement has clearly stipulated that no territorial solutions would be provided for

³⁵ Florian Bieber, "Power Sharing as Ethnic Representation in Postconflict Societies: The Case of Bosnia, Macedonia, and Kosovo." In *Nationalism After Communism. Lessons Learned*. eds. Alina Mungiu-Pippidi and Ivan Krastev (Budapest: CEU Press, 2004).

³⁶ Mirjana Kasapović, *Bosna i Hercegovina Podijeljeno Drustvo i Nestabilna Drzava* (Zagreb: Politicka Kultura, 2005).

³⁷ Bieber, op.cit. (2008).

ethnic issues.³⁸ This principle was intended to satisfy ethnic Macedonians trying to prevent a potential ethnic Albanian secession, and also to encourage ethnic Albanians to participate and integrate into North Macedonian system. Such experiences as Bosnia and Herzegovina and North Macedonia are examples of the complexity and difficulty of building democratic societies from deeply divided multi-ethnic societies.³⁹ In the case of Kosovo, the Comprehensive Proposal of Ahtisaari is considered as a compromise between the claims of the majority Albanians in control of most of the territory and Serbian historical territorial claims in Kosovo.

In the three cases, the creation of political will remains engineered and structured along ethnic lines. Rarely one finds successful cases of an organised political party that bridges ethnic cleavages. Such cases are isolated and short-lived, since parties are backed by a majority support, single ethnicity, required to maintain their political power. Moreover, identity politics is still an attractive and useful tool for political parties in the vote engineering process, and which spills over ethnic divisions. Recently, social democrats in North Macedonia have angled for Albanian votes, but this remains a marginal endeavour, since a significant number of Albanian votes is provided to ethnic Albanian parties. Voting behaviour in the three countries is purely ethnic. This political attitude is deeply rooted at society level. Any attempt to act differently is liable to be condemned as socially non-conformist behaviour, which is not easy to uphold in traditional societies. Ethnic parties utilise ethnic rhetoric in campaigns, serving as a mechanism which creates ethnic hatred, alleviating any possibility for inter-ethnic reconciliation. Politics is based on these ethnic political attitudes and behaviours, leading to ethnic communities becoming more silently and smoothly entrenched into their own ethnic ditches.

In North Macedonia, grand coalition-building is a less formal practice, and different in manner from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. No strict formal quotas have been introduced for representation of ethnicities in parliament and government. However, in practice coalitions are generally ethnic and post-electoral. In the case of Kosovo, representation quotas on ethnic lines in parliament and government composition are set by formal arrangements. In practical terms, this often leads to deadlock in the decision-making and

³⁸ *The Ohrid Framework Agreement* (13.08.2001), Article 1.2.

³⁹ Mirjana Maleska. "Multiethnic Democracy in Macedonia: Political Analysis and Emerging Scenarios," *New Balkan Politics* 13 (2013): 1-27.

governing process, particularly in cases where laws need the majority of the minority vote as well, that is a two-thirds majority of minorities.

The electoral systems of the three cases are also largely shaped on ethnic considerations. North Macedonia changed its electoral system to proportional representation with six constituencies.⁴⁰ In Kosovo, the proportional system with a single electoral zone has been used since the beginning, with few changes to the rules of the system of opening electoral lists. The need to give opportunities for representation to minorities was the main reason for adopting this system. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina the issue is much more complicated, as proportionality and parity are the principles which regulate the main political institutions. These political attitudes and electoral arrangements are weakening and compromising centripetalist tendencies through the inability of consociationalist settings to deliver.

The impact of these arrangements into governability

The main reason for consociational constitutional arrangements in post-conflict multi-ethnic societies is to avoid the tyranny of the majority that would seriously challenge the prospects of national cohesion and democracy. Lijphart highlighted his concern that a majority might obstruct democracy through discriminating against a minority, making coexistence not worthwhile.⁴¹ However, this might also lead to the other extreme, the tyranny of the minority. Minorities empowered with veto power might regularly use it to mire governability in bureaucracy, and even deadlock, producing political stalemate and immobility. This might also be the case in multi-ethnic societies where ethnicities do not necessarily constitute minorities. The experiences of difficulties in governability, due to the use, or even occasional misuse, of veto power by ethnicities are present at various degrees in the three cases considered here, the worst being Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In addition to decision-making obstacles, in these three cases a clear responsibility structure is absent, producing irresponsible and unaccountable political attitudes and behaviour, since politics is primarily structured along ethnic lines, not civic principles.

⁴⁰ Bieber, op.cit., (2008).

⁴¹ Arend Lijphart, "The Wave of Power-Sharing Democracy," in: *The Architecture of Democracy. Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy.* eds. Andrew Reynolds (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 37-54.

Responsibility and accountability is based on ethnic structures from central to constitutive level, compromising the very governability of the system. The political stalemate and discomfort of ethnicities with actual consociational principles might lead to unpredictable scenarios. The arbitrary withdrawal of minority veto powers by the majority will break the very institutional democratic principles. Alternatively, if real possibilities exist and circumstances allow, countries might move towards breaking up, or as an option to eliminate the stalemate, external intervention by the international community will continue to be encouraged, as is actually the case.

The three cases under consideration in this paper have suffered political stalemate and difficulties in governance due to the veto power of ethnic entities. The relationship between the empowerment of ethnic entities and governability in the three cases can be best described as a *ceteris paribus* issue. Bosnia and Herzegovina⁴² has experienced more political stalemate than the other two cases, since ethnicities there are comparably more empowered. The decision-making rules in Bosnia and Herzegovina are set to satisfy the expectations of ethnicities, politically factoring them in with the rules of consensus, qualified majorities and veto power. Important decisions are made by consensus and qualified majorities are used in both houses of the state parliament.⁴³

In Kosovo, minorities are empowered with qualified majority voting requirements and veto power on issues related to constitutional changes and laws considered important, which include changing municipal boundaries, establishing or abolishing municipalities, defining the scope of powers of municipalities and their participation in inter-municipal and cross-border relations; laws implementing the rights of communities and their members, other than those set forth in the Constitution; laws on the use of language; laws on local elections; laws on the protection of cultural heritage; laws on religious freedom or on agreements with religious communities; laws on education; laws on the use of symbols (including Community symbols) and on public holidays.⁴⁴ The Kosovo constitution is also known as Ahtisaari's Constitution since it is subdued to the Comprehensive proposal of

⁴² Slavisa Orlovic, "Consociational experiments in Western Balkans: Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia", *New Balkan Politics*, Issue 17, 2015.

⁴³ Mirjana Kasapović, *Bosna i Hercegovina Podijeljeno Društvo i Nestabilna Država* (Zagreb: Politicka Kultura, 2005).

⁴⁴ *The Comprehensive Proposal for Kosovo*, op.cit., Article 3.7.

Ahtisaari.⁴⁵ In the constitution, minorities are a part of the executive government, but the level on which they exercise the veto is mostly parliamentary. The most challenging aspect of governability in Kosovo remains the Northern region which the central authorities find it practically impossible to exercise state authority.

In North Macedonia, the Ohrid Framework Agreement⁴⁶ specifies equitable representation of communities, guaranteed through the principle of double majority in the legislative process on laws important to minorities. It requires the majority of all members of parliament and the majority of votes of the minority representatives.⁴⁷ In practical terms this is a veto power on laws considered important to the identity of the minority communities, like culture, use of language, education, personal documents, use of symbols and local self-government. On the other issues no majority of minority is required, making governing easier, though at times costly to minority interests. The North Macedonian constitution does not foresee any reservation or guarantee parliament seats to minorities. Governments after, and even before, the Ohrid Framework Agreement have all been grand coalitions including ethnic Albanians in the government, based on the practical principle of power sharing.

The three cases are examples of measures generally undertaken to avoid the tyranny of the majority. Among the three cases, North Macedonia has performed less well in terms of formal guarantees, while Kosovo and Bosnia can be considered extreme cases. However, none of them is proving feasible in preventing the tyranny of the minority that has made political stalemate part of the governing culture in those countries. The use of veto power has become the norm in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to large extent in Kosovo, whenever issues are considered important to minorities. In addition, governance is complicated further due to these minorities or ethnicities in the three cases rarely defining by themselves their political objectives, but acting in a way to please their motherlands at the neighbourhood level.

Those entities or minorities have motherlands or states with vested interests as neighbours: Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo are bordered with Serbia, Croats with Croatia, and Albanians in North

⁴⁵ *The Constitution of Kosovo*, Article 143.

⁴⁶ *The Ohrid Framework Agreement* (13.08.2001), Annex B, Article 5.

⁴⁷ *The Constitution of North Macedonia, Amendment X to the Constitution of FYR of Macedonia 2001*.

Macedonia with Albania and Kosovo. This range of multi-ethnicity across boundary compositions in the region multiplies the number of actors in domestic and regional politics, making governing process even more complex. As such, empowerment with veto powers does not mean only empowering minorities or ethnicities, but also empowering neighbouring countries in their relational power relationship, particularly in cases when a neighbouring country has alleged territorial claims to another, like Serbia's constitutional dispositions towards Kosovo. Those arrangements bring into question the very idea of consociational settings, opening the dilemma whether they are meant to prevent tyranny of the majority, or to create a favourable stance towards certain neighbouring countries over others. The Serb entity in Bosnia and Herzegovina is more loyal towards Serbia than to the state level of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The same can be said about Serbs in Kosovo, manifesting their full loyalty to Serbia, and participating selectively in Kosovo institutions, only when they consider it necessary to them. Ethnic Albanians in North Macedonia still consider themselves marginalised by the North Macedonian state, and show a high degree of loyalty towards Albania and Kosovo. In this sense, minorities and entities in those three countries are perceived as instrumental to neighbouring countries, and as an extended hand and opportunity to interfere in the internal affairs of another country and breach the very principle of sovereignty. This is an opportunity for neighbouring countries to achieve their ambitions in another country. Moreover, this damages the foundations of regional peace, putting countries into a spiral of mutual inter-ethnic mistrust, and making identity politics the mainstream of regional and domestic politics, while undermining other issues of governing that are vital to the lives of citizens.

Thus, governability is one of the main concerns of the legitimacy of the consociational and centripetal settings of the three countries. The political stalemate might be understandable and justified as an exception, but not as the norm it has largely become, in particular if instrumentalised and used as a rivalry tool by neighbouring countries. The only remaining incentive to maintain those constitutional settings is the pressure of the international community which cannot be taken for granted for a limitless time.

The impact of those arrangements into inter-ethnic reconciliation

Apart from the issue of governability, inter-ethnic reconciliation as a fundamental challenge in post-conflict multi-ethnic societies is another pending concern, and one which is not progressing as expected in the

three cases. As Lijphart said, it is not difficult to write constitutions of a consociational nature; the most difficult part is to implement them.⁴⁸ In the three cases, it was expected that implementation would be further facilitated by the involvement of the international community as the main driver of constitutional settings, as it enjoys widespread legitimacy. However, the experience so far shows that implementation has proven to be the most difficult aspect.

The bloodshed during the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo, and the civil war in North Macedonia, can be deemed core and substantial challenges to current inter-ethnic reconciliation. A certain level of mistrust is partially rooted in historical relations among the ethnicities from previous time periods, excluding the period of Tito in which inter-ethnic coexistence was strongly promoted. Aiming to achieve inter-ethnic reconciliation, the international community sponsored constitutional settings based on consociational and to some extent centripetal principles. Yet the perception exists that those settings are not domestically home-grown, but rather foreign and imposed, producing political stalemate and non-governability, as well as being instrumental to the political ambitions of neighbouring countries, and dividing ethnicities territorially and administratively. Such a state of affairs could hardly be expected to deliver and contribute to inter-ethnic reconciliation. On the contrary, they fuel hatred and mistrust among ethnicities, undermining even the possibility to mobilise former channels and sources of inter-ethnic good relations which existed prior to the wars. Ethnicity-based territorial and administrative divisions, either through recognising the status of three nations as in Bosnia and Herzegovina, or ethnic decentralisation as in Kosovo, or de facto territorial ethnic division as in North Macedonia, limit and drastically minimise the inter-ethnic contact necessary to facilitate reconciliation prospects. On the other hand, the political stalemate produced is used in the political rhetoric of ethnic parties, feeding inter-ethnic hatred at society level. In their scramble for ethnic votes, they portray veto-empowered ethnicities as obstacles to the well-being of the country, or as black sheep. From the side of minorities or ethnic entities this is a message to react with further ethnic isolation as a form of self-protection. This minimises the prospects of inter-ethnic reconciliation, creating a vicious cycle.

⁴⁸ Arend Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy* (New Heaven and London: Yale University Press, 1999).

Furthermore, these constitutional arrangements are laying grounds for inter-ethnic mistrust. They initially succeeded in bringing conflicts to an end, but it seems they are not producing a durable and sustainable peace, which primarily requires inter-ethnic reconciliation. The historical, cultural, and social contexts, where ethnicities lived side by side for long periods of history, were not taken into account. In Kosovo, a region in the eastern part, largely untouched by the war, manifested better inter-ethnic relations immediately after the war than it does now. This is due to the establishment of ethnic municipalities in this part of Kosovo within the decentralisation process. The street market where ethnic Albanians and Serbs interacted considerably in the municipality of Kamenica in eastern Kosovo does not exist in the same form any longer, as the market is now organised within the municipalities created on ethnic lines. The municipality of Ranillug, with 94% of Serb inhabitants, has been established through decentralisation, constituting around 15% of the territory of Kamenica municipality to which it previously belonged.⁴⁹ In addition, such territorial divisions further develop the ambitions of ethnicities for either independence or secession, making coexistence and interdependence less necessary and less evident among ethnicities, and inter-ethnic reconciliation less likely.

An important driving force at elite level to increase cooperation and trigger the integration of ethnicities would be clientelist politics as a form of political behaviour and attitude.⁵⁰ The use of public offices for narrow ends is a common feature of political elites in the three countries considered here. However, the reason this is not serving to support reconciliation at the society level is that those narrow benefits do not reach the society level. It has proven to work merely at elite level, while the dominant clientelist vote engineering behaviour is conditioned by identity and ethnicity. Thus, clientelist politics also seems to be within ethnic frames, and unable to promote inter-ethnic reconciliation.

Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia and Kosovo are finding hitches in building up a consensual culture that is needed for a consociational system to function. The current political situation demonstrates heavily-loaded ethnic identity politics fed by ethnic

⁴⁹ *Map of municipalities website of the Republic of Kosovo* (<https://kk.rks-gov.net/ranillug/>; (<https://www.arcgis.com/apps/View/index.html?appid=f918393918f64194b42123a738d77320>)).

Komuna e Ranillikut: problemet kryesore dhe trendet buxhetore. GAP Report, 2005. https://www.institutigap.org/documents/74829_RANILLUGU2013.pdf).

⁵⁰ Leonard Wantchekon. "Clientelism and Voting Behaviour: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Benin," *World Politics* 55 (2003): 399-422.

divisions, unlikely to give way to other concerns in common to all citizens beyond ethnic divisions. Ethnic identity politics rests on stances which divide ethnicities. As long as ethnicities consider each other a burden and are linked into zero-sum game relationships, no prospects of reconciliation are foreseen.

The impact of those arrangements into democratisation and post-democratic politics

In discussing the democratisation process in the western Balkans, pointing out the crucial role of the international community in this process is unavoidable. In specific countries within the region, international community needed to surpass even the role of general sponsors of democratisation, such as by setting constitutional arrangements and even aiding their enforcement. From the theoretical perspective of democratisation, this is not easily justifiable. However, there is a theoretical approach which encompasses such a role of the international community, under the premise of bridging certain gaps resulting from the absence of internal socio-economic conditions needed in the democratisation process⁵¹. This was further elaborated on the grounds that in time this would facilitate the development of internal drivers of democracy, such as civil society. However, in the three cases considered here, so far this does not seem to be the case, as civil society continues to be very weak and international community involvement a necessity.

Democratisation of the three cases is accompanied by inter-ethnic struggle and post-conflict settings, which does not readily allow it to be regarded as successful. Democratisation of post-conflict societies, in particular where the conflict was based on ethnic division, is not a simple straight forward issue.⁵² It necessitated the involvement of the international community in both the creation and implementation of rules, especially in avoiding governing stalemates and stasis in political attitudes and behaviours. However, this led to a discrepancy between democratic principles and post-democratic political practices, as a result of their domestic involvement, and here lies the discrepancy and a form of contradiction, since democracy itself is not delivering as expected in terms of values and political responsibility. Whereas the expectation was the development of civil society and social capital healthy to

⁵¹ David Chandler, *Bosnia: Faking Democracy After Dayton* (Virginia: Pluto Press, 2000).

⁵² Karin Dyrstad, "After Ethnic Civil War: Ethno-Nationalism in the Western Balkans". *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 49(2012): 817-831.

democracy, in the three cases one perceives a social capital promoting corruption and other socio-political vices. This can partly be explained by the heavy involvement of the international community as counter-productive to the prospects of real democracy.

The three main documents, the Dayton Agreement, the Ohrid Framework Agreement, and the Comprehensive Proposal of Ahtisaari, were provided and supported under the stringent supervision of the international community. The three models were designed and enforced internally under international supervision. The success of those constitutional systems is heavily dependent on the international community, whose role is necessary for the acceptance and implementation of those arrangements by entities within the countries. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the institution of the High Representative could pass laws and create new institutions without taking into consideration the will of people. It imposed a number of laws, including laws of a constitutional nature. For example, it redefined Article 3 of the Constitution, which had defined the division of competencies between the entities that according to the Constitution was possible only by inter-entity agreement. Additionally, the high representative appropriated the electoral function and used its power to replace presidents, prime ministers, judges, mayors and other elected officials. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the international community continues to have the heaviest presence.

In North Macedonia, the Ohrid Framework Agreement would hardly be accepted without the representatives of the international community, in particular the EU and the USA, as facilitators and co-signatories of the agreement. NATO troops were engaged in Operation Essential Harvest on August 26th, which disarmed fighters following the conflict between armed ethnic Albanians under the name of the National Liberation Army, and North Macedonian military-police forces in 2001, when the Ohrid Framework Agreement was signed. The role of the international community as initiator and in part as guarantor of the agreement is indispensable in the implementation stage as well as in maintaining the state cohesion and unity.

In the case of Kosovo, the international community also maintains a heavy presence. After the war, UNSC Resolution 1244 mandated KFOR troops to deal with security while UNMIK was mandated to deal with civilian governing issues. As the country declared its independence, the comprehensive proposal foresaw the institution of

the International Civilian Office as an interim institution to oversee the implementation of the comprehensive proposal, at whose heart lay consociational arrangements. Its role was important and was mainly intended to last until the consociational norms were legally codified, as it would cease to exist after such legislative acts were voted. However, the old tradition in the region of ambassadors or consuls of great powers exercising their influence is returning and becoming more significant. Most international influence in the three countries exists through ambassadors of the main players of the international community. This is an informal but decisive informal institution. Usually interference takes place when developments are considered to take opposite directions to the consociational spirit promoted through a form of controlled democracy, or in case of political stalemates.⁵³ The level of influence exercised varies from country to country and from case to case.

Aside from its success in setting and enforcing the agreements, the post-Yugoslav experience is also an example of how international community commitment is insufficient and unsustainable without the firm consensus and will of domestic actors, at least at elite level. Such practices are conceptualised within the concept of post-democracy, considered costly and contradictory to democracy itself.⁵⁴ The will of the people is hindered and surpassed, which contradicts a fundamental principle of democracy. A more contradictory, complex and sensitive factor is that the international community itself simultaneously promotes democracy. This puts the international community into an uneasy position. The more they interfere, the more they compromise democratic and liberal values which are expected to be generated within societies and which are generally promoted by the international community itself. Trying to retain adversarial ethnicities and entities within a state, fuels further hatred which one day might erupt, with devastating consequences. While trying to reach a number of objectives simultaneously, the international community seems to be in a precarious position. On one side are the arrangements they propose, and on the other side is internal resistance to their implementation, by which certain groups consider them infeasible or unacceptable solutions. Furthermore, since the three cases represent new and unconsolidated democracies, this provides them with models of

⁵³ Boykov D. Victor. "Democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Post-1995 Political System and its Functioning". *Southeast European Politics*, vol. 4, No.1 (2003), 41-67.

⁵⁴ Colin Crouch, *Post-Democracy* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004).

democracy perceived to be alien and compromising towards the very values of democracy itself.

Conclusion

Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, and Kosovo present very interesting cases in which the very principles of consociational politics are formally and constitutionally institutionalized, but each country has experienced difficulties in implementing these principles. Meanwhile the centripetalist political practices considered useful in multi-ethnic post-conflict settings are rarely found. In these three cases, issues exist in fulfilling consociational system objectives, governability, inter-ethnic reconciliation, and democratisation. On the contrary, they seem to be compromised by the very system structures themselves, formalising ethnic divisions that discourage interconnection and interdependence among ethnicities. The agreements on which system settings were built served to bring conflicts to an end, but not to engender consociationalist values among society.

The gap between the formal consociationalist structures, their implementation, and their capacity to deliver can be explained, *inter alia*, by the way they evolved and the route they took. Since they have been introduced and enforced mainly by the international community, and lack wholesale internal support, at least at elite level, it can be theorised that such systems are hardly domesticated if solely imposed from outside. The three formal consociational democracies lack the main necessary socio-political conditions for their systems to function. The provisions are very much perceived as an unbearable burden to the majority, or to other ethnicities, and also as useful tools for minority groups to blackmail the central government. The international community as the sole source of support and legitimiser of consociationalism seems insufficient and unsustainable.

The experience of these three countries enriches the theory on consociationalism, providing empirical data and introducing an important dimension to the output of formal consociational setting and enforcement, if it is performed mainly by the international community. The three cases involve fragile systems, or fragile consociationalism, only able to survive as long as the international community is able and willing to provide support.

So far, the experience of the three cases is manifested in various degrees of political stalemate, mostly in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but

also in Kosovo where minority groups have a veto power, and in North Macedonia whenever de facto politics is considered as discriminatory towards other non-Macedonian ethnicities. Inter-ethnic reconciliation is not progressing as expected, with no positive prospects on the ground in the near future. Ethnic identity politics continues to be at the heart of socio-political structuring in these three cases, not healing ethnic divisions, but rather entrenching them further.

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Turkish Local Communities and City Diplomacy with Bosnia and Herzegovina

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Abstract: ‘City diplomacy’ is gaining ground in the rapidly urbanizing globalized world. With the end of the Cold War Turkish local communities got the chance to intensify relations with their counterparts in the Balkans. Today, Turkish local communities actively restore the Ottoman legacy in the Balkans, help the spread of Turkish language in the local schools, and organize mass humanitarian events.

On the other hand, Turkish city diplomacy also faces challenges in the region and often is misunderstood and criticized for its actions. The hegemony of a single party (AKP) politicizes the cooperation more than necessary, causing obstacles in conducting efficient city diplomacy. The non-governmental organizations often create a headache for Turkish diplomacy. Failure to adopt the ‘smart city’ and ‘humanitarian city models’ as a mode of cooperation raises a question whether Turkish local communities could stay a relevant factor in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the long term.

Key Words: Local communities, city diplomacy, municipalism, sister cities, municipality unions, smart cities, humanitarian cities

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Introduction

One of the main channels of Turkish influence in the Balkans goes through city diplomacy. This type of diplomacy is turning into an important element of Ankara's public diplomacy. This work aims to present Turkish city diplomacy in Bosnia and Herzegovina with all its advantages and shortcomings. Although several works are dealing with Turkish city diplomacy, this is the first academic work that particularly focuses on city diplomacy between those two friendly countries. Although it is generally a success story, the internal problems in both countries prevent city diplomacy to be upgraded to a higher level. Turkey's problem with the tight centralist system has politicized the country's city diplomacy. It is almost entirely in the hands of a single party, which has its preferences in the region. Ideological motivations and identity issues are an important ingredient in the relations between Bosnian and Turkish local governments.

Among the aims of the work was to show how city diplomacy between the two countries is limited to relation with the Bosniak-majority municipalities. On the other hand, Bosnian counterparts which are often victims of the decentralized state, ethnic fragmentation, and weak budgets fit the expectations of the Turkish government in that sense. Failure of the Turkish local communities to implement concepts like 'smart city' or 'humanitarian city' raises a question of whether they can go beyond the restoration of the Ottoman legacy in the region and small-budget projects with questionable impact. The success in introducing new modes of cooperation would prolong the success of Turkish city diplomacy, while the introduction of some 'alien' traditions in the region, like in some cases from the past, would be only counterproductive.

Turkish constitutions were crucial in providing an understanding of the Turkish provincial organization. In compiling the work the author used the scarce literature. There is not a single work that would extensively write on city diplomacy between the two countries. In that sense, this work probably is the first of that kind. When it comes to Bosnian local communities the situation is even more problematic. Academic sources are very scarce. Deficiency in the literature was filled with the extensive use of annual reports from the Turkish public diplomacy institutions that are actively involved in city diplomacy between BiH and Turkey. Media reports and web sources were also very helpful in filling the gaps. Interview conducted with the Secretary-General of the TDBB, the municipality union that is most active in BiH, provided some insight into the city diplomacy between the two countries.

What are the local communities?

Local communities represent the lowest level of administrative governance in a certain state.¹ Generally local authorities come with the local elections. The character of a local community depends on the very nature of a country it is part of. Some local authorities enjoy more autonomy some less. This depends on whether they are part of a centralized or federative state. The stronger central state authority's local communities have less autonomy in decision-making. In federations and confederations, local communities enjoy a wide range of liberties.² Sub-national entities representing local governments differ from country to country. Those entities are; provinces, regions, departments, prefectures, districts, municipalities, counties, townships, towns, boroughs, parishes, villages, and others.

Local Communities and Democratization

The development of local communities is interconnected to a general level of democratization.³ In essence, local governments are based on democratic principles like liberty, participation, and efficiency.⁴ As the closest level of authority to the ordinary people are local governments they represent important instances for the political representation of the citizens.⁵ So, the development of the local governments is important from the context of overall democratic development and the preservation of human rights in society.⁶ According to Henri Pirenne rise of cities during the Late Medieval was even responsible for the emergence of modern Western civilization.⁷

1 Rod Hague and Martin Hague, *Comparative Government and Politics: An Introduction*, 6th Edition, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004): 239.

2 Ibid, 228-246.

3 Zakaras, Alex, "John Stuart Mill, Individuality, and Participatory Democracy" in J.S. Mill's Political Thought: A Bicentennial Reassessment, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

4 L.J. Sharpe, "Theories and Values of Local Government", *Political Studies*, Vol. 18. No: 2, (1970).

5 W.J.M. Mackenzie, *Theories of Local Government*, (LSE: London, 1961.); A. M. McBriar, *Fabian Socialism & English Politics 1884-1918*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1962), 109.

6 Rüßen Keleş, *Yerinden Yönetim ve Siyaset*, (Istanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 2012): 49-96.

7 Henri Pirenne, *Medieval Cities: The Origins and the Revival of Trade*, 4th printing, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946), p. 168-240. and Henri Pirrene, *A History of Europe: From*

City Diplomacy

As globalization and urbanization are advancing cities are gaining importance. Some megalopolises have larger economies than the majority of the independent states. For instance, the Metropolitan New York Area has a larger GDP than the whole of Russia which is the sixth-largest in the world and is considered to be a macro-regional power. For instance, forty percent of global finances pass through the City of London.⁸

Globalization and urbanization induced the process of professionalization of the local communities that in turn has created a need for local governments to create networks of cooperation across the globe. Today local administrations are international players, thus a need for the developments of a new form of diplomacy that would coordinate the interaction among the local governments was born. The type of diplomatic activity that is responsible for maintaining the normal relationship among the local communities is known as *local diplomacy* or *city diplomacy*.⁹ City diplomacy has grown into one of the main branches of public diplomacy. It serves the local communities both in and outside the national borders to share mutual experience and knowledge to improve the quality of their services. It often represents an important element of the bilateral relations between the two countries. Dense traffic in the relations between two foreign municipalities is an indication of functioning bilateral relations. For Alexandra Sizoo and Arne Musch, city diplomacy doesn't eliminate the role of the state in diplomacy, but rather serves as a supportive element of state diplomacy.¹⁰

Van Der Plujim and Melissen also recognize the rising role of local governments in public diplomacy, where some cities are developing a consistent "municipal foreign policies."¹¹ For both authors city diplomacy plays an important role in the aspects of; security, development,

the Invasion to the XVI Century, (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1936; reprint, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1958)

⁸ "City of London jobs: Are growing steadily", City of London, March 2019, Accessed on July 3, 2019, doi: <https://www.cityoflondon.gov.uk/business/economic-research-and-information/Documents/city-statistics-briefing.pdf>

⁹ Sabiha Tuğba Ekşi, *Dünyada ve Türkiye'de Kardeş Şehircilik*, (İstanbul, TDBB, 2018): page 27, 28.

¹⁰ Alexandra Sizoo and Arne Musch, "City Diplomacy", in *City Diplomacy*, ed. Arne Musch, The Hague, Deltahage, 2008, 4. Quoted in, Sabiha Tuğba Ekşi, *Dünyada ve Türkiye'de Kardeş Şehircilik*, (İstanbul, TDBB, 2018): 28.

¹¹ Rogier van der Plujim and Jan Melissen, "City Diplomacy: The Expanding Role of Cities in International Relations", *Netherlands Institute of International Relations-Clingendael*, Paper No. 10 (April, 2007), doi: www.uclg.org

economy, culture, networking, and representation.¹² Recently, “city diplomacy” is active in solving environmental problems, conflict prevention, conflict resolution, post-conflict reconstruction, and preservation of cultural heritage.¹³ The expanding role of local communities created a need for the invention of new models. Among those models is the concept of “Human Rights City.”, which is a concept that emphasizes improvement of human rights, social, economic and cultural rights among the residents of a municipality according to international human rights standards.¹⁴ Also, the technological advancement has created a concept of ‘smart cities’ in the developed countries.¹⁵

Turkish Local Communities and the Historical Debate on Turkey’s Governance Model

Turkey inherited a centralist state model from its Ottoman predecessor.¹⁶ The Republic’s first Constitution of 1924 only provided

12 Ibid.

13 Alexandra Sizoo and Arne Musch, *City Diplomacy: The Role of Local Governments in Conflict Prevention, Peace-building and Post-conflict Reconstruction*, in *City Diplomacy: The Role of Local Governments in Conflict Prevention, Peace-building and Post-conflict Reconstruction*, ed. Arne Musch, Chris van der Valk, Alesandra Sizoo and Kian Tajkshsh, (The Hague: VNG International, 2008), 7-27.; Alain Tschudin and Albert Trithart, “The Role of Local Governments” in *Sustaining Peace in Sustaining Peace in Practice*, eds. Youssef Mahmoud, Lesley Connolly and Delphine Mechoulan, International Peace Institute, (2018): 30-35.

14 The concept of human rights cities has settled in modern local government sector with the emergence of global human rights movements. More and more cities around the globe are receiving a status of ‘human rights cities.’ This concept has just recently started being practiced in Turkey. In November, 2017 TDBB brought together its few Turkish member municipalities together with Sweden’s Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights (RWI) in order to sign the ‘The Human Cities Project’ protocol. For more see: “Human Rights Cities Project Cooperation Protocol was Signed Between the TDBB and RWI”, *TDBB*, Accessed on January 12, 2019, doi: <http://www.tdbb.org.tr>

15 ‘Smart City’ is a local government that relies on the latest technological advancements in order to increase operational efficiency, share information with the public and improve the quality of its services and citizens’ welfare.

16 For the organization of local governments in the Ottoman Empire see: İlber Ortaylı, “Belediye”, *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi*, Vol. 5. (İstanbul: TDV Yayınları, 1992), 400., İlber Ortaylı, *Türkiye İdare Tarihi*, (Ankara: Cedit Neşriyat, 2008): 435-443. and Birgül Ayman Güler, “Yerel Yönetim Tarihi”, *Belediye Dergisi*, (July, 1994): 4-6, doi: <http://birgulaymanguler.net/files/1-9guler.pdf>, Ekrem Buğra Ekin, “Osmanlı İdaresinde Adem-i Merkeziyet ve İmtiyazlı Eyaletler”, *Türk Hukuk Tarihi Araştırmaları*, No. 6, 2008., Bayram Bayraktar, “Günümüzde Yeniden Değerlendirilmesi Gereken Bir Düşünür: Prens Sabahattin Bey”, *Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi* Vol. 18 No. 29, 1996, 51-61., Halil İnalçık, “Centralization and Decentralization in Ottoman Administration.” in *Studies in Eighteenth Century Islamic History*, ed. Thomas Naff & Roger Owen, (Carbondale, IL.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1977): 27-52.; Abdulhamit Kırmızı, “19. Yüzyılda Osmanlı Taşra İdaresi’

limited autonomy to local communities.¹⁷ Local authorities were represented by the four different organs: provincial judicial representations (*İl tüzel kişiliği*), provincial councils (*İl Meclisi*), boards of management (*İl Yönetim Kurulu*), and via a provincial president (*İl Başkanı*).¹⁸ The state also delegated a Governor (*Vali*)¹⁹ as a representative of the central authority in the provinces whose one of the main tasks was to interfere in potential disagreements between the central and local governments.²⁰ The dual provincial authority was composed of an elected and an appointed representative and this system continue to be maintained up until today. The transition to a multi-party system in 1946 along with rapid urbanization created a demand for a more liberal constitution that was finally introduced in 1961.²¹ By Article 116 of that constitution, local governments were composed of Provinces (*İl*), Municipalities (*Belediye*), and Villages (*Köy*).²² However, despite some relaxations, the provincial organization remained highly centralized.²³ Social unrest during the 1970s and the eruption of the war against PKK terrorism in the 1980 exacerbated dilemmas regarding civil liberties. The military blamed the liberalization that was introduced by the Constitution of 1961 for the chaos. Turkey's experiment with liberalism was interrupted by the 1980 military coup. The new Constitution of 1982 ordered strict centralization.²⁴ The organization of the local administrations remained vested at the provincial, municipal, and village levels.

in *Selçukludan Cumhuriyete Şehir Yönetimi*, ed. Erol Özvar and Arif Bilgin (İstanbul: Türk Dünyası Belediyeler Birliği-TDBB, 2008), 301.

17 "Turkish Constitution of 1924", Articles 89, 90 and 91.

18 "1924 Anayasası", *Teşkilatı Esasiye Kanunu*, Kanun Numarası: 491, Kabul Tarihi: 20/4/1340 (1924)

19 The word *Vali* comes from Arabic word *Wali* meaning a divinely inspired leader; saint. 20 Rüşen Keleş, *Yerinden Yönetim ve Siyaset*, (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 2012), 163.

21 "1961 Anayasası", *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası*, Kanun No: 334, Kabul Tarihi: 9/7/1961

22 "Madde 116", 1961 *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası*, T.C. Resmi Gazete, No. 10816, 1961, doi: <http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/10816.pdf>

23 Özcan Altaban, "1960-1973 Dönemi Belediyeciliğine Genel Bakış" in *Türk Belediyeciliği'nde 60 Yıl Uluslararası Sempozyumu Bildiri ve Tartışmalar Kitabı*, Ankara: Ankara Büyükşehir Belediyesi Yayını, 1990, 317-325, quoted in Hüseyin Can, "Yerel Yönetim Birliklerinin Belediyelerin Kardeş Şehir İlişkilerine Katkıları: Türk Dünyası Belediyeler Birliği Örneği", Master Thesis, Dumlupınar Üniversitesi, Kütahya, (2018)

24 "Article 127", *The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey(1982)*, (Translated by Erhan Yasar), doi:<http://www.anayasa.gen.tr/1982Constitution-EYasar.htm>

An important step in local governance was the creation of the metropolitan municipalities²⁵ during the 1980s.²⁶ The reason for the introduction of metropolitan municipalities was due to a boom in the urban population. Law No. 3030 passed through certain changes until Metropolitan Municipality Law No. 5216 was adopted in 2004. With the Metropolitan Municipality Law No. 5216, fourteen new metropolitan municipalities were formed.²⁷ The latest change in the number of Metropolitan municipalities occurred in 2012. With Law No. 6360, fourteen new municipalities were raised to the status of metropolitan municipalities thus increasing their total number to thirty.²⁸ Some minor changes to the organizational structure of the local communities (See Tables 1 and 2) came with the new Metropolitan Law. Authority of the local communities belongs to two main groups: those ‘based on representation’ who come to the office via elections and those appointed by the central government whose authority is grounded in the ‘principle of appointment’.²⁹ (See Tables 1, 2 and 3) It is also important to remind that the reformist spirit that came with the AKP party during the 2000s caused by Turkey’s EU ambitions at the time influenced the local governments as well. One of the requirements of the EU accession process was giving more autonomy to local governments.

Table 1: *Local governments formed with elections*

Local government office		Officer in charge
Special Administrations (<i>İl özel idareleri</i>)	Provincial	Provincial General Assembly (<i>İl Genel Meclisi</i>) ³⁰
Municipality (<i>Belediye</i>)		Mayor (<i>Belediye Başkanı</i>)

25 Büyükşehir Belediyesi in Turkish

26 Uğur Yıldırım, Zehra Gül and Soner Akın, “İl Mülki Sınırı Büyükşehir Belediye Modelinin Getirdiği Yenilikler”, *Eskişehir Osmangazi Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi*, 10 (2), Eskişehir, (2015): 205-229. doi: http://iubfdergi.ogu.edu.tr/makaleler/14495928_10-2_A%4%9EUSTOS%202015_Makale_0.pdf

27 “5216 Sayılı Büyükşehir Belediyesi Kanunu”, Mevzuatı Geliştirme ve Yayın Genel Müdürlüğü-Mevzuat Bilgi Sistemi, Accessed on June 23, 2018, <http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.5216.pdf>

28 Ibid.

29 Rüşen Keleş, *Yerinden Yönetim ve Siyaset*, 30.

30 Members of the Assembly are elected by the people through elections. After that, the Head of the Assembly and provincial committee are formed among the elected members of the Assembly.

Local government office	Officer in charge
Village (<i>Köy</i>)	Village representative (<i>Muhtar</i>)

Table 2: Elected local governments after being raised to the status of Metropolitan Municipality

Local government Office	Officer in charge
Metropolitan Municipality (<i>Büyükşehir Belediyesi</i>)	Mayor of Metropolitan Municipality
Municipality (<i>Belediye</i>)	Mayor (<i>Belediye Başkanı</i>)
District (<i>Mahalle</i>)	District representative (<i>Muhtar</i>)

Table 3: Local government offices formed by the appointment of the central state authority

Local government office	Officer in charge
Special Provincial Administrations (<i>Valilik</i>)	Governor (<i>Vali</i>)
District Governorship (<i>Kaymakamlık</i>)	District Governor (<i>Kaymakam</i>)
Ministry Province/County (<i>Bakanlık Temsilcilikleri-İl/İlçe</i>) ³¹	Provincial Director/County Director (<i>İl Müdür/İlçe müdürü</i>)

Turkey's Sister-City Relations

Turkey experienced the first international twinning back in 1965 when Istanbul became a sister city to Rio de Janeiro. Especially during the 1990s number of sister city relations expanded rapidly.³² After former Soviet republics of Central Asia gained independence in the earlier 1990s,

31 Some Ministries, like Ministry of Education or Ministry of Health, have their representative offices at the local government level.

32 Fahri Solak, Interview by Jahja Muhasilović, Interview with Fahri Solak, Secretary-General of the TDBB, Conducted on January 9, 2019.

under Turgut Özal's (1927-1993) pro-active foreign policy Turkish municipalities entered into many sister-city relations with the region's local communities.³³

After the long pause caused by the Cold War during the 1990s, Turkish local communities also became more active in the Balkans.³⁴ In the next decade, even more, town twinning would be signed with the municipalities in the Balkans.³⁵ Turkey's EU ambitions were another driving force for the Turkish local communities to extend the network of sister cities. Also, some internal reforms like the adoption of the Municipality Law No. 5393³⁶ from 2005 pushed municipalities to raise the number of overseas twinnings.³⁷

By the mid-2017 Turkish local communities had 1619 sister cities around the world.³⁸ The most sister cities, 646 of them, were in Europe, representing around forty percent of all the twinnings.³⁹ Among the five countries with whom Turkey has the most sister city relations, four are from the Balkans. Municipalities from this region represent more than a quarter of all twinnings Turkish local communities have overseas. Four-hundred-thirty-nine municipalities from the Balkans have sister city relation to Turkish municipalities. If Greece is added to this number, then the number rise to 525 municipalities, representing 32 percent of all sister cities Turkish municipalities have.⁴⁰ Hundred and twenty-three Bulgarian municipalities have sister city ties to Turkish counterparts. This country champions the list of the Balkan countries. Bosnia and

33 "Kardesehirler", kardesehirler.org.tr, 2017

34 Özcan Sezer and Tuğçe Bayram, "Yerel Yönetimler Arası İşbirliğini Geliştirmede Yerel Ağların Önemi: Balkan Ülkeleri Yerel Yönetimleri ile İşbirliğini Geliştirme Potansiyeli" 1. Karadeniz ve Balkan Ekonomik ve Politik Araştırmalar Sempozyumu Bildiriler Kitabı, *Batı Karadeniz Kalkınma Ajansı Yayını*, Zonguldak (2014), quoted in Hüseyin Can, "Yerel Yönetim Birliklerinin Belediyelerin Kardeş Şehir İlişkilerine Katkıları: Türk Dünyası Belediyeler Birliği Örneği", Master Thesis, Dumlupınar Üniversitesi, Kütahya, (2018), 129.

35 Tarkan Oktay, "Türkiye'deki Belediyelerin Türk Cumhuriyetleri ile Kardeş Şehir İlişkileri", in *Türk Dünyasında Yerel Yönetimlerin Sorunları*, ed. Deniz İşçioğlu, KKTC, 11-28., doi: http://www.tarkanoktay.net/index_html_files/tarkan%20oktay-%20turk%20dunyasi%20kardes%20sehir%20iliskileri.pdf

36 Çiğdem Akman, "Evaluating the Current Situation via Town Twinning Practices in Turkey", *Journal of Süleyman Demirel University Institute of Social Sciences-Süleyman Demirel University*, CIEP Special Edition, (2016): 1058, doi: <http://dergipark.gov.tr/uploads/issuefiles/446c/eeb1/af3b/58a4208447b16.pdf>

37 Ibid. 1055-1071

38 Special Provincial Administrations are excluded from this number.

39 Balkan region is not included in the statistic.

40 Sister Cities of Turkey All Over the World", *Kardeş Şehirler*, Accessed on November 10, 2018, <http://www.kardesehirler.org.tr>

Herzegovina comes second with 101 sister municipalities, followed by Greece with 86 and North Macedonia with 75 sister cities to their Turkish counterparts.⁴¹ According to 2017 statistics provided by *kardessehirler*, a website launched by the Union of Turkish World Municipalities-TDBB, Europe together with the Balkan region is responsible for more than two-thirds of all sister city relations of Turkey.⁴² These statistics undoubtedly demonstrate the importance of the Balkans in Turkish city diplomacy.⁴³ The importance of the region becomes even more apparent when compared to Central Asia, where there are only 92 sister city relations with Turkish counterparts. This number is lower than the number of twinnings with Bosnia and Herzegovina alone.

Table 7.6 *Regional Distribution of Turkey's Sister Cities Abroad*⁴⁴

REGION	TOTAL NUMBER OF SISTER CITIES	RATE (%)
Europe	646	39.9
Balkans	439	27.1
The Middle East and North Africa	134	8.3
Central Asia	92	5.7
Asia-Pacific	86	5.3
South Caucasus	80	4.9
Sub-Saharan Africa	62	3.8
North America	37	2.3
Latin America	23	1.4
South Asia	20	1.2
Total	1619	100

Table 7.7 *Number of Sister Cities in the Balkans Region (Without Greece)*⁴⁵

BALKANS REGION		
COUNTRIES	NUMBER OF SISTER CITIES	RATE (%)
Bulgaria	123	28.0
Bosnia and Herzegovina	101	23.0
Macedonia	75	17.1
Romania	45	10.3
Kosovo	35	8.0
Montenegro	26	5.9
Albania	18	4.1
Croatia	7	1.6
Slovenia	4	0.9
Serbia	5	1.1
Total	439	100

41 Greece is fifth if Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is counted. TRNC has 88 sister cities, two more than Greece. Turkey is the only country in the world that recognizes the TRNC as a state, thus this entity is not counted in the statistics provided above.

42 Union of Turkish World Municipalities

43 Ibid.

44 "Sister Cities of Turkey All Over the World", Kardeş Şehirler, Accessed on March 4, 2018, <http://www.kardessehirler.org.tr>

45 Ibid.

The Role of Turkish Municipality Unions in City Diplomacy

Municipality unions are important platforms for conducting city diplomacy. They often boost cooperation among the local communities. Turkey has dozens of municipality unions operating on different levels, from the provincial to the national.⁴⁶ The first example of setting regulations among the local communities stretches back to the Ottoman period to a 1913 law known as *Idare-i Umumiye-i Vilayet Kanunu Muvakkati*.⁴⁷ During the 1920s local community unions at the rural level were formed to meet their common necessities.⁴⁸ The first constitutional regulations regarding the municipality unions were introduced in the Constitution of 1961. Regional unions like the municipality unions of Aegean, Marmara, and the Black Sea were formed.⁴⁹ Even the Ministry for Local Governments was founded in 1978. However, it was abolished only one year after its foundation.⁵⁰

Unions that operate at the national level exceed the numbers of those that are international scope. The largest nation-wide municipal union is *Turkey Municipality Union (TBB)*.⁵¹ TBB was launched in 1945 as a “public interest association.”⁵² It was reorganized in a way to reassemble all Turkish municipalities under one roof by a 2002 decision from the Council of Ministers. Through this change in legal status, all Turkish municipalities were required to become TBB members.⁵³

46 Yakup Altan, Uysal Kerman and Mehmet Aktel, “Köy Kanunu Tasarısı Taslağı Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme”, *Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi-Dumlupınar Üniversitesi*, No. 26, (2010): 56-65. doi: <http://www.acarindex.com/dosyalar/makale/acarindex-1423876635.pdf>

47 Cenk Reyhan, “Yerel Yönetim Metinleri (XX): 1913 Tarihli Vilayet Genel İdaresi Geçici Kanunu”, *Çağdaş Yerel Yönetimler Dergisi*, Vol. 9, No. 1, 129-154. doi: http://www.todaie.edu.tr/resimler/ekler/91fbf770f89b0c2_ek.pdf?dergi=Cagdas%20Yerel%20Yonetimler%20Dergisi

48 Yakup Altan, Uysal Kerman and Mehmet Aktel, “Köy Kanunu Tasarısı Taslağı Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme”, *Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi-Dumlupınar Üniversitesi*, No. 26, (2010): 56-65.

49 Founded in 1975 as *Municipality Union of Marmara and Straits* (Marmara ve Boğazları Belediyeler Birliği). Union will get its to present name of *Municipality Union of Marmara* (Marmara Belediyeler Birliği) in 2009. doi: <http://marmara.gov.tr/>

50 Rüveyda Kızılböğe Özasan and Orhan Veli Alıcı, “Türkiye’de Yerel Yönetim Bakanlığı Deneyimi ve Günümüzdeki Gerekliğin Sorgulanması”, *International Periodical for the Languages, Literature and History of Turkish or Turkic*, Vol. 10/1, (2015): 351-366. doi: <http://dx.doi.org/10.7827/TurkishStudies.7627>

51 Türkiye Belediyeler Birliği in Turkish

52 “History”, *TBB*, Accessed on December 27, 2019, doi: <https://www.tbb.gov.tr/en/home-page/history/>

53 “Power, Functions and Responsibilities”, *TBB*, Accessed on December 27, 2019, doi: <https://www.tbb.gov.tr/en/home-page/power-functions-ve-responsibilities/>

Union of Turkish World Municipalities-TDBB

Unlike TBB which operates domestically, the Union of Turkish World Municipalities (TDBB) handles international operations. The idea for an international union goes back to the 1990s. Increased city diplomacy with Central Asian and Balkan countries after the Cold War required a municipality union that would coordinate these new sets of relations.⁵⁴ For that purpose “IV. Summit of the Statesmen of the Turkic-speaking countries” was organized in 1996. At the summit a *Tashkent Announcement* calling for the improvement of economic, educational, cultural, tourism, and other ties among the Turkic countries. Another summit was held in 2000 in Baku, Azerbaijan where a decision to work on the “improvement of the cooperation between the local communities” was declared.⁵⁵ Three years later, the TDBB was formed by Turkey's Council of Ministers.⁵⁶

Although the name of the Union indicates the Turkic world, TDBB is more active in non-Turkic countries. By the latest data from early 2018 the total number of TDBB's member municipalities was 1140.⁵⁷ Members come from 28 different countries.⁵⁸ The TDBB today is most active in the Balkans, the Middle East, the Caucasus, Eastern Europe, Central Europe, South Asia, and Africa. In the Balkans, members come from Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Greece, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, and Serbia. Although TDBB primarily focused on Central Asia during its initial years, today the majority of its projects are conducted in the Balkans.⁵⁹

54 Fahri Solak, Interview by Jahja Muhasilović, Interview with Fahri Solak, Secretary-General of the TDBB, Conducted on January 9, 2019.

55 *2017 TDBB Faaliyet Raporu*, (Istanbul: Türk Dünyası Belediyeler Birliği, 2018): 13

56 TDBB was formed with the decision No. 2003/6464 published in *Official Gazette* the same year.

57 Union's budget comes from the fee Turkish member municipalities pay according to the size of their population For more see: “Charter of Union of Turkish World Municipalities”, Union of Turkish World Municipalities-Official Website, Accessed on April 11, 2018, <http://www.tdbb.org.tr>

58 Not all foreign members are sovereign countries. Some various special administrative units like Moldovan Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia, or unrecognized states like Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. “Members”, Union of Turkish World Municipalities-Official Website, Accessed on December 24, 2018, <http://www.tdbb.org.tr>

59 “About us”, TDBB, Accessed on January 6, 2019, doi: <http://www.tdbb.org.tr>; Fahri Solak, Interview by Jahja Muhasilović, Interview with Fahri Solak, Secretary-General of the TDBB, Conducted on January 9, 2019.

Bosnian Local Communities

Unlike their Turkish counterparts, Bosnian local communities enjoy much greater levels of autonomy.⁶⁰ Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is an extremely decentralized country that is composed of two ethnically dominated entities (*entiteti*): the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and the Republika Srpska (RS). The later entity is unitary in structure, while the former is divided into ten cantons (*kantoni*). Seven cantons have Bosniak majorities, while the remaining three are dominated by Bosnian-Croats. Each entity and canton are highly autonomous and their internal formation is state-like in structure.⁶¹ In total, there are 143 municipalities in BiH: 79 in the FBiH, and 64 in the RS in which all mayors are elected by the people. Despite this, Bosnian local communities are often criticized for having better cooperation with foreign municipalities than among themselves.⁶² The reason for this absurdity might be in the absence of a municipality union at the national level.⁶³ There are two main domestic municipality unions for each entity.⁶⁴ The country's ethnic divisions further complicate the situation. Along lacking a central platform, Bosnian local governments also suffer from a chronic lack of finances.

Turkish City Diplomacy in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Unlike European city diplomacy in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Turkey emphasizes the cultural aspect in relationship with this country.⁶⁵ Bosnia-Herzegovina is amongst the countries where Turkish city diplomacy is most active. Regarding twinning relations, Bosnian towns are again

60 Mehmet Uğur Ekinci, "Bosna Hersek Siyasetini Anlama Kılavuzu" (Ankara: SETA, 2014): 31, 32.

61 The two entities and the cantons have their presidents, prime ministers, ministries and parliaments.

62 "Bh. gradovi bolju saradnju imaju s evropskim gradovima nego unutar drzave", *Klix*, Accessed on April 23, 2018, <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/bh-gradovi-bolju-saradnju-imaju-s-evropskim-gradovima-nego-unutar-drzave/171109035>

63 Two major municipality unions exist in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Both, *Association of Municipalities and Cities of FBiH* (SOGFBiH) and *Union of Municipalities and Cities of Republika Srpska* (SOGRS).

64 Bosnia and Herzegovina is composed of two entities, Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, also known as Bosniak-Croat Federation and Republika Srpska which is the Serb-majority half of the country. Two major municipality unions exist in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Both, *Association of Municipalities and Cities of FBiH* (SOGFBiH) and *Union of Municipalities and Cities of Republika Srpska* (SOGRS) are on the entity level.

65 Birgül Demirtaş, "Türkiye'de Yerel Yönetimlerin Dış İlişkilerinin Analizi: Merkez-Çevre Etkileşimini Yeniden Düşünmek", *Uluslararası İlişkiler/International Relations*, Vol. 13, No. 52, *Türk Dış Politikası Özel Sayısı* (2016): 151-173.

among the leaders.⁶⁶ For instance, Gorazde and Sarajevo were the seventh and ninth most popular foreign municipalities with whom their Turkish counterparts had the most sister city relations in 2014. ⁶⁷ Since Turkish local governments have larger resources, the relationship is mostly one way where Turkish municipalities invest in BiH rather than vice versa.

Although the number of sister-city relations is high, not all of the Turkish municipalities are active in BiH. The majority of twinings do not go beyond a protocol of cooperation. Each municipality has a different reason for being active in the region. Sometimes it is simply connected to a particular mayor's vision. Often there is a demand from the Bosnian sister municipality for cooperation. In that case, it is proof that the choice of a municipality for twinning has been paid off. Some municipalities become active in the region because of their membership in a municipality union.

It is important to point out that some Turkish local communities show interest in the region because large Balkan populations reside inside within its confines. Demographic characteristics can be a strong motivation for local administrations to develop international relations.⁶⁸ This phenomenon is known as the "kinship bond"⁶⁹ This phenomenon is relevant especially in the Marmara and Aegean regions where local communities traditionally have large *Muhacir*⁷⁰ populations.⁷¹ In those areas people from the Balkans have cultural associations⁷² for preserving their cultural heritage. Like in the example of *Bosna-Sancak Associations*,⁷³ the largest Bosniak association in Turkey, they often grow into a strong lobbying force. For mayors, Balkan populations and their associations represent both political challenges and opportunities. Having a large number of voters originating from the region pushes some mayors to

66 Tarkan Oktay, "Türkiye'deki Belediyelerin Türk Cumhuriyetleri ile Kardeş Şehir İlişkileri", 19.

67 Ibid.

68 Sabiha Tuğba Ekşi, *Dünyada ve Türkiye'de Kardeş Şehircilik*, 109-112.; Kerem Öktem, "Global Diyanet and Multiple Networks: Turkey's New Presence in the Balkans", *Journal of Muslims in Europe*, (2012): 54.

69 'Soydaşlık bağı' in Turkish

70 Old Ottoman Turkish term for the Muslim emigrants and refugees from the Balkans that settled in the Anatolia and other Ottoman lands that were not lost to the Balkan nation states and Russian Empire. The root of the word Muhacir is Arabic meaning a 'migrant.'

71 It is estimated that people from Balkans and Caucasus represent between one-third and one-quarter of Turkey's total population.

72 'Dernek' in Turkish.

73 'Bosna Sancak Derneği' in Turkish.

pursue more active policies in the Balkans, which in turn provides them votes in elections.

Istanbul's working-class municipality of Bayrampaşa has had a large Bosniak community since the first half of the twentieth century.⁷⁴ It is estimated that almost half of Bayrampaşa's population originates from the region.⁷⁵ It is also home to NGO's like the *Bosna-Sancak Association*. The presence of Balkan populations has turned Bayrampaşa into an important local diplomatic actor. The municipality has a set of different activities in the region, however its most recognized aspect is its on-going cultural diplomacy.

Since 2005, the municipality organizes the "Fertility Convoy"⁷⁶ which provides mass *iftars*⁷⁷ across the region during the month of Ramadan.⁷⁸ The convoy travels as far north as the Croatian capital Zagreb. Iftar meals are served to hundreds of people. The program became a recognized brand of the Bayrampaşa Municipality. The Bosna-Sancak Association organizes "Bosnia-Sancak Culture Days" inside Turkey and promote Bosnian culture through theatre plays, *Sevdalinka*⁷⁹ concerts, and Bosnian movies. In addition, they also host famous Bosnian singers and promote many other cultural activities.⁸⁰

Bursa Metropolitan Municipality, Ankara's Keçiören and Altındağ municipalities, and Konya's Selçuklu Municipality are also active in local diplomacy with Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Ottoman-era stone bridge in Goražde is set to be restored with the help of Ankara's Keçiören Municipality.⁸¹ The reconstruction of the Ottoman-era square next to the bridge is also planned as well. TDBB and the *Directorate General of Pious Foundations*⁸² are also taking part in the project. This project reflects the

74 It is estimated that up to 40 percent of Bayrampasa originates from the Balkans.

75 Özgenur Reyhan Güler, "Bayrampaşa İlçesindeki Demografik Yapının Bayrampaşa Belediyesi'nin Kültür Politikalarını Üzerindeki Etkileri", *Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi (RTEÜ Journal of Social Sciences)* 1: 67-88.

76 'Bereket Konvoyu' in Turkish.

77 Ramadan evening meal.

78 Marija Mitrović, Dušan Reljić and Alida Vračić, "Elsewhere in the Neighborhood: Reaching Out to the Western Balkans", in *Turkey's Public Diplomacy*, ed. B. Senem Çevik and Philip Seib, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015): 115.

79 Traditional Bosnian folk song.

80 "Bosna-Sancak Kültür Günleri başlıyor", *Posta*, Accessed on, April 22, 2018, <http://www.posta.com.tr/bosna-sancak-kultur-gunleri-basliyor-haberi-1341936>

81 2017 TDBB Faaliyet Raporu, (Istanbul: Türk Dünyası Belediyeler Birliği, 2018): 41.

82 Vakıflar Genel Müdürlüğü in Turkish.

successful cooperation of the local community, a municipality union, and a public diplomacy institution.⁸³

Ankara's Keçiören Municipality is quite active in BiH. In 2014 they helped finance the construction of a large Islamic complex in Goražde.⁸⁴ Altındağ Municipality constructed a modern culture center in its sister city Visoko.⁸⁵ Bursa Metropolitan Municipality and the Municipality of Osmangazi have been very active in preserving Sarajevo's Stari Grad district's Ottoman cultural heritage. City diplomacy between the two countries also supports the construction of sports venues. In the small town of Donji Vakuf, a sports hall was constructed through the cooperation of three different municipalities. Building a sports venue, culture complex, helping a school with the equipment, restoring a square, or an Ottoman bridge certainly improves Turkey's soft power standing in BiH.

TDBB's Role in City Diplomacy between the Two Countries

TDBB became more active in the region after 2015 due to Turkey's shifting foreign policy objectives.⁸⁶ Increased diplomatic traffic and higher levels of diplomacy have positively impacted local communities and municipality unions.⁸⁷ Today the Union has more than sixty member municipalities from the region. The number of twinnings rose significantly after 2007.⁸⁸ However, as a practice has shown, the majority of twinnings generally do not bring the expected feedback they initially sought. Thus, municipality unions like TDBB are good platforms for maintaining communication between sister cities and serving as a mediator for keeping relations active. The number of projects coordinated by the TDBB confirms that Bosnia and Herzegovina has become an important destination for Turkish city diplomacy. Between 2015 and 2019, almost fifty different projects were either finished, under construction, or waiting to be started. This amount is much higher in

83 In April 2020 this project appeared to be halted because of Goražde's mayor's differing vision.; "Muhamed Ramovic: Goražde smo ucinili privlacnim investitorima, moramo se nastaviti boriti", *Klix*, Accessed on April 23, 2018, <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/muhamed-ramovic-Goražde-smo-ucinili-privlacnim-investitorima-moramo-se-nastaviti-boriti/180101048>

84 *Keçiören Belediyesi 2014 Faaliyet Raporu*, (Ankara: Keçiören Belediyesi, 2015): 157

85 The mayor of Visoko, Amra Babic, has a positive reputation in Turkish Islamist circles for being the first Bosnian mayor to wear a headscarf.

86 Interview with Fahri Solak, conducted on January 9, 2019.

87 Vedad Halilović, Interview by Jahja Muhasilović, Interview with Vedad Halilović, former foreign relations expert at the TDBB, Conducted via web on 12.04.2018.

88 "Kardessehirler", *kardessehirler.org.tr*, Accessed on May 8, 2020.

comparison to any other country that is a member of the Union.⁸⁹ Thirty Bosnian local communities were members of the TDBB by early 2020.⁹⁰

Doboj Bridge

TDBB rose to prominence in Bosnia and Herzegovina after making the Serb-majority municipality of Doboj a fellow member. This move elicited harsh criticism from the country's nationalist Serb politicians, particularly, President Milorad Dodik and his SNSD party. The mayor of Doboj, Obren Petrovic, went through a lot of trouble for joining the Union.⁹¹ However, Petrovic's membership soon paid off with a significant infrastructure project supported by the Union. Although TDBB generally does not finance infrastructure-related projects, it accepted to finance the "Bridge of Friendship" between the towns of Doboj, located in the RS and Doboj Istok, located in the FBiH, signaling that it was a peacemaker to the region by connecting two ethnic communities.

Turkish Language Classrooms

Together with the *Yunus Emre Institute*⁹², TDBB supports the promotion of the Turkish language in Bosnian schools. It is responsible for the reconstruction of more than twenty classrooms that participates in the Yunus Emre Institute's "My Choice is Turkish" program. This is program for coordination of Turkish language as an elective class in Bosnian schools. As a result of these efforts, more than eight thousand Bosnian kids are taking Turkish as an elective class.⁹³ TDBB also provided a thousand reading sets for the attendees of the Turkish Language classes.⁹⁴ The majority of financing for this project comes from TDBB's Turkish member municipalities.

89 For more see: *2015 TDBB Faaliyet Raporu*, *2016 TDBB Faaliyet Raporu*, *2017 TDBB Faaliyet Raporu*, and *2018 TDBB Faaliyet Raporu*

90 "Members", TDBB, Accessed on May 17, 2020, doi: http://www.tdbb.org.tr/?page_id=2587&lang=en

91 "Doboj izlazi iz 'Turskog sveta'", *Novosti*, 10.03.2015. Accessed on January 12, 2019, doi: http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/naslovna/republika_srpska/aktuelno.655.html:537628-Doboj-izlazi-iz-Turskog-sveta

92 "Yunus Emre Institute", *Yunus Emre Institute*, Accessed on May 8, 2020, doi: <https://www.yee.org.tr/en/corporate/yunus-emre-institute>

93 "Bosna Hersek'te 17 Türkçe Dil Sınıfı Eğitim-Öğretime Açıldı", TDBB, Accessed on April 18, 2018, doi: <http://www.tdbb.org.tr>

94 *2015 Yunus Emre Enstitüsü Faaliyet Raporu*, (Ankara, Yunus Emre Enstitüsü, 2015), 132.

Preservation of the Historical Legacy

Many mosques, Sufi lodges⁹⁵, bridges, and madrasahs are restored with the help of sister cities. Municipality unions and other public diplomacy institutions, like TIKA⁹⁶, work together to help preserve the region's Ottoman legacy. Sometimes even local customs are financed through municipality unions. Financial support is provided to "Days of Ajvatovica" which is the largest Muslim festival in the Balkans which draws tens of thousands of people every year.⁹⁷ Financing is done in cooperation with the Muftiate of Travnik who also co-hosts the event.

TDBB has also worked with the Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina on building a multifunctional Islamic center in the town of Glamoč and constructing the Islamic Community's representative office in the northwestern town of Ključ. The Union's projects are generally financed with the help of a Turkish sister city, while some are jointly financed by the TDBB and a sister city. Some projects include more than two co-financiers such as in the case of the Ottoman bridge in Goražde where the Turkish Directorate for the Pious Foundations was also involved.

Connecting Bosnian Local Governments to the World

A few years ago, TDBB started actively working to increase direct communication between the local communities of its member countries.⁹⁸ Bosnia and Herzegovina and Azerbaijan were chosen as pioneers for this new project. A delegation composed of Bosnian mayors and businessmen paid a seven-day visit to Azerbaijan where they had a chance to meet face-to-face with their Azerbaijani counterparts.⁹⁹ The visit was thematical, only targeting municipalities with similar firms and other relevant industries. A few months later, an Azerbaijani delegation paid a

95 *Tekke* in Turkish.

96 Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency.

97 "TDBB's Support to 509th Ajvatovica Festival", *TDBB*, Accessed on May 3, 2020, doi: <http://www.tdbb.org.tr/?p=14351&lang=en>

98 Interview with Fahri Solak, Conducted on January 9, 2019.

99 "TDBB Bosnia and Herzegovina Delegation Visited Azerbaijan", *TDBB*, Accessed on May 8, 2020, <http://www.tdbb.org.tr/?p=12590&lang=en>

similar visit to BiH.¹⁰⁰ A similar interaction occurred between BiH and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).¹⁰¹

It is important to point out that the majority of overseas projects go through the municipalities that are in the administrative board of the Union, which means the majority of the 151 Turkish members are inactive. Many municipalities are small and distant and thus have a limited capacity to operate internationally. Things became even more difficult following the devaluation of the Turkish Lira against USD in more recent times. As a result, the capacity of Turkish local governments has been significantly reduced over the past couple of years.¹⁰²

Relations Monopolized by the Two Political Parties

The majority of city diplomacy with Bosnia and Herzegovina is run by a single party. Municipalities controlled by opposition parties remain almost completely absent in these relations.¹⁰³ Opposition parties in Turkey have failed to benefit from the diplomatic channels opened by the AKP. The ruling party governs 43% of the country's municipalities and often ideological motivations lay behind many twinnings.¹⁰⁴ The dominance of a single party in city diplomacy sometimes causes certain ideological-based preference in choosing regional partners.

Bilateral relations between BiH and Turkey are criticized for being monopolized by the two political parties, SDA in Bosnia and Herzegovina and AKP in Turkey. The city diplomacy between the two countries is often under criticism as well. Some mayors from the SDA are often accused of having a submissive relationship with the Turkish government. The most notable example is Abdulah Skaka, the Mayor of Sarajevo. In 2018, the City of Sarajevo decided to make Orhan Pamuk, Turkish Nobel laureate, "honorary citizen of Sarajevo". Soon after announcing its intentions the city administration pulled back the decision. Due to Pamuk's bad terms with the Turkish government for his views on the Armenian genocide relations with Turkey were too important to be ruined over Pamuk. It is not clear whether the city was

100 "TDBB Azerbaijan Delegation Visited Bosnia and Herzegovina", *TDBB*, Accessed on January 6, 2019-01-06 doi: <http://www.tdbb.org.tr>

101 "TDBB Northern Cyprus Municipality Delegation Visited Bosnia and Herzegovina", *TDBB*, Accessed on May 8, 2020, doi: <http://www.tdbb.org.tr/?p=15106&lang=en>

102 Sabiha Tuğba Ekşi, *Dünyada ve Türkiye'de Kardeş Şehircilik*, 134.

103 "Metropolitan Municipality of Izmir, a CHP majority municipality, has done some minor projects in the past through Kemal Baysak, a prominent Bosniak living in Turkey." Interview with Vedad Halilović, Conducted via web on 22.04.2018.

104 Ibid. 133.

pressured from the Turkish side or it was simply the mayor's will to cancel the award.

The mayor of Sarajevo was amid a similar scandal two years before. In 2016, a Turkish professor teaching math in a Bosnian school that is believed to belong to the Gulen movement received a "Plaque of the City of Sarajevo" from the Commission for Elections and Appointments of the City Council of the City of Sarajevo. The professor was awarded for training dozens of mathematicians and bringing many awards from international maths competitions to the country. The City authority immediately reacted. As soon as the professor received the award it was taken from him.¹⁰⁵ The city's move was harshly criticized by the majority of political parties.

Skaka's open and unconditional support for the Turkish government and the President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was best seen in his refusal to meet with the newly elected Mayor of Istanbul Ekrem İmamoğlu in 2019.¹⁰⁶ Although the visit to Sarajevo was one of İmamoğlu's first foreign visits and the two cities have sister city relations, Skaka preferred to take Erdoğan's side. Skaka again launched an avalanche of criticism for "embarrassing Sarajevo." As he refused to meet Istanbul's mayor, the leadership of the Sarajevo Canton, at the time run by a coalition of opposition parties, used the chance to host him.

Cooperation only with the Bosniak-Majority Municipalities

Another common claim is that Turkey is favoring Muslims in the region. When analyzing twinnings and TDBB's members, one finds that most of the twinned municipalities have Bosniak majorities. For instance, out of TDBB's members, only three out of thirty municipalities do not have a Bosniak majority.¹⁰⁷ The municipalities of Dobož from Republika Srpska and Zepče from Federation are the only exceptions. Also, membership in the TDBB is reserved almost exclusively for municipalities from the FBiH, especially to those municipalities with

¹⁰⁵ "Slučaj "Plaketa": Bivši učenici podržali profesora Lafcioglua, politizacija nagrade neprihvatljiva", *Klix*, Accessed on May 19, 2020, doi: <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/slucaj-plaketa-bivsi-ucenici-podrzali-profesora-lafcioglua-politizacija-nagrade-neprihvatljiva/161101004>

¹⁰⁶ Since the first days of his terms the mayor is not in good terms with the Turkish president
¹⁰⁷ "Members", *TDBB*, Accessed on May 3, 2020, doi: http://www.tdbb.org.tr/?page_id=2587&lang=en

Bosniak majorities.¹⁰⁸ There is only one member municipality that is not from the FBiH.

TDBB's leadership does not see their vision and the strategy as a reason for this reality; instead they place blame on the attitudes towards collaboration on the RS. When asked about the policies and vision of the TDBB regarding the Republika Srpska, TDBB's Secretary-General Fahri Solak said,

"Despite TDBB's openness the domination of nationalistic sentiment in certain countries defines the relationship with the TDBB.... here the approach from TDBB is not influential, but the approach of the interlocutor (other side)."¹⁰⁹

In recent years Turkey started acting more as an independent player in the region. Turkish local communities are also deficient in cooperating with other countries in the region. Some municipal unions like *Council of European Municipalities and Regions* (CEMR) that are active in Bosnia and Herzegovina can serve as a good platform for cooperation since both Turkey and Bosnia and Herzegovina are members of that union. In order to overcome the barriers from the non-Bosniaks and diversify its partners in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Turkish local communities should consider acting through international platforms like CEMR. This possibility seems less likely as Turkey has distanced itself from the EU in the recent years.

Disruptive Role of the NGOs

In the past, some joint projects between local governments, public diplomacy institutions, and the non-governmental sector have proven to be costly for Turkey's image in Bosnia and Herzegovina. A public "mass circumcision" of disadvantaged Bosnian children was organized in 2014 by the Istanbul Educational-Cultural Center, an NGO led by the conservative Turkish Muslims stationed in BiH, the Yunus Emre Institute, and the Eskişehir Municipality.¹¹⁰ Turkish Minister of Education was even present at this event stamping the mark of official Turkish diplomacy. However, the event resulted in a public outcry. The circumcisions were performed according to the Anatolian tradition by

108 The leadership of the Union refuted the claims of having ethnic priorities or faith restrictions, Interview with Fahri Solak, Conducted on January 9, 2019.

109 Interview with Fahri Solak, Conducted on January 9, 2019.

110 Anadolija, "U subotu kolektivno sunećenje 150 djece u Sarajevu" *Klix*, April 17, 2014. <https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/u-subotu-kolektivno-sunecenje-150-djece-u-sarajevu/140417078>

dressing kids into clothes alien to Bosnian culture.¹¹¹ Some interpreted the event as an attempt at “Turkifying” Bosnian children. This event triggered a robust public debate about Turkey’s ambitions in BiH and even triggered anti-Turkish sentiment among parts of the population that are generally pro-Turkey.

Unlike many local Turkish governments, TDBB does not cooperate with Turkish NGOs abroad; instead they prefer to cooperate with the local sector. This strategy has prevented mistakes like those done by the Eskişehir Municipality. One of those local NGOs is EMMAUS¹¹² that together with the TDBB has completed a few successful projects in BiH.¹¹³

Economic Challenges Ahead

The devaluation of the Turkish Lira that has started in 2018 has created some serious problems for Turkey’s local diplomacy. The crisis over Lira has caused the Turkish economy to slow down. The weakened Lira decreased the purchasing power in Turkey making overseas investments expensive. The economic slowdown has already been felt in terms of the number of newer projects being undertaken in BiH. It is also very likely that the recent crisis surrounding the Covid-19 pandemic will further slowdown cooperation between Turkish and Bosnian municipalities and significantly reduce the capacities of the local communities in two countries.

Concluding Remarks

Turkish local diplomacy has become one of the main instruments of the official public diplomacy. Especially in the last two decades many local communities managed to become a recognized soft power tool in the Balkans. City diplomacy is especially active in restoring the historical legacy from the Ottoman period. Yet, the Turkish local communities appear to have reached their zenith due to shortcomings in the internal structure. The centralist model of the administrative organization has brought too much politicization to the work of the local communities. Being too attached to the central government certainly paves the way to Turkish local communities in favoring particular local communities in the

111 Circumcisions among Balkan Muslims are not performed publicly and collectively.

112 “MFS-EMMAUS”, *Emmaus*, Accessed on May 8, 2020, doi: <https://mfs-emmaus.ba/en/home/>

113 “TDBB Cultural Houses in Dobož Istok-Kids and Youth Center were Inaugurated”, *TDBB*, Accessed on April 18, 2018, doi: <http://www.tdbb.org.tr/>; “Appreciation Plaque for TDBB from Bosnia and Herzegovina’s EMMAUS Association”, *TDBB*, Accessed on April 18, 2018, doi: <http://www.tdbb.org.tr>

region as it was often the case with their Bosnian partners. The city diplomacy between the two countries is a victim of two affiliated political parties. As Istanbul Mayor's visit to Sarajevo in 2019 proved, there is even a political boycott when a mayor outside the mentioned ideological frame is trying to reach out to its Bosnian counterparts. Since the autonomy of the local communities is connected to the level of democratization in a society, Turkish local communities might get more autonomy as Turkey's democracy progresses.

Not keeping up with the latest global trends like working on the development of the concept of 'humanitarian cities' is certainly limiting the capacities that Turkish local communities can offer in the region. Turkish local communities have to update their work to remain an attractive partner for their counterparts in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Organizing *iftar* meals is addressing only limited segments of the Balkan population. But, working more actively on municipal models like 'smart cities' or 'humanitarian cities' probably would be welcomed by everyone in the region. More cooperation with the partners from the EU would certainly provide necessary assistance for Turkish local communities in shifting to the latest models of municipalism.

A cooperation of the official diplomacy and the track-two diplomacy led by the non-state sector is a characteristic of successful diplomacy. In the past, the Turkish non-state sector was proved to be harmful to Turkish diplomacy. They often instigate some alien events and traditions that were harshly criticized by the Bosnian population. Turkish local communities co-sponsored some of those events. Turkey lacks a coordination body that would prevent official diplomacy channels like local communities from joining harmful projects.

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BOOK REVIEW

Giorgi Kazbegi, Bir Rus Generalinin Günlükleri “Türkiye Gürcistanı’nda Üç Ay”

[Giorgi Kazbegi, Diary of a Russian General, “Three Months in Turkish Georgia”], Translated from Georgian into Turkish by Rıdvan Atan, İstanbul: Doruk Yayıncılık, 2019, 173 p. ISBN: 978-975-553-720-7

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Giorgi Kazbegi (1840-1921) was born into a notable Georgian family in Kazbegi region, northern Georgia. He had had his primary education at the best schools in Tbilisi before he enrolled at a military school and graduated as a lieutenant (*teğmen*) to serve in the Russian army. Later in his career Kazbegi rose to the rank of General in Tsar’s Army. He was assigned to the Caucasian Front and actively served at 1877-1878 Ottoman-Russian War.

In 1874, Kazbegi undertook a reconnaissance work at the Southwest Caucasian region, the territories within the borders of Ottoman Empire. During his tour in the region he took notes which later on was published as a book. Though never does Kazbegi state the true nature of his visit to

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the region explicitly, it is highly likely that his mission was strongly associated with the pre-war preparations.

This region is called “Georgia within Turkey” (*Türkiye Gürcistanı*) in the literature. During this tour, Kazbegi paid a visit to a local notable Hemşiaşvili (*Hamşioğlu*) family with the company of Grigol Gurieli, another general in the Russian army. One interpretation suggests that Kazbegi participated this visit undercover as an insignificant officer of General Gurieli thus no one knew what his real identity was. Kazbegi took his notes encrypted and recorded every member in his unit but with only their initials in case his tour was to be interpreted as an espionage activity by the local Ottoman officials.

The book titled “*Three Months in Turkish Georgia*” (*Turkish translation: Türkiye Gürcistanı’nda Üç Ay*) was compiled of Kazbegi’s systematic notes on geographical regions he took within the territories of ancient Georgia; Upper Adjara, Şavşat, Ardanuç, Artvin, Borçka, Hopa, Arhavi, Pazar, and Hemşin.† His trips were planned according to the geographic conditions of the region, sometimes on the back of a horse, sometimes on foot, or by river-going boats. Kazbegi made observations and took detailed notes during this three-month tour and he discovered the uncharted or less known parts of the territory. He even corrected some misinformation of the European travelers. His findings are most probably accurate when the date of this book is considered.

He used technological devices like a compass, aneroid barometer, thermometer to minimize error margins at determination of terrain, direction and altitude. He measured water temperature and collected water samples to analyze later. Moreover, he noted on vegetation cover at the places he visited and collected plant samples as well.

In his book, Kazbegi gave details about demographic structures of the places. He mentioned the numbers of Turks, Georgians, Armenians, Greeks, Laz, Hemşin and Kurdish people living at each place (district, town, and village), and noted their economic activities, and religious beliefs.

† the Russian original of the book: Georgiy Kazbegi, *Tri Mesyatsa v Turetskoy Gruzii, iz Dnevniko Putushestvennika, Osobyi Ottisk iz Zapisok “Kavkasskago Otdela Imperatorskago Russkago Geograficheskago Obshtestva (s Kartoyu)*, Tiflis: Tipografiya g. Chantseva, 1876; the book was translated from Russian into Georgian by Ramaz Surmanizde in 1995 under the title *Sami Tve Turqetis Saqartveloshi* (Batumi: Ajara, 1995).

He specifically mentioned roads and routes. He went from Artvin to Borçka over Choruhı River by a river-going boat and told how transportation worked over this river to Batumi. He also wrote about the mountains, valleys, streams, water resources, and soil structure.

Another important contribution of this book is that it includes the architectural data of the region, such as bridges, castles, towers, mosques, and churches. At one subchapter of the book, he recorded a church noting its building date, physical measurements, construction materials, paintings in it, and even legends about it. Such data is especially important in terms of providing an inventory of destroyed, lost or ruined architectural pieces of the region.

The author of the book aimed to relate geographical, societal, and economic structures of the region to its administrative mechanisms. He also tried to build a historical connection between "Russian Georgia and Ottoman Georgia" and to show how closely they were related to each other. With this objective, he defined a generic Georgian typology and attempted to express similar features of the Georgian people.

The book has four chapters and an introduction part. Chapters are "Upper Adjara/Yukarı Acara" (31-72), "Şavşat" (73-103), "Ardanuç and Livan" (105-126), and Lazistan" (127-169). There is also a list of collected plants and water samples, and analysis of them at the end of the book.

"Yukarı Acara" (Upper Adjara) chapter tells the history of Hemshiashvili - *Hamşioğlu* family/ household. It focuses on the importance of this particular family in terms of relations between the center and the province, and how a provincial household could be an agent (assigned by the state) of controlling a provincial region. This chapter also mentions the history and characteristics of people of Adjara, and contrasts of similarities and differences there were between the people of Adjara and rest of Georgia.

"Şavşat" chapter defines the administrative borders of the region and gives detailed information about a Tbeti'an monastery there. This part tells about a regional administrative person named Selim Hemshiashvili, his rise against *Tanzimat* applications of the 19th century and the consequences of this mutiny.

"Ardanuç and Livan" chapter points out the importance of building proper roads and thus connecting Batumi port to the Central Anatolian

cities emphasizing also the importance of the port of Batumi because of its location. It points out that the roads built in accordance with standards would develop commercial activities with Iran and would increase commercial capacity of Anatolia with European cities. In parallel to this suggestion, the chapter has vast information and evaluations on roadworks from Batumi to Ardanuç over Choruhi River, and then to Kars region.

Kazbegi, in his last chapter "Lazistan" which he identifies as the regions of "terra incognita", defines administrative features of the Lazistan region and describes its geography. It has information about the general history, language, and beliefs (when they converted into Christianity or Islam) of the Laz people. The chapter makes some corrections about their history and adds some unknown information to it.

Kazbegi is certainly one of the most important figures in the formation of Georgian nationality, and nationalism. He was the successor of the founder of Georgian national identity, İlia Chavchavadze. He succeeded İlia Chavchavadze as the Chairman of "Association of Popularization of Literacy Among the Georgians" (*Gürcüler Arasında Okuma Yazmayı Yaygınlaştırma Derneği*). Surely, technical information mentioned at the book has its own merit. However, this book proceeds this contribution and has become a study deserving deeper analysis with its societal and historical evaluations. When it comes to its limitations, one should see that Kazbegi could not examine and evaluate all geographic regions equally due to the weather conditions, geographic difficulties, and time concerns. The author himself admitted that this book did not appear to be the one he had once imagined, and that it had been hard to take notes in a foreign country since he was an outsider.

Kazbegi's book is the first comprehensive scientific study on this region. Being a good military expert and a geographer, he managed to note almost everything he heard and saw meticulously. Not only did he record geographical data, but he also tried to track ethnographic, sociological, architectural, and engineering data and record them to build a more wholistic picture of the region. He gave us information about the various subjects, tangible and intangible cultural properties, river discharges, taxing, transportation structure, economic relations, mutinies, and wars. This book is translated into Turkish by Rıdvan Atan. He used a very fluent Turkish that could be read easily and added

explanatory footnotes to the main text. As a last word, I should mark that this book can be regarded as a significant contribution to the history and studies of Southwestern Caucasus despite its aforementioned lacks. Kazbegi managed to compile a rich variety of information about this specific region and period and provided a comprehensive book for interested researchers.