

**REPUBLIC OF TURKEY  
YILDIZ TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY  
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES  
DEPARTMENT OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES  
MASTER PROGRAM**

**MASTER THESIS**

**THE FORMATION OF HYBRID IDENTITY OF THE  
KURDS AND THE TURKS THROUGH INTERETHNIC  
MARRIAGES IN TURKEY**

**TUĞBA ALTAŞ  
14735013**

**ADVISOR  
Assist. Prof. SETENAY NİL DOĞAN**

**İSTANBUL  
2018**

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


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## ÖZ

### TÜRKİYE'DE ETNİK KİMLİKLER ARASI EVLİLİK YOLUYLA TÜRKLERİN VE KÜRTLERİN MELEZ KİMLİK OLUŞUMU

Tuğba Altaş  
Temmuz, 2018

Başkalarıyla etkileşim sonucu oluşan kimlikler “sabit ve doğuştan” değil “akışkan ve çoklu” durlar; bu yüzden her bir karşılaşma kimliklere yeni anlamlar katar. Farklı kimlik teorilerine dayanan bu çalışma; göç, küreselleşme ve etnik kimliklerler arası evlilik süreçleriyle şekillenen kimliğin değişken doğasını göstermeyi hedeflemektedir. Araştırmanın amacı, özellikle “melezlik, aradakalmışlık ve duygu karmaşası” terimlerini aydınlatmak ve bunları Kürtler ve Türkler arasındaki evliliklerden dolayı etnik olarak melezleşmiş Kürtlere ve Türklere bağlamaktır. Botanik ve biyolojik kökenden gelişen melezlik, özellikle postkolonyal dönemde sömüren ve sömürülen grupların kültürlerinin karışması olarak kullanılmaya başlanmıştır. Bu yüzden, bu çalışma kimliklerin melezleşmesini göstermeyi ve Türkiye’de etnik kimlikler arası evlilikle Kürtlerin ve Türklerin melezleşme süreçlerini keşfetmeyi hedeflemektedir. Tezin ana sorusu melez Kürt ve Türklerin kendilerini iki etnikli/ iki kültürlü sayıp saymadıklarıdır. Şayet böyleyse, bu melezlerin Kürt ve Türk milliyetçiliğine farklı yaklaşacakları varsayılmaktadır. Diğer bir deyişle, farklılıklara odaklanmaktansa, benzerlikler ve paylaşımlar üzerine odaklanacak ve birlikte yaşamaya daha çok istekli olacaklardır. Dolayısıyla, araştırma metninde ilk önce kimlik, melezlik ve küreselleşmenin ne olduğu ve Türkler ve Kürtler arasında evliliklerin olup olmadığı hakkında bilgi vermek önemlidir. Daha sonra, melezliğin 19. yüzyılda ve şuanda ne olduğu açıklanacaktır. Son olarak, mülakatlarla bireylerin kimlikleri hakkındaki düşünceleri verilecektir. Veriler, Erzurum, Bursa ve İstanbul'daki farklı yaşlarda ve mesleklerde bulunan kişilerle yapılmış 15 nitel mülakattan oluşmaktadır. Tezin asıl amaçları; bu insanların kendilerini nasıl tanımladıklarını - Kürt, Türk, aradakalmış veya ikisi birden olarak mı- bulmak ve melez olmayan Kürt ve Türklerden farklılıklarının olup olmadığını incelemek ve Kürt ve Türk milliyetçiliğine karşı tutumlarını görmek.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Melezlik, aradakalmışlık, duygu karmaşası, kimlik ve milliyetçilik

## **ABSTRACT**

### **THE FORMATION OF HYBRID IDENTITY OF THE KURDS AND THE TURKS THROUGH INTERETHNIC MARRIAGES IN TURKEY**

**Tuğba Altaş**

**July, 2018**

Identities are not "fixed and innate" but "fluid and multiple", formed out of the interactions with others; so each encounter adds new meanings to the identities. Based on different theories of the identity, the study aims to show the changing nature of the identity shaped by the processes of migration, globalization and interethnic marriages. The objective of this research is to shed light on the terms, in particular "hybridity, in-betweenness and ambivalence" and to connect them to the Kurds and the Turks who have become ethnically hybrids due to marriages between the Kurds and the Turks. Hybridity, developed from botanical and biological origins has started to be used as mixing of cultures of the colonized and the colonizer groups, in particular during post-colonialism. Hence, the study pursues to indicate hybridization of the identities and explores the processes of hybridization of the Kurds and the Turks through interethnic marriages in Turkey. The main question of the thesis is whether the hybrid Kurds and Turks consider themselves biethnic/bicultural or not. If so, it is assumed these hybrids will approach Kurdish and Turkish nationalism differently. In other words, rather than focusing on differences, they will concentrate on similarities and sharings, and they will be more willing to live together. Hence, in the research paper firstly, it is important to give information about what identity, hybridity and globalization are, and whether there are any marriages between the Turks and the Kurds or not. Soon, what hybridity was in the 19<sup>th</sup> century and is now will be clarified. Finally; with interviews, the thoughts of hybrids about their identity will be given. Data consist of 15 qualitative interviews conducted with the individuals at different ages and different jobs in Erzurum, Bursa and Istanbul. The main purposes of the study are to find how these people define themselves: whether as Kurds, Turks, in-between, or both, and to examine whether they have any differences from non-hybrid Turks and Kurds, and to see their approach to the Kurdish and Turkish nationalism.

**Key words:** Hybridity, in-betweenness, ambivalence, identity, and nationalism

## FOREWORD

I dedicate this paper:

To Maksut Altaş and Saniye Altaş, my parents, who breaking stereotypes got married interethnically and raised hybrid children, and who were the inspiration behind my study into hybridity.

To my big Altaş family who supported me throughout my life without any complaints.

To my friends, for always encouraging me and believing in me.

Also, I would like to thank:

To my advisor Setenay Nil Doğan for her valuable advices and comments,

To all the informants for their cooperation in the study.

İstanbul; July, 2018

Tuğba Altaş

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<b>ANAP</b>	Motherland Party
<b>BDP</b>	Peace and Democracy Party
<b>CHP</b>	Republican People's Party
<b>DDKO</b>	Revolutionary Cultural Society of the East
<b>DDP</b>	Democracy and Change Party
<b>DEP</b>	Democracy Party
<b>DKP</b>	Democratic People's Party
<b>DSP</b>	Democratic Left Party
<b>DTP</b>	Democratic Society Party
<b>DYP</b>	True Path Party
<b>EP</b>	Emek Party
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>HADEP</b>	People's Democracy Party
<b>HEP</b>	People's Labour Party
<b>IP</b>	Worker's Party
<b>MHP</b>	National Action Party
<b>ÖZDEP</b>	Freedom and Democracy Party
<b>PKK</b>	Kurdistan Workers Party
<b>RP</b>	Welfare Party
<b>SP</b>	The Socialist Party
<b>STP</b>	The Socialist Party of Turkey
<b>TBKP</b>	The United Communist Party of Turkey

# 1. INTRODUCTION

## 1.1. Statement of the Problem

Identity has been a significant issue in social studies; however it has not been an easy subject because “identity is not as transparent or unproblematic as we think. Perhaps instead of thinking of identity as an already accomplished fact, which the new cultural practices then represent, we should think, instead, of identity as a ‘production’ which is never complete, always in process...” (Hall, 1990, 222). Taking this into consideration, this qualitative study tries to indicate the identity types, and it is based on such an understanding of identity which shows the changing nature of the identity that was thought to be fixed in the past; yet especially in the postmodern and postcolonial studies which has been considered as something ‘in process’ and tend to shifting from circumstances to circumstances. This fluid nature of the identity has come to be referred as hybrid identity because it implies many affiliations one has inside not just one. With globalization and migration, identities have become even more complicated because each encounter adds new identities or belongings to the existing identities. As a result of these new encounters, hybrid identities occur. In fact, today, it is difficult to find a race or a nation having just one and fixed identity not influenced by others at borders as Young (1995, 1) puts it:

But move a yard to your right, and you enter the East: whoever you are, you have been translated from a European into an Oriental. Put one foot back to the left of the brass strip and you become undecidably mixed with otherness: an Occidental and an Oriental at once.

In other words, there is no homogenous society as Young (1995, 4) continues to say “today’s comparative certainty has arisen because heterogeneity, cultural interchange and diversity have now become the self-conscious identity of modern society.” This cultural interchange leads to hybridity of identities, and according to Ang (2003, 2):

Hybridity is a necessary concept to hold onto in this condition, because unlike other key concepts in the contemporary politics of difference –such as diaspora and multiculturalism- it foregrounds complicated entanglement rather than identity, togetherness-in-difference rather than separateness and virtual apartheid.

Hybridity was firstly used to refer to the mixing of two species in biology and botanic; yet it was in 1861 that it came to refer to the crossing of people of different races (Young, 1995). This kind of hybridity was not welcomed because it meant the contamination of the White (Kraidy, 2002), and these breedings were regarded as infertile or half-breed. Although it has a dark history (Papastergiadis, 2000), hybridity gained importance after globalization, decolonization and migration movements. In particular, in postcolonial studies, especially those of Homi Bhabha, hybridity is regarded as the means for the colonized to show himself/herself to the colonizer. According to Bhabha (1994, 5), in the articulation of cultural differences, boundaries become “Third Space” where “*something begins its presencing*”. The colonized and the colonizer, or neighbor cultures inescapably come to this Third Space where they reciprocally affect each other in terms of language, culture etc. What Homi Bhabha argues is that both sides are influenced by each other through this interaction, and hybrid identities that carry signs of both sides arise as a result. Seeing that there is no more a strict boundary between these groups, Ang (2003, 9) states hybridity:

destabilises established cultural power relations between white and black, coloniser and colonised, centre and periphery, the ‘West’ and the ‘rest’, not through a mere inversion of these hierarchical dualisms, but by throwing into question these very binaries through a process of boundary-blurring transculturaton.

Though inspired by these studies, this research uses hybridity not to mention an interaction between the colonizer and the colonized, but to mention an interaction between two ethnicities, the Turks and the Kurds, who live side by side in Turkey for many years. Its aim is to show the blurring of boundaires between these two ethnicities as a result of interethnic marriages. In Turkey, the Kurds and the Turks live together, and inescapably they are influenced by each other’s cultures, beliefs and lifestyles. Indeed, education and interethnic marriages even accelerate the interaction between these two groups, and facilitate the formation of hybrid identities among them. The important point here is that these people live in the “Third Space” and this “in-between” space provides them to be exposed to both cultures, both languages, and both lifestyles etc. (Bhabha, 1994). So, in these spaces it is possible for the Turks to be Kurdified and for the Kurds to be Turkified (Gökalp, 1992).

As such, this study supposes that there are interethnic marriages between the Turks and the Kurds, and that children born in these marriages have a hybridized identity as they have both Turkish and Kurdish identities together. As a result, it is

assumed these hybrid beings will be more empathetic towards differences and they will support living together rather than separation. Also, they are assumed to be more negative about nationalism, either it is Turkish nationalism or Kurdish nationalism, than non-hybrid Turks and Kurds.

## **1.2 Objective of the Thesis**

The objective of this research is to contribute to the studies on “hybridity and in-betweenness” in Turkey and to connect them to the Kurds and the Turks who have become ethnically hybrids due to interethnic marriages. The notion of hybridity, developed from botanical and biological origins has started to be used as mixing of cultures of the colonized and the colonizer, in particular during post-colonialism. Hence, in this paper it is aimed to indicate how the Kurds and the Turks in Turkey have become hybrids through interaction with each other, and whether they define themselves as Kurd, Turk, in-between or both. The main question is whether the hybrids consider themselves biethnic/bicultural or not. So, this study focuses on the hybridized identities and its aims are as follows:

- To explore whether hybrids define themselves as Kurd, Turk, in-between or both,
- To find whether they sometimes feel more Kurd or more Turk,
- To investigate the impact of interethnic marriages on their identity,
- To find whether they are aware of their hybrid identity and whether they see it as an advantage or not,
- To see whether they try to preserve both their identities,
- To explore how they approach to Kurdish and Turkish nationalism as hybrid beings.

In order to accomplish these aims, 15 interviews were conducted with the hybrids out of Turkish-Kurdish interethnic marriages living in Istanbul, Bursa and Erzurum, and the interview questions were focused on the themes like “fluidity of identity, belonging, in-betweenness, ambivalence, mimicry, hybridity, and nationalism etc.” The main purpose is to show hybridization processes of the identity and its influences on the hybrid individuals’ attitudes towards the Turks and the Kurds.

### **1.3 Hypothesis**

It is assumed that there are the individuals who have become hybridized through their parents' interethnic marriages between the Kurds and the Turks in Turkey. These people are assumed to have the knowledge of both identities and enjoy its advantages as to understanding both sides and feeling empathy. Also, this study assumes that these hybrids approach Kurdish and Turkish nationalisms differently. In other words, rather than focusing on differences, they will concentrate on similarities and sharings, and they will be more willing to live together. On the other hand, seeing that these hybrid beings live in the 'Third Space', it is hypothesized that they experience 'in-betweenness' and 'ambivalence', yet also they have the opportunity of attuning to different circumstances.

### **1.4 Significance of the Study**

There have been many studies on the Kurdish identity, yet little attention is given to the hybridization of the identities through interethnic marriages between the Kurds and the Turks. It is known that the Turks and the Kurds have been living side by side for many years in Turkey. Hence it is unavoidable for them to have been influenced by each other. However, although there are studies on the interethnic marriages between the Turks and the Kurds (for instance Gültekin, 2012; Gündüz-Hoşgör, Smits, 2002), the hybrid children of these marriages are not researched. Therefore, this study tries to look at the issue from a postcolonial perspective, benefitting from Homi Bhabha's notions such as Third Space, ambivalence and mimicry, and focuses on the processes of the hybridization of the identities through interethnic marriages between the Turks and the Kurds in Turkey. Also, it tries to show the feelings about identity and belonging and 'in-betweenness' of those hybrid beings and suggests that it may be these hybrid beings who may carry <sup>1</sup>torches of peace among the Kurds and the Turks seeing that they cannot take sides yet go in-between.

---

<sup>1</sup> The brotherhood among the Kurds and the Turks suffered from the transformation from a multi-ethnic Ottoman to a nation-state (Karabekir, 1997), and especially the emergence of the PKK against the Turkish state undermined this brotherhood. Therefore, in this study it is assumed hybrid children of two ethnicities may be the torches of peace as to each side they belong, so they cannot take sides.

On the other hand, the hybrid identities of this study are different in that they are not discriminated or excluded just because of being a hybrid. For instance, a study on African-American women by Hesse-Biber and Barko (2008) shows that these people are excluded because they are neither black nor white enough. However, in the case of Turkish-Kurdish hybridity, this study has observed no such exclusions narrated by the interviewees, which may be first of all because of the cultural and historical closeness among these two ethnicities. Secondly, they have a common religion that may bind them together; and thirdly, for many years they live side by side in Turkey and they have many common points. So, the possibility of discrimination by the Turks or the Kurds against these hybrids may be very low. That is why, in this study these hybrid beings are assumed to live the advantages of moving between two ethnicities at different times and at different levels. That is what makes this study so significant because in Turkey there is a tendency to approach the Kurds and the Turks with the lenses of nationalism. However, this study shows that there is no more a strict binary opposition between the Kurds and the Turks because it breaks essentialist views on identity as Robert Young (1995, 27) states that hybridity “is a key term in that wherever it emerges it suggests the impossibility of essentialism”.

On the whole, in Turkey research on hybrid identities is very limited, and there is no research on Kurdish-Turkish hybridity through interethnic marriages in particular. So, there are two reasons why this research is important. First of all, it benefits from the postcolonial literature and applies the terms such as “hybridity, in-betweenness and ambivalence” to the Kurds and the Turks who have become ethnically hybridized through interethnic marriages. Secondly, it tries to show that because of being hybrid, individuals are more likely to be willing to live together.

### **1.5 The Organization of the Study**

The study is made up of five parts. The first part introduces the aims and hypotheses of the research. The second part examines identity and identity theories, and it briefly discusses identity types. In this part, globalization and the fluidity of the identity are discussed, and subsequently hybridity theories are presented. In the third part, the history of the Kurdish identity in Turkey is given, and it is discussed at five stages. The fourth stage is composed of the methodology and the data. Here, the

narratives of the interviewees are analyzed with proportion to the themes of the study. Lastly, in the last part conclusions are drawn on the findings of the data.



## **2. IDENTITY, HYBRIDITY AND GLOBALIZATION**

In this chapter, identity theories and definitions are presented. In this part, works of Buckingham (2008), Maalouf (2003), Browne (2008), Kehily (2009), Burke & Stets (2009) and Hall (1996) were used in order to define identity, and different approaches to it. After that, with the work of Oyserman, Elmore & Smith (2012), “identity” was compared to “self” because they were always confused with each other. Subsequently, identity was compared with “subject” and then with “belonging”, and their differences were revealed. Seeing that individuals have different identities changing according to the context, identity types were introduced afterwards so as to show individuals have multiple identities in fact. For that, Burke & Stets (2009), Hall (1990), Oyserman, Elmore & Smith (2012), and Browne (2008) were mainly referred to.

Further; inevitability of societies’ plurality is argued, and a brief definition of acculturation, integration and adaptation processes is given through the works of Berry (2005, 2011) and Sidanius (2000). These terms are important for the study because the way people are acculturated is crucial in understanding the influence of the Turkish and Kurdish culture on identity because both groups’ attitudes, approaches and acceptance of others shape their integration into the society and how much they preserve their identity. After the discussions of these terms, the main issue of the research, hybridity, is discussed thoroughly. Starting with its first usages in botanic, this section aims to show the history of hybridity from botanic to crossings of different races to mixing of languages, and at last to mixing of cultures. For its history, works of Young (1995), Cuninghame (2008), Bakhtin (1981), and Canclini (1995) etc. were used. However, the main emphasis in this research is the formation of hybrid identities through mixing of cultures, thus in order to understand this process the works of Homi Bhabha (1985, 1994), Maalouf (2003), and Fanon (2008) etc. were mainly referred to.

Also, as the globalization is one of the reasons behind the fluidity of identity, its effects on hybridity were examined through the works of Maalouf (2003, 37) who

asks “isn’t it a characteristic of the age we live in that it has made everyone in a way a migrant and a member of a minority?”, emphasizing the mobility of the people; thus, their hybrid identity. Also, five dimensions of globalization by Appadurai (2004), and “stranger” of Simmel (2008), and “translocational positionality” of Anthias (2008) were also explained so as to indicate how globalization affects identity. Furthermore; concepts such as “Third Space, Ambivalence, and Mimicry” (Bhabha, 1994) were also explained with the purpose to show how hybridization occurs and what the hybrids experience. In this part, the main argument is that hybridity can not be avoided because it “is a demographic, racial, social, and cultural fact” (Gomez-Peña, 1996, 70).

## **2.1 Identity and Identity Theories**

We all think we know what the word means and go on trusting it, even when it's slyly starting to say the opposite (Maalouf, 2003, 9).

“Identity is an ambiguous and slippery term” says Buckingham (2008, 1). Its ambiguity resides in its root because though the Latin root “idem” means “the same”, the term encompasses both similarity and difference. According to Buckingham (2008), there are two formulations of identity. The first is that identity is “unique to each of us”; therefore it distinguishes us from others as Maalouf (2003, 10) states “my identity is what prevents me from being identical to anybody else”, who is not just someone from different nations or religions but can be someone in the same nation or religion as well. However; the second formulation emphasizes the collective identities, thus, similarity with others because identity is “identification with others whom we assume are similar to us” (Buckingham, 2008, 1); therefore, national, cultural or gender identities are based on similarities.

It is not just one’s biography that defines who s/he is, but also the society or situations in which s/he is in define one’s identity. Moreover, one’s identity has meaning when it is reflected in the mirror of others as Maalouf (2003, 22) states “it is often the way we look at other people that imprisons them within their own narrowest allegiances. And it is also the way we look at them that may set them free.” In fact, without others, one may not talk about identities because they are not just the way one sees himself/herself, but the way others view them as well.

Individuals may choose who they want to be or to whom they want to belong; however their choices need to be approved by the others. For example, Goffman (1990) regards the society as a stage on which people are acting out their performances, and to be good one needs to perform very well so that people think s/he is the character s/he is playing. In other words, people want to assert that they have particular identities through their speaking, clothing, or bodies etc. However, for these identities to be asserted, they need *others* to see and approve them. Thus, on that stage even though they perform very well, without the approval of others they cannot claim they are having that identity in question. Likewise, Browne (2008, 11) also argues that the identity of individuals consists of both personal choices and the responses of others; so on the one hand, “the individual is not free to adopt any identity they like”; on the other hand their social class, ethnicity, race and sex etc. influence the way others regard them. However; after appropriate choices are done, the differentiation of the ones like “us” from “them” and defining “us” in positive ways start.

It is important to know who one is because it is that knowledge which shapes one’s attitude and role in a society as Browne (2008) states through knowing oneself and the others, people come to know what makes them similar to or different from them, in proportion to which they form social connections. Therefore; Browne (2008, 10-11) says:

If people did not have an identity, they would lack the means of identifying with or relating to their peer group, to their neighbours, to the communities in which they lived or to the people they came across in their everyday lives. Identity therefore ‘fits’ individuals into the society in which they live.

Identity cannot be thought without socialization process since it is socially constructed and has its meanings in social contexts. Browne (2008) argues one’s skin color or race or gender has meaning only when people define others in terms of these categories. Above all, only through socialization, thus through knowing others, people come to know what makes them similar to or different from others. Moreover, Kehily (2009) suggests social recognition is crucial for an identity; thus during its formation ‘sameness and difference’, ‘inclusion and exclusion’ are at work. Whether personal or social, identities are what differentiate “us” from “them” as a result of our relations with others, and identifications with them. One identifies with another on shared characteristics and similarities, which inescapably leads to the split between one (us) and the other (them). In fact, for identity formation ‘other’ is

significant because we are 'we' through the gaze of the 'other'. It is the other that constitutes our identity indeed as Fanon (2008, 84) tells in his great work *Black Skin, White Masks* that "it was no longer a question of being aware of my body in the third person but in a triple person" after a white child sees him and says to his mother "Look, a Negro!"

Kehily (2009) argues that in the past it was easy for a person to find his/her identity because s/he was born into a society where their identities waited for them. Yet, in the postmodern era, due to fluidity, mobility and many choices, constructing one's identity has become more challenging but still necessary as Bauman (1988, 62) suggests "everyone has to ask himself the question 'who am I', 'how should I live', 'who do I want to become' ... Self construction of the self is, so to speak a necessity." However, in today's world both identity building and preserving it are problem. Bauman (1996, 19) argues that identity "was a 'problem' from its birth - was *born as a problem* ... could exist only as a problem". This is because whenever we hear identity remarks, we know that one is uncertain about his/her belonging and wants to locate himself/herself in a place or a group, and "'identity' is a name given to the escape sought from that uncertainty" (Bauman, 1996, 19). Also, Mercer (1990, 43) states "identity only becomes an issue when it is in crisis, when something assumed to be fixed, coherent and stable is displaced by the experience of doubt and uncertainty." In other words, people have many allegiances, yet it is the one which is threatened becomes one's identity at that moment.

Seeing that "an identity is the set of meanings that define who one is when one is an occupant of a particular role in society, a member of a particular group, or claims particular characteristics that identify him or her as a unique person" (Burke & Stets, 2009, 3); identity has a crucial role in defining where one belongs to. Hall (1997) argues that the new form of identity is different from its old form. In the old form, identity was thought to be a complete ground of action whereas the new form is never complete; rather it is "a notion of the continuous, self-sufficient, developmental, unfolding, inner dialectic of selfhood. We are never quite there, but always on our way to it, and when we get there, we will at last know exactly who it is we are" (Hall, 1997, 42). This is because identities are not just based on sources like class, ethnicity, race etc. into which people are born, but they are also concerned with

personal choices and the meanings people give to situations as “identity is something individuals can create” (Browne, 2008, 19).

Likewise, in his essay, *From Pilgrim to Tourist – or a Short History of Identity*, Bauman (1996) argues that today individuals are like pilgrims who are always in pursuit of a true place. Wherever they go, they can not be satisfied as the true place is always at distance. Like pilgrims, individuals are also in pursuit of their true ‘identity’ which is constructed and reconstructed through different identifications. As such, Jabes (1991, 342) states “you do not go to the desert to find identity, but lose it, to lose your personality, to become anonymous... And then something extraordinary happens: you hear silence speak”; that is why hermits are regarded as the first to experience disembedded selves. Therefore; we need to think identity as something always in process.

Besides fluidity of the identity, one needs to know its being context-bound because one has different roles in different contexts. In other words, individuals live in societies and they are affected by these societies as Cooley (1902) states the individual and society are two sides of the same coin. Hence, one can have multiple identities shaped by multiple roles they have or multiple groups they are members of. One can have multiple identities through agents. According to Burke & Stets (2009, 6-7), “agents are actors”, and “‘person’ becomes the link between the various agencies that exist within the person”. So, one can act as a mother and as a doctor together. These two agents can live inside together and cannot impede each other. In fact, these agents are different identities one has inside.

Likewise, Hall (1996a) argues persons have fractured multiple identities which change in context. Also, Kehily (2009, 6) states “identity can be seen as multiple: spoken through and in dialogue with arrange of social categories and positions”. All the allegiances or identities the individual has “are equally strong” and “all are components of personality” so “we might almost call them ‘genes of the soul’ so long as we remember that most of them are not innate” (Maalouf, 2003, 11). For instance, a Muslim woman can be primarily Muslim in her family, a feminist in her relations, a teacher at work etc. Along with having different identities, the same person may change his/her identity over the time. Therefore, thinking of identity as stable and as completely defining one is not so reliable. Besides, we need to think all these identities or allegiances comprising one’s identity as something constructive

not destructive because they are what makes one different from others as Maalouf (2003, 18-20) states “every one of my allegiances links me to a large number of people. But the more ties I have the rarer and more particular my own identity becomes”, and that “through each one of my affiliations, taken separately, I possess a certain kinship with a large number of my fellow human beings; but because of all these allegiances, taken together, I possess my own identity, completely different from any other.”

Moreover; according to Hall (1996b) in the modern times, identities “are never unified” but they are “fragmented and fractured”, always in a process of becoming through different practices, discourses and contexts. Likewise, Maalouf (2003, 23) states “identity isn’t given once and for all: it is built up and change throughout a person’s lifetime”. On the other hand, Maalouf (2003) argues one’s identity is influenced by both ones who try to include him/her in their group and by the ones who exclude him/her. Seeing that there is not one stable identity s/he has, the individual tries to find his/her identity through inclusions and exclusions because “he is not himself from the outset; nor does he just ‘grow aware’ of what he is; he *becomes* what he is. He doesn’t merely grow aware of his identity; he acquires it step by step” (Maalouf, 2003, 25). Being on the same track with Maalouf, Hall is also of the opinion that identity is not something given yet it is in process of becoming:

Identities are about questions of using the resources of history, language and culture in the process of becoming rather than being: not ‘who we are’ or ‘where we came from’, so much as what we might become, how we have been represented and how that bears on how we might represent ourselves (Hall, 1996b, 4).

Besides, identities are constructed through difference; in other words; one’s identity has a meaning if it has its other to exclude as Hall (1996b, 5) suggests “identities can function as points of identification and attachment only *because* of their capacity to exclude, to leave out, to render ‘outside’, abjected”.

On the other hand, Coté (1996, 420) argues today we encounter individuals who try to live according to the others because these people are taught to “conform to whatever are the accepted standards of the time and place”; thus they feel the need to meet the goals of the society; but “those goals shift”; hence they always try to be in tune with the changing goals. According to Coté (1996, 421), social identity was about one’s characteristics in the pre-modern society, one’s personal accomplishment in the early-modern society, and in the late-modern society, it is about “impression

management". During these societies, individuals experience different identities; respectively heteronomous, individuated and image-oriented. The heteronomous identity implies the uncritical acceptance of appraisals and expectations of the society while the individuated identity implies "a distinctive personal style", and image-oriented "based on a projection of images that meet the approval of a community, gaining one's access so long as the images remain acceptable" (Coté 1996, 421). For Coté, in the late-modern society it is difficult for individuals to establish a stable identity due to its altering life-course.

## **2.2 Self versus Identity**

Identity is always confused with self. However, self like agent resides in one and constitutes one's identity as a whole. "The self originates in the mind of persons and is that which characterizes an individual's consciousness of his or her own being or identity" states Burke & Stets (2009, 9). Likewise, Oyserman & Elmore & Smith (2012) explains that self is a feeling about oneself. Hence, it requires both an "I" who thinks and "me" that is thought about. As one has multiple agents, one has multiple selves because the self is also constructed in the social structure in which individuals have different roles; thus there are multiple selves residing inside us, and each of these selves is called an identity. All these selves are acquired through interaction with others. Here, others are important because they shape who one is, and the interaction process proceeds accordingly. James (1927 [1890]) claims the number of others influences the number of the selves since different others recognize different selves, which leads to multiple selves. One can be a mother, a teacher, a woman, a friend etc. in different contexts with different others. On the other hand, for Mead (1934), the self is constituted of an "I" and a "me". "I" is the agent that acts, on the other hand "me" is what knows about the community, culture and the others, thus, it guides "I" to the suitable action or role under the current conditions. As a result, multiple selves in multiple contexts are constructed, and each is recognized as an identity.

Oyserman & Elmore & Smith (2012, 69) states "identities make up one's self-concept", as a result, identities are important for the self as they are constructed dynamically in different contexts. They can be regarded as the different parts of the self which are shaped according to the expectations or the roles persons hold. Above

all, self and identity together have responsibility for persons' actions in a context as they influence not only the behaviors but also feelings of persons. For Oyserman & Elmore & Smith (2012, 75), self and identity both are mental concepts "that is, something represented in memory". Also, both of them are social products since they are affected by the contexts and the others in those contexts as James (1927 [1890]) argues others' perspectives of the self are important because persons include others' thoughts in their self. According to Oyserman & Elmore & Smith (2012, 76), self and identity are inescapably social products because firstly "people are likely to define themselves in terms of what is relevant in their time and place"; secondly "being a self requires others who endorse and reinforce one's selfhood"; thirdly "the aspects of one's self and identity that matter in the moment are determined by what is relevant in the moment".

### **2.3 Subject versus Identity**

Subject and identity are always confused. However, Barker & Jane (2016, 260) states that while identity is about what we think about ourselves, subjectivity is "the condition of being a person and the processes by which we become a person; that is, how we are constituted as cultural subjects and how we experience ourselves". Therefore, "to ask about subjectivity is to pose the question: what is a person? To explore identity is to enquire: how do we see ourselves and how do others see us?" (Barker & Jane, 2016, 260).

Althusser (1971) talks about 'knowing subject' that is an individual who is in control of language and meaning; thus the subject is 'I' who thinks and speaks. Identity, on the other hand is what the subject takes on through identification processes or what Judith Butler calls as 'performativity'. According to Butler (1990, 5) "identity is performatively constituted by the very 'expressions' that are said to be its results". For instance, feminine or masculine identities are acquired through performing what is expected from a feminine and masculine subject. They do not cause femininity or masculinity, but they are the results of these performances. On the other hand, Weedon (2004, 19) argues "while it is possible to be a subject without identification, identity presupposes some degree of self-recognition on the part of the subject, often defined in relation to what one believes one is not" because "identity is relational" and "it is defined in a relation of difference to what it is not".

According to Hall (1996a), there are three types of subjects, namely the enlightenment, sociological and postmodern subject. As the name suggests, the enlightenment subject was related with reason and rationality. It was “based on a conception of the human person as a fully centred, unified individual, endowed with the capacities of reason, consciousness and action, whose ‘centre’ consisted of an inner core ... The essential centre of the self was a person’s identity” (Hall, 1996a: 597). The enlightenment subject was born and never changed throughout his/her life. On the other hand, the sociological subject was formed through acculturation; thus, it is in a way a product of others with whom s/he lives. Although the subject still has a “real me”, it is influenced by the interaction with others. Lastly, the postmodern subject reveals itself as fragmented, multiple and prone to changing because the subject takes different identities at different contexts as no longer one has a unified identity but multiple identities. It is no longer fixed, but “‘moveable feast’: formed and transformed continuously in relation to the ways we are represented or addressed in the cultural systems which surround us” (Hall, 1987, cited in Hall, 1996a, 598).

#### **2.4 Identity versus Belonging**

According to Anthias (2013), identity and belonging both are about inclusion and exclusion. Identity is about on the one hand the ‘core self’, on the other hand categorization and performances around similarities with a group. In this way, it is about recognition and representation. On the other hand, belonging is more likely to be emotional. According to Antonsich (2010, 644), “belonging should be analyzed both as a personal, intimate feeling of being ‘at home’ in a place (place-belongingness) and as a discursive resource that constructs, justifies, or resists forms of socio-spatial inclusion/exclusion (politics of belonging)”. In this regard, belonging can be seen as an emotional attachment to a group whereas politics of belonging is more about who belongs and who does not belong.

Moreover, belonging may be due to similarities; however unlike identity, it does not require shared values or practices etc. One can have different political or cultural values yet still s/he can belong to a group; in the same manner, one can be a member of a club without being identified with them. So, unlike identity which focuses on who one is or with whom one identifies, belonging concentrates on spaces and places one is or feels as a member of as Anthias (2013, 6-7) states:

Belonging is always in relation to something outside the self (a place- in the social as well as geographical sense -and is therefore always 'located'), whilst identity has been used more as a possessive characteristic of the individual, as that which defines 'who they are' or 'who they think they are' as well as entailing the construction of bonds with 'similar' others. Belonging may also be forged in relation to 'belonging with' (for example others) but this is not always premised on similarity but can be forged in relation to solidarity and values of dialogue and engagement.

As a result, one can say that belonging may involve boundary breaking since one's belonging to a group does not necessitate one's identification with that group. To exemplify, an individual may be Christian; but also s/he may belong to charity organizations of Muslims. His/her belonging to such organizations does not undermine his/her religious identity as a Christian as in the belonging individuals may go between categories and hierarchies.

On the other hand, Anthias (2008, 7) states "identity is a slippery concept, and not only contested but contestable" because it has come to say "both too much and too little". Identity says too much because it covers the core self and the identifications with others in addition to objective measures such as the country of birth. In other words, to be a Muslim immediately makes an individual have similar characteristics regarding religious terms in different parts of the world. This individual becomes similar to many others while also s/he becomes different from many others as well. On the contrary, it says too little because it overlooks the structure, context and meaning that, and "cannot fully attend to the conditions of existence of the production of the different component elements under examination" (Anthias, 2008, 7). To just say 'I am a Turk' does not mean one's identity is wholly composed of Turkishness. Along with his/her Turkishness, this individual may also be a Muslim, a father or mother, a teacher or doctor, a communist or capitalist, a feminist or an anti-feminist etc. In other words, individuals are made up of many identities that change as the contexts change. So, focusing of just the 'identity' itself hinders other possible identities the individuals have inside.

Lastly, Anthias (2008) argues the issue of belonging is about we-ness and other-ness. Therefore, the main distinction between identity and belonging is that while identity is based on the stories and articulations about who we are, being basically narratives of self and the other, belonging is about "exclusion, inclusion, access and participation" which has its meaning with experiences and practices (Anthias, 2008, 8). On the other hand, belonging is about hierarchies as well as boundaries that are not fixed and always shifting. As a result of fluid boundaries,

identities always crosscut and people belong to different groups under different contexts, situations and meanings.

## **2.5 Identity Types**

In the previous parts, it is discussed that individuals do not have just one fixed identity, yet many identities that are fluid. There are different identity types, namely role, social, cultural, personal, self, ethnic, collective, and national. Below is brief information about those identities.

First of all, role identities are based on social positions which individuals occupy and roles which are the expectations attributed to these social positions. Individuals may have different roles in different positions. A farmer can be a father, an activist, a criminal etc. in all which he has to meet the expectations or meanings tied to these roles. According to Oyserman & Elmore & Smith (2012) role identity is about one's membership in a role which requires a complementary role to have a meaning. To be clear, a student cannot be a student without teachers because his/her role as a student is complemented by counter role by teachers.

Secondly, social identities, as the name suggests, are about one's place in a society as Tajfel (1981) states it is about one's membership of a group. Browne (2008) also argues social identities define people according to the groups they belong to or identify with; or it may be a result of social roles expected from people. In fact,

Social identities ... are associated with normative rights, obligations and sanctions which, within specific collectivities, form roles. The use of standardized markers, especially to do with the bodily attributes of age and gender, is fundamental in all societies, notwithstanding large cross-cultural variations which can be noted (Giddens, 1984, 282–3).

For Oakes (1987), through “accessibility” and “fit”, individuals construct their social identity. Here, accessibility means the available social categories in mind such as gender, ethnicity, race, and age etc. whereas fit means accommodation of the social category under question to the situation. To exemplify, the basic similarity among individuals may be race, so if one's race fits the situation, then s/he can be a member of this group. According to Hall (1997, 57), “All of us are composed of multiple social identities, not of one.” In the past it was easy to declare one's identity just through saying his/her country, nationality, and race etc. However, today we live in a world where it is difficult for one to locate oneself to a place or a group because they are always fluid and changing.

Thirdly, identity is the product of the culture. One's cultural identity is shaped by the norms, languages, beliefs, and values etc. in his/her culture. Hence, cultural identity is constructed around similarities and differences. However, in the postmodern world, it is difficult to find a pure culture due to the interactions between different cultures. Therefore; as Hall (1996a) suggests cultural identity is not fixed, but it is on the way of continuous becoming "within the vectors of similarity and difference" (Barker, Jane, 2016, 273), open to changes.

Fourthly, personal identity's focus is on one's uniqueness as Hogg (2006, 115) states personal identity "is the idiosyncratic personality attributes that are not shared with other people". Moreover, Oyserman & Elmore & Smith (2012, 94) state personal identities are "a person's traits, characteristics and attributes, goals and values, and ways of being". As can be understood, one's personal identity is what makes him/her distinct from others. Woodward (2000, cited in, Browne, 2008, 13) states personal identity is about the question "Who am I?" therefore, rather than others' thoughts it is one's own perspectives of himself and it is what makes him different from others. Thus, all personal information as their name, their passport, and their DNA etc. are all examples of the personal identity (Browne, 2008).

As for the self-identity, it is, according to Barker & Jane (2016), one's thoughts about oneself and one's identification with those self-descriptions as Giddens (1991, 53) argues "self-identity is not a distinctive trait, or even a collection of, traits, possessed by the individual. It is *the self as reflexively understood by the person in terms of her or his biography.*"

On the other hand, Eriksen (2010, 5) discusses the word 'ethnic' is very old, derived from the Greek *ethnos* which gradually has become to refer to "*something to do with the classification of people and group relationships*" and to "aspects of relationships between groups which consider themselves, and are regarded by others, as being culturally distinctive". Therefore, we can say that one's ethnic identity is the attributes that differentiate him/her from others as well. Regmi (2003, 3) defines ethnic identity as combinations of common descent, attributes and behaviors. According to that formulation:

Common descent may be real or putative (supposed); it is not necessary that there actually be a common racial origin. Cultural attributes like distinctive beliefs; institutions, practices, religion, and language often form the bases of identity. In some instances, physical attributes – pigmentation of the skin or body shape-provide the foundation of ethnic identity. To

consolidate such an identity the members of an ethnic group must also share ideas, behavior patterns, feelings, and meaning. They should distinguish themselves (we) from others (they). They should also perceive that they share a common destiny.

Thus ethnic identity defines people in terms of a shared culture and ethnic group they belong to, and according to Browne (2008), it is transmitted from one generation to other through agencies like family.

Browne (2008) argues like social identity, a collective identity involves a social group; however here individuals' personal choices are at work. Individuals, on their own, choose to be a member of a social group and they both identify with that group and adopt its identity. To exemplify; gender, ethnicity or nationality are identities in which individuals have limited choice; however being a football fan, a feminist or environmentalist "is almost completely a matter of personal choice" (Browne, 2008, 13) and can be called collective identities.

National identity, on the other hand, as the name suggests, is concerned with one's belonging to a nation-state and "sharing things in common with others of the same nationality, and a consciousness of differences with those of other nationalities" (Browne, 2008, 60). It is concerned with belonging to an 'imagined' community (Anderson, 1991) and being patriotic for it. According to Hall (1996a, 612), one was not born with a national identity, but his/her national identity is formed through representation as:

We only know what it is to be 'English' because of the way 'Englishness' has come to be represented, as a set of meanings, by English national culture. It follows that a nation is not only a political entity but something which produces meanings - a system of cultural representation. People are not only legal citizens of a nation; they participate in the idea of the nation as represented in its national culture.

Above mentioned identity types imply that individuals do not have just one identity. Rather, they have multiple selves inside, as a result of which they have multiple identities. Stryker (1980) suggests that in particular, during the postmodern era, the society has become more complex, as a result, persons have also become complex with lots of groups and roles available for them. Likewise; Barker & Jane (2016) claim that the postmodern self is fractured and it has more than one identity. Furthermore, Hall (1996a, 598) states:

The subject assumes different identities at different times, identities which are not unified around a coherent 'self'. Within us are contradictory identities, pulling in different directions, so that our identifications are continually being shifted about. If we feel that we have a unified identity from birth to death, it is only because we construct a comforting story or 'narrative of the self' about ourselves.

Browne (2008) exemplifies it as a person can be a Muslim at home, a good student at school, a drinker in his peer group, or a British during his travelling etc. All these identities reside in one person and they cannot be torn.

## **2.6. Acculturation and Integration**

According to Berry (2005), acculturation is not a new term but it has been occurring for millennia. However, with European domination over indigenous peoples it gained more importance, and from then on it became to concern immigrants lives after their settlement in new societies. Later, it focused on the lives of ethnocultural groups in plural societies as to how they change in interaction with each other. There are different definitions of acculturation indeed. For instance, according to Redfield, Linton, & Herskovits (1936, 149-150):

Acculturation comprehends those phenomena which result when groups of individuals having different cultures come into continuous first-hand contact, with subsequent changes in the original culture patterns of either or both groups... under this definition, acculturation is to be distinguished from culture change, of which it is but one aspect, and assimilation, which is at times a phase of acculturation.

This definition focuses on cultural exchange between groups. What is important here is the fact that acculturation may change the culture of either a group or both groups, and it is different from assimilation where one forgets about his/her own culture.

Another definition made by the Social Science Research Council focuses on the features of acculturation as indirect, delayed and reactive. In the first place, acculturation may be the result of ecological causes but not cultural. Also, it is delayed because it takes time to adjust to a new culture, and it is reactive because rather than pursuing more similarity with the dominant group, individuals may choose to adhere to their own way of life as stated below:

Acculturative change may be the consequence of direct cultural transmission; it may be derived from non-cultural causes, such as ecological or demographic modification induced by an impinging culture; it may be delayed, as with internal adjustments following upon the acceptance of alien traits or patterns; or it may be a reactive adaptation of traditional modes of life (Social Science Research Council, 1954, 974).

These definitions make it clear that acculturation can be experienced by both groups, and it can be resulted from not only cultural sources but also non-cultural sources, and it is distinguished from assimilation because assimilation is just one phase of acculturation.

In today's world, societies have become more culturally plural due to globalization, migrations and technology etc. Berry (2011) argues contemporary societies are made up of plural cultures, languages and identities that are not equal in power thus are grouped as "mainstream", "minority" or "ethnic group". Berry (1997, 8) states that the variety of cultural groups is mainly due to three factors; namely "voluntariness, mobility, and permanence". Some groups may voluntarily enter into acculturation process while some are forced to it. Moreover while some groups permanently settle in the new context, others settle temporarily. Although there are variations in the acculturation process, "the basic process of adaptation appears to be common to all these groups" (Berry, 1997, 9).

According to Berry (2011) in plural societies, there are two tendencies to govern the plurality, namely *mainstream-minority model* and *multicultural model*. The first model assumes a dominant society over all minorities; yet in the latter model plural societies have "ethnocultural groups (rather than minorities), who possess cultures and who have equal cultural and other rights, regardless of their size or power" (Berry, 2011, 2.3). Hence, in multicultural model, rather than assimilation or absorption, all groups are embraced equally.

In plural societies, whether there is mainstream-minority model or multicultural model, dominant groups and ethnocultural groups indispensably contact with each other in different ways, and these preferences are called "intercultural strategies" (Berry, 2011, 2.4). For non-dominants, these are "acculturation strategies" whereas for dominants these are "acculturation expectations" (Berry, 2003, cited in Berry, 2011, 2.4), and these strategies are about "two underlying issues: 1. the degree to which there is a desire to maintain the group's culture and identity; and 2. the degree to which there is a desire to engage in daily interactions with other ethnocultural groups in the larger society, including the dominant one" (Berry, 2011, 2.5).

According to Berry (2011) for non-dominant groups, there are four strategies: assimilation, separation, integration, and marginalization. In the assimilation strategy, individuals do not maintain their cultural identity; on the contrary, they wish to take on the dominant culture. In opposition to the assimilation strategy, in the separation, individuals try to keep their cultural identity and avoid interactions with others. On the other hand, in the integration strategy, individuals both maintain their

cultural identities and interact with others. However, for integration to be pursued, the dominant society needs to be open to plurality. Therefore; “a mutual accommodation is required for integration to be attained, involving the acceptance by both groups of the right of all groups to live as culturally different peoples” (Berry, 1997, 10). Lastly, if individuals do not care about maintaining one’s identity and contacting with others, then marginalization is applied. From the dominant group’s view, Assimilation becomes the *Melting Pot*, Seperation becomes *Segregation*, Marginalization becomes *Exclusion*, and when the scoiety embraces all etnocultural groups then Integration becomes *Multuculturalism* (Berry, 2011).

For instance, in his study on American identity, Sidanius (2000) shows how dominant group employed different strategies to deal with ethnic diversity. The first way was Americanization; in other words, melting pot in which everybody was required to adopt everything belonging to American culture including language, beliefs, and customs etc. Another strategy was pluralism that can be called multiculturalism, in which “unlike the notion of the ‘melting pot’, one’s communal identity is not expected to be submerged into a common national identity, but is retained. In a pluralist society one’s religious, ethnic and ‘racial’ distinctiveness are allowed, and even encouraged, to remain salient and cherished social identities” (Sidanius, 2000, 5).

The other strategy was the general group dominance perspective which assumed that all ethnic group should be regarded as “co-equal partners in the pursuit of the ‘American dream’” (Sidanius, 2000, 6), paving way for disproportionate sharing of power, values and prestige etc., America being on the top and other ethnic groups being on the bottom.

Unlike the melting pot, in the pluralist and group dominant model the salience of the ethnic identities are important; however in terms of patriotism group dominant model assumes the dominant group to be more nationalist and patriotic. Thus, in his study Sidanius (2000) finds that due to group dominant model Euro-Americans think themselves in national terms rather than ethnic terms, and they are more likely to have strong patriotic attachment than other ethnic groups, and also their patriotism is proportioned with their ethnocentrism. In other words, the more they are ethnocentric, the more they are patriotic.

Along with Berry (2011) there are other authors who coined different models of integration such as Lafromboise, Coleman & Gerton (1993) according to whom there are five models of living with two cultures (biculturalism); namely *assimilation* (that is the same with Berry's model); *acculturation* in which although individuals lose some of their cultural identity, they are still known as a member of the minority group; *alternation* in which individuals have the ability to carry on two cultures together and fit the social context; *multicultural* model (that is the same with Berry's multicultural model ); and *fusion* in which cultures become so connected that they eventually become indistinguishable.

On the other hand, Phinney and Alipuria (2006, 211) use a new term, *multiple social categorization* to refer to having two social groups in the self. Having different categories, individuals may be multicultural or hybrid as they argue:

The issue faced by these individuals is not that of balancing the importance or relevance of two distinct characteristics of the self, but rather that of integrating or otherwise managing an internal complexity involving two potentially conflicting, often enriching, parts of one's ethnic, racial, or cultural self... These individuals can claim membership in two or more groups but are sometimes not accepted by others as a member of either.

According to Phinney and Alipuria (2006), if individuals have two races; in other words, if they are multiracial, there are four ways to identify with. First, the individual may choose to identify with just one of the groups. Second, the individual may choose two groups and switch between them according to the context. Third, the individual may regard himself out of the groups, and choose individualism. Fourth, the individual may create a new mixed group to refer to themselves.

One needs to consider acculturation at individual level as well because each individual goes through "psychological acculturation" (Graves, 1967) which refers to the change in an individual who is influenced by both his/her culture and the receptive culture, and which emphasizes that each individual experiences different acculturation. To exemplify, while some individuals wholly are acculturated, some even do not participate in acculturation process. Therefore, while general acculturation occurs at group level, psychological acculturation occurs at individual level.

Berry (1997, and 2005) proposes two outcomes of acculturation, namely behavioral shifts and acculturative stress. In the first, individuals experience some changes in their behaviours in three sub-processes, namely "cultural shedding,

culture learning, and cultural conflict” (Berry, 2005, 707). In the first two processes individuals selectively, accidentally or deliberately changes their behaviours to fit the new society almost unproblematically whereas sometimes cultural conflict may occur as well. Berry (2005, 708) suggests that so as to avoid conflict, in assimilation individuals may accept dominant groups’ behavioral norms, in separation they may “withdraw from the acculturation arena”, in integration both group need mutual accommodation, and in marginalization they may prefer “little involvement in either culture”. The second outcome is acculturative stress when the conflict is great but still controllable. According to Berry (2005), the most stressful one is marginalization while the least stressful is integration; and assimilation and separation are in between.

On the other hand, there are some factors that affect the acculturation process. According to Berry (1997), one of those factors is age because if individuals go through acculturation at an early age, the process is likely to be smoother. However, older individuals experience difficulty in the process. Another factor is gender as the acculturation process is more problematic for females. Education is another factor which eases the acculturation process because higher education is like “a kind of pre-acculturation to the language, history, values, and norms of the new culture” (Berry, 1997, 22).

On the other hand, cultural distance is also significant because “the greater the cultural differences, the less positive is the adaptation” (Berry, 1997, 23). Lastly, one’s places in the economic world as well as personal factors are also important factors that affect the acculturation. For instance, in their study on integration, Damigella & Licciardello (2014) investigated second generation migrant adolescents in Italy and found that integration is both psychological and social phenomenon that enhances differences rather than standardization and similarity, thus creates a multicultural society. Identities of second generations are affected by factors such as “the cultural in which it is rooted; the role and salience of membership, the meaning of parent and Italian culture; the social representation of second generations; the feedbacks that come from ‘others’” (Damigella & Licciardello, 2014, 1128).

The research was done with 104 second generation students. The results showed that students felt the need to accustom or assimilate themselves to the Italian culture to be accepted and the majority insisted the necessity of keeping balance

between parents and Italian culture. The preference was towards maintaining parent's culture in family context and the Italian culture with peers. Parent's culture was regarded as the base for their personal identity; however it was not superior to the other. Rather, a balance between cultures is pursued.

## **2.7 Adaptation**

For Berry (2005, 709) "adaptation refers to the relatively stable changes that take place in an individual or group in response to external demands". It can occur both immediately and last for longer terms. Sometimes adaptation results in fit with the receiver society, which is achieved generally in the cases of assimilation and integration; yet sometimes rather than a fit to the receiver society, adaptation may involve resistance as in the cases of separation and marginalization. According to Berry (1997) while acculturation is about the cultural changes, adaptation and psychological acculturation are about psychological changes that occur as a result of acculturation.

There are two types of adaptations proposed by Ward (1996), namely psychological and sociocultural. As the name suggests, the first one refers to individuals' psychology about their identity, mental health and their satisfaction in the new cultural context whereas the second is about the way how individuals live in the new contexts and the ability to deal with problems they encounter.

## **2.8 Post-Modernity and Identity**

According to Bauman (1996) in the postmodern era rather than identity building, we see avoidance from fixation. No one wants to stick to just one group or a place. In the modern world, even relationships are short; therefore, one's identification with a group does not always last for years; or the number of groups that one is identified with increases. As Marx states:

[It is a] constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social relations, everlasting uncertainty and agitation ... All fixed, fast-frozen relationships, with their train of venerable ideas and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become obsolete before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air... (Marx and Engels, 1973, 70)

Likening the life to a game, Bauman explains how the postmodern identity is against fixation and asserts that in this era the crucial thing is to keep the game short and get detached from a place:

'Determination to live one day at a time', 'depicting daily life as a succession of minor emergencies' become the guiding principles of all rational conduct. To keep the game short means to beware long-term commitments. To refuse to be 'fixed' one way or the other. Not to get tied to the place. Not to wed one's life to one vocation only. Not to swear consistency and loyalty to anything and anybody. Not to *control* the future, but to *refuse to mortgage* it: to take care that the consequences of the game do not outlive the game itself, and to renounce responsibility for such as do. To forbid the past to bear on the present. In short, to cut the present off at both ends, to sever the present from history, to abolish time in any other form but a flat collection or an arbitrary sequence of present moments; a *continuous present* (Bauman, 1996, 24).

Giddens (1991) also argues that in the 'late modern' societies what defined identities in traditional societies is not influential. Rather, individuals have many choices to incline to; as a result of which, they always need to be 'self-reflexive'; in other words, they need to explain themselves to themselves. Seeing that relationships are always changing, narratives about oneself are also changing. Therefore, identities are not fixed but fluid and individuals have the freedom to construct and choose their own identities.

Unlike Giddens, Foucault (1979) emphasizes that one's identity is not his/her choice but the result of the power exercised on him/her. In the modern world, power is hidden in social relationship and norms held by the society. Hence, for Foucault, individuals' identities are the products of disciplinary surveillance of the power, not their own choices. Also, Browne (2008) argues identities are influenced by gender, class and ethnicity etc.; however, in postmodernism, these factors are no longer important seeing that identities are not bound to limitations but they are always fluid and changing in relation with the changing demands and choices as a result of globalization and the mass media which offers different lifestyles, cultures, identities, races, and religions etc.

Also, Hall (1996a) argues late-modernity is encountering a structural change that is also changing personal identities and their stable 'sense of self'. Now, people experience a dislocation or displacement from not only their culture and society but also from themselves. Therefore; new identities occur as dislocated and de-centered. The old identities that were thought to be stable also stabilized the social world; yet the new fragmented identities are "dislocating the central structures and processes of modern societies and undermining the frameworks which gave individuals stable anchorage in the social world" (Hall, 1996a, 596). Likewise, Laclau (1990) argues, modern societies are not unified contrary to what is believed. They are shaped by

difference and produce different subject positions, thus different identities. Hence, we do not have stable identities but dislocated ones.

## **2.9 Hybridity and Hybrid Identities**

The modern society is the remnant of globalization, capitalization and colonization all of which have produced unification and differentiation together, and “heterogeneity, cultural interchange and diversity have now become the self-conscious identity of modern society” (Young, 1995, 4). This diversity has brought hybridity with itself since interactions have caused to mixings among different cultures; as a result, “the desire to be from somewhere, to have a sense of roots and a feeling of belonging are key features of the quest for positive identity in postmodern, post-colonial societies” (Weedon, 2004, 85).

According to Young (1995, 5) the word “hybrid” firstly was used in biology and botanic as “in Latin it meant the offspring of a tame sow and a wild boar” and in 1828 Webster defined the word as “a mongrel or mule; an animal or plant, produced from the mixture of two species”. However, it was in 1861 that for the first time the OED used the term to define crossing of people of different races as “of human parents of different races, half-breed”; yet, these crossings were not embraced easily; rather they were regarded as infertile. In the 18<sup>th</sup> century, hybridity was based on interracial contacts, especially between the White World and the races they colonized, and thus it was generally regarded as the contamination of the White with referring their breedings as “miscegenation” or “amalgamation”, hence claiming White’s superiority over the others (Kraidy, 2002). However this term has gained importance in 19<sup>th</sup> century as Young (1995, 5) puts it “hybrid is the nineteenth century’s word... In the nineteenth century it was used to refer to a physiological phenomenon; in the twentieth century it has been reactivated to describe a cultural one.”

Papastergiadis (2000) argues the word ‘hybrid’ has a dark history encompassing the imperialism period starting by the late 19<sup>th</sup> century in pursuit of civilizing the inferior nations which in fact had unexpected consequences as interracial sexual relations thus reproducing of hybrid offsprings named ‘mulatoes’ or ‘mestizos’. Knox (1862, 487) explains that situation as follows:

Naturalists have generally admitted that animals of the same species are fertile, reproducing their kind for ever; whilst on the contrary, if an animal be the product of two distinct species, the hybrid, more or less, was sure to perish or to become extinct...the products of such a mixture are not fertile.

Following the same track, Long (1774, 335) also argued that

Some few of them [Mulattos] have intermarried here with those of their own complexion; but such matches have generally been defective and barren. They seem in this respect to be actually of the mule-kind, and not so capable of producing from one another as from a commerce with a distinct White or Black.

Likewise, Cuninghame (2008, 20) argues, due to being “the ‘half-breed’ of European and non-European extraction” the hybrid was regarded as dangerous and therefore in order to obstruct it, its offspring was depicted “as weak, sickly, inferior idiots”.

So, as stated in Young (1995, 17) there have been different approaches to crossings or mixings as follows:

1-The straightforward polygenist *species* argument: the denial that different peoples can mix at all; any product of a union between them is infertile, or infertile after a generation or two; so that even where people intermingle physically, they retain their own differences (though those differences, when combined, may make up the totality of the nation) (Long, Nott in his early article, *The Mulatto*, Hitler);

2- The *amalgamation* thesis: the claim that all humans can interbreed prolifically and in an unlimited way; sometimes accompanied by the ‘melting-pot’ notion that the mixing of people produces a new mixed race, with merged but distinct new physical and moral characteristics (Prichard, Gobineau’s ‘quaternary’ types);

3- The *decomposition* thesis: an admission that some ‘amalgamation’ between people may take place, but that any mixed breeds either die out quickly or revert to one or other of the permanent parent ‘types’ (first advanced by Edwards, endorsed by Thierry, Arnold, and subsequently adopted by Nott and Gliddon, but combined with 4);

4- The argument that hybridity varies between ‘proximate’ and ‘distant’ species: unions between allied races are fertile, those between distant either are infertile or tend to degeneration (Nott and Gliddon, Broca, Darwin, Spencer, Galton). This became the dominant view from the 1850s to the 1930s;

5- The negative version of the amalgamation thesis, namely the idea that miscegenation produces a mongrel group that makes up a ‘raceless chaos’, merely a corruption of the originals, degenerate and degraded, threatening to subvert the vigour and virtue of the pure races with which they come into contact (Gobineau, Agassiz, Vogt).

All these negative connotations of hybridity started to disappear with decolonialization and national liberation struggles and postcolonial discourse in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. According to Cuninghame (2008), until the 19<sup>th</sup> century, hybridization was assumed as infertile and detrimental to the society. However, since 1870 with the findings of Mendel who showed how fertile is the mixing of different plants, hybridization has become to be welcomed in biology (Olby, 1985), as Cuningame (2008, 20) asserts:

By the 1970s, its present generally positive nuance had emerged in anthropology, ethnography, and sociology with their increasing interest in the emerging multicultural societies of Western Europe, the rights of ethnic minorities and indigenous peoples slowly emerging from centuries of invisibilization, and the massive migratory flows that have increasingly come to characterize the post-1945, post-imperialist, neocolonial, globalized world.

So, with decolonization movements, migrations and globalization, hybridity gained importance and began to live its heyday.

Up to now hybridity was basically related with crossings between different races and the discussions were chiefly about whether hybrid bodies are fertile or infertile. However, as we shall see, there is also the hybridity of language proposed by Bakhtin (1981, 358) who questions the meaning of the term and answers:

What is a hybridization? It is a mixture of two social languages within the limits of a single utterance, an encounter, within the arena of an utterance, between two different linguistic consciousnesses, separated from one another by an epoch, by social differentiation or by some other factor.

In other words, here hybridity is used to describe the duality of language as it encompasses similarity and difference together. For Bakhtin, there are two types of hybridization namely ‘intentional hybridity’ and ‘organic hybridity’. The first implies that a language, especially those called ‘pidgins’ or ‘creoles’, bearing inside two voices, two beliefs and two languages etc is intentionally ‘double-accented’ and one voice can unmask the other as Bakhtin (1981, 304-5) states:

What we are calling a hybrid construction is an utterance that belongs, by its grammatical [syntactic] and compositional markers, to a single speaker, but that actually contains mixed within it two utterances, two speech manners, two styles, two ‘languages’, two semantic and axiological belief systems. We repeat, there is no formal — compositional and syntactic— boundary between these utterances, styles, languages, belief systems; the division of voices and languages takes place within the limits of a single syntactic whole, often within the limits of a single sentence. It frequently happens that even one and the same word will belong simultaneously to two languages, two belief systems that intersect in a hybrid construction— and consequently, the word has two contradictory meanings, two accents.

On the other hand, ‘organic hybridity’ implies the unconscious process of language mixing that occurs in the course of time through interaction beyond boundaries. In intentional hybridity world views are not mixed whereas in the organic hybridity “the mixture merges and is fused into a new language, world view or object” (Bakhtin, 1981, 361). According to Bakhtin (1981, 358-9), organic hybridity is what is observed in the evolution of languages:

Unintentional, unconscious hybridization is one of the most important modes in the historical life and evolution of all languages. We may even say that language and languages change historically primarily by hybridization, by means of a mixing of various ‘languages’ co-existing within the boundaries of a single dialect, a single national language, a single branch, a single group of different branches, in the historical as well as paleontological past of languages.

Whether hybridity implies crossings of races or languages or cultures, it involves fusion under which resides separation, and it is also what gives the opportunity to the subordinate languages or cultures to show themselves as Young (1995, 20-1) states:

Hybridity as in the racial model, involves an antithetical movement of coalescence and antagonism, with the unconscious set against the intentional, the organic against the divisive, the generative against the undermining. Hybridity is itself an example of hybridity, of a doubleness that both brings together, fuses, but also maintains separation.

Gaining significance in particular in post-colonial studies, hybridity has been the way of claiming one's existence in the dominant society. The great postcolonial writer Homi Bhabha (1985, 156) defines hybridity as "a problematic of colonial representation... that reverses the effects of the colonialist disavowal, so that other 'denied' knowledges enter upon the dominant discourse and estrange the basis of its authority." The interaction between the colonized and the colonizer is not one-way any longer. Both parts are influenced by the colonization process and are the outcomes of hybridizations as Bhabha (1985, 154) declares "if the effect of colonial power is seen to be the production of hybridization... it enables a form of subversion... that turns the discursive conditions of dominance into the grounds of intervention." In other words, being the outcome of the interaction through dominant and *other* cultures, hybridity undermines the dominance over others, and it enables the others to be seen in language, culture, and music etc. On the other hand, in his interview with Rutherford (1990, 211), Bhabha states "the process of cultural hybridity gives rise to something different, something new and unrecognizable, a new area of negotiation of meaning and representation". In other words, at the meeting point of two societies, a new hybridized identity occurs that carries signs from both societies. In fact, according to Bhabha all cultures are related to each other, so all cultures are in the process of hybridity in a way.

According to Young (1995, 23), hybridity works both as 'organically', that is, "hegemonizing, creating new spaces, structures, scenes", and "intentionally", that is "diasporizing, intervening as a form of subversion, translation, transformation". It creates a space in which both the colonized and the colonizer, or both the dominant and the subordinate group share their cultures and form a common culture in which differences become the same as Young (1995, 24) declares hybridity:

implies a disruption and forcing together of any unlike living things, grafting a vine or a rose on to a different root stock, making difference into sameness. Hybridity is a making one of two

distinct things, so that it becomes impossible for the eye to detect the hybridity of a geranium or a rose.

On the other hand, it is also breaking of a single entity into different parts; “hybridity thus makes difference into sameness, and sameness into difference, but in a way that makes the same no longer the same, the different no longer simply different” (Young, 1995, 24-5). Likewise, Bhabha (1994) argues as a result of the relationship between the colonized and the colonizer, both groups begin to resemble each other; however; this resemblance is not a complete resemblance and also it is not a complete difference.

In fact, hybridity implies there are no pure cultures. For Canclini (1995) as a result of the definitions made in social sciences hybridization has come to refer to “*social cultural processes in which discrete structures or practices, previously existing in separate form, are combined to generate new structures, objects, and practices*”; however in the introduction part of *Hybrid Cultures Strategies for Entering and Leaving Modernity* Canclini approaches differently to that definition. This definition requires mixing of ‘pure’ societies; yet “the so-called discrete structures were a result of prior hybridizations and therefore cannot be considered pure points of origin” (Canclini, 1995, xxv). Although hybridization seems to be a new term in social sciences, it has been around since there is no ‘pure’ society in the world as willy-nilly they are hybridized through interaction with others. Stross (1999) explains this situation with the “cycles of hybridization” formula according to which there are no pure societies but heterogeneous ones, and these are always in a move from heterogeneous ones to more heterogeneous ones. According to Canclini (1995), hybridization undermines the pretense of ‘pure’ or ‘authentic’ identities as well because their language, traditions or even behaviors are not far from being mixed in the history. Ethnicities or nations are not enough to declare members of those groups are unique or pure; they are always in process of changing and restructuring themselves as in the introduction part of *Hybrid Cultures Strategies for Entering and Leaving Modernity* Canclini (1995, xxviii) puts it:

It is no longer adequate to say that there are no identities describable as self-contained and ahistorical essences, and to understand them as ways in which communities imagine themselves and construct stories about their origin and development. In a world so fluidly interconnected, identitarian sedimentations organized in more or less stable historical groups (ethnicities, nations, classes) restructure themselves in the midst of interethnic, transclass, and transnational groupings.

Canclini argues there are oppositions to hybridization as well; this is because it is sometimes understood as the ‘fusion’ of cultures despising differences. On the other hand, it undermines ethno-centrism and breaks binary classifications which may lead to movements resisting it. However, hybridization is neither fusion nor assimilation since one keeps all of his/her allegiances at once and has the opportunity of choosing either any of them or all of them together or neither of them.

Also, Kraidy (2002, 320) writes there are two paradoxes regarding hybridity, first of which is its being understood “as subversive and pervasive, exceptional and ordinary, marginal yet mainstream”. For instance, Werbner (1997, 1) says “the current fascination with cultural hybridity masks an elusive paradox. Hybridity is celebrated as powerfully interruptive and yet theorized as commonplace and pervasive”. Due to its pervasiveness, Werbner (1997, 15) sees hybridity as useless inasmuch as “all cultures are always hybrid”. The second is its openness because although hybridity is for multiple identities, its open nature may be used by anyone to include and exclude different peoples as Gómez-Peña (1996, 12-13) puts it:

Precisely because of its elasticity and open nature, the hybrid model can be appropriated by anyone to mean practically anything. Since the essence of its borders is oscillation, these boundaries can be conveniently repositioned to include and exclude different peoples and communities.

Another opposition is that though hybridity discourses offer a world without problems, it still cannot solve the problems of exploitations and racism (Werbner, 1997). Still another criticism concerns that hybridity is constructed by the power so as to exercise its power and neutralize difference. So, according to that view hybridity is only realized in the interest of dominant power and again with the aim of exercising its power (Kraidy, 2002). Yet, in the introduction part of *Hybrid Cultures Strategies for Entering and Leaving Modernity* Canclini (1995, xxxi) opposes these ideas and says it is hybridity that may lead to a world of real multiculturalism and states:

Hybridization, as a process of intersection and transaction, is what makes it possible for multicultural reality to avoid tendencies toward segregation and to become cross-cultural reality. Policies of hybridization can serve to work democratically with differences, so that history is not reduced to wars between cultures, as Samuel Huntington imagines it. We can choose to live in a state of war or in a state of hybridization.

### **2.9.1 Types of Hybridity**

Smith (2008, 6) states there are different types of hybridity, namely “identities that exist across borders, duality, gender (a false dichotomy), new

identities, the diaspora (borderless), and the internal colony hybrid (formed within boundaries)”.

### **2.9.1.1 Identities that exist beyond borders**

The first type is the outcome of the crossing borders that has been at speed especially with globalization during which the local and the global cultures have come in contact and formed a distinct identity, that is, hybrid identity. According to Smith (2008), this way of the formation of hybrid identities emphasizes the changing nature of the borders, implying that borders are not fixed but always shifting and in a process of being. As a result, rather than fixed identities, hybrid identities occur. Leavy (2008, 171) also suggests that individuals respond to this shifting of borders via “(re)negotiating collective identities” and “in this vein, shifting borders can both reify and alter group identities”. For instance, doing research on the United States-Mexico border, Gonzales (2008, 179) examined how Mexicans experienced hybridity and sometimes ambivalence and concluded that “identities by their nature are hybrid”. On the other hand, Weedon (2004, 105) argues that today societies are in contact and even “white societies, especially former colonial powers, have themselves been shaped by a history of contacts with their colonial others”; as a result of which cultural fusion occurs that produces multiple and hybrid identities. As such, Renan (1990, 1a-15) even states:

The leading nations of Europe are nations of essentially mixed blood": "France is [at once] Celtic, Iberic and Germanic. Germany is Germanic, Celtic and Slav. Italy is the country where. . . Gauls, Etruscans, Pelagians and Greeks, not to mention many other elements, intersect in an indecipherable mixture, The British Isles, considered as a whole, present a mixture of Celtic and Germanic blood, the proportions of which are singularly difficult to define.

Hybridity is not just about mixing but it is also about deconstructions since it makes it possible “to deconstruct and reshape the dominant hierarchies, be they of gender, sexuality, race or colonialism and to create new forms of identity” (Weedon, 2004, 106) as it paves the way for moving beyond binary oppositions.

### **2.9.1.2 Duality**

The second type is based on DuBois’ “Double Consciousness” which defines hybridity as “two-ness” existing within a person. Accordingly, the individual has two distinct identities inside and has the opportunity to navigate between identities in order to attune to the context; but the individual has to keep his own race’s characteristics rather than adopting the other completely. DuBois (1903) uses the

term “Double Consciousness” to refer to the situation the Black live, and show how they experience “two-ness” by way of being both ‘American’ and ‘Black’. In that sense, the Black can live their two-ness in so far as they retain their own characteristics as DuBois (1903, 5) states “One ever feels his two-ness – an American, a Negro, two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings, two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder.” According to Leavy (2008), individuals having double consciousness need to negotiate between two identities they have in order to fit the context.

### **2.9.1.3 A false dichotomy**

The hybrid form of gender identity questions the fixed beliefs about maleness and femaleness and it implies the changes occur within genders as a result of globalization, migration or trans-genderism as Smith (2008, 7) states “studies of gender hybridity allude to the false dichotomy of sex and gender identities, suggesting that maleness and femaleness do not adequately represent the range of sex and gendered identities.”

### **2.9.1.4 New Identities**

New identities are the result of meeting and blurring of cultural boundaries. Cuninham (2008) argues identities in the borderlands tend to be hybrid, and this is accelerated via globalization, media, migration and travelling etc. The interaction beyond borders is not so easy contrary to what it is thought to be; rather as Bhabha (1994) argues this interaction is quite complex breaking binary oppositions like center-margin, or civilized-savage. In fact, hybridity dislocates the colonization by influencing both the colonized and the colonizer. This negotiation of boundaries form a new space called “Third Space” by Homi Bhabha (1994) where two societies exchange their cultures, languages, customs and beliefs etc., and the hybrid identity formed here is a new identity bearing characteristics of both one’s own culture and the other culture as he states:

The importance of hybridity is not to be able to trace two original movements from which the third emerges, rather hybridity . . . is the ‘third space’ which enables other positions to emerge. This third space displaces the histories that constitute it, and sets up new structures of authority, new political initiatives, which are inadequately understood through received wisdom . . . The process of cultural hybridity gives rise to a something different, something new and unrecognisable, a new area of negotiation of meaning and representation (Bhabha, 1994, 211).

Leavy (2008) argues with globalization the probability of emerging of the ‘Third Space’ has increased and continues that popular culture has examples of the “Third Space”; for example, a musical genre “British Bhangra” is in fact a combination of Punjab and British music.

### **2.9.1.5 Diaspora**

Another type of hybridity suggested by Smith is the diasporized hybrid identity. As it is known, diaspora is the dispersion of populations to new lands. As such, diasporas have ties to both their homelands and the new place they are living in, and they “wax and wane in diasporism, depending on changing possibilities” (Clifford, 1994, 306). As a consequence, again bearing two cultures “members of diasporized groups attempt to fit in within their new homeland, they might be more likely to adopt a hybrid identity” (Smith, 2008, 9).

### **2.9.1.6 The Internal Colony Hybrid**

The internal colony hybrid focuses on the relationship between the colonized and the colonizer. It breaks the frozen binary thoughts that colonialism wanted to expose. It is about the emergence of a new identity as Hall (1990, 52, cited in Weedon, 2004, 61) asks:

Is it only a matter of unearthing that which the colonial experience buried and overlaid, bringing to light the hidden continuities it suppressed? Or is a quite different practice entailed – not the rediscovery but the *production* of identity. Not an identity grounded in the archaeology, but in the *re-telling* of the past?

As can be understood, hybridity is in fact a production of identity because here, both groups are influenced by each other and as a result, hybrid identities occur, in particular among the colonized group because on the one hand they try to live their culture, on the other hand they try to fit the cultural and legal norms of the dominant culture as Smith (2008, 10) states “the internal colony creates an opportunity to maintain the integrity of its culture while learning to exist within the outsider culture”. Alongside colonization, the internal colony is used to describe populations living within nation-states that “were born within the territorial boundaries of those states, and thus legally integrated into the state and economy, but who remained structurally, culturally, socioeconomically, legally, and socially marginal” (Bush, 2008, 130). These groups live both their and majority’s culture and “their hybridity

gave them a connection to the larger society and enabled them to communicate their insights across the cultural barriers they faced” (Bush, 2008, 131).

On the whole, “hybrid identities emerge: when a false dichotomy fails to represent identity fully, when identities merge across bordered spaces to span the previously established boundaries, and when cultures fuse within boundaries” (Smith, 2008, 11).

### **2.9.2 Globalization and Hybridity**

A great tide of different images, sounds, ideas and products submerges the whole planet, bringing every day new changes to our tastes, hopes, habits, life style and view of the world, and also to ourselves (Maalouf, 2003, 107).

Hybridity is not something new; however it occurs more in contemporary times, and “there is a proliferation of cultural, linguistic, artistic, ethnic and racial forms of hybridity” and globalization fastened this process giving opportunity to the mixing of practices and meanings (Cieslik & Verkuyten, 2006, 78). Globalization “refers to all those processes by which the peoples of the world are incorporated into a single world society, global society” (Albrow, 1990, 9, cited in Pieterse, 1995, 45). As a consequence, with globalization the individual tries to be “a citizen of the world” distancing himself from his culture (Yanmış & Kahraman, 2013, 120). All the identities including ethnicity and religious ones as well do not have ontologic reality because individuals construct identities through socialization. So, here globalization gives the opportunity of socialization and paves the way for mutual exchanging; as a consequence “it becomes less obvious to think of globalizations in terms of standardization and less likely that globalizations can be one-directional processes, either structurally or culturally” (Pieterse, 1995, 46).

Globalization has become the characteristics of the twenty-first century as Maalouf (2003, 37) asks “isn't it a characteristic of the age we live in that it has made everyone in a way a migrant and a member of a minority?” Seeing that globalization is the result of the rapid increase in communication and transportation technology by which the world has become smaller, now, it has become easier to travel seeing that distances are no more important thanks to improvements in technology. Locations and boundaries have become worthless, as the whole world seems to be on move. The flow of ideas, cultures, even diseases etc. across boundaries are indispensable. These flows may lead one to think that there will be no differences in terms of

culture and locality seeing that with globalization a uniformity in culture, in other words homogenization, is achieved. However; the point is that cultural differences do not occur because of the isolation from each other, but rather they occur as a result of connections with each other, which means that one's self is realized in the face of others' self. Maalouf (2003) states individuals have two heritages namely 'vertical' and 'horizontal'. The vertical heritage implies what one acquires from his ancestors while the horizontal implies what one acquires through the age he is living in, and it is the horizontal heritage one needs to give attention because each one of us is in process of becoming, and globalization has accelerated this process.

According to Appadurai (2004) there are five dimension of global cultural flow, namely ethnospaces, mediaspaces, technospaces, finanscapes and ideoscapes, all of them together constitute the backbones of 'imagined worlds'. 'Ethnoscape' means any moving people across boundaries such as "tourists, immigrants, refugees, exiles, guestworkers" (Appadurai, 2004, 222). By 'technoscape' what is meant is the rapid flow of technology across boundaries, as a result of which "many countries now are the roots of multinational enterprise" (Appadurai, 2004, 222). On the other hand, 'finanscapes' is about the rapid flow of global capital. As for 'mediascape', it is about the mediums of media such as television, newspaper etc. and "the images of the world created by these media" (Appadurai, 2004, 223). Mediascape has an important role in creation of 'imagined worlds' since by means of complex images, it blurs the distinction between the realistic and fictional landscapes. On the one hand, it narrates lives of other people, on the other hand it presents possible lives and fantasies, which consequently results in "the desire for acquisition and movement" (Appadurai, 2004, 224). The other dimension is 'ideoscape' which is about the ideologies of the states, having the nature of fluidity in different national contexts. According to Appadurai (2004, 225), global flows occur "in and through the growing disjunctures between ethnoscapes, technoscapes, finanscapes, mediascapes and ideoscapes". It is the flow of these scapes beyond boundaries that erases all boundaries and distinctions between global/local or North/South. As a result, these flows created a global imagined world on which there is always a struggle over sameness and difference and as a consequence one can say that rather than homogeneity, a more heterogeneous world is achieved.

Following the same track, Clifford (2008) also suggests that the globalization created much different cultures. According to Clifford (2008), cultures should not be regarded as fixed to a locality thought apart from the outside world. He argues that people are dwelling on surface, but in fact they were all travelers at a point in their time, “insider-outsiders, good translators and explicators, they have been around” (Clifford, 2008, 318). On the other hand, mobility for Cresswell (2008, 329) is not just moving from one place to another, rather it gets meaning in social and cultural context, and more importantly it is related to resistance to the power since it has “a furtive and transgressive character to it, crossing boundaries, breaking definitions of the proper.” Michel de Certeau’s (1984) distinction between strategy and tactic, mentioned in Cresswell (2008), indicates this resistance nature of mobility. According to Certeau, the strategy is the weapon of the strong and it gets its strength from fixing of boundaries whereas the tactic being the weapon of the weak is mobile, and “the powerful make spaces but the weak use them” (Cresswell, 2008, 329). Mobility is seen as a threat to normal life and the particularity of the place in terms of cultural or national identity; therefore, it is restricted by the state to some extent. However, in today’s world there is no way to escape from mobility, and this mobility “is produced and given meaning within relations of power” (Cresswell, 2008, 331). The state prefers stability of citizens over mobility. It sees mobility as a threat to country’s order. As a result, citizens seeking for freedom use mobility as a resistance to the state’s power.

Furthermore, Simmel (2008) argues that mobility resulted in emergence of ‘stranger’ who comes to a place but does not go back keeping his freedom to come and go, yet who is not assumed as belonging to that particular place. In fact, this stranger has some advantages not belonging to that specific place. First of all, he is objective seeing that he “is not bound by ties which could prejudice his perception” (Simmel, 2008, 313) along that since he does not belong to that society, his actions are not restricted by the custom or the culture. His objectivity also depends upon his nearness and remoteness as even in very intimate relations there is a kind of strangeness. People are united around some commonalities among them, yet these commonalities or similarities are just a way of putting a boundary between the ones like them and unlike them. Therefore, Simmel (2008, 314) insists that although, there is nearness in these relations, there is always remoteness as “the commonality

provides a basis for unifying the members, to be sure; but it does not specifically direct these particular persons to one another.” So, the stranger becomes close when we have the same nationality or the same occupation etc., and he becomes remote when these similarities are discovered to stem from a more general one differentiating ‘us’ from ‘them’. It is because of that a stranger of a race or ethnicity is so remote to the country they are in, but so near to the ones having the same race or ethnicity. These strangers are united as they have similarities in terms of nationality or race; however, they are still strangers to the country as a group of ‘strange’ people as Simmel (2008, 314-15) states “strangers are not really perceived as individuals, but as strangers of a certain type. Their remoteness is no less general than their nearness.”

In fact, mobility and globalization produces transcultures and transnations that are not bound to national borders and change with interaction with other cultures. Seeing that cultures are not fixed, one can say that one’s identity in that culture is not fixed as well. This situation is called “translocational positionality” by Anthias (2008) to refer to individuals’ geographical and social dislocation which lead to instability of their identities. Didero (2011, 1) suggests that the concept of translocational positionality needs to be stressed in identity research because in the global world “every identity is by definition hybrid, every culture transcultural and every space translocal”.

Anthias (2008, 5) argues that translocational positionality “addresses issues of identity in terms of locations which are not fixed but are context, meaning and time related and which therefore involve shifts and contradictions”. Mobility of people, goods, cultures etc. transforms the locales they settle into translocals and affect the people within these translocales as well seeing that from then on they have not only multiple locations but also multiple identities along with multiple belongings. With translocations, not only movement of people is defined, but also fragmentation of social life and breakings of boundaries are implied. As Anthias (2008, 9) emphasizes “the notion of translocations references the idea of ‘location’ as a social space which is produced within contextual, spatial, temporal and hierarchical relations around the ‘intersections’ of social divisions and identities of class, ethnicity and gender.” Hence, one can say that identities have become more fragmented as Hall (1996a, 622) puts it:

The more social life becomes mediated by the global marketing of styles, places, and images, by international travel, and by globally networked media images and communications systems, the more identities become detached - disembedded - from specific times, places, histories, and traditions, and appear "free-floating." We are confronted by a range of different identities, each appealing to us, or rather to different parts of ourselves, from which it seems possible to choose.

Also, Inglis (2009, 1) argues that in the globalized world, belonging to a particular place has gained importance because "the more the local becomes penetrated by global flows, the more people move around the world, the more family and community will become 'disembedded' (Giddens, 1991, 146)." It is obvious that one of the main outcomes of globalization is the decrease in attachment to a locality; however there is still belonging to places. Furthermore, Hall (1996a) argues globalization does not hide differences rather it reveals them. Therefore, with globalization there is an interest in localism as well. Although the level of attachment varies, people feel belonged to places in terms of similarity and familiarity. Thus, belonging to places imply social labeling and identification in fact. Inglis (2009, 3) says, in Ireland, -in Turkey as well, the following question after asking names is where people are from, which implies that "place is seen as a major social indicator, of culture, class, nationality, urbanity and so forth." Moreover, places are also about bonding and belonging. The feeling of being at home is generally true for the places where one has family or groups that s/he knows. Although globalization seems to decrease attachment to localities, in fact it increases the belonging and attachment to the places that is what Inglis found in his research on Irish people. On the other hand, according to Maalouf (2003, 37), everyone is a migrant in a way because:

We all have to live in a universe bearing little resemblance to the place where we were born: we must all learn other languages, other modes of speech, other codes; and we all have the feeling that our own identity, as we have conceived of it since we were children, is threatened.

Therefore, without moving out of hometown, one can still become a migrant exposed to changing nature of the world. The migrant is the 'victim' of the 'tribal' notion of identity which assumes that there is only one dominant identity ignoring other components forming one's identity. In other words, the migrant bears different cultures, languages and beliefs etc. inside; however, if s/he is forced to choose just one of them, then s/he "finds himself split and torn, condemned to betray either his country of origin or his country of adoption" (Maalouf, 2003, 38). However, with globalization, there needs to be a different approach to identity in which one emphasizes common points with other humans as Amin Maaoluf (2003, 100) puts it:

Identity would be then seen as the sum of all our allegiances, and, within it, allegiance to the human community itself would become increasingly important, until one day it would become the chief allegiance, though without destroying our many individual affiliations.

Having written about ideas on globalization, now its relation with hybridity can be discussed. As it is known, globalization has a great role in producing hybrid identities as it fuses borders and leads to creation of new mixed cultures. According to Smith (2008), cultural globalization results in either “differentiation” or “assimilation” or “hybridization”. Hybridization seems to be the most occurred outcome. It is “the ways in which forms become separated from existing practices and recombine with new forms in new practices” (Pieterse, 2004, 64, cited in Smith, 2008, 3), and with globalization, the global and the local get in contact and together produce the hybrid by influencing each other. Such hybridity “signifies the encounter, conflict, and/or blending of two ethnic or cultural categories which, while by no means pure and distinct in nature, tend to be understood and experienced as meaningful identity labels by members of these categories” (Lo, 2002, 199, cited in Smith, 2008, 4).

Globalization exposes individuals to new identity opportunities, offering new places, times, cultures and belongings etc. Pieterse (1995, 52) states “multiple identities and the decentring of the social subjects are grounded in the ability of individuals to avail themselves of several organizational options at the same time. Thus globalization is the framework for amplification and diversification of ‘sources of the self’.” Benefitting from those sources, individuals construct hybrid identities. Pieterse (1995, 56) also argues hybridization is a:

*‘Cross-category process’ as to sites, such as fairs, which bring together the exotic and the familiar, villagers and townsmen, performers and observers. The categories can also be cultures, nations, ethnicities, status groups, classes, genres, and hybridity, by its very existence, blurs the distinctions among them. Hybridity functions, next, as part of a power relationship between centre and margin, hegemony and minority, and indicates a blurring, destabilization or subversion of that hierarchical relationship.*

This is to say, through hybridization, the binary oppositions become irrelevant as it blurs the divisions between the upper and the lower, creating a new identity out of both. Hybridity is also referred as “migration mélange” because “second-generation immigrants, in the West and elsewhere, display mixed cultural patterns – for example, a separation between and, next, a mix of a home culture and language (matching the culture of origin) and an outdoor culture (matching the

culture of residence” (Pieterse, 1995, 56). However, these generations show different levels of hybridities. That is why; Pieterse (1995, 56-7) suggests:

We can construct a *continuum of hybridities*: on one end, an assimilationist hybridity that leans over towards the centre, adopts the canon and mimics the hegemony, and, at the other end, a destabilizing hybridity that blurs the canon, reverses the current, subverts the centre.

Although it seems to be complex, hybridity is a benefit in fact because bearing a mixed culture, hybrids have the ability to handle with different cultures as Smith (2008, 4) states “those who occupy hybrid spaces benefit from having an understanding of both local knowledge and global cosmopolitanism. Those who can easily cross barriers in a world of amorphous borders have an advantage.” On the other hand, hybridity also opens a different window to the world through which one embraces multiculturalism since “the hybrid identity might allow the globe to unite in its differences, to be a truly multicultural society that is able to recognize and reconcile diversity” (Smith, 2008, 5).

### 2.9.3 Boundary and Hybridity

A boundary is not that at which something stops but, as the Greeks recognized, the boundary is that from which something begins its presencing (Martin Heidegger, 'Building, dwelling, thinking').

Identities are not pre-given; yet they are formed out of interactions with the society, always subjected to changes; not bound to border. Hence; individuals have identities beyond boundaries. Bhabha (1994, 1) defines the beyond as follows:

The ‘beyond’ is neither a new horizon, nor a leaving behind of the past... Beginnings and endings may be the sustaining myths of the middle years; but in the *fin de siècle*, we find ourselves in the moment of transit where space and time cross to produce complex figures of difference and identity, past and present, inside and outside, inclusion and exclusion. For there is a sense of disorientation, a disturbance of direction, in the ‘beyond’; an exploratory, restless movement caught so well in the French rendition of the words *au-delà* – here and there, on all sides, *fort/da*, hither and thither, back and forth.

He continues saying “‘beyond’ signifies spatial distance, marks progress, promises the future, but our intimations of exceeding the barrier or boundary – the very act of going *beyond* – are unknowable, unrepresentable, without a return to the ‘present’ which, in the process of repetition, becomes disjunct and displaced” (Bhabha, 1994, 4). In that sense, beyond is the intervening space which is true for boundaries as well. In fact, boundaries have the mission of revealing differences rather than hindering them because they are like bridges allowing crossings and differences as Heidegger (1971, 152-3) states “always and ever differently the bridge escorts the lingering and hastening ways of men to and fro, so that they may get to

other banks... The bridge *gathers* as a passage that crosses.” However many boundaries there seem to be, hybridity is unavoidable seeing that even the border itself has a nature of combining and mixing. At that very border, one realizes his identity so as to be recognized:

Once more it is the desire for recognition, 'for somewhere else and for something else' that takes the experience of history beyond the instrumental hypothesis. Once again, it is the space of intervention emerging in the cultural interstices that introduces creative invention into existence. And one last time, there is a return to the performance of identity as iteration, the re-creation of the self in the world of travel, the –resettlement of the borderline community of migration (Bhabha, 1994, 9).

Boundary is not the end yet the beginning “because it captures something of the estranging sense of the relocation of the home and the world – the unhomeliness” and “the borders between home and world become confused; and, uncannily, the private and the public become part of each other, forcing upon us a vision that is as divided as it is disorienting” (Bhabha, 1994, 9). Here, the unhomed does not mean someone without home; rather it refers to the displacement of those people and their in-betweenness, and, hybridity is the means of displacing borders, making the world full of the unhomed, changing fixed oppositions and reversing the power relations. Therefore; Yazdiha (2010) argues by means of hybridity it is possible to apply effective public policies which can reach and encompass its diverse population, and by the way of breaking of boundaries as well as dominations as a result of the Third Space and hybridity, it would be easier to construct a more inclusive world.

Also, Ang (2003, 6) states “as hybridisation consists of exchanges, crossings, and mutual entanglements, it necessarily implies a softening of the boundaries between “peoples”: the encounters *between* them are as constitutive of who they are as the proceedings *within*.” Although these encounters are always violent, Ang argues different “peoples” inescapably exchange their differences so as to avoid a war, which created a hybridized world in which boundaries are not so strict. Moreover, Ang (2003) continues saying that hybridity does not erase the boundaries but it problematizes them because it is the borders where differences meet, and it is these meetings that unsettle identities. On the other hand, Ang (2003, 11) argues hybridity is everywhere and it is the means of breaking essentialist views, and gives the example of banana that is “yellow outside, white inside” in order to show “togetherness-in-difference”:

The banana is representative of the porousness of identities and, more importantly, of the fact that all identities evolve and take shape through daily and multiple interrelationships with

myriad, differently positioned others... It is a world that is described by Iris Marion Young (1990) as the 'being together' of strangers": a world in which the complicated entanglement of togetherness in difference has become the rule rather than the exception.

Going through hybridity and in-betweenness, Ang (2003, 8-9) acknowledges hybridity and views it as something leading to go-betweens among boundaries and cultures and says:

If I were to apply this notion of complicated entanglement to my own personal situation, I would describe myself as suspended in-between: neither truly Western nor authentically Asian; embedded in the West yet always partially disengaged from it; disembedded from Asia yet somehow enduringly attached to it emotionally. I wish to hold onto this hybrid in-betweenness not because it is a comfortable position to be in, but because its very ambivalence is a source of cultural permeability and vulnerability that is a necessary condition for living together in difference.

To sum up, hybridity is everywhere. It can occur beyond boundaries, and these boundaries are not the endings but the beginnings of new identities. One's being mixed of two races, may lead to his/her feeling as in-between or ambivalent, yet it does not mean they are half. Rather those individuals have the advantages of going between different cultures and boundaries.

#### **2.9.4 In-betweenness**

As discussed in the first chapter, identities are not fixed. They always tend to change, especially when they are in contact with other cultures. During these interactions, in-between spaces where cultural differences and different identities are revealed and recognized occur. According to Bhabha (1994, 2), "it is in the emergence of the interstices – the overlap and displacement of domains of difference – that the intersubjective and collective experiences of *nationness*, community interest, or cultural value are negotiated". This contact produces in-betweenness which is also always changing as Linda McDowell (1999, 215) states:

Instead of identities of 'oppositional' or 'minority' groups being constructed as different from a 'norm,' it is now asserted that all identities are a fluid amalgam of memories of places and origins, constructed by and through fragments and nuances, journeys and rests, of movements between. Thus, the 'in-between' is itself a process or a dynamic, not just a stage on the way to a more final identity.

According to Robins (1996) for the dynamism of cultural identities, these interactions are crucial because through the gaze of the other one knows his identity. Therefore, every culture needs to accept differences as Robins (1996, 64) suggests we need to be open to cultural exchange because "progress can only be achieved through cultural receptiveness and reciprocity." Likewise, Ricoeur (1992, 123) states we need to be ready "to cross our memories, to exchange our memories". Whether

one wants it or not, today it is difficult to be close to changing; that is why it is unrealistic to think of societies and cultures as pure and uncontaminated, in particular due to global market, technology and migrations.

According to Eliot (1949, 63-4), with migrations “the people have taken with them only a part of the total culture... The culture which develops on the new soil must therefore be bafflingly alike and different from the parent culture.” For Bhabha (1996, 54), this ‘part’ culture that Eliot mentions refers to both cultures’ boundary and connectedness as “it is indeed something like culture’s ‘in-between’, bafflingly both alike and different.” To live such an likeness and difference together does not require one to migrate to a different soil. In fact, in the same nation we see many minorities that are really different from the dominant group, yet alike them, still. They live both their cultures and the culture of the dominant group and they speak both their language and the language of the dominants. This situation is what Bhabha terms as “in-betweenness” and the ones who live this situation are mainly the hybrid as Bakhtin (1981, 360) states:

The hybrid is not only double-voiced and double-accented . . . but is also double-linguaged; for in it there are not only (and not even so much) two individual consciousnesses, two voices, two accents, as there are [doublings of socio-linguistic, consciousnesses, two epochs . . . that come together and consciously fight it out on the territory of the utterance. . . . It is the collision between differing points of view on the world that are embedded in these forms . . . such unconscious hybrids have been at the same time profoundly productive historically: they are pregnant with potential for new world views, with new 'internal forms' for perceiving the world in words.

On the other hand, Weiner & Richards (2008) argues hybridity is not being lived just among today’s immigrants; yet it was under consideration in the past as well but they were called ‘multicultural individuals’ instead, resembling marginal men with “no clear boundaries between him and himself and the varieties of cultural contexts he may find himself in” thus he is “very much a formative being, resilient, changing, and evolutionary” (Adler, 1974, 369-71). Weiner & Richards (2008) say that until the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century, European immigrants were considered as living an ‘in-between’ status because they were neither black nor completely white. Likewise, Robert Park (1928, 892) states hybrids live “the cultural life and traditions of two distinct peoples”, they are neither ‘one’ nor the ‘other’ as they live two-ness and in-betweenness, and “because they spent time in two different worlds impacting both aspects of their identity, work and home, people could not choose one identity, over another” (Weiner & Richards, 2008, 104).

### 2.9.5 Mimicry

Mimicry reveals something in so far as it is distinct from what might be called an itself that is behind. The effect of mimicry is camouflage . . . . It is not a question of harmonizing with the background, but against a mottled background, of becoming mottled - exactly like the technique of camouflage practised in human warfare (Jacques Lacan, 1977, 99).

Mimicry, as the name suggests, is the imitation of one by others. In Webster's New World College Dictionary, it is defined as "close resemblance, in color, form, or behavior of one organism to another or to some object in its environment... it serves to disguise or conceal the organism from predators." In postcolonial studies, mimicry is significant because the colonized try to imitate the colonizer so as to resemble him; therefore it can be considered as camouflage as it paves the way for the colonized to move towards the colonizer. Benefitting from the relation between mimicry and camouflage proposed by Jacques Lacan, Bhabha (1994) states that "colonial mimicry is the desire for a reformed, recognizable 'Other', *as a subject of difference that is almost the same, but not quite*". Here, what is important is that however much the colonized or the minority try to resemble the majority, he is still "almost the same, but not quite" because "the discourse of mimicry is constructed around an *ambivalence*; in order to be effective, mimicry must continually produce its slippage, its excess, its difference" (Bhabha, 1994, 86).

Most of the migrants try to resemble the natives and they try to imitate them. However, they often fail because "they haven't got the right accent, the right shade of skin, the right first name, the right family name or the proper papers, so they are soon found out" (Maalouf, 2003, 39). Although mimicry seems to represent similarity, it "emerges as the representation of a difference that is itself a process of disavowal" (Bhabha, 1994, 86). In other words, it shows similarity between two groups; yet on the other hand, due to slippages it signifies the difference itself seeing that it is "the sign of a double articulation; a complex strategy of reform, regulation and discipline, which 'appropriates' the Other as it visualizes power" (Bhabha, 1994, 86). Hence, through mimicry the colonized resists assimilation by means of imitating the colonizer. That is why the colonized prefers to be almost the same but not quite.

Individuals experiencing mimicry may not be able to conceal their own identity. In his great book, *Black Skin White Masks*, Fanon (2008, 4) reveals how the Black, through mimicry, tries to be like the White as he asserts "for the black man

there is only one destiny. And it is white.” The oppressed try to be the same as the oppressor so as to be accepted by them, which is not acceptable seeing that they lose their real identity for the sake of acceptance of the superiority.

Fanon (2008, 1) starts the book asking the questions “What does a man want? What does the black man want?” and he answers “at the risk of arousing the resentment of my colored brothers, I will say that the black is not a man” seeing that he feels ashamed of his identity and tries to turn into the white with the aim to “prove to white men at all costs, the richness of their thought, the equal value of their intellect” (Fanon, 2008, 3). However, as mentioned above, although they try to mimic the superiority, they can not escape from slippages that reveal their differences indeed. These slippages show themselves especially in language. Fanon (2008, 8) states “to speak is to exist” and it is “above all to assume a culture, to support the weight of a civilization”. Therefore; one’s mastery of different languages means his being close to that culture because the more one knows the others’ language the more he is welcomed by others. In fact, his adoption of a new language means his separation from his own group; that is dislocation. Yazdiha (2010) also asserts speaking of the other’s language implies acceptance of a role in that culture. So, no more this culture belongs to the other, but both of them have the chance of shaping it, and this is true for the language as well because from then on “the language no longer exists as it was; it has shifted in meaning” (Yazdiha, 2010, 34).

Imitating the superiority or the other culture is in order to feel equality with them and to be recognized by them, and this is realized through the ways of clothing, speaking, and expressions etc. Fanon (2008, 168-9) states that:

Man is human only to the extent to which he tries to impose his existence on another man in order to be recognized by him... It is on that other being, on recognition by that other being, that his own human worth and reality depend. It is that other being in whom the meaning of his life is condensed.

On the whole, as for the Blacks, mimicry is a way of resembling the Other; however it still shows its difference through slippages.

### **2.9.6 Ambivalence**

Ambivalence means experiencing contradictory feelings at the same time. This case is lived especially when one is hybrid; in other words, when one lives two cultures, speaks two languages, and has two different ways of life together etc.

Weiner & Richards (2008, 102) argue in the United States, many immigrants have gone through that ambivalence process “between their hopes for being a part of the American citizenry while simultaneously desiring to retain elements of their homeland cultures”, and that ambivalence resulted in “a close connection between the notion of identity and the awareness of belonging to a distinctive group set apart from others in American society” (Gleason, 1992, 141, cited in Weiner & Richards, 2008, 102). Immigrants or others living hybridity, sometimes attune their identities to the contexts in question, that is, they show their homeland culture when they are with someone from their homeland, and the other culture when they are with others.

The condition of ambivalence is best understood in the following poem:

A part of me is every person  
Another part, depthless depth, is no one  
A part of me is the multitude  
Another part strangeness and solitude  
A part of me ponders, weighs  
Another part raves  
A part of me eats lunch and dines  
Another part is easily frightened  
A part of me is always constant  
Another part knows itself in an instant  
A part of me is dizzying change  
Another part language  
Translating one part into the other part  
Which is a matter of life and death  
Could it be art?  
(Ferreira Gullar)

As can be understood from the poem, ambivalence is the condition of living contradictory feelings. As one can be ‘every person’ and ‘no one’ at the same time; or one part can be ‘multitude’ yet the other part ‘solitude’. This is what hybrid individuals experience in their daily lives. They sometimes feel one of their race, sometimes both of them, and sometimes neither of them.

Hesse-Biber & Barko (2008) argue that people of color have role-conflict because of their dual identity and they are sometimes regarded as “insiders” but sometimes “outsiders” because they appear “too white” to their friends of color but “not white enough” to their white peers. In their study on African-American hybrids, they found that interviewees mostly felt ambivalent because they were forced to choose one side or the other side; and so they felt as divided. In fact, such people are “able to negotiate multiple spaces, and yet not a member of either group or world”

because they are at the “Third Space” or at an “in-between” space, not fully one nor the other but two of them together” (Hesse-Biber, Barko, 2008, 198). For instance, Rasheed Araeen (1992, 89), an artist, sculptor, painter and a writer, describes the ambivalence he lives and reflects upon the situation as follows:

I was born in India, when India was under the British Raj. As a teenager I grew up, spent my early youth and was educated in Pakistan. At the age of 29, inspired by the West’s achievement in art in the 20th century, and to fulfill my own aspirations to be a modern artist, I left my country to live in Europe. I have now lived and worked in London for 27 years. I often travel to Pakistan to see my mother, brothers and sisters and also some friends. I can say I’m Asian, Indian, Pakistani, British, European, Muslim, Oriental, secular, modernist, postmodernist, and so on. . . . But what do these mean? Do they define my identity? Can I accept all of them as part of my life, or must I choose one thing or another according to someone else’s notion about my identity? I have no problem in saying that I am all of these things, and none of these things at the same time.

Araeen has many allegiances at once, but he does not complain about that because he has the chance of choosing any of them at any time or rejecting all of them; yet if he is forced to choose one of them, then he would feel ambivalent.

### **2.9.7 Third Space**

In the first chapter, it is argued that identities are context-bound and they are constructed through social interactions, and they are shaped by the mirrors of others. Therefore, in the third space we see how hybrid identities are shifted across contexts and interactions. Bhabha (1994, 1-2) states “‘in-between’ spaces provide the terrain for elaborating strategies of selfhood – singular or communal – that initiate new signs of identity, and innovative sites of collaboration, and contestation, in the act of defining the idea of society itself.” Departing from the resemblance to a stairwell, Bhabha (1994, 5) argues the Third Space unites the upper and the lower as follows:

The stairwell as liminal space, in-between the designations of identity, becomes the process of symbolic interaction, the connective tissue that constructs the difference between upper and lower, black and white. The hither and thither of the stairwell, the temporal movement and passage that it allows, prevents identities at either end of it from settling into primordial polarities. This interstitial passage between fixed identifications opens up the possibility of a cultural hybridity that entertains difference without an assumed or imposed hierarchy.

Also, Brunsma & Delgado (2008, 337) study on how in the third space multiracial identities occur and show how “multiracial identity is a constant process of ‘doing race’ (Lewis, 2003) or its interwoven process, ‘doing racial identity’ – racial identity is both active and directed work.” Examining Black-White multiracials they assert that multiracial hybrids see themselves multifacetedly “as black, as biracial (either unvalidated or validated by others), as white, as ‘protean’ (shifting via context), and as ‘transcendent’ (no salient racial identity)” which changes according

to “their social networks, feelings of closeness to blacks, social class, family structures, and, indeed, their appearance” (Brunnsma, Delgado, 2008, 342). Hence, they are not bound to just one culture and one identity like their one-raced pers because of their in-between status. The Third Space gives that opportunity, and it has a crucial role in intervening binary race and nation narratives, being against dominant hegemonies.

Kalra, Kaur & Hutnyk (2005, 70-1) state “hybridity has come to mean all sorts of things to do with mixing and combination in the moment of cultural exchange”, thus, “the hybrid is a usefully slippery category, purposefully contested and deployed to claim change.” They argue that hybridity is the means of resisting essentialism which supposes nations and cultures as pure. Mitchell (1997, 258) also asserts these spaces are “theorized as important positions in the tactical war against dominant hegemonies”. Living in these third spaces, the hybrid stands for pluralism and non-fixity. They are neither at one place nor the other, but in-between and “because of its neither-nor nature, hybridity is celebrated as a process rather than a thing; its inherent resistance to fixed binaries causes it to remain in a perpetual state of flux, related to and yet not originating from or causing other moments, spaces, or entities” (Mitchell, 1997, 260). For instance studying on bi/multiracial Maori women, Moeke-Maxwell (2008, 239) comes to the conclusion that “having more than one cultural ethnicity does not reduce the “value” of what it means to be Maori.” Rather, they have many ways to show they are Maori. Their being hybrid proves pluralism and fluidity of their identities.

Through globalizations and especially migrations, third spaces have become in-between states against the hegemonic narratives of race, culture and nation, by means of fusing the dominant and the subordinate cultures in that very common space, and opening the way to other possible spaces being against essentialism and purity of cultures, indeed as Bhabha (1990, 211) states “for me the importance of hybridity is not to be able to trace two original moments from which the third emerges, rather hybridity to me is the ‘third space’ which enables other positions to emerge.” The Third Space reveals the dynamic nature of culture. It implies cultures are always in process of construction as Bhabha (1994, 247) expresses “the great, though unsettling, advantage of this position is that it makes you increasingly aware

of the construction of culture and the invention of tradition.” Thus, the Third Space is where cultures meet and go into new constructions.

Also, the Third Space paves the way for choosing different identities at the same time. Yazdiha (2010, 33) says it gives the hybrid a freedom to move between identities and this movement reflects the power of the hybrid because “the management of these identities becomes its own sort of performance, as the body negotiates each consciousness in different spaces. Again, the ability to play multiple roles, to ‘pass’ in different arenas, carries significant power.” It deconstructs boundaries of race, language and nation, and “hybridity has the potential to allow once subjugated collectivities to reclaim a part of the cultural space in which they move” (Yazdiha, 2010, 36).

To exemplify, Helen Kim (2008, 250) studies on the second generation Korean-American women who “on an everyday basis, assume a hybrid identity” and argues hybridity is a way to break hierarchies in terms of race, ethnicity or gender as she states “indeed, for members of the second generation, arriving at a hybrid identity involves maneuvering social hierarchies based on intersections of race, ethnicity, and gender in addition to shifting norms that signal difference” (Kim, 2008, 246).

Furthermore; Lee (2008) also explores how Koreans in China and the US live in the third space and create a third identity that is “rooted in their local context but connected to the global”. They acknowledge their hybridity and try to keep both their local Korean and American identities. To achieve this, during such border crossings, it is mainly parents and grandparents that transmit Koreanness by means of language and food unique to Korea; but still they accepted they are American as well.

However; Lee observes among her interviewees the fact that hybridity is received differently in America and China. While China protected the differences as Hee Sook states “In China, there are many different races. The nation protects and maintains these cultural differences . . . Whether or not one was born in Korea, it is understood that Joseonjok have Chinese citizenship but roots in Korea” (cited in Lee, 2008, 298). America disregarding ethnic or racial differences placed all of its citizens as Americans. Therefore; Korean-Americans had difficulty in their internal and external life because if they were unable to assimilate to American culture they were

labeled as “fob” signaling their foreignness whereas if they forget about their Koreanness and fully assimilated into Americanness they were labeled as “Twinkie” meaning “yellow on the outside, white on the inside” (Lee, 2008, 306). So, one can say that hybridity is experienced differently in different societies.

Still, Cieslik & Verkuyten (2006) study on the Polish Tatars who have lived in Catholic Poland for more than 600 years thus have a hybrid identity comprising of their Tatar, Muslim and Pole identities at the same time. Hybridity is the rejection of the imaginary homogenous nations or identities, which emphasizes the heterogeneity and multiplicity instead. Through narratives, different identities become manifest however narratives are restricted politically, historically and socially especially of those minorities. Cieslik & Verkuyten (2006, 81) argue hybridity depends on those narratives; in other words, if there is openness to multiculturalism, then it would be easier to tell and accept their different identities because “hybridity in any real sense implies that one is able to claim and narrate desirable images and self-understandings in a variety of contexts and especially in public spaces” and this requires openness indeed. Examining the hybrid identity of Tatars, Cieslik & Verkuyten (2006, 85) find how Tatars live their Oriental history, their religion –Islam-, and Polish-ness together without any contradictions, which is what makes them unique because “being *Polish* Tatars is stressed as distinguishing them from Tatars elsewhere”. Although having different identities raise questions regarding how they are dealt with, the case of Polish Tatars show it is indeed possible to be hybrid and keep different identities at the same time and to give importance to all of them. In fact, multiple identities are managed in two strategies; in the first, definition of identity through history and imagined community is emphasized, and in the second one, which is spiritual, connection or belonging to multiplicities is stressed.

## **2.10 Summary**

In this chapter, it is argued that individuals are not composed of just one identity but many, namely role, social, cultural, personal, self, ethnic, collective, multiple and hybrid identities. Also, it is argued identities are not stable; rather they change with new encounters or in new places.

When individuals live in a different culture, they become acculturated and integrated into it inescapably. As a result, they become hybridized because there is

no more a border between them and they start to know and live both cultures. Globalization has fastened this process, leading to smoothening of the borders; thus, encountering of the differences.

Moreover, hybrid individuals can feel in-between or ambivalent because of the Third Space they are in. Also, they can sometimes mimic the other so as to resemble them. So, it is argued that these individuals have many allegiances, each of which makes them richer. Although they can sometimes feel in-between or ambivalent, they have the chance of attuning themselves to different cultures.



### **3. KURDISH IDENTITY IN TURKEY**

In this chapter, the history of the Kurdish identity is examined because without the knowledge of the Kurdish identity, the findings of the study may not be understandable. Hence, the Kurdish nationalism was examined vis-à-vis the Turkish nationalism because it is assumed both provoke each other and cannot be thought apart. Then, five stages of Kurdish nationalism by Yavuz (2001) were presented. After that, assimilation and settlement of the Kurds, followed by exclusive recognition by Saraçoğlu (2011) towards the Kurds were discussed. This background was given to set the stage for the hybridization processes of the Kurds. In other words, this study adds a new stage to Yavuz's five stages which is the hybridized Kurds. It is discussed the Turks and the Kurds live together and they inescapably affect each other. On the one hand, the Turks have become Kurdified; on the other hand the Kurds have become Turkified. So, this chapter moves towards hybridization through interethnic marriages.

#### **3.1 A Brief History of the Kurds of Turkey**

Bruinessen (2013) argues the Kurds started to live under other state's sovereignty during 1450s with Karakoyunlus. The tribes were loyal to the ruler; however in 1467 after the war between Karakoyunlus and Akkoyunlus, Kurds got under the control of Akkoyunlus who wishing not to leave any place for rebellion, firstly killed the foremost Kurdish men, and made their own men governors of provinces. After Akkoyunlus, Safevis dominated Kurdistan, and they followed Akkoyunlus in killing Kurdish foremost men and making their own men governors of provinces. Experiencing so much difficulty on their lands, Kurds indispensably wished to get help from someone, and this was the Ottoman Empire during that time, 1500s. Setting their hopes on the Ottoman, the Kurds declared their devotion to Selim. Subsequently, as they lived on lands too difficult to reach, they were left autonomous dependent on the Empire. As a result, they did not have to pay taxes for central treasure nor did they have to go to do their military service. However, in the

19th century, emirates were begun to be abolished to strengthen the central power, which continued in the 20th century as well.

According to Bruinessen (2013), until the mid of the 19th century, in Kurdistan there were different tribes or emirates more like to the states; though independent inside, more or less bound to an outer power which changed as the power changed owners in Kurdistan, whose leader –*agha*- had a specific land, thus, power over the others who were mainly peasants. There were always quarrels among different tribes which indispensably resulted in “blood feud” that lasted for many years with many deads, which is very clear in Han’s (1971, 24) words who emphasizes that “Kurds do not conform to each other; there is not alliance and cooperation among them”, and continues “except for the Islamic confession of faith, there is not any bond binding them” which explains why Kurds, though intended, could not wholly come together, indeed. This is also clear in one of the most important Kurdish poet, Ahmed-i Hani’s epic, *Mem u Zin* (cited in Bruinessen, 2013, p.390):

I wish there had been harmony among us,  
If we had obeyed someone among us,  
He would have dominated Turks, Arabs, Persians, all of them,  
We would have perfected our religion and government,  
And we would have educated ourselves in knowledge and understanding.

Furthermore, since Kurds had always lived in mountainous lands, they were difficult to reach while also the possibility of the contact among them was low. Hence, they were always a buffer society between two or more different rulers. On the other hand; “isolation and an often pastoral way of life in many areas contributed to the development of a strong clan and tribal structure that perpetuated political and regional divisions” as well (Barkey, Fuller, 1998, 6).

### **3.2 Kurdish Nationalism vis-á-vis Turkish Nationalism**

Kurdish nationalism is not easy to understand without taking a look at Turkish nationalism. However, still to understand both of them, one needs to know the term ‘nationalism’ first. Nationalism is the construction of, with Anderson’s (1991) words, “imagined communities” in pursuit of finding a commonality to gather around. In the past, what gathered people around a mutual interest was, as Anderson

(1991) argues, either religion or dynasty. Soon, nation has perceived to come to replace religion and dynasty realm. For Anderson (1991), nations are imagined, limited and sovereign. They are imagined because although no one knows each other in a nation, they have the same imagined “community” as their nation in their mind. On the other hand, nations are “limited” seeing that “even the largest of them, encompassing perhaps a billion human beings, has finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations” (Anderson, 1991, 5). Lastly, they should be “sovereign”, in other words; they should be free by themselves. If a community is not sovereign, it is difficult to talk about its being a nation since first of all, it does not have an imagined sovereign space, and secondly, it does not have a sovereign flag and language.

On the other hand, according to Hobsbawm (1995) the word ‘nation’ was used for the religious group who held the political and cultural authority in 16th century. There was not any political meaning attached to the word; rather as Kedourie (2009, cited in Dursun, 2013) says it was used to emphasize the people who shared the same culture. However, from 18th century then on, its meaning has changed from the people sharing the same culture to “a government or a politic unit that recognizes a common governing center which is superior to everything” (Hobsbawm, 1995, 30). As for nationalism, Özkırımlı (2009, 285-6) states that it is a concept consisted of three basic features which are “1- nation is superior to everything, 2- nation is the only source of legitimacy, and 3- the world is divided into two, as ‘we’ and ‘others’, ‘allies’ and ‘enemies’”.

After the definitions of nation and nationalism, we can look at Kurdish nationalism. According to Saraçoğlu (2011, 2) the “Kurdish question” has been discussed in two contexts: the first is that “the state long denied the presence of the Kurds in Turkey as a distinct ethnic group and limited their ethnicity-based political and cultural rights” and the other is about integration into the EU as “the Kurdish question is seen as one of the most important obstacles to Turkey’s integration into the EU” whereas according to Yavuz (2001), Kurdish nationalism has five stages in each of which the state’s policies have been determinant to a great extent.

The first stage encompasses the years between 1878-1924 when, as a response to the centralization policies of the Ottoman Empire, Islamic networks such as Nakşibendi and Kadiri were politicized and “Kurdish ethnic awareness evolved

within the framework of Islamic consciousness” (Yavuz, 2001, 5). However; at that stage the Kurds did not want to get separated from the Ottoman Empire as they were loyal to the Caliph and Islam deeply. Yet, as Karabekir (1997) states the brotherhood between Kurds and Turks which started during Yavuz Sultan as a result of tribes’ pledging allegiance to the Caliph suffered from the Turkish nationalism fired by Young Turks during the late Ottoman period. So, the second stage (1925-1961) covers the years of the transformation from a ‘multi-ethnic’ Ottoman to a ‘nation-state’. During these years, a homogenization project was applied to create one nation-one people either by disregarding the diversity or compelling the diversity to be Turk, which inescapably activated Kurdish tribes against the reforms of Mustafa Kemal seeing that on the one hand the religion’s role in bounding people from different races commenced to lose its importance; on the other hand, the new nation state “either denied the existence of the Kurds or reconstructed a political language to talk about the issue without pronouncing the word ‘Kurds’” (Yavuz, 2001, 2).

As for the third stage (1962-1983), it was the period of secularization of Kurdish identity as a result of the encounter with socialist ideology. Accordingly, this period emphasized economic inequalities between the Eastern and Western parts of Turkey and suggested socialist solutions, and Kurds intellectuals were regarded as leftist. It was followed by the 1980 coup as the turning point in Kurdish nationalism since many Kurds were imprisoned and many took refuge in Europe. Rather than compressing, the coup had the opposite impact by strengthening Kurdish nationalism, which eventually led to the fourth stage between 1983-1999 when the PKK took the responsibility to resist the Turkish state and to raise Kurdish political consciousness. The final stage is about “the ‘candidate Status’ of Turkey and the Europeanization of Kurdish question in Turkey” (Yavuz, 2001, 2) after the arrest of Öcalan in 1999.

### **3.2.1. Stage I: The Kurds during the Ottoman Empire**

In the Ottoman Empire, there was the ‘millet system’ based on religion stratification, not on ethno-linguistic or racial category (Yeğen, 1999). In this system, Sunni Muslims were privileged as they had the chance to “occupy a place in the Ottoman bureaucracy regardless of their ethnic background”, which means “as long as different ethnic groups belonged to the Muslim community, they were treated

equally as the ‘subjects’ of the Sultan” (Saraçoğlu, 2011, 38). Therefore; during the Ottoman Empire, the Kurds “were simply called *ra'yat* (subjects), without any ethnic label attached” (Bruinessen, 1992, 46). According to Saraçoğlu (2011), with the status of Caliphate, the bonding nature of the religion gained importance and it was only the religion which distinguished people, thus, cultural and ethnic differences within the Sunni population had no significance, indeed. In other words, “the notions of Kurdishness and the Kurds did not possess any political meaning in the eyes of the Ottoman rulers” (Saraçoğlu, 2011, 39). On the other hand, Yavuz (2001, 5) argues during the Ottoman Empire “religious identity shaped political loyalty”; so during the centralization of the Ottoman Empire Nakşibendi and Kadiri Sufis as well as sheikhs gained power, as a result of which “Kurdish ethnic awareness evolved within the framework of Islamic consciousness.”

However; towards the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the Young Turks took a Turkish nationalist approach in order to save the Ottoman state, which prioritized Turks over all other ethnicities, and therefore it excluded the Kurds. However; according to Saraçoğlu (2011), during this time, there was not still a complete change in the image of the Kurds. This is because at that time Turkish nationalism was weak, and that the support of the Kurds was crucial during the World War I especially in repelling the Armenians; hence the Kurds at that time were still “peripheral Muslim population” (Saraçoğlu, 2011, 43). For a unity against the Allied powers, it was necessary for Mustafa Kemal to emphasize “Muslimhood” in Anatolia rather than “Turkishness” during the war (Ahmad, 1993), and main objectives of the resistance movements were put as “to save the fatherland (*vatan*) from the foreign occupiers” (Saraçoğlu, 2011, 44). Thus, the Kurds were needed in that war regardless of their ethnicity.

During the resistance movements, statements such as “the Muslims who form one nation (*millet*), consisting of Turks and Kurds” and “the Muslim majority consisting of Turks and Kurds who for centuries have mixed their blood in an intimate relationship and who form the community (*ümmet*) of one prophet” were used so as to gather around religious affiliations against foreign powers (Zürcher, 2000, 164-5). Zürcher (2000) draws the attentions to the fact that in those statements, for the first time in the Ottoman history the Kurds were seen as a distinct group with political and cultural rights. On that basis, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk declares:

There are Turks and Kurds. We do not separate them. But while we are busy to defend and protect, of course, the nation is not one element. There are various bonded Muslim elements. Every Muslim element which makes this entity are citizens. They respect each other, they have every kind of right, racial, social and geographical. We repeated this over and over again. We admit this honestly. However our interests are together. The unity we are trying to create is not only Turkish or Circussian. It is a mixture of one element (cited in McDowall, 2000, 188).

McDowall (2000) argues, during the later stages of the resistance, Mustafa Kemal even talked about giving autonomy to the Kurds stating “whichever provinces are predominantly Kurd will administer themselves autonomously” (cited in McDowall, 2000, 189). In fact, at the Lausanne Conference, İsmet İnönü asserted the Kurds’ being a distinct ethnic group with cultural and political rights, emphasizing that they are “not a minority, but an integral part of the nation entitled to state-guaranteed cultural rights and freedoms” (Saraçoğlu, 2011, 48). Although the attitudes and beliefs were like that during the war, after the foundation of the Turkish Republic there were radical changes in the attitudes towards the Kurds.

### **3.2.2. Stage II: The Kurds during the Turkish Republic**

On 29 October 1923, Mustafa Kemal declared the new form of the state as a Republic, which no more relied upon Muslimhood but Turkishness, and “in the discourse of the new Turkish state, the Kurds were neither the loyal Muslim subjects of the Sultanate nor a component of the Muslim nation with ethnic and racial distinctiveness” (Saraçoğlu, 2011, 48). Yavuz (2001, 7) says “the transition from a multicultural cosmopolitan Ottoman empire to a Republican Turkey resulted in the promotion of a homogenous secular nationalism that did not tolerate diversity and insisted that all inhabitants become Turks.” In fact, as Yeğen (2006) states the Kurds were perceived as “prospective Turks”, so they needed to be assimilated into the “Turkish nation” with the purpose of protecting the unity of the Turkish nation.

According to Saraçoğlu (2011, 49, also see Zeydanlıoğlu, 2008), the main aim of the new state was to “abolish all remnants of the Ottoman political system and to replace it with a new secular national state” and this could be achieved through suppressing the Islamic nature of the state and assuming a secular national identity instead. The state was no longer based on Muslimhood, rather ethnicity and nationalism became the most significant aspects.

Barkey & Fuller (1998) state the Kemalists so much intended on building a ‘modern’ state that they ignored the periphery for the sake of the center. Seeing that from then on Turkish nationalism was the ideology of the state, Turkishness became

the diagnostic characteristic of not only the state but also the society as Saraçoğlu (2011, 50) states “The ‘Turk’ was no longer conceptualized as one of the equal components of the Sunni Muslim population in Anatolia; rather, it functioned as a demarcation that distinguished nation, state and society from ‘others’.” These ‘others’ were thought to be easily assimilated into Turkishness as there was a shared religion that united them.

Likening Kemalism to Orientalism of Said, Zeydanlıoğlu (2008, 4-5) says the Kemalists took “‘White Turkish Man’s Burden’ in order to carry out a civilizing mission on a supposedly backward and traditional Anatolian society enslaved by the retrograde influence of Islam”, and “the ethnic, religious and linguistic diversity of the society were constructed as a source of instability and a barrier to progress.” Therefore; Kemalism pursued to be Westernized from above without taking the plurality of the society into consideration, so “since Western modernity, superiority and strength was defined by homogenous nation-statehood and militarism, systematic Turkification became Kemalism’s very own civilizing mission” (Zeydanlıoğlu, 2008, 6). The Kurds were tried to be Turkified through ‘forgetting and denial’ processes as they were supposed to have forgotten their pasts so needed to find the truth, and these truths were shown with the slogans written on the mountains, hills and school etc. such as “How happy is the one who says I am a Turk”, “One Turk equals the world” and “One language, one people, one flag” (Zeydanlıoğlu, 2008).

It is an undeniable fact that Kurdishness gains meanings through Turkishness, so it is through Republic’s defining the borders and interpretations of Turkishness that Kurdishness also was shaped. Saraçoğlu argues there were three definitions of Turkishness: namely civic, cultural and ethnic, and all these meanings “refused to recognize the Kurds as a separate ethnic group”. The civic sense of Turkishness assumed “every citizen of the Republic of Turkey is considered ‘Turkish’ regardless of racial and ethnic difference” (Saraçoğlu, 2011, 51). As for the cultural sense of Turkishness, it emphasized a common culture shared by inhabitants of Anatolia, and because Islam greatly shaped the culture of Anatolia, non-Muslims were excluded from being ‘Turks’. Yet, the Kurds and other Muslim groups were regarded as ‘prospective Turks’. The last form was ethnic nationalism which defined Turkishness solely on Turkish ethnicity and race, and “traced the origins of the ‘Turks’ to the

Central Asian plateaus in ancient times, from where Turkish ethnicity was believed to have spread all over the world”; as such it privileged Turkish ethnicity over all others and “denied the existence of other ethnicities in Anatolia” (Saraçoğlu, 2011, 53). As a result, one can say that to be Turkish, one needed to be of Turkish ethnicity. In particular, with the foundation of Society for the Study of Turkish History and Society for the Study of the Turkish Language, and the theses named as the Sun Language Thesis and the Turkish History Thesis, ethnic Turkish nationalism was institutionalized. As such, Kurdish language was thought to be descended from Turkish, and the Kurds were thought to be Turks in the past but assimilated by the Persians and Arabs (Saraçoğlu, 2011).

Ethnic nationalism was felt especially in 1930s and 1980s as these were the times when Turkish nationalism was at peak. Yavuz (2001) argues while the new state was opposed to Islam, it used Islam to unite diverse groups within its borders and invited them to participate in jihad against the allied forces. However, after the 1925 Sheik Said Rebellion and abolition of the caliphate in 1924, the unifying nature of Islam became to break. In 1930-31 the revolt of Ağrı broke out, which was followed by the 1934 Law that dispersed the Kurds in the region. However, in 1937-38 there was another revolt in Dersim against assimilationist policies of the state. Yavuz (2001, 8) says “these three rebellions against the young and inexperienced Republic created a cumulative image of the people of the region as socially tribal, religiously fanatic, economically backward, and most important, a threat to the national integrity of the Republic of Turkey” (also see Zeydanlıoğlu, 2008), of which was put as a legitimization of the state’s steps towards the Kurds. The state “did not deny the existence of the Kurds, but rather developed a new discourse to speak about them without pronouncing the word ‘Kurd’ in the ethno-national sense” while presenting itself as “modern, secular and progressive” (Yavuz, 2001, 8). Hence, especially after the 1980 coup the Kurds went through difficulties as Kirişçi and Winrow (1997) state during these times the Kurdish language was banned and it was really difficult for the Kurds to express their culture or identity as it resulted in arrests immediately.

On the other hand, the components of Turkish identity were ‘Muslimness, Turkishness and secularism’, so anyone lacking any of these three requirements “fails to achieve full citizenship” according to Bilici (2009, 26). However, these

identities also had specific requirements; so as can be understood, during the Republic it was difficult to define both the Kurd and Turk as it is shown below:

You have to be Muslim but not religious. You have to get Turkified (i.e., adopt Turkishness as language and identification) but you don't have to be an ethnic Turk – even ethnic Turks had to go through this Turkification process. You have to be secular, but you have to support state-sponsored Islam (Bilici, 2009, 27).

Saraçoğlu (2011) argues when the Kurds wanted to assert their distinct identity, civic and cultural nationalism were put forward so as to suppress these demands, and the state applied to the idea “everyone living within the borders of the Turkish Republic who considers themselves Turkish is Turkish” (Robbins, 1993, 661). In fact, Saraçoğlu says the state used all three modes of nationalism with the purposes of both protecting the unity of the Turkish state and assimilating the Kurds into Turkishness. Moreover, this situation enabled the Kurds “to obtain equal rights and opportunities as long as they did not express their Kurdishness” which shows the aim of the state was to assimilate and integrate them into the Turkish nation (Saraçoğlu, 2011, 56). However, this was not so easy due to the fact that on the one hand, “according to the 1927 census, the Kurds constituted the largest non-Turkish ethnic group, with a population of 1, 184, 446 in a country that hosted 13, 542, 795 people in total” on the other hand the majority of the Kurds settled in Eastern Anatolia, which made it difficult to assimilate them (Saraçoğlu, 2011, 56).

On the whole, with Kemalist ideology, the Kurds in Turkey have been discriminated against, ignored and thus “the history of the Kurds in Turkey is a history of war, repression, a history of small victories and great losses” (Haddad, 2001, 88).

### **3.2.3. Stage III: Awareness of Kurdishness**

Yavuz (2001) argues during this period, the Kurdish identity moved away from tribal and religious leaders and was shaped by new intellectuals. With the establishment of DDKO (the Revolutionary Cultural Society of the East) in 1969, a mixture of Marxism and Kurdish nationalism, the consciousness of Kurdishness was tried to be raised, and it was the Alevi Kurds who were pioneering left-wing movements. Yavuz (2001, 9) says “in the late 1960s, the Kurdish identity question was expressed in terms of regional economic inequalities and suggested a socialist solution”.

Barkey & Fuller (1998) argues with the Democrat Party coming to the power in 1950, the Kurds for some time relieved from Kemalism's pressures and they even found opportunities of bringing their grievances to light. However, soon after the 1960 military coup that overthrew the Democrats, the Kurds again were exposed to discriminations; therefore "the 1960s were turbulent times: It was a period of left-wing mobilization, and many politically active Kurds threw their lot in with the Turkish Left in search of their 'national rights'" (Barkey, Fuller, 1998, 15). Disappointed by the Turkish Left, the university youth established left-wing explicitly Kurdish groups; such as the Democratic Party of Turkish Kurdistan. However, the most important one was the DDKO because it paved the way for other revolutionary Kurdish groups, in particular the PKK. Barkey & Fuller (1998, 15) says what is significant here is that "the older generation, whose traditional ties limited its rebellious temptations, was replaced with one raised with all the symbols of nation and state."

Although Yavuz's third stage encompasses the years between the 1960s and 1970s, it would be reasonable to mention two great events of the 1990s because they had great impact on the awareness of Kurdishness as well according to Bruinessen (1998), which are two great waves of people from Iraq to Turkey that greatly helped in awareness of Kurdishness in Turkey. The first one was in 1988 and "the arrival of these Iraqi Kurds had a great impact on public awareness in Turkey, among Kurds as well as non-Kurds. It was the first time people could hear Kurdish spoken on radio and television" (Bruinessen, 1998, 42), and the second wave of 1991 was so great that Turkey could not accept them but proposed a protected zone inside Iraq, which clearly showed distinguishing between Turks and Kurds as Turkey had accepted Turcoman beforehand (Bruinessen, 1998, 43). All these events brought the 'Kurdishness fact' to the stage, and as it will be discussed different approaches were followed subsequently.

#### **3.2.4. Stage IV: The Emergence of the PKK**

In 1980s, the Kurdish question took a new form with the rise of Marxist-Leninist organization, the PKK which was established to found a socialist Kurdistan in the Middle East. The PKK was founded on 27 November 1978 by Abdullah Öcalan (Yavuz, 2001). Regarded as the voice of the Kurds, the PKK gained support

from the Kurdish people in the Eastern Anatolia because they saw it as an escape from the assimilationist policies and the poverty (Saraçoğlu, 2011).

Beriker-Atiyas (1997) says the PKK demanded not only cultural and political rights but also federalism and even a separate state. These demands were regarded harmful to the unity of Turkey as a nation. So, the continuous conflicts between the state and the PKK along with poverty in the region forced the residents to migrate to the western cities to find safety. Saraçoğlu (2011, 77) argues after the 1980s, the Kurds migrated to the cities and they again lived through poverty and unemployment; as a consequence of which they mostly settled in gecekondu zones, which “brought about a clear spatial and socio-economic separation between Kurdish migrants and the rest of the population”. Along with these gecekondu, their Turkish-accent or speaking Kurdish immediately made it clear that they were Kurds, and led to their ‘otherization’. Those ‘otherized’ Kurds were the target of the PKK as Yavuz (2001, 12) argues, the PKK benefitted from those Kurds who moved to cities either to get education or find jobs but had difficulties in daily lives, and offered these displaced people “identity (Kurdish nationalism) and commitment to justice (socialist economic order)”. So, the 1980 coup had the reverse effect as rather than eliminating Kurdishness it even more provoked it because the PKK started its armed attacks just four years after the coup (Yavuz, 2001). The PKK has had a great role in raising the awareness of Kurdishness while on the other hand “unexpectedly popularizing and consolidating Turkish nationalism in Turkey”. Hence, Yavuz (2001, 11) says “as a result of the PKK terror campaign against all walks of Turkish life, Turkish nationalism has been popularized and articulated in almost all public gatherings”.

Although it claims to be representing the Kurds, Bruinessen (2015, 7-8) says the PKK’s nationalism was “never purely ethnic, for the party has always acknowledged the existence of, and granted equal rights to, other groups in Kurdistan as well as co-operated with ideologically close non-Kurdish organizations” and “the presence of non-Kurds among its founding members and political leaders was a matter of pride and considered an expression of revolutionary internationalism.” In the name of Kurdish identity and Kurdishness, the PKK destroyed the lives of both the Turks and the Kurds alike, on the other hand it has been one of the major instruments of increasing both Kurdish awareness intentionally and Turkishness unexpectedly as Yavuz (2001, 12) states:

It consistently targeted the educational infrastructure in the region, branding the public schools as 'instruments of Ankara's assimilation policy.' The PKK reportedly killed two hundred teachers and destroyed 150 schools to 'stop assimilation' and it blew up bridges, hospitals and slaughtered 'collaborators.' It killed Kurds and Turks alike so long as the victims were perceived as pro-state. The PKK and its leadership never tolerated dissent from the party line and considered assimilated Kurds as the 'biggest enemy'.

### **3.2.5. Stage V: The Kurdish Question from Different Parties' Perspectives and the EU**

Saraçoğlu argues until the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the Kurdish question was not seen as an ethno-political issue; rather it was reduced to either economic undevelopment or military security. Yet, in the late 1990s, with Turkey's will of integration into the EU, the Kurdish question has been started to be approached differently as it was understood that the underlying problem was neither the PKK nor the economy but the assimilationist approach of the state. Also, Bruinessen (1998, 39) states Turkey's Kurdish issue of the 1990s differ from that of the 1920s and 1930s because changing world environment inescapably weakened states' 'nation building' policies while "repressive measures directed at the expression of Kurdish nationalist sentiment have had the effect of strengthening rather than eliminating it".

The Kurds in Turkey continuously assert their rights to self-determination; and indeed they meet the requirements of self-determination by "having common historical tradition, ethnic identity, cultural homogeneity, linguistic unity, territorial connection and common economic life" as well as they "perceive collectively themselves as distinct people and have self-consciousness of being Kurdish" (Vezbergaitė, 2015, 8). However, this is not so easy unlike it seems to be because the 1982 Constitution prohibits any attempts to undermine the unity of the state.

Throughout the Turkish parliament, the Kurdish question was approached differently. For instance, The United Communist Party of Turkey (TBKP) defended that the main reason of that question lies in "the denial of the Kurdish people's existence, national identity and rights in Turkey" while the Socialist Party (SP) proposed a "democratic federal republic". As for the People's Labour Party (HEP), it advocated "the setting up of 'Kurdish provinces' and supported the activities of Kurdish military groups by calling them freedom fighters". On the other hand, the Socialist Party of Turkey (STP) demanded self-determination, as well as language and cultural rights for the Kurds. There were also Freedom and Democracy Party (ÖZDEP), the Democracy Party (DEP), the Democracy and Change Party (DDP), the

Emek Party (EP), the Democratic People's Party (DKP), the People's Democracy Party (HADEP), the Democratic Society Party (DTP) and the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) which supported the self-determination of the Kurds, cultural, political and language rights however closed by the Constitutional Court with the claim they undermine the unity of the Turkish nation (Vezbergaite, 2015, 9-11).

In 1991, Süleyman Demirel "acknowledged the existence of a 'Kurdish reality' in Turkey" and although he at the beginning saw giving cultural rights to the Kurds would end terrorism, he sooner changed his position and declared "unless terrorism comes to an end, cultural rights cannot be an item on the agenda"; and in 1994 also he proposed 'Constitutional Citizenship' which is based on constitutional rights rather than nationality; however he did not take a concrete step (Beriker-Atiyas, 1997, 442).

Democratic Left Party (DSP) on the other hand, saw the underdevelopment of the region not cultural or ethnic dimensions as the primary source of the problem. As for the National Action Party (MHP), it regards the Kurds as their brothers; yet it does not recognize a separate ethnic identity. So the MHP pursues "the Kurdish problem will stop if external support ends" and "military measures are the only way to deal with this problem" (Beriker-Atiyas, 1997, 443). On the other hand, Beriker-Atiyas (1997) states the Welfare Party (RP) regarded the issue as one of the regime problems and emphasized on Islam as the unifying factor. Abdullah Gül, for instance in November 1996 stated "Racist approaches to the conflict are wrong and may result in a civil war. The problem can only be solved by relying on one common denominator; Muslim brotherhood" (cited in Beriker-Atiyas, 1997, 444). This approach resembles the Ottoman Empire's attitude towards its Sunni minorities in which Muslimhood overshadowed any other differences and led to unity. Moreover, the leader of the party, Necmettin Erbakan was aware of the main reason of the problems; so he proposed the Kurds and terrorism should be treated separately and that violence and assimilation cannot solve the problem. Rather; what is needed is to give the Kurds the right to broadcast and educate in Kurdish.

Following the RP; the Motherland Party (ANAP) claimed as well as military action, there should also be economic and social measures. In its election declaration in 1995 the Kurdish issue was aimed to be solved with following promises: "(a) the state of emergency imposed by the government in the southeast would be abolished;

(b) the village guard system would be revised; (c) measures to enhance the right of self-expression would be taken; (d) resettled people would receive compensation for their losses; and (e) economic and social development of the region would be encouraged” (Beriker-Atiyas, 1997, 444).

As to the Republican People’s Party (CHP), being loyal to the principles as the unitary state and Turkish being the official language, along with military measures to the solution, it demanded democratization through freedom of expression, establishment of a Kurdish TV and other cultural rights. There was also the True Path Party (DYP) which saw the problem as a conflict between the PKK and the state and as an economic underdevelopment; so it proposed steps should be taken to improve the economy in the region especially in the realms of irrigation system, textile and animal husbandry. Furthermore; the Worker’s Party (IP) regarded the main reason of the problem as “the US interest in the region” and also demanded a change in the Turkish Constitution (Beriker-Atiyas, 1997, 444).

As can be seen, the Kurdish issue has been approached and dealt with differently throughout Turkish history. However, it was Turgut Özal who first launched the idea of “melting pot” and before his death he said “he was open to discussion of the idea of a federation” (Beriker-Atiyas, 1997, 446). After Özal, Necmettin Erbakan for the first time tried mediation; however the party confronted with lots of criticism; as a result they stepped back. Yet, Beriker-Atiyas (1997, 448) argues the parties mentioned above generally reduced the problem to one of economy and social conditions; hence they overlooked real solutions as “direct means to solve the problem, such as mediation and negotiation, are not welcomed”.

Also, there were different opinions as to the sources of the problem not a decided one, and more importantly Kemalist ideology “based on monocultural understanding of nationhood and the principle of protecting the unity of the existing Turkish state” still persisted (Beriker-Atiyas, 1997, 451). For instance, Kaya (2012, 2) suggests “the best solution, the best initiative is ‘We are Turkey Together’ and that all of us adopt the concepts ‘One Country, One Flag, One State, One Nation’”. Statements like I am this, I am that are what undermines our unity in Turkey.” Kaya (2012, 3) also argues the Kurds and the Turks are equal, and they are natural allies. So, “the energy spent on violence must be spent on Turk-Kurd brotherhood”. In fact, Barkey & Fuller (1998) argues the problem was an ethnic one, so it required an

ethnic solution. Economic and social improvements can solve the problem just to some extent, so an ethnic solution “that means clear recognition of the existence of the Kurds as a culturally distinct identity, and recognition of the rights of Kurds to express their culture fully under a system of cultural autonomy” will after all be required (Barkey, Fuller, 1998, 180).

On the other hand, the Kurdish issue gained a new direction after Turkey’s desire to be a member of the EU because this membership has to pass through the Kurdish issue as Yavuz (2001) says Turkey’s membership of the EU would be realized as soon the condition that “full implementation of democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and the protection of minorities” was met. So, for instance Mesut Yılmaz said “[t]he road to the EU passes through Diyarbakir... Democracy is the right of both the Turk and the Kurd” (Yavuz, 2001, 16-7).

### **3.3. Assimilation and Settlement of the Kurds**

Jongerden (2001, 81) argues Atatürk’s political heritages were “ethnic-nationalist ideology and an authoritarian state”. The first element pursued that “all citizens of Turkey are Turks”, and accordingly İnönü declared:

We are frankly [n]ationalis[s]... and [n]ationalism is our only factor of cohesion. In the face of a Turkish majority other elements have no kind of influence. We must turkify the inhabitants of our land at any price, and we will annihilate those who oppose the Turks or ‘le turquisme’ (cited in Barkey and Fuller, 1998, 10).

As can be understood, the first heritage ignored ethnic differences and prioritized Turkism over others. As for the second heritage, it was complementary of the first element because in order to found a single ethnic nation, an authoritarian state was needed. Based on these heritages, “portraying the status of Kurds *vis à vis* Turkishness is not so easy”, which is because the Kurds’ status has always been ambiguous as sometimes they were considered as members of the nation whereas sometimes they were considered outside of Turkishness (Yeğen, 2009, 597). They were exposed to both assimilation and discrimination; so Yeğen states the best way to define the Kurds in Turkey is “prospective-Turks”. However, “the idea that Kurds are prospective-Turks always has left open the way to a counter-perception that Kurds may not become Turkish”; and in these cases the Kurds were regarded as “outside of the circle of Turkishness, and were left subject to the discriminatory practices of citizenship” (Yeğen, 2009, 598) as well as Morton Abramowitz states in

the foreword to Barkey & Fuller (1998, xi) that “modern Turkey has never accepted the notion of a Kurdish ethnic minority with minority rights. Turks have readily accepted Kurds as Turks but have difficulty letting Kurds be both Kurds and Turks.”

Yeğen (2009) asserts that during the Republican period, the Kurds were not received as ‘prospective-Turks’; rather it was accepted that the Kurds had a different cultural and ethnic identity as Mustafa Kemal declared:

The general principle is that the various Muslim elements living in the country ... are genuine brothers who would respect each other’s ethnic, local, and moral norms [laws]. ... If one thing is certain, it is this: Kurds, Turks, Laz, Circassians, all these Muslim elements living within national borders have shared interests (cited in Yeğen, 2009, 598).

Before the Republic, acknowledging that the Kurds are of a different ethnic group, Atatürk even promised to give autonomy to them:

In accordance with our Constitution, a kind of local autonomy is to be granted. Hence, provinces inhabited by Kurds will rule themselves autonomously. ... [The] Grand National Assembly of Turkey is composed of the deputies of both Kurds and Turks and these two peoples have unified their interests and fates (cited in Yeğen, 2009, 599).

However, after the proclamation of the Republic, the status of the Kurds changed abruptly. The Kurds’ right to self-rule was banned with the 1924 Constitution as it stated:

Our state is a nation state. It is not a multi-national state. The state does not recognize any nation other than Turks. There are other peoples which come from different races [ethnic groups] and who should have equal rights within the country. Yet it is not possible to give rights to these people in accordance with their racial [ethnic] status (cited in Yeğen, 2009, 599).

As can be understood, the Kurds were no more seen as a distinct group deserving their own cultural and political rights; rather they were assumed to be Turkish citizens. The Kurds came to represent “either proper Turkish citizens or outlaws characterized by tribalism, religious reactionism, or banditry” (Yeğen, 2009, 599). Hence, Jongerden (2001) argues in the 1920s and 1930s, the Kurds were dispersed to throughout Turkey, and according to Bruinessen (2000, 79) “[t]he first deportations were simply reprisals against rebellious tribes. In later years, deportations became part of the concerted effort to assimilate the Kurds.” So, seeing that the Kurds were in majority to the east of Euphrates; in order to Turkify these parts, Bayrak (1994, 255) stated it was presumed necessary:

To settle Turks into the villages on the important roads; to rebuild Turkish villages; ... to render Turkish predominant; building schools, particularly girls-schools in such places of Kurdish region as Siirt, Mardin, Midyat and Savur where people speak Arabic; ... making those Kurds who are dispersedly settled in some of provinces in the west of the Euphrates Turkish.

Bayrak (1994) also says along with above mentioned precautions, Turkish immigrants were settled in those places to increase the number of the Turks in the region, and also the Kurds were dispersed to Turkish villages, both of which aimed to make the Kurds a minority. Moreover; Yeğen (2009) argues in 1934 the Settlement Law was enacted for the purpose of the Turkification of the Kurds either through dispersing the Kurds into Turkish areas or dispersing the Turks into the Kurdish areas, and accordingly the law declared that:

[The T]urkish Republic could not allow these people to exploit the facilities of being Turkish citizens without their devotion to the Turkish flag. It is therefore that this law has shown the means to assimilate these kinds of people into Turkish culture. ... The Turkishness of everyone who claims to be Turkish must be clear and certain for the state (cited in Yeğen, 2009, 603).

The second article of the law divided Turkey into three different zones in terms of the needs of Turkification as follows:

No. 1 zones are the areas deemed to be where the Turkish cultured population is dense. No. 2 zones are the areas separated for the migration and settlement of the population deemed to be assimilated into Turkish culture. No. 3 zones are the areas where settlement and residence are prohibited owing to the reasons related to health, economy, culture, politics, the military, and security (cited in Yeğen, 2009, 603).

Compulsory settlement policies were halted in the 1940s because firstly with the Democratic Party there was a more democratic environment; secondly after suppression of 1925, 1930 and 1938 rebellions, the Kurds were not expected to make troubles anymore; and lastly with the increase in urbanization, the Kurds themselves willingly migrated to the west to find employment. Therefore; from then on, less force was used to assimilate the Kurds. However, in 1990s, the Turkish state again applied to compulsory settlement as there were conflicts between the state and the Kurdish military forces. In fact, “according to a report written by a Grand National Assembly of Turkey commission, more than 3,000 villages were evacuated in the 1990s” (Yeğen, 2009, 604).

Yeğen (2009) argues along with compulsory settlement, the state used other means to assimilate the Kurds into Turkishness such as closing religious schools in Kurdish regions and prohibiting publication in Kurdish as well as prohibiting using Kurdish language. Moreover; the Surname Law of 1934 “prohibited using ‘the names of tribes, foreign races and foreign nations’ as surnames”, and Bruinessen (1997, 6) says with this law many Kurds have become “Türks, Tatars, or Özbeks” and the Provincial Administration Law of 1949 required the changing the names of places while Article 16 of the 1972 Population Law “prohibited giving Kurdish

names to newborns though it also never mentioned the Kurdish language by name” (Yeğen, 2009, 605).

Besides above mentioned measures, the state applied to boarding schools to assimilate the Kurds; hence, “a number of boarding schools were established in the Kurdish region with the aim of educating Kurdish boys and girls in an environment that physically separated them from their families and cultural habitat” as well as “campaigns like ‘Girls, Off to School’ and ‘Father, Send Me to School’ are further instruments of Turkification through education” (Yeğen, 2009, 605-6). However; Beşikçi (1969) argues though these boarding schools aimed to Turkify Kurdish students, they also helped to increase their awareness of Kurdishness accidentally. Besides, Bruinessen (1998) also states radio and television have been among the most powerful means of national integration because through these technologies even people in distant villages learned Turkish.

On the other hand, Yeğen (2009, 606) states like Kurdishness, Turkishness has also been ambiguous because “it has been both open and closed to non-Turks. In other words, Turkishness has been open to some non-Turks, but not to all of them.” According to Yeğen, the 1924 Constitution implied two meanings of Turkishness; namely “Turkishness as citizenship” and “Turkishness as such”. Non-Muslims were treated as constitutional-Turks so they were not suitable to be assimilated whereas the group of Turkish as such was Muslims in Anatolia who were suitable to be turned into Turk.

As such, Bruinessen (1997, 2) also observes in Zürcher that Kemalist conception of Turkishness is rather ambiguous seeing that while on the one hand it sees everyone living Turkish culture in Turkey as Turk, on the other hand it insists that one’s culture cannot be changed so easily, which implies the Kurds “would never be able to adequately adopt Turkish culture, and would therefore have to remain second-class citizens”. Bruinessen (1997, 2) benefits from Diyarbakır newspaper of 1932 in which Atatürk declares “The people of Diyarbakir, Van, Erzurum, Trabzon, Istanbul, Thrace and Macedonia are all children of the same race, veins of the same precious minerals” to show that the Kurds were at the beginning supposed to be from Oghuz Turks whereas they sooner were claimed to be ‘mountain Turks’. Bruinessen says the dilemma of the Kemalist ideology resides in the fact that in contrast to their declaration of everyone’s being Turk, “it is the Turks have to

unite and teach the others”, focusing on Mahmut Esat Bozkurt’s statement: “It is my firm opinion, and let friend and foe hear it, that the lords of this country are the Turks. Those who are not real Turks (öz Türk) have only one right in the Turkish fatherland, and that is the right to be servants” (cited in Bruinessen, 1997, 3). Still, Bruinessen again captures an ambiguity in the words of General İhsan Göksel who criticizes the 1982 Constitution because it assumes everyone as Turk through citizenship. For Bruinessen, the words below indicate on the one hand adoption of Turkish identity as prerequisite for full citizenship, on the other hand the impossibility of changing one’s ethnic identity:

'Citizen' is the general term for people living in the same fatherland. It is not possible to speak of belonging to a nation as long as there is not the combination of common language, custom and tradition, common descent and common history, the factors that give a nation its name. By accepting a person as a citizen we cannot change the blood in his veins and replace it with Turkish blood, we cannot take the values in his heart and mind and instead rebuild him physically and spiritually with Turkish culture, Turkish virtues, the rich history of the Turks and, if you wish, the racial superiority of the Turkish race. (...) You can make a person a citizen, but you cannot make him a Turk. (...) If we wish to identify citizenship and Turkishness, we should definitely include the element of adoption of Turkish identity. The person who cannot call out from his heart the words 'happy is who calls himself a Turk' cannot be a Turk (cited in Bruinessen, 1997, 3-4).

However; Yeğen (2009, 611-2) states although during the Republic, the Kurds were assumed to easily become Turk; this belief is not so strong today, stating:

The idea that Kurds are prospective-Turks is, at both the official and popular levels, not as strong as it once was. It is of course impossible to allege that this conviction has been abandoned entirely. Nevertheless, that connections are built between Kurds and various forms of non-Muslimhood and that the term “pseudo-citizens” is used to describe some Kurdish groups suggest that both the official and the popular perceptions of Kurds are now subject to a very fundamental change.

This belief decreased because of the fact that the Kurds resisted Turkification through supporting pro-Kurdish parties or demonstration on the streets; and the important point here is that the number of these Kurds were huge, which is “the main reason for the erosion in the long-standing image of Kurds as prospective-Turks” (Yeğen, 2009, 612). On the other hand, Turkey’s candidacy for EU membership also decreased the chances of assimilation. On the contrary, in 2009, TRT 6 –a 24-hour Kurdish language channel- was launched and the Higher Education Board (YÖK) allowed for Kurdish language and literature departments at universities, which enhanced the opportunity of one’s claiming his/her Kurdish identity (Yeğen, 2009). Also, Barkey & Fuller (1998) argues the assimilation policies were partially successful due to the geography (as most of the Kurds lived in far-reached areas), economics (as these areas were economically ignored) and the lack of resources

(insufficient resources to integrate those people), which is proved by the fact that today there are Kurds in the southeast and east who still cannot speak a word in Turkish.

### **3.4. Exclusive Recognition towards the Kurds**

The Kurds have not been accepted wholly by the society as Saraçoğlu (2011) says especially in the media the Kurds are depicted as culturally inferior, violent or separatist. Approaching to the question differently, Saraçoğlu studies on middle-class İzmirlis and tries to find how the Kurds are “recognized exclusively”. To understand this, one needs to know ‘exclusive recognition’ first, which is:

Neither a natural antipathy of individuals to ‘strangers’ nor an individual illusion stemming from exceptional experiences throughout the life course. Rather, it entails the responses of social actors to an assemblage of social structures and social changes, and hence it is always mediated by historical and social factors (Saraçoğlu, 2011, 35).

In big cities of Turkey the Kurds are recognized as a distinct group, but mostly with negative stereotypes and labels, and this “exclusive recognition” is interestingly just against the Kurds not towards other ethnic groups. What is more interesting is that this attitude is not shaped by an ethnical conflict as Saraçoğlu asserts there has been never an ethnic conflict between the ethnic Kurds and ethnic Turks; on the other hand it is not just about ethnic differences as there are many ethnicities in Turkey ranging from Circassians to Albanians, from Arabs to Bosnians, and their differences are almost “invisible” whereas exclusive recognition is exclusively applied against the Kurds in urban areas in particular.

Saraçoğlu proposes different stereotypes about the Kurds used to ethnicize them. One of them is “ignorant and cultureless” which is used with two meanings; one implies they are uneducated therefore they have problems regarding poverty, unemployment, and the other signifies “the Kurds’ alleged inability to comply with the basic rules of ‘good manners’ and etiquette in the city. In this sense, Kurdish migrants are conceived as lacking the cultural capital necessary for full incorporation into city life” (Saraçoğlu, 2011, 22).

Another stereotype is “benefit scroungers” according to which the Kurds get rich by “ill-gotten” money, “they steal electricity and water from the municipality, and more importantly they work in informal sectors and do not pay taxes to the state” (Saraçoğlu, 2011, 22). On the other hand, they are regarded as “disrupters of urban

life” as the Kurds are seen as the cause of insecurity in the city leading to crime and violence everywhere. Still another stereotype is “invaders” which assumes the increasing number of the Kurds implies the ‘Kurdification’ of the city and the Kurds purposefully give lots of births to occupy the city. Lastly, they are seen as “separatists” because of the 1990s conflicts between the PKK and the state. Although initially the Kurds were distinguished from the PKK, this tendency has started to move from “an extreme position of seeing the Kurds as completely unaffiliated with the PKK to another extreme position of seeing all Kurds as loyal sympathizers” (Saraçoğlu, 2011, 24).

### **3.5. The Kurds and the Turks as Hybrids**

Yazdiha (2010, 31) says “The contemporary cultural landscape is an amalgam of cross-cultural influences, blended, patch-worked, and layered upon one another. Unbound and fluid, culture is hybrid and interstitial, moving between spaces of meaning”, and this hybridity is seen in every corner of the society ranging from cuisine to music, from language to clothes, in which signs from both the colonized and the colonizer or both the dominant and subordinate, or both groups beyond borders can be observed. Raab & Butler (2008, 6) also point “in this process of countless interrelations, contestations, contacts, contrasts, and confluences, the ground is slippery; the structures, the languages, and the dividing lines are constantly changing and require our attention.” As a result, identities of individuals are also in the way of “becoming hybrid” through changing over time. Therefore; “hybridity, as a processual quality, and a resistance to (one-sided) definitions characterize not only national, cultural or ethnic group identities but also the identity of individuals” (Raab & Butler, 2008, 6).

As such, the Kurds and the Turks have lived together for many years. They become accultured; in other words, values, beliefs and attitudes compromising of specific cultures were shared together paving way for acculturation as Heper (2007) argues the Kurds and the Turks have become to share the same culture over the years of mutual acculturation living side by side; therefore one cannot talk about a distinctive identity but rather a hybrid one composed of properties of both identities. That is because they are influenced by each other either by interethnic marriages or cultural sharings as Kinzer (2001, 133) states “today Turks and Kurds live together

peacefully in cities and towns all over Turkey, often barely conscious of each other's backgrounds, and intermarry frequently." Therefore; "due to the centuries-old mutual acculturation on the part of the Turks and the Kurds, what those two peoples would end up sharing between them would be greater than on what they differ" (Heper, 2007, 11).

The Ottoman Empire was a multiethnic and multicultural state and it reinforced differences rather than eliminating them as Rodrique (1995) argues for the state differences had to exist because it ensured order so the state wanted to "freeze" them not "change" them. Differences were not transformed into sameness; rather they were integrated into the state. Heper (2007, 27) argues "ethnic transformation in the Ottoman Empire, to the extent it existed, emerged as acculturation rather than as forced assimilation. The acculturation in question was voluntary, or even unconscious." Also, he says "in the Ottoman realms one came across syncretism and hybridism rather than the hegemony of one element over the others" (Heper (2007, 177). Likewise; perceiving the nation as a cultural entity Gökalp (1992) also explains the Turks and the Kurds had a mutual religion and history that merged them both physically and culturally. Although the Kurds are ethnically different, they have come to have a hybrid identity after many years of interaction with the Turks as Gökalp (1992) states especially in the urban areas the Kurds go through Turkification process, and the Turks in rural areas go through Kurdification. Both meet at the Third Space and a new, hybrid identity is formed. Gökalp also suggests these kinds of mixing occur because "Turks and Kurds like each other. If there is a Turk who does not like the Kurds, s/he is not a Turk, and if there is a Kurd who does not like the Turks, s/he is not a Kurd" (Gökalp, 1992, 125). Heper argues this approach is continued during the Republic as well, and emphasis is given to common culture shared by different groups in the state.

The important point is that people have many identities not just one. One's being Kurd does not mean that in his all bones there is just Kurdish identity. In today's world, via migrations and technology in particular, sharing of ideas and values became easier. So, every time one new identity is added to the one already present. And globalization is one of the reasons contributing to this process because globalization has changed the traditional ways of encounters and it created identities beyond boundaries. This is true for the Kurds as well. Through the globalization and

migrations, they gain many new identities and merging them together they form a hybrid identity. What is significant is to keep differences along with acknowledging similarities with others. Ang (2003, 1) questions whether “we live together-in-difference” and says “we no longer have the secure capacity to draw the line between us and them, the different and the same, here and there” because we live in a hybrid world and hybridity is “a necessary concept to hold on” as “it foregrounds complicated entanglement rather than identity, togetherness-in-difference rather than separateness and virtual apartheid” and also it “prevents the absorption of all difference into a hegemonic plane of sameness and homogeneity”.

Likewise, for Zeyneloğlu, Civelek & Coşkun (2011), the fact that one speaks Turkish does not mean s/he is just Turk nor who speaks another language other than Turkish has another ethnicity. In fact, in Turkey there are transitions among different ethnicities. One is neither fully Turk nor another ethnicity; but there are moves from one to another, besides which there are always additions of new belongings to what has existed. This is the case for the Kurds as well. Especially, via education the Kurds have come to live these transitions. That the Kurds have a different language – Kurdish- does not hinder their belonging to the national group. On the other hand, their using Turkish does not necessarily imply they have been Turkified. Rather; this situation shows the eradication of borders and transitions among ethnicities. They have come to have a hybrid identity along with their Kurdish identity. Therefore; it would be wrong to say that the Kurds and the Turks are mutually exclusive categories because it is possible for a Kurdish to adapt a Turkish identity and vice versa as Zeyneloğlu, Civelek & Coşkun (2011, 367) state:

By ignoring the presence of maybe hundred thousands of adults with Kurdish origin who while speaking Kurdish with their own parents, speak Turkish with their children, and also try to transmit both belongings to their children, and by associating them with just one language and as a consequence of which with just one ethnicity means the ignorance of transition existing in the society.

However, some Kurds have had difficulty in participating these transitions. Education is one of the reasons because the number of educated Kurds was very low; “less than %10 of the men and less than %1 of the women whose mother tongue is Kurdish are literate” (Zeyneloğlu, Civelek, Coşkun, 2011, 361). Another reason is the endogamous family structure. Among the Kurds, it is common to get married to someone from the family like cousins. This is because “individuals or groups see the power and source of existence inside themselves (inside the ones who are included in

the definition of “we”) (Altuntek, 2001, 23). As a result, this situation may obstruct having different ethnicities inside because one’s interaction with others is made easier via exogamy marriages. Still another reason may be the status women have in the society because women have a great role in the development of the society. So, the more women participate in the social world, education, and work etc., the more the societies live fusions. For instance, in their study on Diyarbakır youth, Yanmış & Kahraman (2013) find the number of women who define themselves both Kurd and Turk is less than men. On the other hand, although girls were reluctant to get married to someone from a different ethnicity, in contrast boys were willing.

Zeyneloğlu, Civelek & Coşkun (2011) come to the conclusion that there are four groups in terms of having Turkish or/and Kurdish identity. The first group is the ones whose mother tongue is Kurdish and who cannot speak Turkish as a second language. This group does not participate in the social and trading life and also does not have education. The second group is the ones whose mother tongue is Kurdish but who can speak Turkish as well. The third group is the ones who do not speak Kurdish as the mother tongue but the second language; or who do not know Kurdish but whose parents’ mother tongue is Kurdish. These ones can be called “Turks with Kurdish origin” as well (Zeyneloğlu, Civelek, Coşkun, 2011, 367). And the last group is the ones who neither have a Kurdish origin nor speak Kurdish as a mother or second language. Hybridization for the first group may be difficult; but the other groups have the advantage of living differences.

On the other hand, Nuri Gültekin (2012, 159) studies on intermarriages between Kurdish and Turkish people and says “intermarriage between Kurds and Turks appears to date back at least a thousand years, to the historical invasion by Turks of Asia Minor during the 11th century” and proposes that intermarriages result in acculturation and integration of those people having different backgrounds, stating “these intermarriages events may contain one-sided or reciprocal assimilation of the couple, and integration of different ethnic culture or values” and that “one marriage may at first illustrate assimilation, followed later by integration. Similarly, assimilation can lead to integration, which in turn may lead to cultural hybridization” (Gültekin, 2012, 152).

Nuri Gültekin reminds the important role of marriages in peacemaking among tribes and exchange of cultures. During that process language and its carriers also

have a great role because it is the means of transferring and preserving culture. Gültekin analyzes two important studies made on intermarriage in Turkey; the first by a private survey company KONDA in 1992 and the second by Gündüz-Hoşgör and Smits in 2002. According to these studies, “the general form of intermarriage amongst Turks and Kurds is between Kurdish husbands and Turkish wives” and “another clear finding is the low rate of Kurdish wives within intermarriages” (Gültekin, 2012, 155). Both studies show the increase in Turkish-Kurdish intermarriages.

Gültekin (2012, 156) argues due to “semi-feudal values system” Kurdish women are kept at homes and regarded as “solely as an embodiment of ‘honour’ and as mothers not individuals”, that is why the number of Kurdish wives/Turkish husbands marriages is low. On the contrary, Kurdish men are free to take part in the outside world and as a consequence encounter others, and education is the first means of that, so

It is these educated men in the urban social environment who marry Turkish or non-Kurdish women. Conversely, marriages between Turkish men and Kurdish women, the latter of whom are imprisoned by traditional social structure, are prevented from increasing. These women cannot access the educational and modern opportunities men are able to. Thus we encounter more marriages between Kurdish husbands and Turkish wives (Gültekin, 2012, 156).

However, with migration to cities intermarriages between Kurdish wives and Turkish husbands also have increased. These Kurdish wives or husbands try to keep both of their identities, which can be seen in the Kurdish names they give to their children or Kurdish music they listen to or in Kurdish they speak with old people. In fact, “most Kurdish couples speak Kurdish between themselves, but the communication process in Kurdish is cut off when they communicate with their children at home; they speak Turkish with their children in order to support their school life and future interests” (Gültekin, 2012, 157).

To sum up, in Turkey defining a Kurd is difficult because many individuals identify themselves both as Turk and Kurd. Barkey & Fuller (1998) says it is really difficult to define them; so the best way is to apply to Bruinessen’s definition: “All native speakers of Kurmanji or Zaza, as well as those Turkish speaking persons who claim descent from Kurmanji or Zaza speakers who still (or again) consider themselves as Kurds” are the Kurds in Turkey (cited in Barkey, Fuller, 1998, 62). Also time changes this definition as well because “a second-generation (or third-

generation!) Kurd in Istanbul also has a rather different identity than a Kurd in southeastern Turkey” (Bonine, 2002, 301).

On the other hand, there are crucial differences among the Kurds as well. For instance, Bonine (2002, 302) states within Turkey some Kurds are Alevis, some are Sunni of the Shaf’i school whereas some are Ja’fari or “Ithna-Ashari (Twelver) Shi’I adherents”; so the Kurds “are a mixture of Sunni, Shi’a, Alevi, and other Cults of the Angels”. However, this division is not just about the religion but also the language as Bonine (2002, 302) states “even the Kurdish language itself is not a unifying factor for Kurdistan” because there are different dialects of the Kurdish language; the two main groups are “Kurmanji and Pahlawani”, and their subgroups “North and South Kurmanji; Zaza, Gurani and Laki of the Pahlawani” which are very different from each other, hence unintelligible to each others. However, in this study the Kurds of Bruinessen’s definition will be used; in other words, the Kurds who are speaking Kurmanji or Zaza.

On the whole, there are Kurds in Turkey who have become integrated into Turkish culture and hybridized inescapably. Barkey & Fuller (1998, 81) summarizes the reasons behind these processes as such:

- They may have elected to become Turkish, either as a result of the socialization process in schools and elsewhere, or, even if aware of their Kurdish origins, they may prefer to consider themselves Turkish as a result of a deliberate choice to belong to the larger, more powerful, and more prestigious Turkish mainstream.
- They may be deliberately concealing their Kurdishness and pretending to be Turkish.
- They may think that the politics of ethnicity is irrelevant or may be by and large apolitical.
- They may live in western and central Turkey and live and work in a purely Turkish environment, rendering Kurdish identity irrelevant if not forgotten.
- They may have lost any working knowledge of the Kurdish language.
- They may be the offspring of mixed marriages.
- It may be professionally more prudent for them not to state their Kurdish origins.
- To conceal any Kurdish origin may have certain opportunistic benefits, at the least to avoid possible problems, especially at a time of confrontation and rising Turkish national chauvinism in some circles.
- A handful may genuinely feel that Turkish culture is more advanced, may see the Turkish language as a greater vehicle for access to the world in general: to literature and the means of being part of an intellectual, business, and power establishment that is more attractive than a (deliberately) underdeveloped Kurdish culture.

### **3.6 Summary**

In this chapter, Kurdish nationalism was examined in proportion to Turkish nationalism. It was argued that the Kurdish nationalism has five stages. In the first stage, that is during the Ottoman Empire, the Kurds lived autonomously under emirates, and they were regarded as the same as the Turks because both of them were Sunni Muslims. However; in the second stage during the Republic, the Kurds were started to be discriminated, and they were regarded as ‘mountain Turks’, and were forbidden to speak Kurdish and perform Kurdish culture anywhere. In the third stage, an awareness of Kurdishness arose, which was followed by the fourth stage, that is, with the emergence of the PKK. In the last stage, the Kurdish issue became the hindrance to the entrance into the EU, so there were regulations such as a Kurdish TV channel and speaking Kurdish were allowed.

Also, in this chapter, it is argued although there are some steps towards the recognition of the Kurds, this recognition shows itself as exclusive recognition because especially in the big cities, the Kurds are still biased and recognized exclusively as separatist or benefit scroungers.

Moreover, in the last part, it was argued that there is a new stage of Kurdishness that is hybridization through interethnic marriages with the Turks. The interaction between these two ethnicities unavoidably has led to Turkification of the Kurds on the one hand and Kurdification of the Turks on the other hand.

## **4. HYBRID KURDS AND TURKS IN TURKEY**

The main purpose of this study is to see how the hybrid children of the interethnic marriages between the Turks and Kurds define themselves, where they belong to, how they approach to Turkish and Kurdish nationalism, and whether they feel in-between or not etc. So, gathering data is important seeing that there is little previous research on this issue. Hence, in this chapter, information about methodology which is semi-structured interview and the limitations of the study were given; and subsequently the data was analyzed in accordance with the research questions. Informants' hybrid identities, in-betweenness and ambivalence were chiefly examined. Moreover; advantages and disadvantages of being hybrid as well as their thoughts of Kurdish and Turkish nationalism were investigated through their narratives.

### **4.1 Methodology**

This research is based on the qualitative research method which “investigates the quality of relationships, activities, situations, or materials” with an aim to catch a complete picture as “there is a greater emphasis on holistic description – that is, on describing in detail all of what goes on in a particular activity or situation” (Fraenkel & Wallen, 2009, 422). Ary, Jacobs & Razavieh (2002, 25) state “qualitative researchers seek to understand phenomenon by focusing on the total picture rather than breaking it down into variables. The goal is a holistic picture and depth of understanding, rather than a numeric analysis of data.” Qualitative methods dwell on the words or pictures rather than numbers.

According to Bogdan & Biklen (2007 cited in Fraenkel, Wallen, 2009, 423), there are five features of the qualitative research. The first being “*The natural setting is the direct source of data, and the researcher is the key instrument in qualitative research.*” Here, the researcher directly investigates the situation; therefore the context is important for him/her as the surroundings also influence their behaviors. The second: “*Qualitative data are collected in the form of words or pictures rather*

*than numbers.*” Unlike quantitative methods, what is important here is not numbers but words, experiences, pictures, and feelings etc. and the researcher is aware of the importance of anything that may give information about the situation in question. The third one is: “*Qualitative researchers are concerned with process as well as product.*” They are not just bound to the results they gather, but the gathering process also has meaning because it gives insight to the situation as well. The other feature is that “*Qualitative researchers tend to analyze their data inductively.*” In qualitative methods, researchers do not have a complete picture beforehand; rather as they collect information their picture begins to take shape. The last feature is that “*How people make sense out of their lives is a major concern to qualitative researchers.*” In other words; for the researcher participants’ perspectives are important, so s/he tries to capture the feelings and thoughts of the subjects in the study not just report what s/he thinks true.

As one of the subcategories of qualitative research, interviewing method is used in that research. Interviewing is useful seeing that it is “an important way for a researcher to check the accuracy of – to verify or refute- the impressions he or she has gained through observation” (Fraenkel & Wallen, 2009, 445), and also it is crucial in reflecting what is in people’s mind which is always unobservable as Patton (1990) states:

We interview people to find out from them those things we cannot directly observe. The issue is not whether observational data is more desirable, valid, or meaningful than self-report data. The fact of the matter is that we cannot observe everything. We cannot observe feelings, thoughts, and intentions. We cannot observe behaviors that took place at some previous point in time. We cannot observe situations that preclude the presence of an observer. We cannot observe how people have organized the world and the meanings they attach to what goes on in the world. We have to ask people questions about those things.

Therefore; to go into the minds of people, interviewing method is chosen. On the other hand, in that research, semi-structured interviewing is chosen because unlike structured interview, this type is more flexible, thus leaves rooms for both the interviewee and the interviewer as Rubin (2005, 88 cited in Alshenqeeti, 2014, 40) states “it allows depth to be achieved by providing the opportunity on the part of the interviewer to probe and expand the interviewee’s responses”. Semi-structured interview is useful seeing that the researcher has the opportunity to change or skip questions or ask additional questions in the duration of interviews in proportion to the needs as Blandford (2013, 8) proposes one of the defining characteristics of semi-structured interviews is that:

They have shape... but not too much: that there is some structure to guide the researcher in how to organize a study, what data to gather, how to analyze it, etc., but that that structure is not immutable, and can adapt to circumstances, evolving as needed to meet the overall goals of the study. The plan should be clear, but is likely to evolve over the course of a study, as understanding and circumstances change.

Also, “many questions – or at least themes- will be planned ahead of time, but lines of enquiry will be pursued within the interview, to follow up on interesting and unexpected avenues that emerge” (Blandford, 2013, 23). Accordingly, in that research open-ended questions have been defined beforehand, leaving rooms for new questions to emerge during the interviews, and this open-ended nature of the questions “defines the topic under investigation but provides opportunities for both interviewer and interviewee to discuss some topics in more detail” (Mathers, Fox & Hunn, 1998, 2).

On the other hand, to find interviewees snowballing method, that is, “a process in which contact is made with participants appropriate for your research through whatever access route you can find, and through these first participants you are introduced to others of similar/ relevant characteristics for your research” was used (Edwards, Holland, 2013, 6). In fact, snowballing or, in another name, chain referral sampling is one of the most used methods in qualitative sociological research (Biernacki & Waldorf, 1981). It helps the researcher to reach people of research interest through referrals. Those referring people can be called ‘locators’ and they have two important purposes:

First, because of their particular pasts, occupations, social positions and / or lifestyles, they had relatively easy access to certain sources and, as a result, could make contacts for possible interviews more efficiently than could the researchers. Second, because the locators often knew the persons referred to the study, they could verify the respondents’ accounts (Biernacki & Waldorf, 1981, 152).

So, in this research first interviewees were found among friends, relatives, and soon with their referents more interviewees were included in the research. Below are the information about the interviewees and the results gathered.

#### **4.1.1 Interviews**

The research is based on the hybrids whose parents have made Turkish-Kurdish interethnic marriages. It does not matter whether the father or the mother is Kurdish or Turkish. The main point is that one of the parents is Turkish and the other is Kurdish. Accordingly, in Bursa, Istanbul and Erzurum, relevant informants were found through snowballing method. The researcher informed all her relatives and

friends about the research she is doing, and wanted to find someone meeting the requirements. After finding the interviewees, the researcher took their phone numbers and arranged an appointment with them.

The interviews were conducted between 15 March and 10 May, 2018. There were 15 interviewees chosen through snowballing method. When they were chosen, attention was given to their being from different age groups and different sexes. Accordingly, 8 of them were male and 7 of them were female from different ages and different jobs. 1 of the interviewees was illiterate, 3 graduated from primary school, 1 was still a student at secondary school, 2 graduated from secondary school, 1 of them graduated from high school while 3 of them were still at high school, and 3 of them graduated from university while 1 of them was still a university student. Although 7 of the interviewees know Kurdish language, the interviews were conducted in Turkish because it was easier for both the researcher and the interviewees to communicate.

In the first place, the researcher gave all necessary personal information about herself and explained what she is working on. Then, to make the participants feel secure, the researcher ensured the privacy of their personal information and told them their names would be invented and changed. After the basic information, the researcher explained the purpose of the study and the reason why she is working on this issue. Also, they were informed that if they are not satisfied with the given information, they could withdraw from the research.

With all of them, the interviews were conducted face-to-face and in Turkish. To keep the eye-contact, most of the interviews were recorded and they were soon transcribed. However; 2 of the interviews did not want their voices to be recorded; therefore, during these interviews the researcher took notes. The interviews were held at places suitable for the interviewees and they lasted for about thirty minutes. So, four of the interviews were held at the interviewees' homes; four at a café planned together, and the others at their working places. As required in semi-structured method, the interviews were held around the themes defined previously, and the questions were asked accordingly. Then, the questions were changed, rethought and evolved in accordance with the contexts. Whenever they did not understand the questions, the researcher either simplified the questions through examples or asked in a different way. Also, the interviews went on as a conversation

with the breaks of coffee and meal. The researcher asked questions on the themes such as fluidity of identity, belonging, in-betweenness, hybridity and nationalism etc.

On the other hand, to keep the identities of the interviewees, the researcher invented new names for the informants on purpose so as to comply with the ethical concerns of the study and informed them beforehand that their names would be changed. (You can find the informants in the appendix.)

#### **4.1.2 Limitations of the Study**

Although the Kurds mainly live in the eastern and southeastern part of Turkey, the current study chooses to study on the Kurds in Istanbul, Bursa and Erzurum. There are several reasons behind the choice of these cities. First of all, Istanbul and Bursa are one of those cities to which the Kurds migrate a lot (Saraçoğlu, 2011). Therefore, it is more possible for them to get married to Turkish people in those cities. Secondly, the researcher is from Erzurum, and she lived in Istanbul for six years and now she is living in Bursa; in other words, these cities are convenient for her to study. So, the number of the cities included in the study is the main limitation of the study as the researcher could not travel to other cities because of her job and the time limit.

The other limitation of the study is much older ages. The researcher tried to find individuals at different ages; yet she could not find anyone over 60. This may be related to the fact that it is mostly the new generations that migrate to the big cities to get educated or find occupations. According to Saraçoğlu (2011), migration to big cities started in 1960s; yet in 1980s large-scale migrations to cities took place. Hence, finding a hybrid of Turkish-Kurdish marriage over 60 in these cities was difficult for the researcher.

#### **4.1.3 Reflexivity**

Reflexivity is about the “analytic attention to the researcher’s role in qualitative research” (Gouldner, 1971, 16, as cited in Dowling, 2006). According to Dowling (2006), it is both a concept and a process. Reflexivity is a concept because it is about consciousness in a way because the researcher is “actively involved in the research process” (Palaganat et al., 2017, 427). On the other hand, reflexivity is a process of the researcher’s subjectivity as his/her “social background, location and

assumptions affect their research practice” (Hesse-Biber, 2007, 17). Based on these facts, the researcher of this study is also actively involved in the research and her background has a great role in her choosing this subject. The researcher is a hybrid from Erzurum whose father is Turk and whose mother is Kurd. She has relatives from two ethnicities, and she knows both languages. She has lived among the Kurds and the Turks both and understands each side, and feels close to both sides as well. Therefore, her background as a hybrid has pushed her to study this subject and incited in her wonders whether there are other hybrids as her and if so whether they feel the same as she feels.

The researcher’s resemblance to the informants in the study made it easy to comment on the findings as “through reflexivity, we become aware of our contribution to the construction of meanings and of lived experiences throughout the research process (Palaganat et al., 2017, 427). She could understand her informants very well as she has the opportunity to put herself in their shoes. However, still the researcher tried to be as objective as she could because not her expectations but the data was important to come to a conclusion. Hence, to be objective she performed both a researcher role that is distant from the informants and a social role that is close to them in terms of background.

## **4.2 Discussions and Results**

Hybridity is everywhere. Nations, cultures and individuals are all hybrids, indeed. Though they seem to be pure, they have gone through interactions with others and unavoidably influenced and become mixed or hybrid. Renato Rosaldo in the introduction of *Hybrid Cultures* by Canclini (1995, xv) says “hybridity can be understood as the ongoing condition of all human cultures, which contain no zones of purity because they undergo continuous processes of transculturation (two-way borrowings and lending between cultures).” Hence, in the following discussion, it is aimed to show hybridity of the Kurds and the Turks, and find how they define themselves. Hybridity in this research means being hybrid as a result of the interethnic marriages. So, in this study there are the interviewees who are ethnically hybrid – that is, one of their parents is Turk and the other is Kurd-. Below are ten subtitles under which different issues are discussed, and the main questions of the research are examined.

#### 4.2.1 Constituents of Identity

When the interviewees were asked about what constitutes their identities and how they define themselves, in the first place they had difficulty in understanding what was meant; but as the conversation went on, they sooner realized different parts of their identities and they claimed they indeed have many identities defining them. Some of them thought of 'identity' as something about one's personality; however towards the end of the conversation, they came to define themselves in different ways. For most of the interviewees race or ethnicity was not important; rather what is important is being a human. Furthermore; most of them were aware their identities were not constituted of just Kurdishness or Turkishness, or just race. Yet, they carry both the identities and live its advantages as they can attune to the different contexts and can feel empathy for both sides.

As can be seen below, most of the informants did not define their identities in racial terms; rather they defined themselves in many aspects. On the other hand, being a human and personality prevailed more:

Reşit (a 17-year-old student at 11th grade): I am both a Kurd and a Turk. But, I have never felt obliged to give a discriminatory answer. I never felt as in-between. I don't think there is such a distinction in this country. I mean, I didn't feel such a necessity, indeed.

Ayşe (a 53-year-old housewife): This is a difficult question. I have never thought about it. I mean, I cannot define myself just from one aspect. Or I cannot say I am either Kurd or Turk. I mean, I see myself as blending of all these things. I define myself as someone who has blended two cultures inside and live accordingly.

Yusuf (a 46-year-old teacher): When I say identity. I mean, personality, human. I don't regard it as an allegiance to an ethnicity but as being a human, as one's living one's life or expressing it as how one regards oneself. This is what identity is for me. My identity, hmmm. What constitutes my identity? I mean, I see myself as cement of Turkey. I mean, because of the fact that my father is Kurd and my mother is Turk. It is in fact a beautiful example of Turkey. I see myself as one of the most important values that hold Turkey together. I both feel empathy and I mean, I see myself as Turk and Kurd. I feel myself as belonging to the both sides. I regard this as cement.

In the second chapter, it was argued there are different types of identities not just one, and in this study also the interviewees though the same. They do not just have an ethnic identity that is either Kurdish or Turkish, but they also have religious, cultural and social identities as well as role and collective identities which makes them hybrid, indeed:

Esma (a 19-year-old university student): Race is a little mixed for me. I mean, Kurd, Turk and Circussian are mixed in my family; so I cannot define myself in racial terms. I mean, I am against racial differences; but cultural identity prevails more. I mean both Malatya and Maraş. I like both of them. I am all of them. I never thought and asked who I am. I just said I am a human every time. I am a hybrid person.

Fatma (a 27-year-old English instructor): This is a good question and what I cannot answer in my real life as well. I mean, my identity is composed of first of all, Muslimhood, a little Kurdishness, a little Turkishness. I mean, I am a Kurd who is attracted to the Turks. When people ask me, and when I say I am a Turk, I feel in-between and ambivalent inside because I am also a Kurd... Also, I am an instructor. I am a woman. I mean, I am not just Kurd or Turk. I mean, my identity is not just my ethnicity.

Jiyan (a 25-year-old teacher): These are difficult questions. I mean, how can I define my identity? First of all, I define as a woman. After that I say an undergraduate of Boğaziçi University, from Elazığ, a graduate student, as a teacher. I mean, I feel more as Kurd inside. Yes. I mean, because I listen to Kurdish songs much more, and I like them more or I want to speak Kurdish but I cannot speak, which is a sorrow for me. I mean, I am much closer to that culture. I mean I like that culture more, their clothes, and their dances.

Identity used as all one knows about oneself by Erikson (1950) came to refer to the roles individuals have internalized by Foote (1951). This view of identity was held by McCall and Simmons (1978, 65) as they define it as “the character and the role that an individual devises for himself as an occupant of a particular social position”. So, as can be seen in the quotes of the informants above, it is difficult to define oneself with just a word. This is because first of all they are hybrid children of two different ethnicities on the one hand, and they have different roles in the society on the other hand. They both carry Turkishness and Kurdishness, and they perform different roles such as being a teacher and a mother and a woman together. What is important is to admit all the allegiances one has inside, and in this study the informants were proud of having many allegiances as Maalouf (2003, 16) states:

My object is not to discover within myself some ‘essential’ allegiance in which I may recognize myself. Rather the opposite: I scour my memory to find as many ingredients of my identity as I can. I then assemble and arrange them. I don't deny any of them.

However; not all the interviewees defined themselves as having many identities. One of the interviewees approached this question from a patriarchal perspective. 40 year-old Ahmet whose father is Turk and mother is Kurd is from Erzurum but he lives in Bursa for 26 years. He knows Kurdish, listens to Kurdish music; but to him, his identity is shaped by his father’s ethnicity. He admits his hybridity; yet still he prioritizes his Turkishness because his father is a Turk:

Ahmet: Aaa I am a hybrid but if today they ask me whether I am a Turk or Kurd, I say I am Turkish, son of a Turk (*Türkoğlu Türk'üm*). I haven't discriminated against the Kurds so far, and I am not discriminating either; but my race, I am whatever my father is. Kurdishness is for me at the second stage.

His prioritization his Turkish identity is not due to the problems he lived with the Kurds in the past. He doesn't deny his mother is a Kurd, but he still defines his identity as a Turk because his father is a Turk:

Ahmet: I don't say I am Turkish, son of a Turk (*Türk oğlu Türk'üm*) because of the problems I lived in the past. I lived many problems with the Kurds in the past, but today my best friend is

a Kurd. My essence is obvious (*Benim özüm belli*). Even if I hadn't lived those problems, I would still be proud of my Turkishness, and I say I am Turkish, son of a Turk. I am what my father is. I am not segregating or I am not nationalist but if my father was Kurd and my mother was Turk, I would say I am a Kurd. I would live accordingly and live my Kurdishness. Forget about their purpose whatever. What is my father? A Kurd. Then, I am a Kurd. It is true that now there is a Turk-Kurd war. But if I was a Kurd, I could even say I am Kurd and defend Kurdishness and I even offer my life, but this is to sometime. This is what ignorant people do.

On the other hand, it was found that individuals' identities change as the context change, which implies identities are not stable as Grossberg (1996, 89) says "identities are always relational and incomplete, in process"; in other words, there is not a singular identity but multiple identities. So, all the informants said that their identities are not stable yet tend to change as the context changes. For instance Fatma is from Diyarbakır but her family lives in Elazığ, and because of education and work she has been living in İstanbul for 8 years. She has seen different lifestyles in those different cities and each time her identity changed:

Fatma: I have changed. I am continuing to change. I mean what seemed to me contrary or what seemed to me true in the past has changed. I mean, my opinions are changing. My perspective of the life changes at least. It is impossible for the identity not to change as you read or live. If you are really a questioning person, your identity changes willy-nilly. Maybe it is not in your hands. Your living and experiences determine everything.

This proves what Hall (1990) goes after regarding the identity as it is something 'in process' not something 'production'. Each encounter is a new identity. Informants' studying in different cities other than their cities, or their marriages all add new things to their identities. Also, with their ever-changing identities, all the individuals are unique and complex as Maalouf (2003, 20) states:

Any person of goodwill trying to carry out his or her own 'examination of identity' would soon, like me, discover that that identity is a special case. Mankind itself is made up of special cases. Life is a creator of differences. No 'reproduction' is ever identical. Every individual without exception possesses a composite identity. He need only ask himself a few questions to uncover forgotten divergences and unsuspected ramifications, and to see that he is complex, unique and irreplaceable.

#### **4.2.2 Feeling as a Kurd, Turk, In-between or Both**

The study is based on the hybrid Kurds and the Turks who are ethnically hybridized. So, it is important to find whether the interviewees define themselves as a Turk, Kurd, in-between or both. Not interestingly, some of them felt more Kurd, some more Turk, some in-between and some felt both of them, which changed according to the context. Grossberg (1996) argues identities are fragmented and situational. They are not singular; rather an individual can have partial identities, indeed. David Bailey and Stuart Hall (1992, 21) state "identities can, therefore, be contradictory and are always situational... In short, we are all involved in a series of

political games around fractured or decentred identities...” So, the interviewees’ also had decentred identities. When the question whether they feel as a Kurd, Turk, in-between or both was asked, some of the informants defined themselves as each of them. For instance, Ali is a 41-year-old self employed person living in Erzurum. His father is Kurd and his mother is Turk. Although the place he lives, a village in Hınıs, is mostly composed of the Kurds, he is not bound to an ethnicity but he can manage two ethnicities inside, as a result of which he is understanding towards both sides:

Ali: I don’t look at anything as religion, sect, and race, as Kurd or Turk. I just look at the humanity dimension. I am socialist. That is, each, Kurd, Turk never matters. When a Turk makes a mistake, I can directly tell it to her/his face. I can directly reply this when he tells it in a society no matter whether he is Turk or Zaza. I never care about it. I can tell him whatever his mistake is. We can be more sensitive. If there is a problem no matter in whichever side it be, we tell it without gratitude.

There were also some others who defined themselves as both Kurd and Turk:

Reşit: I am someone who carries two different civilizations, who thinks both of them are good and a chance and an advantage. I don’t know.

M. Akif (a 15-year-old 9th grade student): I am half Kurd and half Turk. I am happy of that. I mean, there is no problem.

Esmâ: I mean, I cannot define myself in racial terms, I think, and I don’t want to define so. But, I mean I am a Muslim. I mean all races are the same, indeed. For me, nothing matters. I mean, Circassian Turks have a distinct culture; Kurds have a distinct culture. I mean, all of them are we, there is no difference.

As can be seen, the interviewees’ being hybrid leads them to avoid from binary categorizations and to accept all allegiances s/he has. In fact, hybrid identities have come to refer to people who have “a mix of two or more other identities” (Browne, 2008, 52). Not just after colonization, but also after globalization, and the mass media, hybrid identities have emerged. According to Browne (2008), with hybrid identities, ethnic identities have become to be confusing because new generations born into interethnic marriages live a fusion of two distinct identities. For instance, in Britain, people who have a mixed identity have a white parent and were born in Britain.

Therefore, Browne (2008, 54) argues for such mixed people “it is difficult to establish whether they identify themselves as having a white ethnic identity drawn from one parent, an identity arising from the ethnic minority group of the other parent, or whether they see themselves as having a new hybrid identity drawing on both parental ethnic groups.” While some groups protect both of their cultures and ethnicities, Browne (2008) argues some hybrid minority groups try to play down their ethnicity and culture wearing a ‘white mask’, which is sometimes in order to

respond to racism, sometimes to fit into the majority group and to be accepted by them. However, in this study, it was found that individuals respect and accept both their ethnicities and do not play down any of their identities. They sometimes privilege one of their identities over the others but never despise any of them.

On the other hand; some of the interviewees said they feel ‘in-between’ and ‘ambivalent’ and this happens especially when someone asks where they are from, or when they encounter someone from either their paternal or maternal side. Bhabha (1994) argues, hybrid individuals live in the Third Space, and because they belong to both cultures together, they have the opportunity to go-between two cultures. Their condition as in-between paves the way for them to understand both cultures and to create a new mixed identity out of these cultures that is neither at one place nor the other, but which can change as the context changes. Below are some examples of in-between individuals:

Leyla (a 28-year-old housewife): I definitely define myself as in-between. I mean, when someone asks me where I am from, I immediately start saying my husband is from Erzurum; secondly I was born in Bursa; thirdly my father is from Samsun, and fourthly my mother is from Elazığ. They say 'What?', 'What do you say', 'Can someone be so much mixed?' I mean, I like the Kurds' features such as respect, love, tolerance and service. I mean, rather than my father's side, I admire my mother's side much more both in terms of their attitudes and behaviors towards humans. Like that. I like Kurds much more. I mean their temperament, their morals and hospitality. I feel in-between when I am with my father's side because they know I am fonder of my mother's side. In fact, I feel in-between a lot. That is when someone asks.

Menekşe (a 27-year-old housewife from Erzurum): I am in-between. But my Turkishness prevails more. I mean I like my Turkish side more. I like the Turks more than the Kurds.

Fatma: I feel in-between. For instance, when a foreigner from abroad asks me, I say I am sometimes Turk, sometimes Kurd. I sometimes don't know what to say. When there is a tension between the Kurds and the Turks, I feel in-between. Turkishness or Kurdishness is not so important; but when there is harm to human being, I am ashamed of both sides and I feel very distant from them.

Gökhan (a 14-year-old 8th grade student): Now, when someone asks me where I am from, I say my father is from Ağrı, but I feel as belonging to Trabzon because most of the time I see my mother's relatives and because I resemble people of Trabzon, mostly I regard myself as someone from Trabzon. When there is a wedding ceremony, if my mother's brother and my father's brother ask me where I am from, I say I am from Ağrı but I feel as from Trabzon. How can I say? They sometimes say: “But your father is from Ağrı”, but I say he can be from Ağrı but I feel as I am from Trabzon. I mean I feel as if I am in-between.

Yet; some of the interviewees declared themselves as either Turk or Kurd. This is because those individuals had some problems with either the Kurds or the Turks. Therefore; although they are hybrid, they feel closer to one of those ethnicities. This can be explained by the fact that social structures influence one's identity as Burke & Stets (2009, 34) states social behavior is best understood “by focusing on individuals' definitions and interpretations of themselves, others, and

their situations”. Hence, the social structure they are in shapes who they are as Syryker & Vryan (2003, 22) states:

Social structures in general define boundaries, making it likely that those located within them will or will not have relations with particular kinds of others and interact with those others over particular kinds of issues with particular kinds of resources. Structures will also affect the likelihood that persons will or will not develop particular kinds of selves, learn particular kinds of motivations, and have particular symbolic resources for defining situations they enter.

For instance, Semra is a 37 year-old housewife from Erzurum living in Bursa now. Although her father is a Kurd, she mostly felt ‘Turk’ because she always lived with the Turks and because her mother was forced to marry to a Kurdish man, she has never been close to the Kurds:

Semra: Sometimes I feel Turk; sometimes I feel both of them. I mean, Kurdishness lags behind. There haven’t been any times when I feel Kurd, but sometimes you feel inbetween. I don’t know. In fact, I have never been aware of Turkishness or Kurdishness. I mean, from my childhood on, I have always lived with the Turks and I liked my maternal side more than my paternal side, I was always in that mode. Even, when I went to the wedding ceremonies, people always thought I was a Turk. I mean, my Turkishness prevails more. As my mother was married by force, and went through difficulties, we couldn’t love the other side (Kurdish). Maybe my mother made a mistake. I wish my mother hadn’t reflected this to us. But if she hadn’t reflected us, someone else would certainly tell us. I don’t know. We couldn’t like the other side.

Another person in this category is Ahmet who insisted on his being a ‘Turk’ and this is because of the fact that on the one hand his father is Turk; on the other hand he went through difficulties owing to the Kurds in the past. As a result, he said:

Ahmet: I am Turkish, son of a Turk (*Türk oğlu Türk’üm*). My mother is Kurd, my father is Turk. Hmmm. Yes, I do not discriminate against, but I am Turkish, son of a Turk. How is my dialogue with the Kurds? It is the same as how my dialogue is with the Turks. Yet, with the Kurds it is at a certain level. Because of the Kurds, I can say I am today a half man. Because of the Kurds, I left my home, hometown. Because of the Kurds I am a person that suffered how many difficulties. I am even threatened.

However, for some of the interviewees, to feel as a Kurd or Turk depends on the social or political circumstances of the time. In other words, if an identity is suppressed, then their allegiance to that identity comes to the front more as Maalouf (2003) argues people have many allegiances inside, and it is when one of those allegiances is threatened then this allegiance becomes the identity of the person. Likewise, in this study as well, it is found that individuals become more Turk or more Kurd when their Turkish or Kurdish side is threatened and / or discriminated negatively as they said:

Yusuf: I always, I mean, during the terms when I was working in Diyarbakır. For instance, if a side was suppressed, I was against that. I felt close to the other side. On the other hand, if there was a pressure on a side, I always was with the suppressed group, I mean with the victims or with the idea or identity. I preferred to be with the “other” side.

Jiyan: This is about the context. For instance, when one of my identities is suppressed, I feel the urge to defend that identity more. For instance, when we went to Sweden with a friend from Boğaziçi, I mean, it was just us who were Turks. I mean there was a girl who always said something about Turkey. I mean she always generalized something. I mean, Turks are like that, Turkey is like that etc. I automatically felt the urge to defend because they were great generalizations. At that moment, I felt the need to protect Turkey and Turkish as opposed to her. But definitely in my own country, I am never nationalist. However, in Turkey I feel as Kurd. The reason why I feel this maybe because they are in minority, because they couldn't get their rights, because they are more oppressed. I mean I feel close to them because of these, maybe. For instance, assume that if my mother had not been a Kurd, I still would feel close to them. I mean because they are the oppressed, their language is forbidden. I mean, because when they speak their language either on a bus or anywhere, they come across with different looks of people. I mean, everything because of their being minority. For instance they cannot be educated in their own language. After that, for instance when they share their music anywhere, they are misunderstood. I mean, because of the word he used, he can be misunderstood. Such things happen. Therefore; I feel close to that group (Kurd) because of their being the oppressed.

Metin (a 60-year-old businessman from Mardin): Race, ethnicity; these are not important for me. I never think about such issues. However, when sometimes I watch TV and see our soldiers die because of the PKK, I immediately feel as a Turk. But when I see the Kurdish language is forbidden or the Kurds are despised in the big cities, I feel myself as Kurd. As I said, it is not important for me to be a Kurd or Turk. I am with whoever is suppressed.

As can be seen, these people's identity choice depends on the environment and the problems an identity faces. When it is the Turks that are threatened, they immediately become a Turk, or when they see it is the Kurdish language that is forbidden, then they become a Kurd. In other words, inside an individual there are many selves that are ready to come to the front when it is tried be suppressed or when the context requires it.

#### **4.2.3 Belonging More to the Kurds or the Turks**

In the research, it was examined whether the interviewees more belong to the Kurdish or Turkish society. Anthias (2008) argues because boundaries are fluid and identities crosscut, people belong to different groups at different levels at different times. Their belongings are shaped by the context and the emotions. So, most of the interviewees declared this happens when they encounter someone from either their father's or mother's side. For instance:

Gökhan: My Turkish side prevails. Mostly at wedding ceremonies my Kurdish side prevails, for instance when I dance to halay<sup>2</sup>. In such issues I feel more Kurdish. For example, when I sit with my uncles (father's brothers) I feel as Kurd but when I sit with my uncles (mother's brothers) I feel as Turk much. If the majority is Turk - for instance around the Ulu Camii as I work there- my Turkishness prevails because there you don't speak Kurdish.

Kadir (a 17-year-old 10th grade student): When I am with people from my father's side, I cannot say I am a Kurd. I mean, I say I am a Turk to my father's side, and a Kurd to my mother's side. It changes. I mean, I feel both as a Kurd and a Turk. It depends on the

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<sup>2</sup> Halay is the name of Kurdish dances as a whole.

circumstances. If the majority is Turk, I feel more like Turk, if the majority is Kurd, I feel more like Kurd.

Menekşe: I become Turk with the Turks, and I become Kurd with the Kurds. I mean, I have both of them, I don't discriminate. How can I say? I don't feel in-between. But when someone says something against the Kurds, it definitely hurts me and I feel obliged to give an answer, and I say you will not say such things. But when they say something against the Turks, I again give an answer and oppose them. I am both a Turk and a Kurd. I mean, I try to preserve both sides.

On the other hand, it was found, the individuals' choices of Kurdishness or Turkishness are related with some characteristics of these two identities. In other words, in terms of religion, custom and nationalism, the individuals expressed, they choose the identity which is more suitable for them. For instance, when it comes to religion, the interviewees said they prefer Turkishness because for them the Turks are more close to religion whereas when it comes to custom they prefer Kurdishness. However, if there are "martyrs" because of the PKK, then their national identity – Turkish- comes to the front, which shows that those individuals are inescapably influenced by the political events and their identities are shaped around those events, too:

Leyla: My Kurdishness prevails. I don't know whether this is because I like my mother's side. But when there is a martyr, I mean when soldiers die, I mean when there is 'motherland issue' I say I am a Turk, I am under Turkish flag and if it is necessary I can sacrifice my life. At these times, I feel more Turkish. I mean, when I say Kurdishness, this is because I admire their attitudes. For instance, when I go to my mother's side, I see they are more hospitable, more concerned and friendlier contrary to my father's side. But of course, I am a Turk forever; I can sacrifice my life for my flag if it is needed.

Fatma: Because of their Islamic identity, I feel much more close to the Turks, but because of their customs and traditions I feel close to the Kurd. I don't know. But I don't feel close to the Kurds when there is the issue of politics. It is the Turks who have brought Islam to the front; therefore I like the Turks very much, and my Turkishness prevails when I think of this. Yet, I insistently say I am against all kinds of nationalism and fascism; whether one is Kurd or Turk, if he is fascist or nationalist, I am totally against them and I go away from them.

Also, in the literature review, it was argued that people have many identities inside ranging from religious to cultural to ethnic; and it was proposed that when one of those allegiances feels pressure by the others, then it becomes the very identity of that person (Maalouf, 2003). Likewise, in these interviews also, it was found that when the interviewees feel one side of them is oppressed or discriminated against, they immediately take this side as their main identity. For instance:

Esma: It happens to me, in particular when I am with rightists (*ülküçü*). Because one Turk said to me that "The best Kurd is the one who is dead", which really hurts me. At these times I found myself defending the Kurds. I mean, I want to be opposed to what the person across me defends much because all are the same. I mean, Turk, Kurd, Circussian are all the same, they are not different from each other. All of us are human; therefore as long as the person across me doesn't run down the other race, I am all of them. But if they really run down a race too much, then I feel myself belonging to that race.

Jiyan: I will tell you an event that I lived. I shared a Kurdish song of street singers on WhatsApp, and I wrote there “Hewals<sup>3</sup> have a different place” (*arkadaşların/dostların yeri ayrı*). A person who saw that misinterpreted it, and told others as if I was a member of an organization. I don’t know as if I was a terrorist. When I heard that, I got very angry and I wanted to be more and more Kurd at that moment. I mean, it changes according to the contexts or things you come across. For instance, assume that my Turkish side is ridiculed a lot or it is oppressed, then I would prioritize that identity.

According to these individuals, their chance to go between identities makes them more empathetic towards all the others who are suppressed. Yazdiha (2010) argues hybridity offers a world of inclusion, which is because it is against any essentialist views, so it makes the individuals more open and understanding towards the others. Likewise, being a teacher at the age of 46, Yusuf described his feelings as follows:

Yusuf: I mean I don’t know if I say that whether it would be believable or not but I don’t feel as belonging to an ethnicity. I mean I see myself as a human. I mean I have never had it in my philosophy or in the way of my life. I have been always like that as far as I know myself. I always regard myself as a human. I can be a Turk, a Kurd or an Arab if needed be. I can be everything. To feel empathy is a lot in me. If he is the victim, I mean which side is victim; I objectively take sides with them. If there is a problem, it doesn’t matter to whom it happens, if he is the victim I take sides with him. My approach is like that. When I see the ‘human’ as basis, I mean when I was young, I had Alaouite friends. Why did I have Alaouite friends? Because they were in minority. I always showed an attitude towards their being suppressed. I tried to be like them, tried to feel empathy for them.

On the contrary, for Ahmet there is not such a thing to feel more Kurd or more Turk. It is impossible to feel so because he is just ‘Turk’. Unlike the other interviewees, Ahmet pursued a Turkish nationalist approach. This is related to his background in Erzurum because he lived in a village where almost all the villagers were Kurds, and they discriminated against the Turks. Also, he lived there when the PKK was on move, so he had many difficult times. Therefore; he accepts his mother side is Kurdish, but he never defines himself as a Kurd which can be explained by Saraçoğlu’s (2011) term ‘exclusive recognition’<sup>4</sup> towards the Kurds as in exclusive recognition one has negative stereotypes or labels about a group. Likewise, Ahmet’s attitudes toward Kurdishness are shaped by his belief that they are ‘not trustworthy’:

Ahmet: No. I don’t believe in such a thing. Okay, during an argument they say his Kurdishness gets obstinate or his Lazness gets obstinate. I don’t believe in such things. I mean it is about one’s character. But there cannot be Kurdishness bone in me (*Ama bende Kürt damarı olmaz*). I mean, I have been brought up in the Kurds, even if my mother is Kurd, I say I am what my

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<sup>3</sup> Hewal means friend in Kurdish.

<sup>4</sup> In his study, Saraçoğlu examines how middle class people of İzmir approach the Kurds in İzmir and he uses the term “exclusive recognition” so as to explain their attitudes. According to that exclusive recognition, firstly the Kurds are ‘recognized’ as a distinct group; secondly this recognition ‘excludes’ the Kurds as in this recognition the Kurds are defined basically in negative labels and stereotypes; thirdly this negative recognition is ‘exclusively’ against the Kurds not other minority groups.

father is. I don't argue about my father's character or personality but what is my identity? I am Turk. I say I am a Turk. This issue cannot be argued in fact. I never and never defend Kurdishness nor do I run down it. I do not prefer that side when I have my own identity. They are not trustworthy. They don't give trust. They seem to be so trustworthy in front of you, but when you trust them a little bit, you cannot guess what they can do behind you. In fact they are doing that. It is obvious. A person who comes your home and eats with you is good with you as you are sitting as a Turk, but when two Kurds come together, they are ready to kill you on the slightest pretext. Their true life is like that.

As a whole, it was found the individuals' identities are shaped by the context as Browne (2008) expresses individuals have many identities and they use different identities in different circumstances. Except for one interviewee, all the others sometimes more belonged to the Turks and sometimes more to the Kurds.

#### **4.2.4 Influence of the Others on the Identity**

Individuals may be influenced by the people around them, so sometimes they may feel the need to behave as they are expected from the others. Their preferring to be Turk or Kurd may be affected by the requirements of their families or friends. Buckingham (2008, 3) states "identity is developed by the individual, but it has to be recognized and confirmed by others." It is the 'others' who shape one's identity. Therefore; one's preferring to be Kurd or Turk may be the result of the others who want them to choose that identity. Accordingly, most of the interviewees acknowledged that they are forced to choose either Kurdishness or Turkishness and they are influenced by their surroundings especially from their paternal side as well as some of them said they do not face such things, but they can be attuned to the needs of the environment. For instance:

Leyla: For instance when I was a girl, neighbors in my father's village always said to me don't go, they are Kurds, your mother will give you to them as well. We are Turks; you are daughter of your father. Your father must prevail your mother.

Semra: People never saw me as a Kurd but as a Turk, neither in the village nor here. They always said you are behaving like a Turk, you resemble them. I was criticized by my paternal side. They said you are a Kurd, why you are defending the other side so much. I mean, I have been criticized a lot. Especially in Istanbul, I was criticized much more. I don't know. Maybe that was because I was fond of my mother. Maybe this is because I was fond of my uncles (my mother's brothers). I don't know.

Ayşe: My father is a Kurd and my mother is a Turk. When I am with someone from my mother's side, I don't speak Kurdish and I become a Turk, but when I am with someone from my father's side, I become a Kurd. I mean you have to be so, or else they will misunderstand you. I mean you feel obliged to behave as they want you to show. I don't know.

Gökhan: Of course, at some places there are pressures like you are Kurd, you cannot deny your Kurdishness, your father's being from Ağrı. Okay, they are right at that issue. I even accept that. I don't feel uncomfortable either because they know me; they know what I am, so I don't have a problem.

On the other hand, some of the interviewees were forced to choose Turkishness because of the status of the Kurds in Turkey. As explained in the third chapter, the Kurds were regarded as the ‘mountain Turks’ (Bruinessen, 1997) or ‘prospective-Turks’ (Yeğen, 2009) during the early Republican era, and they were tried to be assimilated and their language was forbidden (Yeğen, 2009). Moreover, with the outbreak of the PKK in 1980s, the Turkish nationalism has been dispersed to the country more, and the Kurds have began to be related with the PKK (Saraçoğlu, 2011). Therefore, in the study some of the interviewees declared they were forced to choose Turkishness or they were forced not to learn or use Kurdish as a precaution so as not to be regarded as a member of the PKK:

Jiyan: For instance my father's side is Turk. As I said because of my sharing of a Kurdish song, they said "What is your relationship with them? Why are you sharing such things? What is hewal (*arkadaş/dost*)? You are a Turk. Why do you use that word? What is the need to use it?" as such. Or, I mean it is because of the patriarchal structure of the society. I mean, you are what your father is. Therefore, I can feel pressure from my family such as "You are Turk" because my mother's side doesn't bring forward their identity, then my father's identity become more dominant. In such conditions, they can say "You are Turk, what can you do with such things?" I mean the event I lived. That of the song I mentioned. "Why are you using such things?" I mean I feel annoyed because I say this is a language spoken by a people, and its meaning. I mean look at in which context I used it. I mean its use by others does not mean I have the same purpose as them. It is just a music video. For which purpose can I use it for instance? I couldn't explain this. I mean, I couldn't persuade them. They warned me against not to use it because it can be dangerous, I don't know. I mean they say we can get in trouble. I mean they say "what you share on the social media may get you in trouble". "You know there are people who are arrested or taken into custody". Such things. I mean, "They can be dangerous for your future". "Don't share such things, you shouldn't do that" etc. I mean I am forced to choose Turkishness over Kurdishness.

Fatma: My family, on the contrary, has been assimilated and they don't like the Kurds. My father's side is Kurd but they behave as Turks. They are a little bit nationalist. They preserve Kurdish culture, traditions but they don't like Kurdish politics and nationalism. We know that we are Kurds; but they don't allow the children to learn Kurdish. I mean because of the politics, they have become alienated from the Kurds. So, when I am with my paternal's side, I cannot say I am also a Kurd. For them, Kurdishness is about the PKK. I mean, because of that my father does not say he is a Kurd. He is totally assimilated into Turkishness.

Also, identities cannot be thought apart from the environment they evolve in because every time new things are added to the identities. Sometimes people may feel pressures because of their identities; but most of the time they themselves attune to the environment inescapably. For example:

Metin: Your environment of course changes your identity. I mean what your environment is, or where your environment pushes you to, you are at that side. I mean in Mardin, most of the people are Kurdish. I mean although my father is a Turk, we become Kurd with our surroundings. I mean you have to adapt to your environment. This is the key of peace. Here, in Istanbul for example, it is meaningless to speak Kurdish with someone who does not know. I mean, of course you have your own identity inside, but you also have to adapt to the surroundings. This is inescapable.

Esmâ: I am a mixed child. I am both a Kurd and Turk. But race or ethnicity is not important for me. I was brought up with the thought that "We are all from Turkey" "We are all Muslims".

My mother also never insisted on me 'You are from Malatya', nor did my father say 'You are from Maraş'. We always brought up with the idea that all of them are the same. My father's side saw the Kurds very differently but after my mother - because she came from the Kurds - their thoughts have changed. I mean you have the chance of becoming this or that. I can be everything. I can be a Kurdish with the Kurds, a Turkish with the Turks or I can be a socialist with the socialist. I mean we are shaped by our environment.

These statements show that these hybrid beings are integrated into two different ethnicities. Berry (2011) argues one of the acculturation strategies is the 'integration' in which people keep both their identities and have the advantages of go between cultures. They do not despise or forget their identities. As such, the informants of this study showed that they keep both of their identities; yet they attune their identities to the context. Their choosing Kurdishness or Turkishness is a matter of the social or political context at that moment. Also, Phinney and Alipuria (2006) argue one of the ways that people who have two ethnicities identify with is choosing both the ethnicities according to the context. Likewise, interviewees' statements show they accept all their allegiances and switch them as the social or political context changes. Moreover, Ward's (1996) psychological and sociocultural adaptations can be applied here as well seeing that the individuals are adapted to different environments psychologically and socioculturally. In other words; as psychologically they know and accept their identity, and as socioculturally they have the chance of coping with different contexts and attuning to different lifestyles.

#### **4.2.5 Local Belonging and Interethnic Marriages**

The interviews were conducted with the ones who live in a city other than his/her hometown except for two. Ali and Ayşe are from Erzurum and they live there; but all the others are from different cities but live in either Bursa or Istanbul. It is argued that migration has a great role in shaping one's identity in previous chapters. Therefore; it is searched whether those people have changed because of the city they are now living in, or whether the city has influenced the way of their life, and also it is tried to be found whether they belong to the hometown or hosttown. Moreover, because 8 of the interviewees made interethnic marriages, whether these marriages influenced their views was also examined. Most of the interviewees feel as belonging to the city they are now living in because either they have left their hometown for many years or they have been born in the hosttown not in the hometown. But half of the ones who were born in their hometowns feel belonging to the hometown. In fact, as the interviews went on, it became clear that the reason is

not just being born or being raised somewhere; but there are also other reasons such as the opportunities of the city, the multicultural nature of the city, or the attitudes of the people in a city. So, when asked where they belong to, the interviewees said:

Leyla: I feel as belonging to Bursa because I was born and grew up here. I am a Turk, but I like the Kurds in terms of moral much more.

Gökhan: Now I feel as belonging to Bursa because I am now living here.

Fatma: When I go between Elazığ and Diyarbakır, I say I belong to Elazığ because I was raised there and also I don't know Kurdish. So, I am a stranger in Diyarbakır. But when I say Diyarbakır, Elazığ and İstanbul, I say I belong to İstanbul because I am working here, my home is here. I mean I have been here for 8 years; so İstanbul has become a part of me.

Jiyan: Presumably after these 8 years, I have been alienated from Elazığ a little. I don't know. Elazığ seems dull, tasteless. I mean something lacks there. But the life here is very dynamic and fast. I feel belonging to İstanbul quite more because I am very active here.

Reşit: I belong to Bursa because I was born here. I mean I went to Erzurum once. Of course one wants to live there, too. I mean my relatives from Kurdish and Turkish sides both are there but I belong to Bursa.

Ahmet: I belong to Erzurum, still to Erzurum. The place where I was born and grew up is different for me. If I had a chance even now, I could live there. If I had a work opportunity there, I could go there.

Kadir: I feel belonging to Erzurum. I have been living in Bursa for 17 years but I belong to my own hometown.

Those individuals or their families moved to cities other than their hometown because of the reasons as education, marriage or work opportunities. . In 1900s, the Kurds were deported from their villages and they were dispersed all around Turkey so as to be assimilated into the Turkish society (Jongerden, 2001; Bruinessen, 2000). Yet; in this study, the interviewees have moved to big cities not because of deportation but because of education, work or marriage. In fact, globalization has fastened the migration between cities, which produced 'translocationality' (Anthias, 2008) that means geographical and social dislocation. Although these people are dislocated, they still belong to somewhere as Inglis (2009) argues in the globalized world the need to belong to somewhere increases a lot because this belonging implies similarity or familiarity with others; that is it means an identity. So, the interviewees in this study also showed that they indeed belong to either the hosttown or the hometown where they have their families or acquaintances.

On the other hand, the study pursues to find whether those cities have changed their lives and identities or not seeing that the individuals get in contact with different groups in the big cities and they encounter a different lifestyle in which over time some of them are acculturated. Berry (2005, 698) argues "acculturation is the dual process of cultural and psychological change that takes place as a result of

contact between two or more cultural groups and their individual members”, which is experienced differently by each individual and group. Istanbul and Bursa are one of the biggest cities of Turkey in which there is a great chance of encountering ethnically different groups of people. So, the interviewees were asked whether these cities have changed or influenced their identities or not. All of them except for one were of the same opinion and they said they are influenced willy-nilly and they gained something:

Gökhan: Bursa has affected me in positive ways. I mean, if I was in Ağrı, I would be discriminated when I went to Trabzon. But because Bursa is far from both Kurdish and Laz, I will not be discriminated when I go to either Ağrı or Trabzon. I will get accustomed to both sides more easily. I will feel close to both sides.

Semra: Bursa has changed me a lot, I mean in religious terms, in moral terms. But as Kurdishness, Turkishness, I didn't change. I was always like that.

Esmâ: First of all Istanbul is a city full of different kinds of people and you can see every kind of people here. I mean, Turk, Kurd, Circassian.. I mean there are people from every race. This is a good thing... I mean, in the future I also want to live like that and I also want to bring up my children accordingly. I mean, at least we shouldn't forget where we are coming from. Yes, we are all humans but all of us have family structures, roots, traditions, customs, all of which are really beautiful. All of them are beautiful one by one, and I hope we will protect these features because Istanbul is a different city and there are no places to apply them. We are squeezed among buildings. I mean, I even miss country lives. That is to say, I admire Anatolian women much more. I mean Istanbul affects me badly in spiritual terms, but in terms of humanity I gain a lot of things. For instance you learn not to run down anyone here.

In this globalized and mobile world, it is now easier to come across many differences. Maalouf (2003, 93) argues in today's world people are living both “harmonization” and “dissonance” together as “never have men had so many things in common – knowledge, points of reference, images, words, instruments and tools of all kinds”; however, this harmony increases the need for an identity as well, as “this only increases their desire to assert their differences.” In other words, it is obvious that globalization has produced translocations which subsequently paved the way for both harmonization and dissonance of the people. On the one hand, moving beyond the boundaries reveals that people have many common points; on the other hand, this moves them to declare their difference. Likewise, in this study it is found that meeting different cultures and people pushed some of the interviewees to become more aware of their identities and aroused a need to assert and protect their difference:

Fatma: During the secondary and high school, I denied my Kurdishness; but after the university I started to think more differently and now I declare I am a Kurd and I don't deny it. I say the Kurds are also Muslims and I support them. I mean I don't deny. I mean when I came to Istanbul and met with the Kurds from different parts of Turkey, I have become attracted to the Kurds. I mean, I left nationalism. I mean, I could become more objective to the Kurdish politics. In the past, I regarded the issue of a 'Kurdistan' very strictly, but now I say yes there

can be a 'Kurdistan', it is not a problem. But I mean, it wouldn't be a sympathizer of the PKK, but as was in the Ottoman Empire it would define the places where the majority is Kurdish. I mean, of course, I have been influenced by the Turkish culture, but I haven't forgotten my Kurdish identity, either.

Jiyan: I mean, I can explain it maybe with Boğaziçi University because after I came to Boğaziçi, I met with people who are of different lifestyles and different opinions, I moved to a liberal point. I mean, my world became broadened. After that, when I went to Erasmus, it also added me a lot of things. You become even much broader. I mean when you see different people, different cultures, different religions and languages, people from different countries. I mean, it broadened my vision, the way I look at the events, the way I comment on the events. But as for the identity, I can say that the activities of the groups at Boğaziçi led me to question something. I mean the walls. It was the turning point for me because for the first time I have ever met such a thing. I mean, people who were sent to jails. For instance, convicts, for instance Diyarbakır prison<sup>5</sup> was something that I had never known. I encountered this. These raised questions in my mind: "Just a second!" I mean, after such actions, I became to think and question the things that I had never thought about so far. I mean, I have become more conscious after encountering such actions. I mean an awareness raised. I mean I started to question why my family does not speak Zazaki, what the reason is, why these identities are not protected, why the language is not protected, why it is regarded unimportant, and after that, I started to insist on my family and I said "Speak your language". I went to my grandparent and said "Grandma, I will teach you English and you will teach me Zazaki". I mean, Boğaziçi and encountering with different people was an opening for me, I mean it added a lot of things to my identity and led me to question.

On the other hand, Ahmet regarded moving to Bursa as meeting with civilization and humaneness because he lived difficulties when he was in his hometown, Erzurum, because of the Kurds; yet in Bursa because of his skin colour he was also discriminated against, but this did not push him to Kurdishness unlike the ones above mentioned; rather he tried more to prove he is a Turk, instead:

Ahmet: We have become more conscious, we have seen civilization, and we have seen humaneness, honesty, and bravery. We saw them, indeed. In fact, you can stop the relationship when you think your minds do not reach an agreement, but when you do the same thing there,

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<sup>5</sup> After the 1980 coup d'état, many people were detained and prisons were filled up with those regarded as threat to the unity and safety of the nation. Diyarbakır Prison was among these prisons; however, it was totally different not because of its appearance but rather, as Ayata (2012) stresses, its core ethnicity. All the convicts sentenced to here were Kurdish, which was not a coincidence; yet it was the purpose of the state to compile Kurds here and use Diyarbakır Prison as a "concentration camp" (Paker, 2003, 12) since it was the place of Turkification by means of tortures. According to Ayata (2012), the objective of the coup was not to eradicate the distinction between right and left, yet it was to dissolve one's Kurdishness under inhumane conditions. Likewise, in his interview with Kılınçarslan (2011), Paker states Diyarbakır Prison should be kept away from other prisons seeing that here people were tortured just because they were Kurd and they spoke Kurdish regardless of whether they were militants or not. On the one hand, it was a 'concentration camp' inasmuch as it was notorious for the many inhumane tortures practiced there; on the other hand, it was the campsite of Turkification as Zeydanlıoğlu (2009) states the prisoners were obliged to recite and memorize the Turkish National Anthem, Atatürk's Address to the Turkish Youth, military and ultra-nationalist songs and slogans such as 'A Turk is worth the whole universe', 'I am so proud to be Turkish', 'Turks have brought civilization to all the countries they have conquered' etc. Moreover, the walls were painted with pictures of Atatürk, Kenan Evren and historical Turkish figures, or with the Turkish flag or slogans, the most common one being 'Happy is he who can call himself a Turk.' Although most of these convicts did not know any words in Turkish, they were forced to 'Speak Turkish, Speak a Lot'.

you will see the other day that they (*the Kurds*) will set fire on your house. Two times two makes five. They are doing that. I mean I didn't lose my essence. Today they are asking me where I am from I say I am from Erzurum; they ask I say I am from Hınıs. I again say the Kurdish hometown with pride and pleasure. But when it comes to Turkishness and Kurdishness, yes I was born in a Kurdish village, I grew up in a Kurdish village, I know Kurdish very well, my uncles are Kurds but I am Turkish, a son of a Turk (*Türk oğlu Türk'üm*) I cannot say I am a Kurd. When I came to Bursa, I was discriminated against as a Kurd. Especially during that period. I mean you have come from a Kurdish district of Erzurum and you came to a place like Bursa. "Where are you from?" "A Kurdish district" "Your colour resembles as of Kurd." These were the times when the southeast and the east were in conflict, problematic, and you escaped from that. They perceive you as a terrorist or PKK. Of course you are discriminated against. On the contrary, I tried to prove myself. I tried to explain I am not what they think of me. I said this explicitly. Even now I am against it.

There were also the interviewees who made interethnic marriages. Therefore; whether their being married to someone non-hybrid Kurdish or Turkish has affected their identities was examined as well. By chance, 7 of them have a Turkish spouse, and one of them has a Kurdish spouse, and all confessed that their interethnic marriages raised their awareness of differences more and most importantly, their interethnic marriages increased their empathy feelings as they cannot choose this side or the other side because they live in the 'Third Space' (Bhabha, 1994), and this makes it easier to feel close to both sides. According to Bhabha (1994) the 'Third Space' resembles the stairwell because it binds two ends and helps the go-betweens from the upper to the lower. Thus, people in the Third Space have the ability to go between two cultures. They do not choose the upper or the lower, yet they have identities in-between, as a result of which they have understanding of both sides, and this is increased with the interethnic marriages of those who are also children of interethnic marriages. So, the interviewees explained their feelings as below:

Leyla: My husband is Turk and he is really bound to his motherland and flag. I mean my husband's side is Turk. I mean I can understand both sides when there is a problem. I mean I cannot say the Turks are bad or the Kurds are bad because I am both of them, and I understand them. My marriage eased my understanding.

Yusuf: People firstly love you, and then they start to believe in what you say. Think that, Erzurum. I am married to a woman from the Black Sea Region. I mean two very opposite cultures. Even in these cultures, people close to each other have problems, but I and my life has a relationship without trouble which is indeed I guess really rare in the society. This is not just about me, but my wife also feels empathy, understands. So what eases is feeling empathy. We can put ourselves in each other's shoes. When two different cultures meet, we can find a common point. I believe I gained a lot from my marriage. Different cultures have made me much more mature, powerful and in that term it added me too many things.

Ayşe: In Erzurum, you are what your father is. My father is a Kurd as I said before, but I am both a Kurd and a Turk. My husband is a Turk, and after our marriage, he has become more understanding about the Kurds. I mean, in the past he didn't like the Kurds, but now he even knows Kurdish. I mean he understands me and I understand him. I cannot say I am pure Kurdish because my husband is a Turk, or I cannot say I am pure Turkish because my father is a Kurd. I mean it is something different. You can put yourself in both side's shoes. You can understand everyone.

So, living in a different city and making interethnic marriages increase the individuals' understandings and empathy feelings, and also it raises the need for claiming their identity.

#### 4.2.6 Cultural Belonging

Seeing that the interviewees are exposed to both Kurdish and Turkish culture, it is aimed to find whether they feel closer and belong to one of them, both of them, or none of them. Hall (1990, 222) argues that identity is not something that can be handled easily because “who speaks and the subject who is spoken of are never identical, never exactly in the same place” , and he continues saying that we need to think identity as something problematic which is “never complete, always in process, and always constituted within, not outside, representation”. Therefore, according to him, there need to be at least two thoughts about cultural identity. The first one “defines ‘cultural identity’ in terms of one, shared culture, a sort of collective ‘one true self’, hiding inside the many other, more superficial or artificially imposed ‘selves’, which people with a shared history and ancestry hold in common” (Hall, 1990, 223). This definition undermines the differences in the name of a whole, one identity, which was pursued especially in the post-colonial societies.

On the other hand, the second approach “recognizes that, as well as the many points of similarity, there are also critical points of deep and significant *difference* which constitute ‘what we really are’; or rather –since history has intervened- ‘what we have become’” (Hall, 1990, 225). In that sense, cultural identity is not a complete, fixed being; rather it is in the process of becoming that is always “subject to the continuous ‘play’ of history, culture and power” (Hall, 1990, 225). Therefore; from that perspective, cultural identity is not something that is awaiting for us to be discovered; but it is the name that we give to different positions that we hold in the course of time. As a result, most of the interviewees claimed they can live both cultures according to the circumstances, and do not choose between them; rather they attune to the culture of the society in question. They do not stick to the first meaning of the cultural identity as they admit they are continuously shaped by the environment, and can adapt to the culture of the context:

Reşit: Both of the cultures are beautiful, so in whichever culture you are in, at that moment you feel close to that culture.

Semra: I mean it depends. What I love is the Kurds' respect, service. But in religious terms, I find the Turks more tend to religion; therefore I feel close to them. But when you say 'respect' or 'service' I say paternal side. I mean the Kurdish culture. So I belong to both cultures.

Fatma: What should I say? Turk? Or Kurd? Hmm. I am close to Kurdish culture but because of the fact that I cannot do it, I am influenced by the Turkish culture. By the way, I feel close to the Turkish culture when it comes to religion, but when I say traditions and customs; I belong to the Kurdish culture.

On the other hand, being a teacher at the age of 25 from Elazığ, Jiyan also can conform to the culture of the society either Turkish or Kurdish; but because she has more inclined to the Kurds, she likes the Kurdish culture more and she is very worried of not knowing Kurdish language:

Jiyan: Inside me, there lives a Kurd. I mean, I don't know. For instance, their traditional clothes, you know them. I love them a lot. As I said, I like their songs very much, both singing and listening. Their halay, for example, I like it very much. For instance, I want to learn its language, and I started a course at the university but I couldn't continue. I just know very simple words. I want to learn this language. When it comes to language, I face such statements: "Why are you learning it, you will not benefit from it? What will happen when you learn it?, Who will you talk to it?, It is not an important language?, How many people speak it?" This really upsets me. I couldn't explain how important it is to know and protect it. I couldn't explain if people don't speak it, this language will disappear. I couldn't explain this. I couldn't persuade and this is a sorrow for me.

As explained before, the concepts of belonging and identity are defined in similar terms; yet they are different issues, indeed. While belonging is about the similarities, it does not require any shared values or practices as in the identity (Anthias, 2013). So, the individuals in this research belong to what makes them feel comfortable, and their belongings change as the subject changes. For instance, in terms of respect and customs Fatma and Semra belong to the Kurdish culture; however in terms of religion they belong to the Turkish culture. Also, although Jiyan's father is a Turk, she finds solidarity with the Kurds and likes their customs more. This is because, as Antonsich (2010) states, belonging is more emotional as it focuses on solidarity. This shows that a person can belong to anything s/he wants, and this cannot immediately become his/her identity. Therefore, the study found that the individuals' belonging to Turkish or Kurdish culture depends on the contexts, and it is not fixed. Moreover, one's cultural identity is not fixed as Hall's (1990) second definition of cultural identity implies it is in a process of becoming. As a result, the interviewees also did not cling to a fixed culture; yet they enjoyed moving between them.

#### 4.2.7 Being a Hybrid and Its Outcomes

The interviewees were asked whether they think they are hybrid beings and if so, what they think about being hybrid. Except for two of them, all the other said they are hybrids and they regarded it as an advantage. Yet, all the interviewees, either they say they are hybrid or not, were aware they know two cultures and enjoyed its advantages because they can easily conform to both Turkish and Kurdish cultures. In fact, this study found that hybrid beings have the advantages of living two cultures and two languages. They understand each side and embrace diversity more as Smith (2008, 4) states for the hybrids “the ability to negotiate across barriers – language, cultural, spiritual, racial, and physical – is an asset”. This is because they live in the ‘Third Space’, and their hybridity allows them to go beyond the boundaries as can be understood below:

Ali: I definitely think I am so and I declare this is a privilege. I mean it is because of intelligence. Presumably you are gradually becoming without gratitude. You cannot take a side. Whatever it is, you can say the just and the unjust. You become to have this characteristic.

Yusuf: Yes, I am a hybrid and I enjoy this fact. Under Turkey’s conditions, it is in fact an advantage. Under Turkey’s conditions you can look at the things differently from the other people, not from just one perspective. If need be, it gives you the opportunity to look at things from this perspective or that perspective. Do you understand? But, assume that you belong to just one ethnicity, willy-nilly you will look just from one perspective. No matter however much you want, the empathy borders are drawn and you cannot feel empathy enough. But I am with my situation, because I can put myself in both sides’ shoes, I understand more or comment more. I can find a true solution.

Ahmet: It is a great advantage, good I mean. Such that. For instance, some people don’t know Turkish, I always come across this, I mean I am facing such people due to the work I am working at. I mean I say if only I knew not two languages but ten languages. I know this Kurdish matter, and my dialogue with some people becomes easier. Communication becomes easier. It becomes easier to understand people, some people. Because I know Kurdish and they know Kurdish, it becomes easier for me.

Semra: Of course, it is a good thing. For example, knowing both the languages is a very good thing. You understand. You translate... You both help people and mediate, you support. I mean, you understand both sides. I understand both my Kurdish side and Turkish side and I respect.

Above cited individuals are aware of their hybridity and enjoy its advantages as understanding both sides, feeling empathy, knowing two languages and looking at the world from different perspectives. However; Leyla, a 28-year-old housewife, does not feel hybridity because she does not know how it feels; but people around her always say she is a hybrid. Moreover, although she does not feel hybrid, she in fact feels in-betweenness caused by the hybridity, and she thinks hybridity is a good thing as long as one can manage it:

Leyla: In fact, people say that I am a hybrid but I don’t know. When they ask me my homeland and when I answer, they say I am a hybrid but I have never felt this inside. But I feel

inbetweenness a lot. For me, there are two worlds: I am different with my maternal side, and I am different with my paternal side. But my maternal side is much closer to me. It is an advantage but not everybody can manage it. For instance, my brother cannot manage two sides together; he just prevails his paternal side, and thus Turkish culture. He does not adapt his behaviors to the maternal side. Everybody cannot manage to be different in different circumstances, but I can do that, and because I can manage that I am loved by both sides and I am not scorned, either. But if you cannot manage this, neither you nor they can show tolerance. I mean, it is an advantage but just if you can do it.

Also, being hybrid hinders the individuals' being racist towards both the Kurds and the Turks because they are not required to choose among races as they are in the Third Space on the one hand; on the other hand they cannot do racism, either because their mixedness paves the way for them to be objective and open towards differences. For instance:

Esmâ: I think I am a hybrid because when I am asked where I am from, or where I belong to, I don't have an answer to give. I am a hybrid. I cannot be any other things. I am neither Turk, neither Kurd nor Circassian. I mean, I don't want to proudly say I am a Turk because humans cannot choose their 'blood'. I mean, as we cannot choose our parents, we also cannot choose our place of birth and blood, and I couldn't have been born here or I could have been born in a different country and in a different family. Therefore; I never say "I am this, my blood is that". I mean I am hybrid, I am all of them. I mean, definitely it is an advantage. I mean both culturally you feel close to all of them and you are aware of how racism is a bad thing. I mean, I couldn't be a racist person because my family structure doesn't allow that, and this is really a great advantage.

Fatma: I mean I am from Diyarbakır. You know Diyarbakır is a Kurdish city. After that, I lived in Elazığ and Elazığ is a Turkish nationalist city. I mean people there are Turks and they are very nationalist. I came to Istanbul, and here there are as many kinds of people as you may guess. I mean you feel both of them. You are both Kurd and Turk because you have lived both cultures and you know both of them, and it is an advantage seeing that you feel close to both sides. I mean, you try to find a common way by smoothing excessiveness of both sides. I mean, you cannot be a racist person because your hybridity impedes this. This is a good thing, indeed.

On the other hand, Jiyan thought of hybridity as mixing of completely distinct races or cultures; so because Elazığ is already assimilated into Turkishness, she thinks she cannot be a true hybrid:

Jiyan: When you look at culturally, a Kurd in Diyarbakır or Hakkari or Şırnak is very distinct from a Kurd in Elazığ. So, if very different cultures and very different identities came together, then I became a hybrid. I don't think so because Zazas in Elazığ are assimilated. They are Turkified; so there is not much difference. Therefore; I don't feel as a hybrid. I feel Kurd inside. This is completely my personal thought. I mean because they have forgotten their own identity, I cannot say this is a hybridity.

Although for Jiyan, people in Elazığ are assimilated into Turkishness, thus they cannot be a true hybrid; she as the other interviewees in the study still admits her being born in an interethnic marriage has made her more empathetic as she has become more understanding towards the oppressed group:

Jiyan: Maybe, I wouldn't feel so much empathy. Maybe it wouldn't hurt me so much, especially the language issue. Maybe, I wouldn't be so aware. Maybe, it would seem so distant to me, and because it seemed distant, I wouldn't be interested in it. I wouldn't think about it.

Maybe, I wouldn't be so open to different cultures. Or I would be more indifferent to sensitivities of an oppressed group. Or I wouldn't be so worried about disappearing languages.

On the whole, hybridity provides the individuals to go beyond the boundaries and embrace multiculturalism. It also helps them to break binary oppositions as Bhabha says hybridity is a way of terminating social categories as national, religious and ethnic. Thus, hybridity is against exclusions and racialism seeing that it is transgressive and it asserts that there are no pure nations thanks to transgressions as Gómez-Peña states:

Binary models of understanding the world are no longer functional: us/them, right/wrong, progressive/reactionary, global/local, Third World/First World, alternative/mainstream, center/periphery, etc., are constantly shifting terms in an ever-fluctuating cultural and political landscape. ... This binary morality is completely out of touch with the times and excludes the possibility of building a more complex and holistic sense of community. ... Such monolithic definitions of community overlook the obvious facts that nowadays, we all are members of multiple communities, at different times and for different reasons (Gómez-Peña, 2000, 276-77, cited in Raab& Butler, 2008).

#### **4.2.8 On the Kurdish Identity and Kurdish Language**

It is important to find if the interviewees protect both their Kurdish and Turkish identity. Seeing that those people live in the Third Space, they may have the knowledge of the both cultures and languages, or they may know just one of them but still they may attune to the needs of the society. Hence, they were asked whether they know Kurdish and which language they use at home, and it was discovered that 7 of the interviewees know Kurdish and use it when they encounter the Kurdish people, 8 of them do not know Kurdish. It was found the younger generation does not know Kurdish because either they were born in either Istanbul or Bursa, or because their parents talk to them in Turkish. Berry (1997) says there are some factors that affect the process of acculturation. One of these factors is the age, and the younger generations are easier to be acculturated into the new society they are in. So, the young individuals in this study who lives in the host-towns as Bursa and Istanbul are acculturated to the life styles of these cities, and they do not know Kurdish as a result, yet they do not despise Kurdish language; rather they want to learn it:

Reşit (17-year-old student at 11th grade): My mother speaks Kurdish when she talks to her relatives but I don't know Kurdish. I wish I knew it because language is language. I mean, there cannot be any bad things. Knowing a second or a third language can be needed.

Mehmet Akif (15-year-old student at 9th grade): My father doesn't know Kurdish and at home we just speak in Turkish. I don't know Kurdish but I would like to learn it.

Gökhan (14-year-old student at 8th grade): I don't know Kurdish completely. Sometimes I understand it but I can't speak. Also, I sometimes understand Laz, but I can't speak. I wish I knew them.

These interviewees were born in Bursa and Istanbul, and they live there. So, although one of their parents is Kurdish, they do not know Kurdish as they are more acculturated into the Turkish society. However, there were also some others who do not know Kurdish not because of being born in the host-town, but because they were forbidden to learn Kurdish as the Kurdish language was forbidden in the past, and their families did not want them to learn or use it:

Leyla: I say my mother is a Kurd and I like the Kurds much without fear. I wanted to learn Kurdish much but my mother didn't want. My mother said it isn't necessary because we are under the same flag, we will speak Turkish not Kurdish. In fact, my mother always speaks Turkish. For instance, my grandmother asks something in Kurdish, but my mother always replies in Turkish. So, she didn't want us to learn it. You know the problems in the past. Therefore; we couldn't learn it.

Fatma: I don't know Kurdish, but I wish I had known it. Each language is a person. I mean, the more you know different languages, the richer you become. If I had known Kurdish, I would learn my own traditions and culture more easily. I mean, I would get in contact with the Kurds easily. My father speaks Turkish at home. My sisters don't know Kurdish. My grandparents and our relatives in Diyarbakır know and speak it. By the way, in the past, I mean in 1990s it was forbidden to speak Kurdish; so my family didn't want us to learn Kurdish as it was a problem.

Yet, the others know Kurdish but because their spouses are Turk, they mostly use Turkish at home. However, when they are with the Kurdish relatives, they have the ability to switch to Kurdish and also they try to keep their Kurdish customs along with the Turkish customs. Also, they want their children to learn and speak both languages as well, which implies those people are hybrid, and they have the chance of switching between cultures or languages:

Semra: I preserve some of my Kurdish identity. For instance, in Kurdish tradition, when someone enters, you stand up. I preserve that. For instance, you are more well-behaved towards your older ones. For instance, you cannot love your children when there are older people. I preserve these things. But Turks are more relaxed. When there are Kurds, I speak Kurdish. I mean I also want my children to learn Kurdish, but I didn't encourage them. I didn't say you have to learn at all costs. They can learn. The more languages they know, the better it is.

Yusuf: I mean not much because my wife doesn't know it, there isn't much chance. But with my mother or when I go to my hometown, with relatives I speak it. My children know just a little. But they wonder it. They want to learn it. You are living in a society and there are people who speak that language. There is not anything as an important and crucial thing as this. I mean my Kurdish identity; I keep it by speaking, by keeping customs and traditions alive because language is important.

On the contrary, Menekşe, a 27-year-old housewife from Erzurum whose father is a Kurd and mother is a Turk, does not want to speak Kurdish as she feels closer to the Turks and regards herself as a Turk. As mentioned before, one of the ways that hybrid individuals identify with is choosing one of their identities over the

other (Phinney & Alipuria, 2006). So, as Menekşe's Turkishness prevails more, she does not see the need for speaking Kurdish:

Menekşe: I speak Turkish with my children. I don't speak Kurdish. I mean, I don't like to speak Kurdish. For instance, my mother and my father spoke Kurdish with each other, but they spoke Turkish with us. When some of our neighbors visited us, I tried to speak Kurdish, but I didn't know much. My children don't know and they don't want me to speak, either. When I speak Kurdish, they call me a 'Syrian mother'. They don't like. Even when I go to my hometown and when they speak Kurdish, it sounds bad to me.

Frantz Fanon (2008, 8) states "to speak means to be in a position to use a certain syntax, to grasp the morphology of this or that language, but it means above all to assume a culture, to support the weight of a civilization." Therefore, it is crucial to know one's own language. When it comes to the hybrid beings, they have the chance of knowing two languages, hence two cultures. However, because of the reasons such as the prohibition of the Kurdish language in the past, living in the big cities, and marrying to a non-hybrid Turkish person, some of the interviewees could not learn the Kurdish language. Yet they want to learn it, which shows they do not despise their Kurdishness. According to Fanon (2008, 24), in the world there are "the ones who forget who they are," and, in contrast to them, "the ones who remember where they came from." In this study, the informants know where they come from and acknowledge both their identities; they are not assimilated but are integrated into the Turkish society more.

#### **4.2.9 Differences from the Non-Hybrid Turks or Kurds**

To start with, what is intended to be meant by "non-hybrid Turks or Kurds" is that they are the individuals whose both parents are either Turk or Kurd and who live in that culture, or who is Turk or Kurd but has never been to the western (for the Kurds) or eastern (for the Turks) parts of Turkey. The aim is to find if the hybrids think they have differences because they have two worlds in their minds. Seeing that identity is "about what you have in common with some people and what differentiates you from others" (Weeks, 1990, 88), identities are the ways of constructing boundaries between "us" and "them". In other words, by the way of knowing oneself and others, thus, of seeing the similarities and differences, people who have similarities are declared as "we" whereas people who are different from "us" are declared as "they". Burke & Stets (2009, 118) clarifies this as:

Through a social comparison and categorization process, persons who are similar to the self are categorized with the self and are labeled the ingroup. Correspondingly, persons who differ from the self are categorized as the outgroup. Having a particular social identity means being

like others in the group and seeing things from the group's perspective. It is assumed that individuals as group members think alike and act alike. Thus, there is uniformity in thought and action in being a group member.

As such, this study assumes that the non-hybrid Turkish and Kurdish people are more prone to construct boundaries between "us" (the ones similar to them) and "them" (the ones different from them) in contrast to the hybrid persons. Nonetheless, the hybrid individuals live in the Third Space (Bhabha, 1994) and their condition of in-betweenness prevent them from setting strict boundaries. As a result, the study found that except for one interviewee, all the others thought they are different from the non-hybrid Turkish and Kurdish people. This is because they know two cultures, and some of them know two languages, which both ease their life and lead them to be more empathetic and objective towards each side on the one hand, and to move beyond boundaries on the other hand. For example:

Ali: Valla I think I have a good deal of differences, maybe I am thinking so... However much you try to explain something, because they are taking sides, you may not have the chance of persuading them. They do not have the chance of feeling empathy. That is, it is not important for them to be right or wrong. They defend their sides. From this point, I have a very big advantage. I mean, I am not prejudiced. What is it? They emphasize it, whichever part or sect it is. Say it Kurd, he tries to defend his thing, on his side or always feels empathy with them. Say it Turk, he tries to feel empathy with his side, tries to defend his side. There is not such a thing with me, but no matter whoever is oppressed, a little more I try to stand by him. By 'a little more', we try to stand by him with every fiber of our being.

Yusuf: Those people have just one perspective, just one-sided. Your difference is there. I can see from my perspective and from other side's perspective both. I mean, you belong to both sides. They cannot be like you. I wish all Turkey had been like that. Of course, he is different because the possibility to see things as I see is very low, and they cannot find reasonable solutions to the problems. When you see just your truths, it is really impossible to find a common point. The other side also has truths so when you see both sides; you can find a common point and a solution.

Semra: The difference is that I understand both sides. I lived in both sides... I mean I comply with them.

Gökhan: First of all, I don't regard myself neither completely Kurdish nor Turkish. I feel myself just in-between. This is my difference. If someone is completely Kurdish, he cannot know what to do when he comes across with the Turks or vice versa; but someone in-between knows what to do when he is with the Kurds and Turks.

Also, although there may be some exceptions like Ahmet who has become a Turkish nationalist because of the problems he went through due to the Kurds when he was living in a village of Erzurum, the hybrids are different in terms of racism and separatism because they may not be racist or nationalist as they carry two identities inside:

Fatma: I mean you become opposed to nationalism of both sides. You don't be a racist because you know two races, ethnicities and cultures. I mean, you don't 'otherize' anyone. You can say everybody is equal and you can use both your identities without hesitation. Moreover, because the religion is also a common point, you cannot go in opposite positions. I mean you see

different cultures and you become more open-minded. This is your difference. You cannot be conservative, I mean.

Esma: I think there is no difference if s/he does not take pride in this, but if s/he takes pride in this, there is already a big difference among us because Turks, I especially want to mention the Turks because - yes we are all Turks but- they say we are Turk, we have the noble blood, Turkish blood. I say "No, you didn't choose that blood because you cannot choose it. This is given to you before you were born and you have to live this". I mean, I will never forget the statement "The best Kurd is the one who is dead" by even looking into my eyes and I said then "How can you utter that sentence? You don't have that right. Is it because you are born in a Turkish family? Never." Because he also didn't know what Turkishness, Kurdishness is before the birth, it is given to us over time. But pure Turkish or pure Kurdish one more tend to be inclined to his race. Neither I, nor you, nor another person can choose this blood. No, I mean it is really a great thing because if my mother and father were from the same race and they were pure, most probably race would be more dominant for me. But I don't have such a thing because you become more moderate. I mean you can see all of them equal. I mean I have many identities; how can I regard any one of them odd?

Yusuf: I mean I didn't show myself with my either Kurd or Turk identity as it is not included in my life philosophy. I mean I have communication with every person. This is also a little about my personality. I mean I can communicate with every person, because of that; I say I am the cement of Turkey. I have communication with religious ones, or atheist ones. I mean with the leftist, with the rightist. I mean you find a common point.

As can be seen, hybrid beings are less prone to racism and nationalism as they go between identities. Yazdiha (2010, 33) argues hybridity breaks the essentialized racial identity as it provides the individuals to move between different ethnic identities, and one can apply this statement to the hybrid Kurds and Turks although they are not racial but ethnic identities:

The ability to play multiple roles, to 'pass' in different arenas, carries significant power. In embodying the inability to bind identities to race, racial hybridity both in the physical body and in consciousness offers a means of deconstructing the boundaries of dichotomous racial identities.

This may be the difference of the hybrid beings from the non-hybrid Turkish and Kurdish people. There is a possibility that is also underlined in the literature for the hybrids to break essentialist views and to be more empathetic and understanding towards the differences. So, hybridity provides people living in the Third Space to go between two worldviews, cultures, and languages; in other words, to have many identities, as a consequence of which it can be considered as gain not drawback. Those people resemble an artist who has the ability to cross cultures and reflect as many cultures and realities as possible in their works seeing that they are not fixed to just one culture or one identity as Gomez-Peña (1996, 12) puts it:

An ability to understand the hybrid nature of culture develops from an experience of dealing with a dominant culture from the outside. The artist who understands and practices hybridity in this way can be at the same time an insider and outsider, an expert in border crossings, a temporary member of multiple communities, a citizen of two or more nations. S/he performs multiple roles in multiple contexts. At times s/he can operate as a crosscultural diplomat, as an intellectual *coyote* (smuggler of ideas) or a media pirate. At other times, s/he assumes the role of nomadic chronicler, intercultural translator, or political trickster. S/he speaks from more

than one perspective, to more than one community, about more than one reality. His/her job is to trespass, bridge, interconnect, reinterpret, remap, and redefine; to find the outer limits of his/her culture and cross them.

#### **4.2.10 Kurdish and Turkish Nationalism from the Perspective of the Hybrids**

In the third chapter, Kurdish nationalism was examined vis-à-vis Turkish nationalism, and accordingly the thoughts of the interviewees about the Kurdish and Turkish nationalism were sought. All the interviewees regarded any kinds of nationalism as wrong, but they supported the protection of the Kurdish language and culture. They were of the opinion that all the people living in Turkey should live his/her own cultures and beliefs; but there is no need for nationalist, in particular extremist movements:

Semra: I don't enjoy them. I don't approve. I mean, we are Muslim and they are Muslim, too. So it seems unnecessary. Everybody is under the Turkish flag, and everybody should respect each other. I can say this to both sides, to extreme MHP and to extreme Kurds. This flag, this religion belongs to both of us. It is the same. The rest seems ridiculous for me... I get angry with their thoughts, I mean nationalist thoughts.

Yusuf: I mean, I am opposed to all kinds of nationalism. I mean, because I have a philosophy that sees the human as basis, when I look at people I never care about where they are from, who they are. I mean, just as human. After that other things come to the stage. I am now 47 and up to now I have tried to preserve this and this makes me happy more. But when you approach it other way, you cannot find a way and you become unhappy.

Fatma: I don't like people who regard themselves as superior because they are Kurd or Turk. Also, I don't like the Kurds who are in or supporters of the PKK and who are communist. On the other hand, I don't like fascist MHP and the ones who say they are the GokTurks. For instance, I hate Atsız and Öcalan. What I mean, I am against of all kinds of extremist nationalism and fascism and I am with those people who are suppressed. The unifying thing is Islam. Therefore; I feel close to both sides. I am not opposed to a different Kurdistan be established; but if it would be a nation state, there is not such a need. I mean, I support their autonomy. I mean, I cannot approve such an idea that they establish a nation that is fascist or socialist; but they can be autonomous. I mean, I condemn all nationalisms. I mean, there is no problem in preserving one's Kurdish language and culture; but when otherization starts, no matter which side it is, I immediately react to it. I mean, one should protect one's cultural identity without otherization of the others. This can be both the Turks and the Kurds. I support such steps towards protection of cultural heritage; but I again say that I am against a Kurdistan based on nationalist, racist system. They can be autonomous but not a nation state.

On the other hand, some of the interviewees were against any kinds of nationalism but they also supported the Kurdish nationalism because they think if today there is a Kurdish nationalism, this is because there is a Turkish nationalism. For them, Kurdish nationalism is more meaningful because it is the Kurds who are suppressed. Indeed, these claims parallel some of the studies on the Kurds in Turkey which underline that the Kurds were discriminated against and they were tried to be assimilated as discussed by Yeğen (2009), Jongerden (2001), Beşikçi (1969), Zeydanlıoğlu (2008) and etc. For instance; Yeğen says for the state the Kurds in Turkey were regarded as “prospective-Turks” that needed to be Turkified, especially

in the early Republican era. Based on these facts, Kurdish nationalism seemed more meaningful than Turkish nationalism to some of the interviewees as they said:

Jiyan: I am politically antipathetic. I mean, Turkish nationalism, Turkishness. I mean, I am against all kinds of nationalism but Kurdish nationalism does not seem to be repulsive to me as Turkish nationalism does. I mean, Turkish nationalism is so repulsive for me because the incident there is different. I mean on the one hand there is a group which was oppressed; their nationalism can be more acceptable and reasonable; but on the other hand in Turkish nationalism you cannot say the same thing because it is the oppressor side, and also it pursues nationalism and even become fascist, not respecting any other cultures. Therefore; I even get uncomfortable of my surname because there is 'Turk' in my surname. As I said before, I am against nationalisms. For example, I am against that leader fetishism. I mean whether it is Turk or Kurd. People stopped thinking logically and run after what someone says without thinking. I mean, in nationalism there is leader, fetishism, and to go after something without thinking, analyzing and questioning. This is contrary to my nature because I question everything. But as I said, for instance, when we see both Turkish nationalism and Kurdish nationalism, Turkish nationalism is very repulsive for me. I mean fascist. I mean it doesn't respect any other cultures. It just tries to assimilate others. But I regard Kurdish nationalism as something which has cultural demands, and declare them. Of course, it should be in the council. I mean without moving towards the violence. I mean without being militarized. But there are historical reasons behind that, I mean I don't say this for now. But as opposed to a fascist, extremely militarized Turkish army, there appeared a militarized Kurdish army. But, this cannot legitimate its actions. I mean of both sides. But I can support a Kurdish nationalism, or I don't say nationalism but say movement, that escaped from violence and has produced a different discourse.

Metin: I am neither a racist nor a nationalist person. I am against all kinds of nationalism. But you need to look into the depth of nationalism. I mean if there is a nationalist movement, you have to search the reasons of it. For example, up to now the Kurds have always been suppressed, their language is forbidden, they were dehumanized. I mean if there is a Kurdish nationalism, its reason is the Turkish nationalism.

On the other hand, for Ahmet the Kurds were raised with the nationalist feelings and that there is not a Kurdish nationalism but just a movement for language and culture. In the previous section, it is discussed Ahmet's approach towards the Kurds is more likely an 'exclusive recognition' (Saraçoğlu, 2011). His problems with the Kurds in the past have led him to recognize the Kurds exclusively with negative stereotypes and labels as can be understood from his statement:

Ahmet: We didn't know what nationalism means when we were in the village. When we were in the village, we didn't know what Turkisness or Kurdishness is. But I didn't know, I. But the ones at the same age as me or the ones older than us did know very well. Why did they know very well? Because their fathers instilled in them that they are Turks, enemies. They instilled these ideas into their children's minds, and they treated us accordingly. But we, not from our fathers but even from our grandfathers, did not hear such things. They said no, you will not disrespect, behave rudely, commit theft, and look at their wives or daughters when you go their home. They said these words to us but theirs said they are Turks, break, steal. I lived them by myself, I experienced them. I have never segregated so far. When you say nationalism, it is enough to say a lover of Turkey. But so far, I have never discriminated between the Turks and Kurds. When you ask this to not a hybrid, but to a Kurdish, son of a Kurd (*Kürt oğlu Kürt*), you see. If a Kurd had lived the life I lived, in fact someone lived and there is a live example of this. He lived the life I lived, now he is an enemy of the Kurds and he is a Kurdish, son of a Kurd (*Kürt oğlu Kürt*). We suffered from the things that we both went through together. I did not nurse a grudge but he does against the Kurds. Surely, when you sometimes think, you say yes. If you say whether there is Kurdish nationalism, I say no because it is in existence just as language not as a motherland. It can be as a language. It is their own language, they can defend

it, speak it. I mean it is freely spoken today in the places where it was forbidden until yesterday. That is not a problem.

On the whole, Kurdish nationalism and Turkish nationalism cannot be handled apart. They are two sides of a coin and without one the other does not have a meaning. In the third chapter, it was discussed there are five stages of Kurdish nationalism (Yavuz, 2001), and each stage is shaped by the attitude of the Turkish state towards the Kurds. Turkish nationalist movements inescapably caused Kurdish nationalist movements and vice versa. So, the study searched how the interviewees feel about those nationalist movements and found that the individuals do not approve any kinds of nationalism either Turkish or Kurdish; yet they support cultural rights of both sides and condemn any extremist actions of each side.

### **4.3 Summary**

In this chapter, the methodology of the study, qualitative method, is presented and information about the interview and the interviewees were given. The main issues were searched under ten subtitles. Interviewees' thoughts regarding those themes were presented here.

The first thing that is researched is how the individuals define themselves and whether they see their identities as multiple or not, and it was found that these hybrid beings are composed of many allegiances and they are aware of its richness. They don't see their identities as stable. Also, the individuals are aware of their different types of identities such as national, cultural or ethnic. Their national identity is Turkish, but their cultural and ethnic identity changes as the context changes, and it depends the people around them. Moreover; those individuals have multiple and hybrid identity; so, they have the chance of moving between different identities. Furthermore, they admit their identities are fluid. The more they are in new surroundings and encounter different groups of people, the more their identities change as Oyserman & Elmore & Smith (2012, 93) argues identities are not fixed, but are constructed dynamically in the moment because people are able to attune themselves to the context seeing that "although often experienced as stable, identity is highly malleable and situation-sensitive, so which aspect of identity comes to mind is a dynamic product of that which is chronically accessible and that which is situationally cued."

Secondly, because they are ethnically hybridized, they have different ways to define themselves as both Turk and Kurd, as in-between or just as a Turk or a Kurd. Homi Bhabha's (1994) Third Space applies here because these hybrid beings live in very Third Space and this space does not require them to choose this or that; rather it provides them to choose any of them or both of them. Although he uses this term to explain the relation between the colonized and the colonizer, in fact the Third Space refers to any exchanging space between any societies. The important point here is that in the Third Space a new identity is formed out of those exchanging of language, custom and beliefs etc. So, being born into Turkish-Kurdish interethnic marriages, these people are at the Third Space and they have the chance of going between two ethnicities. Therefore; the study tried to find how those people define themselves and found that their being Kurd or Turk or both depend on the circumstances. In other words, it is not fixed. While they know they have both Turkishness and Kurdishness, their identity is shaped by the context. On the other hand, some of them feel 'in-between' and 'ambivalent' (Bhabha, 1994) because they have two ethnicities together.

Furthermore; as explained above, those people's living in the Third Space provides them to move between the identities at any time and at any level. Therefore; the study questioned whether there are times they feel more Kurd or more Turk, and it found that except for one of the interviewees, Ahmet, all the other felt sometimes more Turk and sometimes more Kurd. There are two reasons of this: the context and the suppression respectively. First of all, it was found that the individuals are influenced by their environment and the people around them as Barker & Jane (2016, 260) states "identities are wholly social constructions and cannot 'exist' outside of cultural representations". Therefore; when they are with the Kurds, they belong to the Kurdish society more; yet when they are with the Turks, they belong to the Turkish society more. Yet, as said before, one of the interviewees, Ahmet was not of that opinion, and he prioritized his Turkishness over Kurdishness. This is because he lived in one of the villages in Erzurum when the PKK was active; thus the problems he lived with the Kurds at that time pushed him to a Turkish nationalist position and exclusive recognition towards the Kurds, which may also be explained by the influence of the social and political context on identities as what made him so nationalist was his past with the Kurds. In other words, for him there is not such a

thing as sometimes being Kurd and sometimes Turk in terms of ethnicity. Yet, still he can speak Kurdish with the Kurds, and he has Kurdish friends.

Secondly, their belonging to Turkishness or Kurdishness is related with the degree of suppression those identities feel under. In other words; inside individuals there are many allegiances; however there has been always a tendency to see one of them as more important than others, and people regard it as the individual's identity. Yet, Maalouf (2003, 13) argues that whenever one of those allegiances is threatened, that allegiance becomes to reflect his/her identity, "where people feel their faith is threatened, it is their religious affiliation that seems to reflect their whole identity. But if their mother tongue or their ethnic group is in danger, then they fight ferociously against their own co-religionists." As a result, it was found that some of the individuals feel more Kurd or more Turk when any of them is threatened.

On the other hand, it was found the individuals' belonging to the hometown or host-town depends on where they were born and where they feel as 'at home'. So, while some of them belong to the hometown, some of them belong to the host-town. Moreover, it was found that the individuals' interethnic marriages also have accelerated their hybridity, understanding and empathy. Also, it was found these individuals see themselves as hybrids and they enjoy its benefits such as understanding both sides, feeling empathy and being with all who is suppressed. Therefore; they see themselves as different from the non-hybrid Kurds or Turks in terms of racism and nationalism because they cannot be a racist or nationalist as they are a part of both. Yazdiha (2010) argues hybridity does not pursue a division but interconnectedness. Therefore, while a non-hybrid Turk or Kurd can be more racist or nationalist, a hybrid being can focus on more sharing and they can be more understanding as the fact that they have both ethnicities leads them to emphasize inclusion not exclusion.

Lastly, it was found these hybrid beings approach nationalism differently. None of them like nationalism of any kind; but they pursue all people living in Turkey should be able to live their own culture and speak their own language, but not to use military force to gain some rights, which is true for both Turkish and Kurdish nationalism. However, some of them were of the opinion that Kurdish nationalism is the result of the Turkish nationalism as it was discussed in the five stages of Yavuz (2001).

## 5. CONCLUSION

Every time, even every minute one gets in contact with others, s/he realizes some differences in his/her identity, which is inescapable because individuals do not have just 'one' identity but a hybrid one that is getting even multiple day by day. Accordingly, this study is based on the hybrid Kurds and Turks who have become hybridized through interethnic marriages between the Turks and the Kurds in Turkey. As a consequence, the study aimed to find how these individuals define their identities and to see whether they cling to just one identity cutting off a part of their identity or whether they acknowledge all what constitutes their identities or whether they reconstruct that 'all' themselves in the Third Space. In other words, it aimed to see whether these hybrid beings regard themselves as just Kurd or Turk, as both, or as none of them.

Hence, in the study, it was questioned whether those individuals adhere to just one identity or not, and except for one, all the individuals defined themselves as both Turk and Kurd. In other words, all the individuals in the study do not define themselves in just racial or ethnic terms; rather they are aware of other identities as national or role. For instance, they said Turkishness is their national identity, but they also have some other identities such as being a teacher or a mother which are their role identities, indeed. They did not cling to just one identity, but enjoyed having differences instead. So, their identities are not composed of just one but many allegiances, any of which comes to the stage when it is needed. Also, it was found those individuals do not regard their identities as fixed but they accept as the contexts change, their identities change, too. On the one hand, they try to comply with the requirements of the social and political context, thus as the political or social context in Turkey changes their identities also change; on the other hand their identities evolve over time. Each encounter or each knowledge adds something to their identities.

Also, seeing that these people are living in the Third Space (Bhabha, 1994), the study investigated the ways these individuals defined themselves as Turk, Kurd,

in-between or both, and found that it depends on the context as sometimes they are Turk or Kurd, yet sometimes they are in-between. This is because their surroundings influence the ways they identify with. If they are with someone Turk or Kurd, then their Turkishness or Kurdishness becomes more evident; yet if they are forced to choose any of their identities, they feel in-between or ambivalent.

Also, it was found that those individuals sometimes belong to Kurdish and sometimes to Turkish society more. There are two reasons of these. Firstly, as said before, their identity is bound to their social surroundings. So, if they are with someone from either society, then they assume this identity at that moment. Secondly, it was found that the individuals' feeling more Kurd or more Turk depends on the political events of the time. In other words, when a group is suppressed, then the individuals feel empathy with that suppressed group more and assume this identity over the others. So, if the Turks die because of the PKK, then they feel more Turk; yet if the Kurdish language is forbidden or if the Kurds are despised anywhere, then they become more Kurd. As can be understood, these individuals do not have just one way of identifying; rather they have the opportunity of choosing either one or both identities, and more importantly their choices are not fixed as sometimes they can be just a Turk yet sometimes they can be both a Turk and Kurd, which is what makes them hybrid, indeed.

On the other hand, it was examined whether these people are influenced by their surroundings, and found that they are influenced by their relatives as to claiming belonging to just Kurdish or Turkish identity. In such conditions, it was found that individuals feel in-between and ambivalent. Some of the interviewees said when they say they are Turk or Kurd, they have been criticized by their Kurdish and Turkish relatives. This situation causes them to feel in-between and ambivalent. In fact, hybrid beings should be appreciated rather than being pressured because they are the ones who give the hopes of peace as Maalouf (2003, 5) states those people are important in compromises as "their role is to act as bridges, go-betweens, mediators between the various communities and cultures" and they "will hand on the torch between communities and cultures, will be a kind of mortar joining together and strengthening the societies in which they live" (Maalouf, 2003, 36). The world should not be divided into "we" and "they", and it should not be full of wars on

reclaiming ones' identities over others' identities. Rather, if one sees all allegiances inside himself/herself regarding nation, religion, gender, culture and, ethnicity etc:

Then one enters into a different relationship both with other people and with one's own 'tribe'. It is no longer just a question of 'them' and 'us': two armies in battle order preparing for the next confrontation, the next revenge match. From then on there are people on 'our' side with whom I ultimately have little in common, while on 'their' side there are some to whom I might feel very close (Maalouf, 2003, 31).

In accordance with what Maalouf stated above, the interviewees in the study approached the Kurdish issue with empathy and understanding. They were not racist or nationalist because they live in the Third Space (Bhabha, 1994), rather they may act as 'bridges and go-betweens' arousing hopes for peace as they were aware of both pros and cons of the both sides, Kurdish and Turkish, and could criticize both sides objectively. As a result, the study found that the fact that those individuals are mixed of two ethnicities refrains them from discriminating against the Kurds or the Turks, and even against any group of people in Turkey, that is why they suit Maalouf's description as 'mediators' and 'go-betweens' between the communities.

On the other hand, seeing that most of the interviewees live in the cities other than their hometowns, the study aimed to find where they belong to, either to hometown or hosttown, and it found that the younger generation that was born in the hosttowns stated to belong to the hosttowns. The ones who were born in their hometowns belong to either the hometown or hosttown; this is because of the reasons such as work opportunities of the city, multicultural nature of the city, and attitudes of people etc. So, where they feel as 'at home', they belong to this place. Also, it was aimed to find whether the identities of the ones who have been living in the cities other than their hometown have changed or not. The study showed they have changed except for one interviewee in terms of tolerance and acceptance. Most of the interviewees in this study live not in their hometowns but in Bursa and Istanbul. Therefore; willy-nilly they are influenced by their urban environment. As such, it was found living in big cities have broadened their horizon and made them more understanding towards the differences.

Moreover, it was searched whether the individuals' interethnic marriage has an effect on their identities, and it was found those individuals have become even more understanding and empathetic towards both sides, and also it has become more obvious that their identities are not fixed, yet fluid and always tend to changing. In

this way, one may overturn essentialist binary oppositions as Weedon (2004, 154) suggests:

Identities are not just enabling, in defining their own sense of identity, individuals and groups tend to fix the identity of others, often working within long established binary modes of thinking that help sustain inequalities, exclusions and oppression. This is why it is important to see identities as both changing and changeable cultural constructs.

Also, seeing that these people are exposed to both Kurdish and Turkish cultures, the study tried to find to which culture they claim to belong to, and found that their cultural belongings are also not fixed and it depends on the context as well. They “like” both cultures and they assume the culture in which they are in at that moment. Also, their cultural belonging is about the context. In other words, when it comes to ‘religion’ most of the interviewees said they prefer Turkish culture because the Turks are more conservative about the religion whereas when it comes to ‘tradition’ they prefer Kurdish culture because the Kurds have protected their traditions more and their traditions are much better than Turkish traditions. For instance, they said in the Kurdish traditions, respect to the old people is very important, and this tradition has not changed. According to that, a daughter-in-law cannot speak loudly when there is an older man or father-in-law, which shows her respect to them.

On the other hand, Barkey & Fuller (1998) state one of the reasons behind the integration is the mixed marriages, so the offspring of those marriages become hybrids. Therefore, the study explored whether these individuals regard themselves as ‘hybrid’, and if so what they think of being a ‘hybrid’. Although two interviewees of the study did not call themselves as ‘hybrid’, all the others claimed they are ‘hybrid, and all of the interviewees were on the opinion that they are able to move between two identities as they can easily comply with the requirements of the society. These individuals have the opportunity of choosing to be just a Kurd or Turk, or to be both, or in-between, and they do not have just one stable identity, which provides them to be accepted in both Turkish and Kurdish cultures on the one hand, and to be more objective to Turkish and Kurdish issues on the other hand. Also, they said they have the advantages of being more understanding and empathetic towards differences.

In fact, being in the Third Space provides them to move beyond the ‘boundaries’, and here the boundaries are not the end, yet the beginning of new

identities (Bhabha, 1994). So, these individuals are mixed of Turkishness and Kurdishness, which is a new identity, indeed, and they are not assimilated because they are detached from neither the Turks nor the Kurds. Yeğen (2009) argues the Kurds in Turkey have been tried to be Turkified as they were regarded ‘prospective-Turks’. However, this study found that these individuals are not assimilated but hybridized because of the interethnic marriages as Heper (2007) states over time the Turks and the Kurds have gone through mutual acculturation, which resulted in the hybridization of both sides. Also, Gültekin (2012) states the interethnic marriages between the Turks and the Kurds started in about 11<sup>th</sup> century, and these marriages led to integration and soon hybridization of both sides. Indeed, hybridization is different from assimilation. In assimilation, one loses his own identity and adopts the other identity; however in hybridization one has allegiance both to his own culture and the new identity he is exposed to, and this is the way they retain their difference not being completely similar. Oyserman, Sakamoto & Lauffer (1998, 1606) explain hybridization as follows:

Hybridization involves the melding of cultural lenses or frames such that values and goals that were focused on one context are transposed to a new context. Hybridization has the potential of allowing individuals to express cultural values, even when the original contexts no longer exist, and also may create a bond or connection between individuals and their new contexts by allowing a socially approved forum to express their identities.

Moreover, the thesis pursued to find whether these individuals protect their Kurdish identity along with Kurdish language, and it found that the younger generation does not know Kurdish because they were born in the hosttowns and their families do not speak Kurdish with them as the children live in a mostly Turkish society and they are educated in Turkish language. Yet, still they want to learn Kurdish language, they do not despise it. Also, the study found that some of the interviewees do not know Kurdish just because of the politics. In the past, the Kurdish language was forbidden; so these individuals were refrained from learning Kurdish; but now they also want to learn it.

On the other hand, in the study it was sought whether the hybrids regard themselves as different from the non-hybrid Kurds or Turks, and it was found they indeed say they have a great many differences, in particular regarding the view of the world. It is true that hybrid beings have the advantage of living two cultures or identities at once. Hence; they are privileged because they understand both parts and what is needed is to recognize and respect them. The hybrids in this study expressed

their being mixed has helped them to be more understanding, empathetic and all-embracing towards the differences.

Lastly, their approaches to Turkish and Kurdish nationalism are questioned in the study, and it became clear that these hybrid individuals do not take sides; therefore they can not be a nationalist person. They find extreme nationalist movements meaningless and wrong, yet they pursue that all the people living in Turkey should be able to live their own culture and speak their own language without applying to military forces. However, the study found that some of the interviewees were criticized of not taking sides with just the Turks or the Kurds, especially by their paternal sides. For instance, one of the interviewees was criticized a lot just because of sharing a Kurdish song. Also, one of them cannot say she is a Kurd to her paternal side although they are Kurd because they think Kurdishness is about the PKK. As can be understood, the hybrid beings are more likely to be all-embracing, and they are more tolerant towards the differences. However, nationalist people insist them to choose just Kurdishness or Turkishness.

Seeing that hybridization involves one's turning into the other, there is no more "we" and "others" because "'we' (the *Self*) can no longer imagine 'ourselves' in such a binary opposition: the *Other* is among 'us', and even more, 'we' are the *Other*" says Beck (2007, cited in Sayegh, 2008, 2). So, the situation the hybrid lives is neither assimilation nor discrimination; yet it is a kind of embracing differences inside oneself. As such, the study showed the hybrids regarded themselves different because they have the knowledge of the two identities and cultures although some of them did not know the Kurdish language. They could not define themselves as just a 'Kurd' or just a 'Turk', and because of that they could not be racist or nationalist. Their hybridity allowed them to be more "objective", and above all to feel more empathy towards each group. They are not assimilated but they carry both the Kurdish and Turkish identities and they easily comply with the society.

Furthermore, the study found that individuals do not 'mimic' the others; rather they try to fit the context they are in. Their compliance with the context is different from the mimicry of the Black people mentioned in Frantz Fanon. Those people try to resemble the other at the cost of forgetting their own identities; however the hybrids in this study underlined their effort to embrace their Kurdishness as well

as Turkishness together. As the study showed these hybrid individuals know either Kurdish language or try to apply Kurdish customs along with the Turkish customs.

Another important finding is that the individuals in this study are not discriminated or excluded just because they are hybrid in Turkey. The only negative thing they live is the in-betweenness and ambivalence they go through when they are asked about their identities; yet this was also not to an extreme degree. They accept both their identities and try to fit the political and social contexts they are in.

On the whole, hybridity is the “fact” of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Raab & Butler (2008, 16) dwell on the uniting nature of hybridity arguing that “since cultural hybridity is a given (and a very desirable one at that!), isolationism – be it in politics, national identity, cultural practices, or academic disciplines – does not fit the realities of the twenty-first century.” In that case, hybridity does not mean a fusion of cultures; but differences exist still. So, what is needed is “an openness for challenges to national and cultural identities, a willingness to live with and respect difference and to acknowledge the pervasive interconnections and hybridities...”

So, one has many allegiances inside and s/he is not ‘half’ because s/he is hybrid; instead s/he is free to express either one of them or all of them, and this is what makes him/her so rich. As a result, as hypothesized before, this study showed there are hybridized people through interethnic marriages in Turkey as well. They live in the Third Space and they have the chance of moving between different identities. They are not pure Kurdish or Turkish, yet they are either both or in-between. Also, they may be the ones who carry the torches of peace between the Kurds and the Turks, which is what Turkey may need in the 21<sup>st</sup> century because they cannot be racist and nationalist as Maalouf (2003) discusses they are like ‘mediators’ and ‘go-betweens’.

However; seeing that the research covers the interviewees from three cities of Turkey, namely Erzurum, Bursa and Istanbul, further research is needed to generalize it. This is because the surroundings and the events around people influence their identity definition. So, someone from the southeastern part of Turkey may be hybrid but s/he may not feel the same as the ones in this research. Hence, further research is needed in this field.

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## **APPENDIX A**

### **Backgrounds of the Interviewees**

**Ali:** He is 41 years old. He is from Erzurum and he is living in one of the villages of Hınıs, Erzurum which is mostly composed of the Kurds. His father is Kurd and his mother is Turk. He is married to a Turkish woman. They have three children, and he is self-employed.

**Ahmet:** Born in Erzurum, he is a forty-year old man having been living in Bursa for 26 years with his family. His father is Turk, and his mother is Kurd. He is married to a Turkish woman. He has two children, and he works at the municipality.

**Ayşe:** She is a 53-year old woman from Erzurum. Her father is a Kurd and her mother is a Turk. She is married to a Turkish man and they have five children. They live in Erzurum. She is a housewife.

**Metin:** A 60-year old man from Mardin, Metin is a businessman in a private company in Istanbul. His father is Turk and his mother is Kurd. He has been living in Istanbul for 40 years. He is married to a Kurdish woman and they have three children. He graduated from the high school but did not continue his education.

**Leyla:** She is a 28-year-old housewife. She was born in Bursa, but her father is from Samsun and is a Turk, and her mother is from Elazığ and a Kurd. She is married to a Turkish man, and has been living in Bursa from her birth on. She has two children.

**Menekşe:** A 27-year-old housewife, she is from Erzurum. Her father is Kurd and her mother is Turk. She was born in Erzurum, but has been living in Bursa for 9 years. Also, she is married to a Turkish man and has three children.

**Reşit:** Being a student at 11<sup>th</sup> grade, he is 17 years old. His father is Turk and his mother is Kurd. He was born in Bursa and lives there.

**Yusuf:** He is a 46-year-old teacher. He is from Erzurum, but he has left Erzurum for 27 years. His father is Kurd and his mother is Turk. He is married to a Turkish woman and they have 2 children. They live in Bursa now.

**Gökhan:** He is at the age of 14 and a student at 8<sup>th</sup> grade. His father is from Ağrı and a Kurd, and his mother is from Trabzon and a Turk. He was born in Bursa and lives there.

**Kadir:** A 17-year-old high school student at 10<sup>th</sup> grade, he lives in Bursa. His father is from Erzurum and a Turk, his mother is from Rize and a Kurd.

**Mehmet Akif:** He is 15 years old and he is a 9<sup>th</sup> grade student. His father is from İzmir and a Kurd, his mother is from Rize and a Turk. He was born in İstanbul, but he has been living in Bursa for 8 years.

**Semra:** She is a housewife at the age of 37. Her father is a Kurd and her mother is a Turk. She is from Erzurum but lives in Bursa now. She is married to a Turkish man and they have 2 children.

**Fatma:** She is 27 years old. Her parents are from Diyarbakır, but they live in Elazığ. Her father is Kurd but her mother is Turk. She has been living in İstanbul for 8 years, but she goes to Elazığ on holidays. She is an English instructor at a private university.

**Jiyan:** She is 25, and she is from Elazığ. Her father is Turk and her mother is Zaza Kurd. She has been living in İstanbul for 8 years for education and work; but she goes her hometown on holidays. She is a teacher at a private school.

**Esmâ:** A 19-year old student at a private university, Eda lives in İstanbul with her family. Her father is a Turk from Kahraman Maraş, and her mother is a Kurd from Malatya. She has been living in İstanbul from her birth.

## APPENDIX B

### Interview Questions

1. Kimliğinizi ne gibi ögeler oluşturuyor?
2. Daha çok hangi kimliğiniz ön planda?
3. Kimliğinizin sabit olduğunu düşünüyor musunuz?
4. Kendinizi daha çok nasıl tanımlıyorsunuz? Kürt olarak mı? Türk olarak mı? Arada-kalmış olarak mı? Yoksa ikisi birden mi?
5. Kendinizi daha çok Kürt ya da Türk olarak hissettiğiniz zamanlar var mı? (Varsa ne zaman ve neden?)
6. Arada-kalmış gibi hissettiğiniz oluyor mu hiç? Ne tür durumlarda oluyor bu?
7. Çevrenizdeki kişilerin sizi tek bir kimliği seçmeye ittiği zamanlar oluyor mu hiç? (Şayet oluyorsa, bu durumdan rahatsız oluyor musunuz?)
8. Kendinizi nereye ait hissediyorsunuz? Doğduğunuz yere mi yoksa göçtüğünüz şehre mi?
9. Kimliğinizde ırklar-arası evliliğinizin etkileri var mı? Ne gibi?
10. Farklı bir şehirde yaşamanızın kimliğinizi etkilediğini düşünüyor musunuz? Nasıl?
11. Kendinizi daha çok hangi kültüre yakın hissediyorsunuz? Türk kültürüne mi, Kürt kültürüne mi ya da hiç birine? (Neden?)
12. Çevrenizdeki kültürlerin kimliğinizi etkilediğini düşünüyor musunuz? Nasıl?
13. Melez olduğunuzu düşünüyor musunuz? Neden?
14. Aradakalmışlık ya da duygu karmaşası yaşıyor musunuz? Neden ve ne zaman?
15. Evde hangi dili kullanıyorsunuz?
16. Çocuklarınızla hangi dili kullanıyorsunuz?
17. Kürtçe dilini ve Kürt kültürünü kullanmaya çalışıyor musunuz?
18. Tamamen Kürt ya da tamamen Türk olan kişilerden farklı olduğunuzu düşünüyor musunuz? Nasıl?
19. Farklı aidiyetlerinizin olmasının ne gibi avantajları ve dezavantajları var?
20. Kürt ve Türk milliyetçiliği hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz?

## CURRICULUM VITAE

### PERSONAL INFORMATION

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### EDUCATION

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Undergraduate	Foreign Language Education Department	Boğaziçi University	2014
High School	Elazığ Ahmet Kabaklı Anatolian Teacher Training High School		2010

### WORK EXPERIENCE

<b>Year</b>	<b>Corporation/Institute</b>	<b>Enrollment</b>
2016-2018	Republic of Turkey Ministry of Education	English Teacher
2014-2016	Istanbul 29 May University	English Instructor