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A Kantian Analysis of Pricing and R & D

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dc.contributor.authorDonduran, Murat
dc.contributor.authorUnveren, Burak
dc.date.accessioned2026-06-27T14:32:10Z
dc.date.issued2021
dc.description.abstractCan cooperation offer an innovative alternative to competition among firms? This design problem is analyzed in the context of Kantian cooperation among firms in a two-stage model. In the first stage, firms invest in R&D, which increases the probability of obtaining a superior technology. In the second stage, firms observe their technology, and choose their prices. The equilibrium R&D levels under competition, Kantian cooperation, and cartel cooperation are analyzed and compared. We show that without (with) perfect research spillovers, Kantian price cooperation supports weakly higher (lower) R&D than does cartel price cooperation. Moreover, the results are compared to the social optimum. Among the cases that we studied, only Kantian cooperative pricing with competitive R&D can induce an R&D investment that exceeds the socially optimal level, and all other R&D outcomes in our study unambiguously fall below the socially optimum level.en
dc.description.urihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-020-09801-y
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s11151-020-09801-y
dc.identifier.eissn1573-7160
dc.identifier.endpage605
dc.identifier.issn0889-938X
dc.identifier.issue4
dc.identifier.startpage583
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14981/61766
dc.identifier.volume58
dc.identifier.wos000604458400002
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherSPRINGER
dc.relation.ispartofREVIEW OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
dc.subjectR and D
dc.subjectInnovation
dc.subjectCooperation
dc.subjectKantian equilibrium
dc.subjectRESEARCH JOINT VENTURES
dc.subjectCOMPETITION
dc.subjectSPILLOVERS
dc.subjectBusiness & Economics
dc.titleA Kantian Analysis of Pricing and R & D
dc.typeArticle
dspace.entity.typePublication
local.import.sourceWOS

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