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On self- and other-regarding cooperation: Kant versus Berge

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dc.contributor.authorUnveren, Burak
dc.contributor.authorDonduran, Murat
dc.contributor.authorBarokas, Guy
dc.date.accessioned2026-06-27T14:53:40Z
dc.date.issued2023
dc.description.abstractThis study analyzes the space of all continuous and discrete games to see whether self-and other-regarding cooperation are similar or inherently different. The solution concept for self-regarding cooperation is the Kantian equilibrium while other-regarding (i.e., altruistic) cooperation corresponds to the Berge equilibrium. We find that any Pareto-efficient Berge is generically a Kantian equilibrium in all symmetric games (e.g., prisoner's dilemma, stag hunt, etc.), whether they are continuous or discrete. In asymmetric games, however, Kant and Berge are generically different. These results suggest that self-and other-regarding cooperation is tight-knit under symmetry, a ubiquitous assumption in applied game theory, albeit asymmetric games do not allow a similar close connection.& COPY; 2023 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.en
dc.description.urihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.05.007
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.geb.2023.05.007
dc.identifier.eissn1090-2473
dc.identifier.endpage20
dc.identifier.issn0899-8256
dc.identifier.startpage1
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14981/65917
dc.identifier.volume141
dc.identifier.wos001026423100001
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
dc.relation.ispartofGAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
dc.subjectCooperation
dc.subjectKantian equilibrium
dc.subjectBerge equilibrium
dc.subjectEXISTENCE
dc.subjectNASH
dc.subjectBusiness & Economics
dc.titleOn self- and other-regarding cooperation: Kant versus Berge
dc.typeArticle
dspace.entity.typePublication
local.import.sourceWOS

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