Abstract:
The foreign policy decisions of the United States towards Bosnia during period of the Bosnian War from 1992 till 1995 had been altering and fluctuating from a policy of disengagement to a policy of hesitant engagement and, eventually, to a full-blown military intervention. The questions this thesis concerns are the reasons behind these policy inconsistencies: What were reasons behind initial U.S.' disengagement during George H. W. Bush's presidency, which factors influenced President Clinton's increased engagement efforts throughout 1994 and what propelled the United States to intervene in the summer of 1995? The central claim of this thesis .is that American foreign policy decisions regarding the Bosnian War are best understood through a theoretical framework of neoclassical realist theory. This relatively new strand of realist theory carries a renewed interest in the role of domestic factors in defining the limits of traditional 'power politics'. The role of ideas has long been discussed among the scholars in the international politics, however the theories of International Relations have seemingly failed in their endeavor to apprehend their influence in the formation of foreign policy or the nature of the international system. With this aim in mind, this thesis introduces the role of ideas in foreign policy, as an intervening variable between state- the central apparatus of governmental institutions- and it's pursued foreign policies. In the absence of any tangible threats to the United States' power in the unipolar post-Cold War environment, its grand strategy formation was less affected by the imperatives of the international system and more by ideas at the domestic level advanced to conceptualize American foreign policy. These ideas were groped under the labels of isolationism and internationalism. The competition between these strategic ideas resulted in the United States pursuing a disorganized foreign policy that reflected on its foreign decision-making in the Bosnian War.
